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Abstract 
This thesis examines the history of one of the most active socialist organizations 
during the period commonly referred to as the Irish ‘Troubles’, the People’s 
Democracy (PD). It constitutes the first archive driven study of the PD, 
combining a rich body of primary sources with important oral testimony. 
Following an interdisciplinary approach and utilising work from various fields, 
including historiography, political science and sociology, this research covers 
some fifteen years of political activism, offering a unique look at the recent 
history of Northern Ireland through the prism of the radical left. The formative 
chapters consist of a detailed account of the emergence of the PD in 1968 and its 
role in the civil rights movement, showing how the PD drove forward the civil 
rights campaign in a radical direction. In doing so, these chapters strengthen our 
understanding of the socialist left in this complex social movement, they also 
challenge much of the existing academic literature, which tends to be under 
researched and suffers from a number of lacunas.  The experience of repression 
that met the civil rights movement saw the PD radicalise, wherein it cohered into 
an organised political party, carrying out activity throughout some of the most 
tumultuous events of the Troubles, and helping to spearhead many of the most 
important campaigns of the 1970s and early 1980s, including the campaign 
against internment in 1971, and later protests around prisoners’ rights. This thesis 
chronicles the role of the PD in these movements and assesses the politics of the 
organisation, including its changing relationship with Irish republicanism. It 
provides a thorough account of the PD’s unique contribution to the history of the 
radical left in Ireland, from 1968 to the early 1980s, and therefore fills a 
significant gap in the historiography.   
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Abbreviations 
BICO – British and Irish Communist Organisation: a small but influential 
Stalinist organisation active in Britain and Ireland.  
CDU – Campaign for Democracy in Ulster: a lobby group inside the British 
Labour Party that sought to challenge discrimination, founded in 1965.  
CPNI – Communist Party of Northern Ireland: a member of the Communist 
International in Northern Ireland.   
CSJ – Campaign for Social Justice: a pressure group set up to campaign against 
discrimination in Northern Ireland, founded in 1964.  
HCL – Homeless Citizens League: a Dungannon based housing rights campaign 
in the 1960s.  
INLA – Irish National liberation Army: a republican paramilitary group founded 
in 1974, armed wing of the IRSP.  
IRSP – Irish Socialist Republican Party: a republican socialist organisation 
founded in 1974 by former members of the ‘Official’ republican movement.  
IWG – Irish Workers’ Group: a small Marxist organisation in Ireland in the 
1960s.  
LAW – Loyalist Association of Workers: a militant unionist organisation of 
workers and trade unions, formed in 1971.  
MSR – Movement for a Socialist Republic: a socialist and Trotskyist inspired 
organisation that united with PD in 1978.  
NICRA – Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association: founded in 1967, NICRA 
was the largest coalition of civil rights groupings.  
NRM – Northern Resistance Movement: founded in 1971 to campaign against 
internment and British military repression.  
NILP – Northern Ireland Labour Party: the main labour and social democratic 
organisation in Northern Ireland, founded in 1924.  
OIRA – Official Irish Republican Army: the second largest republican military 
organisation of the troubles.  
PD – People’s Democracy: a student based civil rights organisation founded in 
1968, which later morphed into a revolutionary socialist party.  
PHRC – Political Hostages’ Release Committee: a campaigning organisation that 
agitated for prisoners’ rights.  
PIRA – Provisional IRA: founded in 1969 after a split from the IRA, the PIRA 
was the most active republican paramilitary during the troubles.  
RMG – Revolutionary Marxist Group: a Trotskyist group in Ireland founded in 
the early 1970s.  
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SDLP – Social Democratic and Labour Party: social democratic and Irish 
nationalist political party founded in 1970.  
UDR – Ulster Defence Regiment: a regiment of the British Army in Northern 
Ireland, founded in 1970.  
USFI – United Secretariat of the Fourth International: international Trotskyist 
organisation.  
RAC – Relatives Action Committee: committee founded to campaign for 
prisoner’s rights, established in 1978.   
RCA – Revolutionary Citizens’ Army: a small paramilitary organisation founded 
by PD members in the mid 1970s.  
RRP – Red Republican Party: a small breakaway from the PD in 1976.  
RSSF – Revolutionary Socialist Student Federation: a radical student 
organisation launched in Britain in 1968.  
RUC – Royal Ulster Constabulary: the majority Protestant police force in 
Northern Ireland, established in 1922.  
UDA – Ulster Defence Association: the largest loyalist paramilitary organisation 
during the troubles and founded in 1972.  
UPV – Ulster Protestant Volunteers: a loyalist paramilitary group founded by Ian 
Paisley in 1966.  
UVF – Ulster Volunteer Force: a loyalist paramilitary organisation founded in 
1966.  
UWC – Ulster Worker’s Council: a loyalist workers’ movement established in 
1974.  
YS – Young Socialists: the youth section of the Northern Ireland Labour Party.  
YSA – Young Socialist Alliance: founded in 1968 by leftwing activists in 
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1.1. Introduction: the changing question 
Those remotely versed in the contentious history of Anglo-Irish relations should 
be familiar with the well-worn adage—which, if taken literally, must be 
recognized as containing a hint of colonial cynicism—that, ‘Every time the 
English tried to solve the ‘Irish question’, the Irish changed the question.’ 
Perhaps no grouping in the history of the Irish left sought to change the terms of 
the Irish question more fundamentally than the People’s Democracy (PD). First 
emerging as a loosely organized student protest movement in October 1968—
during the height of civil rights agitation in Northern Ireland, and on the eve of 
the tumultuous and protracted period of violence now commonly known as the 
‘Troubles’—the PD would become central to some of the most significant and 
contentious events in recent Irish history, including many that continue to be a 
source of dispute among historians and political scientists today. As a radical 
student ‘ginger group’, the organization played a key role in the Northern Ireland 
civil rights movement—a broadly supported campaign, seeking a series of 
reforms from the Unionist government—operating as its most militant and 
uncompromising wing, causing it to clash with its more moderate leaders in the 
process, and often providing the impetus for some of the period’s best known 
demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience.     
The PD was an Irish expression of an international phenomenon, having 
been formed by a generation of young radicals inspired by the rebellious spirit of 
the sixties then sweeping the globe. It was born in the dormitories and halls of 
Queen’s University, exploding onto the streets of Belfast in 1968 through a series 
of marches and sit down protests, before entering the electoral field the following 
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year wherein it began to cohere into a more rounded political party with its own 
program and structure, and later going on to have a significant influence over a 
wide range of campaigns and social issues, including the mass resistance to 
internment and the removal of rights for prisoners, through to the intense period 
of political activity surrounding the hunger strikes. The PD, during this period, 
valiantly attempted to change the terms on which the Irish question could be 
answered, and sought a radical socialist solution to the century’s old conundrum. 
In doing so, however, the group also began to radically change themselves as 
much as they altered the question; a key theme that I will explore throughout this 
thesis.   
No understanding of the PD is possible without placing it within the 
wider material and political context that it emerged. Undoubtedly, however, chief 
amongst the precipitating factors was the emergence of the civil rights movement 
in the late sixties, that sought to challenge and dismantle the discrimination 
against the minority Catholic community. In 1933, Lord Craigavon, the first 
Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, described his government as ‘a Protestant 
Parliament and a Protestant state,’1 insinuating that the priority of his state was 
the welfare of the majority Protestant community, to the detriment of its Catholic 
minority. By the 1960s, the general feeling among Catholics was that little had 
changed since Craigavon uttered those infamous words, and there were 
increasing efforts to challenge discrimination. As television stations and local 
papers began to circulate news of the civil rights movement in America, a 
number of groups took inspiration from the black civil rights struggle and 
decided that a similar movement should be launched here. In 1967 the Northern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jonathan Bardon, A History of Ulster (Belfast, Black Staff Press, 1992), p. 539.  
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Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) was born: campaigning to reform the 
Northern state, through mass peaceful protest. Many of the leading figures within 
NICRA came from the more established political formations in the North, 
including the trade unions, the Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP)2, the 
Nationalist Party3, and the Communist Party of Northern Ireland (CPNI)4. These 
organisations tended to be led by older, experienced political operatives, often 
quite cautious in their political approach, and wedded to an ideological outlook 
that had been formed over many decades. By contrast, the PD was almost 
exclusively made up of people in their teens and twenties, whose political 
worldview was likely to be more radical, possibly even less patient than the 
established left in the country.   
It can be said, therefore, that the PD was both the youth wing of the civil 
rights movement, and also its far-left section. Among the generation of young 
people that formed the grouping, there was an almost universal belief that the old 
political questions were the property of the previous generations. Historic 
disputes over national reunification and the border, it was thought, were no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Formed in 1924 the NILP coalesced the most important political labour forces 
in the North. It had initially refused to take a position on the question on the 
border, but by 1949 the party voted in favour of the union with Britian. Aaron 
Edwards, A History of the Northern Ireland Labour Party: Democratic Socialism 
and Sectarianism (Manchester University Press, 2009).  
3 The Nationalist Party in Northern was a successor to the Irish Parliamentary 
Party. Traditionally its elected representatives followed the policy of 
abstentionism, refusing to take their seats in the Northern Ireland parliament. In 
1965 the party became the official opposition to the Unionist government. 
Brendan Lynn, Holding the Ground: The Nationalist Party in Northern Ireland, 
1947-1972 (Ashgate, Hampshire, 1997).  
4 The CPNI (later the Communist Party of Ireland) was the main organisation of 
the radical left entering the late 1960s. A member of the Communist 
International, it would play an important role in the civil rights movement. Mike 
Milotte, Communism in modern Ireland: The pursuit of the Workers’ Republic 
since 1916 (Dublin, Gill and MacMillan 1984).  
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longer relevant. The old political world was dying and the new one was being 
born. The PD was more interested in radical mass action. The first mass student 
‘sit-down protests’ in Belfast were PD demonstrations, and civil rights activists 
would go on to utilize various forms of civil disobedience including marches, 
strikes and non-violent actions.  
In the heady days of 1968, the PD began more as an idea than as an 
organization. It initially emerged as a ‘spontaneous’ student movement, bearing 
all the hallmarks of campus revolts in 1968—for example, a rejection of formal 
structure, organization, leadership and even, at times, politics itself—though at 
its core was a group of socialist activists who were distinguished by their 
emphasis on the primacy of class politics and class struggle in addressing the 
problems of sectarian division and discrimination in the North of Ireland. From 
the beginning, the organisation was built upon the ideal of ‘Protestant and 
Catholic’ unity, advancing from its outset the strategy of uncompromising, mass 
mobilization as a means to bring this to fruition. This thesis will argue that whilst 
the PD was not always successful in this goal—and indeed occasionally made 
mistakes that made it more difficult to achieve it—it was nevertheless one of the 
most ardent and sincere proponents of anti-sectarianism during the 1968-69 
period, and that the tangible if temporary growth and success that it achieved was 
testament to the enduring possibility of socialist politics, even as the dark clouds 
of communalism gathered around them.  
The PD began life, therefore, as a loose grouping with an aversion to 
‘green’ and ‘orange’ politics. The experience of repression and sectarian violence 
that met the civil rights movement throughout 1968-69, however, would 
precipitate a major ideological transformation in the group, and an abandonment 
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of its earlier refusal to take a position on the national question. During the most 
violent years of the troubles—as the struggle to reform the state transformed into 
a struggle to overthrow the state—the PD began to see the solution to the crisis in 
the North as being one that necessitated a struggle to ‘smash the Northern state’ 
by any means necessary, as a prerequisite to the pursuit of a socialist Ireland. 
This did not automatically lead the group to abandon the ideal of class politics 
and Protestant and Catholic unity—though as this thesis will argue, this was 
ultimately its trajectory. But it did cause the group to confront all of the major 
questions that have historically faced the left in Northern Ireland. This thesis will 
focus around a number of these questions and the most pertinent are laid out 
below.  
— How can class politics develop and can it overcome sectarian 
division? Examining the socialist left inside the civil rights 
movement, this thesis will address its potential in offering a 
different direction to oppositional politics in the North of Ireland 
in the late 1960s, and ask to what extent was the PD successful in 
pursuing class politics?   
— Did the PD contribute to the rise of sectarianism during the crisis 
of 1969? By providing an in-depth look at political agitation from 
1968 onward, this thesis will explore the strategies of tactics 
deployed by the PD and assess its role in the movement for civil 
rights.  
— Is Protestant and Catholic unity possible within the Northern 
Ireland state? The Unionist state’s response to civil rights 
mobilisation centrally stoked opposition to the movement. 
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Research will chart this process and assess what approach should 
socialists take towards the Protestant working class.  
— To what degree, if any, should the left support republican 
campaigns of armed struggle? Through a detailed look at the PD, 
this research will address the complicated connections that 
existed between the PD and the Irish republican movement.  
— Exploring the broad theoretical standpoints central to leftwing 
politics during the troubles is crucial to this work. How did the 
PD define the Northern Ireland state? What was their approach 
toward British military intervention? How did they characterise 
the loyalist movement?  
— Finally, this thesis will examine the relationship between the 
pursuit of socialist politics and the republican goal of Irish 
reunification; consequently, it will ask what was the relationship 
between class struggle and the national struggle during the most 
contentious period of the troubles?  
In addressing these questions, this thesis offers a fresh assessment of the left in 
contemporary Northern Irish history. An examination of the role of the PD in the 
civil rights movement will show how the tension between class and communal 
politics existed at the centre of events during the outbreak of conflict. From 
1968-69 the PD attempted to push class politics to the fore of the movement. 
Research contends that the politics and tactics of the PD were a central driving 
force to the civil rights movement, largely contributing to the movements’ anti-
sectarian character. Although the PD genuinely strove to put working class unity 
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at the heart of the civil rights movement, it ultimately ended amidst sectarian 
division and violence.   
This thesis explains this process and highlights the problems that wracked 
the PD as political crisis developed across the North. Foremost among these was 
the sectarian opposition that faced the movement from the outset, a detailed 
account of which is presented ahead. Yet while this thesis places a significant 
focus on the challenging objective conditions that confronted the PD, it also 
contends that no history of the organisation will be complete without recognition 
of the subjective difficulties that imbued the movement; for example, in 
identifying how the loose and unorganised nature of the PD meant the group 
found it hard to offer practical leadership to the mass upsurge that erupted in the 
late 1960s, and in assessing how the PD was politically ill-equipped to confront 
the crisis that met the civil rights campaign.   
In charting the role of the PD during the outbreak of the troubles, this 
research pays significant attention to the political shifts that the PD undertook 
during its efforts to build a current of socialist politics, and such an approach 
allows one to address many of the issues that have historically confounded the 
left. A principal challenge for the left has been to understand the nature of the 
Northern Ireland state and its relationship to the Protestant working class. The 
PD developed a notable critique of the Northern state, which defined it against 
other currents on the left, and which this thesis will explore.  
The violent reaction that met the PD and the wider civil rights movement 
caused a serious re-think on the part of the PD, and led them to a position that the 
‘Orange state’ must be challenged. Subsequently, the PD became defined by an 
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anti-partitionism and a rejection of Protestant working class agency, which was 
an inverted version of their earlier insistence that the national question did not 
matter. This thesis will document how the PD came to redefine the problem as 
originating from the strength of militant Unionism and its relationship to the 
British state. The fight against loyalist power and British imperialism thus 
necessitated an anti-imperialist struggle that was primarily geared toward 
national reunification.   
This shift coincided with the upsurge of armed republicanism, and the 
relationship between the PD and Provisional republicanism ranks among the 
most interesting chapters in the interweaving history of socialist and republican 
movements in Ireland. Throughout the late 1970s, as the conflict continued and 
the republican movement waged a long military campaign, the PD saw the 
problem as lying with the failures of the ‘anti-imperialist movement’ and agitated 
for a left orientated mass national liberation struggle to pursue a 32-county 
socialist republic. In the post 1972 period horizons shrank for the radical left, and 
prospects for mass struggle waned. However, in the early 1980s the Northern 
state faced another period of instability brought about by mass popular protest 
against prison repression. The campaign against the H-Blocks represented the 
last significant outing of the PD, and the organisation played a pioneering role in 
this movement, which this thesis will document. The wider context was one 
where the republican movement began to embrace ‘politics’, and indeed adopt 
long held left-wing positions that the PD had previously championed, posing 
serious questions of identity for much of the ‘anti-imperialist’ left in Ireland. 
Ultimately, this process dwarfed the PD in the early 1980s, contributing to its 
long demise.   
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The main contention of this thesis is that the PD exercised an important 
influence over oppositional politics inside the Northern state throughout the 
recent conflict. Despite its small size the PD often punched above its weight, 
largely because it forwarded an approach that emphasised widespread social and 
political mobilisation. This allowed the PD to put mass protest at the centre of 
events, and an appreciation of this approach tells us something fundamental 
about how political change was enacted throughout the troubles. It also helps 
illuminate the importance of the politics of the PD, by drawing out the wider 
ideological influences that the organisation exercised upon larger forces. An 
account of the PD’s role in the civil rights movement will show that the 
organisation was a crucial component to the social movement that erupted in the 
late 1960s. Further, this thesis will argue that the PD was among the most anti-
sectarian political forces that existed in this movement, and against some of the 
most authoritative literature on the civil rights campaign, which advances a 
critical view toward the ‘provocative’ tactics of the PD— an ostensibly new 
approach, but one that, in regards to the PD at least, does not stray far from the 
official British government view of disturbances in the late 1960s5— this thesis 
suggests that any appreciation of the civil rights movement ought to assimilate 
the non-violent and anti-sectarian politics of the PD.  
The impact of the PD is not, however, confined to its notable role in the 
civil rights movement. As the organisation developed it formed into an organised 
party and went on to have influence over a variety of campaigns and struggles. 
This thesis argues that PD continued to have relevance right up until the early 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For the most authoritative recent interpretation of the civil rights movement, 
see, Simon Prince, Northern Ireland’s ’68: Civil Rights, Global Revolt and the 
Origins of the Troubles (Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 2007).  
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1980s, when it influenced sections of the Irish republican movement. Ultimately, 
however, the form of socialism developed by the PD rendered the organisation 
incapable of sustaining itself amidst the changing political environment in which 
it operated. To draw out this history, this research combines a rigorous 
examination of political activism with oral testimony from former PD members.    
The central rationale behind the thesis is that the PD has not been given 
sufficient academic attention. The history of the PD sheds light on a number of 
crucial junctures in Irish history, and this thesis seeks to illuminate its unique 
contribution, and to critically assess its impact on the history of Northern Ireland, 
and the politics of those behind it. Among a huge body of historical work that 
looks at the recent conflict in Northern Ireland, there is a tendency to overlook 
the ideas and role of the radical left. This is an obvious reflection of the historic 
weakness of the left in Ireland, but it also illustrates the attraction of narratives 
developed by the dominant nationalist/republican and unionist/loyalist traditions 
surrounding the outbreak of conflict. Moreover, there exists an assumption that 
oppositional politics inside Northern Ireland is essentially torn between the 
armed tradition of republican militarism and constitutional parliamentary politics 
that rejects violence. This has been reinforced by a near two-decade long peace 
process that claims to have solved the Northern crisis, and asserts constitutional 
parliamentary politics above all else.6  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This has been popularized in the decades since the institutions established after 
the signing of the Belfast Agreement, which counter posed the violence of 
previous generations to new constitutional methods of politics, ‘The Belfast 
Agreement’ (1998), available online, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/13
6652/agreement.pdf, accessed on 10/11/2016.  
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Yet any serious look at the history of Northern Ireland will show that 
political change is not as simple as that. The major moments of instability during 
the troubles saw widespread forms of political participation and action, the most 
obvious being the civil rights movement between 1968-69, but also during the 
mass civil disobedience movement from 1971-72, and later during the movement 
in support of republican prisoners from 1979-81. The PD is one political current 
that connects all of these periods and was defined by its emphasis on class 
politics and popular struggle from below as an alternative to either constitutional 
reform or armed deeds. PD activists played an important role in grassroots 
politics for over a decade during the Northern troubles and in charting this 
journey this thesis offers a critical assessment of the recent development of the 
Irish left and provides a new lens through which one can view the history of the 
troubles. That alone should justify this study.  
Lastly, it should also be recognized that many of the issues that the PD 
sought to confront are still with us, and a critical understanding of their activities 
should be of both historical, and contemporary interest. On 6 May 2016, 73-year-
old veteran socialist Eamonn McCann was elected to the Stormont Assembly. A 
central figure on some of the most contentious PD marches, McCann first ran for 
election to Stormont under very different circumstances in 1969 as a member of 
Derry Labour Party, during an election that propelled the PD onto the national 
political stage. McCann’s election agent in 2016 was Bernadette McAliskey (née 
Devlin), the PD founding member who became an international figure in 1969 
when she was elected to the Westminster parliament during the civil rights 
movement. Reflecting on his election McCann told one journalist,  
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I contested my first election in February 1969. Before this election I 
went into the attic in the house and found one of my original election 
posters. I campaigned then for a proper university for Derry, for 
improved railway travel, for an improved roads infra-structure and 
for more jobs. They were the exact same issues that I campaigned on 
almost fifty years later.7  
The continuity that McCann suggests here brings new verve to the necessity of 
reassessing an organization like the People’s Democracy, and breaking what 
McCann himself has described as the ‘chronic insularity’ of historiography 














	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Irish Times, 6 May 2016.  
8 Eamonn McCann, ‘Civil Rights in an International Context’, in Spirit of ’68: 
Beyond the Barricades, ed. Pauline McClenaghan (Derry, Guildhall Press, 2009), 
p. 16.  
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1.2. Structure and methodology 
The structure of this thesis is both chronological and thematic, interweaving key 
ideological, political and historical themes with more than a decade of PD 
activity, helping to illuminate the extent to which PD and its ideas impacted on 
society, then in turn exploring the impact of events on PD and its ideas. In doing 
so, this thesis will cover the PD’s activity during a period of social and political 
instability—running from the birth of the civil rights movement and the founding 
of PD, through the beginning of the ‘Troubles’ and its relationship to the 
emerging violence in the North and related events such as internment, finishing 
with an assessment of its activity in the run up the 1981 hunger strike—whilst 
providing an account of specific actions of the group, including its instigation of 
hundreds of marches, demonstrations and political actions, and the scores of 
campaigns (of varying size and influence) that it either launched or was central 
to. The PD also produced regular publications including a newspaper, pamphlets 
and journals, all of which provided a running commentary on the unfolding 
conflict in the North, and the changing perception of the group. This thesis, 
therefore, will critically assess how PD’s ideas underwent a transformation, and 
will explore the factors that led to these important changes.  
While this research lays the basis for an authoritative history of the PD, 
this thesis has not attempted to chart every element of PD activity, instead 
focusing on ideas, events, and campaigns that have a wider historical 
significance, providing a clear, critical and detailed account of PD’s relationship 
to them. This research, therefore, is primarily concerned with the areas in which 
PD had social weight and was able to influence events, and ultimately the course 
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of history. Consequently, a significant portion of this thesis is devoted to the 
early years of PD, a period where the organisation had a greater impact on 
society than any other time, while the final chapter offers a longer summary of 
the demise of the group.  
This chapter introduces the thesis and explores the methodology utilised 
ahead. The following subchapters offer an analysis of the literature on the PD, 
which are broadly broken up into two sections; the first assesses historiography 
on the PD during the upsurge of 1968 and the civil rights movement, while the 
second considers literature concerning the PD after the civil rights movement and 
into the later period of the troubles. The final section of this chapter offers a short 
historical introduction to the PD. Chapter 2 looks at the emergence of the PD in 
1968; it considers the social and economic changes that gave rise to a student 
revolt in Belfast and analyses the international influences that shaped the group 
and the wider civil rights movement. Chapter 3 addresses the most widely 
discussed and controversial period of PD activity, including its role in the now 
infamous ‘Burntollet’ march. The crisis that followed this march would expose 
the sheer lack of strategy of the civil rights movement, and this is the focus of 
Chapter 4, which addresses the division among civil rights activists and how the 
PD related to this and the emerging violence of 1969. Chapter 5 begins by 
looking at the formation of the PD as a more explicitly socialist organization and 
its attempts to assert class politics against rising sectarian tensions. The second 
major phase of mass political activity during the troubles came to the North after 
the introduction of internment in 1971, and Chapter 6 charts the role of the PD in 
reigniting civil rights demonstrations through its contribution to the mass civil 
disobedience movement during this time. The final chapter takes a longer look at 
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the demise of the PD, and also pays considerable attention to the extent in which 
the PD influenced the changing politics of the Irish republican movement in the 
early 1980s.  
Although the history of the left in the North of Ireland has not been 
subject to a high level of historical scholarship, there exists a rich body of activist 
accounts that encompass some of the most interesting books to emerge from the 
early troubles, though coloured by the particular political outlook of the 
individual authors. This fits into a wider continental trend, as Dr Chris Reynolds 
notes in regard to the broader European experience of 1968,  
Given the immediacy of the urgency to understand, in many cases, it 
has been the very protagonists who have been central in forging the 
dominant narrative. This has inevitably led to a situation whereby, in 
each national setting, a specific representation, largely infected by 
former militants and actors from the time, has come to dominate how 
these stories are told.9  
Many of the most popular accounts of socialist politics from 1968 onward come 
from the activists themselves, often in autobiographical form. Eamonn McCann’s 
War and an Irish Town (1981) offers a lucid and highly readable account of the 
civil rights movement in Derry and the emergence of the troubles, from perhaps 
the most notable socialist activist in the city.10 Bernadette Devlin’s The Price Of 
My Soul (1969) gives the raw personal story of the young PD student activist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Chris Reynolds, Sous les Pavés... The Troubles: Northern Ireland, France and 
the European Collective Memory of 1968 (Frankfurt am Main; Bern, Peter Lang, 
2014), p. 11. 
10 Eamonn McCann, War and an Irish Town (London, Pluto Press, 1981). 
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who inspired a generation, and offers important insights into the thinking of one 
of the PD’s most known members.11 Anniversaries of 1968 have also provided 
opportune moments for activists to reflect on that momentous year and the events 
that followed. PD leader Michael Farrell’s Twenty Years On (1988) delivered an 
important retrospective of the civil struggle from various quarters, including; the 
radical left, republicans, student activists and the women’s movement.12 In 
similar manner the fortieth anniversary in Derry led to the publication of Spirit of 
'68: Beyond the Barricades (2009), which provided further reflections from 
participants in the civil rights movement.13 
Likewise, some of the first academic authors who tried to come to terms 
with what happened in 1968-1969 were products of the post-war generation who 
came through the ranks of university in the 1960s and often were participants in 
PD activity, their contributions to the literature are considered ahead.14 All of 
these works provide useful contributions to historical study in their own right, 
even though they present different, and at times conflicting, perspectives on 
events. But the passing of time, the opening up of state archives, and the more 
general body of sources that exist surrounding the PD allows a much more 
detailed and considered treatment of the PD.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Bernadette Devlin, The Price Of My Soul (London, Pan Books, 1969).  
12 Michael Farrell, Twenty Years On (Kerry, Brandon Books, 1988). 
13 Pauline McClenaghan, Spirit of 68’: Beyond the Barricades (Derry, Guildhall 
Press, 2009). 
14 Both Paul Bew and Henry Patterson, two of Northern Ireland’s most renowned 
historical scholars, participated in PD activity and went on to write serious 
contributions to the outbreak of the troubles. See, Paul Bew, Henry Patterson and 
Peter Gibbon, The Northern Ireland State 1921-72, Political Forces and Social 
Classes (Manchester University Press, 1979). 
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 This thesis is the first archival-based history of the PD. It presents an 
interdisciplinary approach, utilizing secondary research from a variety of fields, 
including historiography, political science and sociology. It employs a wide-
range of sources and primary material that form the basis of this research, 
including various newspapers from the period, personal memoirs, student 
documentation and government and police files. These are complimented by 
open-ended interviews conducted with surviving activists and members of the 
PD.  
The bedrock of this thesis is made up of sources and documents from the 
PD itself, which traverse the different periods of the movement’s development. 
Student documentation, leaflets, newssheets and personal papers pieced together 
in detail help illuminate the early phases of civil rights mobilization, which was 
decentralized and uncoordinated by its very nature. Newspaper reports from the 
period provide a wealthy source of information surrounding PD activity 
throughout a huge number of protests, demonstrations and other actions. Later, 
when the PD became a centralized organization, it began its own regular stream 
of publications and these provide the crucial sources from which one can 
ascertain the organizations activity, and its political line or perspectives. A 
plethora of PD publications exist that have received little academic scrutiny. The 
most pertinent of these include the organization’s newspapers, which contain 
some of the first attempts at developing a Marxist understanding of the crisis in 
Northern Ireland in the 1970s.15 For all historians concerned with Northern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The most pertinent PD sources are those located in the Linenhall Library, 
including: Free Citizen (1969-71), Unfree Citizen (1971-79), Socialist Republic 
(1979-83), PD Voice (1969), People’s Democracy bulletin (1985), 
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Ireland’s troubled past, Belfast’s Linenhall Library hosts a highly valuable and 
much utilised archive, in its Northern Ireland Political Collection, which has 
amassed hundred of thousands of files related to all areas of the conflict from 
1968 onward. The collection includes various boxes related to the PD and other 
civil rights bodies, including campaigning material such as leaflets, newsletters, 
posters and internal documentation.  
At governmental level the opening up of state archives over the past 
number of decades has released a large body of sources that provide an intricate 
look at both the inner workings of the Unionist state, and the role of the police 
force and security services during the civil rights upsurge. Records of the 
Northern Ireland Cabinet provide an internal view of what was happening at the 
highest level of the Unionist government, and the Ministry of Home Affairs files 
offer us insight into perhaps the most controversial branch of the state, which 
exercised wide responsibility for parading and public order affairs. Many of 
these sources are located in the Northern Ireland Public Record Office (PRONI), 
and police documentation is of particular importance in this regard. Extensive 
RUC files offer a snapshot of the security service’s thinking throughout 1968-
1969 illuminating the most contentious demonstrations, and the way in which the 
state treated both the civil rights movement and loyalist counterdemonstrators.   
A crucial body of primary sources are the many interviews that 
contributed to the Cameron Inquiry, the British government’s official 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Andersonstown citizen (1972), West Belfast newssheet (1972), PD Hunger Strike 
bulletins (1981), An Reabhloid (1982, 1986), Armagh Peoples Bulletin (1971-
1972), Northern Informer (1969), Northern Star (1972), Resistance (1972), The 
People’s Press (1971), People’s Democracy London Bulletin (1975). Billy Liar 
(1968), Action for freedom (1969), Journal of Armagh PD (1971), Socialist 
Action (1982-1987). 
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investigation into civil rights disturbances in 1969, of which the majority of files 
are now accessible in PRONI16. This inquiry was based upon scores of formal 
interviews with participants in events during 1968-1969, including civil rights 
activists, politicians and police officers, which constitute some of the most 
significant sources that illuminate what happened during the civil rights 
movement. The Cameron Report (1969) has been heavily cited throughout 
historiography, however, scholars have generally engaged with the findings of 
the published report—which are often accepted uncritically—as opposed to 
interrogating the many interview transcripts that are now deposited in archives, 
thus investigating the methodology and findings of the inquiry. This thesis has 
taken a different approach, and has benefited from a detailed examination of the 
Cameron interviews, which help expose the limitations to the conclusions 
contained in the Cameron Report surrounding the PD. This effort helps illustrate 
one of the central arguments made ahead; that historiography on the PD has been 
strongly influenced by the Cameron Report.  
An obvious strength of this topic is that it covers a period of history 
within living memory, and this research has benefitted from 13 open-ended 
interviews conducted with surviving members of the PD and other civil rights 
activists. The generation who led civil rights agitation would go on to make an 
impressive contribution to Irish society, and today’s former PD activists populate 
a variety of fields; they include, writers, journalists, solicitors, political activists 
and academics. The majority of those approached were open to being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Records of the Governor of Northern Ireland, Cameron Commission evidence 
submissions (1962-1969) PRONI, GOV/2.   
 
	   29	  
interviewed about their time in the PD. Yet the nature of the Northern Ireland 
conflict confronts oral historians with obvious problems, and activists from 
various political traditions are often wary of being interviewed. The ongoing 
legal battle over the Boston College Tapes, the Belfast based academic project 
launched in 2001, in which a number of former republican and loyalist 
paramilitaries gave a series of candid interviews surrounding their role in the 
conflict, has created a somewhat hostile environment toward future oral archives 
concerning paramilitary activity during the troubles.17  
In terms of the PD, the level of violence inflicted on civil rights activists 
remains an emotive subject for some. More importantly, the PD’s later flirtations 
with paramilitarism meant that some participants were cautious of going ‘on 
record’ about certain elements of PD activity, and some would agree to do so 
only on the basis of remaining anonymous. Unfortunately, some of those 
approached were not willing to participate in this thesis, and these included key 
figures in the PD. Nevertheless, the pursuit of interviews proved fruitful and this 
thesis had managed to amass a notable body of oral testimony, all of which have 
complied with the universities ethical requirements.        
The use of interviews warrants some engagement with the large body of 
literature surrounding the theory and practice of oral history. This thesis broadly 
accepts Paul Thompson’s analysis of the subject, which presented oral history as 
a potentially radical method that can compliment a form of history from below. 
As Thompson put it, oral history can give a voice to those whose views and 
experiences may not normally be recorded or given preference; ‘History 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 What are the Boston College Tapes? BBC News, available online, accessed on 
2/1/17, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-27238797.   
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becomes, to put it simply, more democratic.’18 This seems evident even when 
looking at the limited development of oral history in the North of Ireland. In 
1987, Munck and Rolston noted how oral history was in its infancy, not least 
because of how the historical establishment tended to ‘frown on oral evidence, 
clinging still to the apparent security of the archive and the public records 
office.’19 Their work went on to help rediscover the social history of the 1930s in 
Belfast, and drew out the role of the radical left throughout that decade.  
Such works angled against a well-established opinion within the 
academy— one that is often summarised by A. J. P. Taylor’s sceptical comment 
that oral history amounted to ‘Old men drooling about their youth’20—, and 
formed part of a wider generational shift that championed the importance of oral 
history as a tool to compliment and strengthen the discipline. Ronald Fraser 
argued that oral history should be seen, not as a substitute ‘but an adjunct of, 
traditional history; it functions with the interstices of the latter.’21 Similarly, 
Thompson contended that many modern social and political upheavals were 
almost impossible to analyse solely through written records, citing the outbreak 
of the Irish troubles as a specific case.22 Van Voris’ Violence in Ulster: An Oral 
Documentary (1975) was a pertinent example of how the history of the late 
1960s and 1970s in Northern Ireland was brought to life through a range of fresh 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Paul Thompson, The Voice of the Past: Oral History (New York, Oxford 
University, Press) p. 8. 
19 Bill Rolston and Ronnie Munck, Belfast in the thirties: an oral history 
(Belfast, Blackstaff, 1987) p. 12. 
20Ibid, p. 12.  
21 Ronald Fraser, Blood of Spain: An Oral history of the Spanish Civil War 
(London, Pimlico, 1994) p. 30.  
22 Thompson, The Voice of the Past, p. 83. 
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interviews with political actors in this period. Since then, many studies 
concerning the political history of the troubles have utilised oral interviews.23 
The use of oral history, however, also poses questions surrounding the 
reliability and accuracy of evidence. As Thompson points out there are general 
rules to be utilised in order to ensure a rigorous examination of information 
gathered through interviews, such as cross-referencing with other sources to seek 
clarification, to look for internal consistency, or to ascertain bias.24 In many ways 
interviews present advantages to a researcher, for example, the subject can be 
cross-questioned and asked to expand on particular points of interest.25 In 
approaching interviewees as ‘living sources’, one should be aware of the ‘two 
way process’ that exists between researcher and participants.26  
Nevertheless, the accuracy of the oral interview fundamentally rests upon 
the reliability of the memory process, and the further the subject period from the 
present, the higher the possibility of distortions, perhaps influenced by 
subsequent changes in norms or values, which might unconsciously alter 
perceptions.27 There is a high level of consideration of these problems among 
academic literature, as interviews carried out some three to four decades after the 
event contain many potential pitfalls. Perceptions of the past are often influenced 
by historical hindsight and filtered through contemporary political viewpoints. 
However, provided one recognizes these potential weaknesses and allows such 
recognition to inform the interview process, oral testimony can provide us with a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 W. H. Van Voris, Violence in Ulster: an oral documentary (Amherst, 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1975). 
24 Thompson, The Voice of the Past, p. 102.  
25 Ibid, p. 104.  
26 Ibid, p. 149.  
27 Ibid, p. 110.  
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powerful tool to strengthen the practice of historical discovery.28 It is also worth 
noting that although information ascertained during these interviews has been 
used throughout this thesis, oral testimony has not dictated the central arguments 
presented ahead, and therefore the ‘problems’ alluded to above are perhaps not 
posed as acutely within this research as they are in research primarily dictated by 
oral evidence. Finally, it is useful to quote Lynn Abram’s advice offered to oral 
historians embarking on the interview process, as a way of capturing the 
approach followed ahead: 
The best we can do is create an environment in which a 
respondent can call up memories in a state of comfort, to 
provide the cues to the recall of memories which aid us in our 
research. Most respondents will do their very best to 
remember; they may struggle to recall every detail and have 
difficulties with chronology, but they come to the interview 
prepared to remember in a helpful way. The interviewers task 
is to facilitate their remembering and then, in our analysis, to 
consider the various influences that have shaped their recall. 
The important point here is that memory is not just a source; it 
is a narrator’s interpretation of their experience and as such it is 
complex, creative and fluid.29 
Through such an approach one can glean relevant information that helps shed 
light on the history of an organisation such as the PD. There are obvious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 For two of the best works on oral history see, Thompson, The Voice of the 
Past, and Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory (New York, Routledge Press, 
2010).   
29 Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 105. 
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limitations to relying solely on PD publications; this was a small organization, 
one that was continually ‘on the move’ politically, and reacting to events as they 
unfolded. One is therefore often forced to rely on a limited number of sources, 
perhaps a short newspaper article, for example, to glean the PD’s analysis at any 
given development. In this context oral testimonies can provide a rich source to 
illuminate or further develop areas of research. Testimonies from activists have 
been used to further draw out aspects of the development of the PD that have 
been primarily ascertained from documentary research. Of course all sources are 
susceptible to bias. Just as a party’s publication has its own political line to 
present, so does an established newspaper have its own editorial line and social 
influences, so too do government sources reveal perceptions associated with their 
own actions, interests and ideological standpoints.  
Recognizing this is a central part of all historiography and the problems 
associated with research concerning a controversial movement such as the civil 
rights campaign are obvious. For example, a recurring feature that arises when 
researching civil rights demonstrations is the question of numbers on 
demonstrations, and one can often find contradictory claims of numbers of 
participants on any given protest, march or demonstration, which often reflects 
the source of the claim. Put crudely, establishment media outlets or oppositionist 
politicians tended to downplay numbers on marches, while civil rights activists 
had a tendency to over estimate numbers— presumably a result of each 
respective partys’ own particular bias. The reality of numbers perhaps lies 
somewhere in between these claims, but the wider point is that a piece of 
research that covers many demonstrations runs into an obvious and recurring 
problem.  
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However, the primary intention of this research is not to ascertain 
accurate numbers for each demonstration, or to reveal the full story behind every 
political initiative, although this has been attempted to the extent in which the 
sources permit. Rather, it is to identify the political and ideological thinking 
behind such actions, what strategies informed the PD as they embarked on their 
actions, and to what extent were these successful? In combining how the ideas 
and actions of the PD influenced the process of historical change, this thesis 
offers a novel approach to the political history of Northern Ireland and fills a 
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1.3. Literature review: Interpreting the civil rights movement 
There is a vast and impressive body of literature on the most recent phase of 
conflict in Northern Ireland, covering a range of disciplines.30 By contrast the 
historiography surrounding the role of the left during this period is notable for its 
dearth and lack of scope. The size and influence of the radical left in Ireland has 
been limited by western European standards and although there exists a socialist 
and communist tradition stretching back decades, the social weight and strength 
of the organized left has been comparatively low, not least because of the 
seemingly insurmountable national divide and the extent of sectarian conflict in 
the North.31 Nevertheless, in unison with much of Europe in 1968, the North saw 
a revitalization of the radical left and the grouping most politically and 
ideologically associated with this period of resurgent socialist activism was the 
PD.  
Central to understanding the emergence of the PD is the international 
context. Although the global aspect of the Northern Ireland civil rights 
movement was obvious— Irish student activists were clearly inspired by the 
tactics of other European student revolts, which reached its peak in Paris during 
May 1968, and civil rights marches were consciously modelled on the black civil 
rights movement in the US—this relationship has rarely been investigated with 
any serious rigour, and there has been a lack of attention given to Northern 
Ireland in wider studies of the European experience of 1968. In his comparative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 For a substantial review of literature surrounding the troubles, see, John 
Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland (New York, Oxford University Press 
2003). 
31 For a contemporary appreciation of Ireland’s revolutionary tradition see, 
Kieran Allen, 1916: Ireland’s Revolutionary Tradition (London, Pluto Press, 
2016).  
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account of the student upsurge in Paris in 1968 and the revolt in Northern 
Ireland, Reynolds notes that while there has been a proliferation of scholarship 
around 1968 in Europe, Northern Ireland has largely been left absent from these 
works. Reynolds continues to provide a useful rectification of this trend.32 There 
are other notable exceptions, including Ronald Fraser’s 1968: A Student 
Generation in Revolt (1988). This work shows how the PD represented the Irish 
version of a much wider international radical phenomena, but as the title suggests 
it specifically focuses on the role of students, and therefore neglects the role of 
other social forces in the radical movements that were emerging at his time.33  
The most widely recognized influence upon the Northern Ireland civil 
rights movement was the black civil rights movement in the United States (US). 
Brian Dooley’s Black and Green: The Fight For Civil Rights in Northern Ireland 
and Black America (1998) is not a work of academic history, but it goes some 
way to exploring the links between the Irish civil rights movement and its main 
source of inspiration in the US, although it perhaps overstates the point.34 The 
connections between civil rights activists in Northern Ireland and other protest 
movements across the globe in the 1960s were always tentative, but they were 
most expressed in the radical student current that emerged in the PD. It was PD 
activists who made the most effort to study and model their actions upon the US 
civil rights movement, and they who were most clearly inspired by the 
internationalist movements of this period; from the anti-Vietnam War movement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Reynolds, Sous les Pavés... p 15.  
33 Ronald Fraser, 1968: A Student Generation in Revolt, An International Oral 
History (Pantheon, New York, 1988).  Also see, Prince, Northern Ireland’s ’68.  
34 Brian Dooley, Black and Green: civil rights struggles in Northern Ireland and 
Black America (London, Pluto Press, 1998).  
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to revolts in the Eastern Block, and new left challenges to free market capitalism 
in the western world.   
Despite being an active organization throughout the most turbulent years 
of the Irish troubles, historical literature on the PD is noticeably undeveloped. 
What scholarship does exist is generally limited to looking at the PD in relation 
to the civil rights movement between 1968 and 1969, when the student 
movement was at its peak. Almost every academic work that examines the 
outbreak of conflict in Northern Ireland has made some form of reference to the 
PD, particularly with regard to its militant role in pressing ahead with civil rights 
protests at the beginning of 1969. No history of the period could pass over the 
high points of the PD protest movement, in particular the infamous ‘Burntollet 
march’; a key moment of the early civil rights movement.35 Although the civil 
rights period has been accorded a respectable level of academic attention, this 
rich social movement is also conspicuously understudied. There are few major 
historical works addressing the civil rights movement, its origins, social roots 
and global influences.36 The most authoritative accounts of the movement are 
dated and recent scholarship has tended toward focusing on how civil rights 
mobilization emerged more broadly, and later spilled over into violent conflict, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 For a survey history of Northern Ireland, see, Jonathon Bardon, A History of 
Ulster (Belfast, Blackstaff, 1992). 
36 It is worth noting that the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association is yet to 
be the subject of a substantial academic publication, despite being one of the 
most important organizations of the late 1960s and early 1970s. For the 
organizations own official history see, NICRA ‘We Shall Overcome’… The 
History of the Struggle for Civil Rights in Northern Ireland (published by 
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, 2 Marquis Street, 1978), available 
online, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/crights/nicra/nicra78.htm, accessed on 
8/8/2015.  
	   38	  
as opposed to the actual political organizations that led the movement.37 
Therefore, within historical literature the PD arises as an important reference 
point, often focused on at key junctures, but there has been very little effort to 
focus specifically on the organization, taking its ideas and actions seriously. Any 
work that addresses the PD should have some sense of how the ‘new left’ 
experiments that emerged across Europe at this time made a significant mark on 
the body politic of various states. Italy and France in particular saw major civil 
disturbances, which included mass student protests and strikes, but across 
Europe, for example, in Spain, Greece and Portugal resurgent left movements 
emerged that often involved a rise of socialist activism on campuses that 
orientated to working class communities.38 The PD did not rise on the same scale 
as many of these movements, not least because the major dynamic in Northern 
politics was not class politics, but sectarian division. Nevertheless, the PD joined 
a generational wave of protest and resurgent leftism that helped shape European 
politics for over a decade.   
The only monograph devoted to the PD is Paul Arthur’s The People’s 
Democracy 1968-73 (1974). Written by a former PD activist, this details the 
early years of the movement and contains an account of the PD’s origins and its 
contribution to the civil rights campaign. The book is useful for its 
documentation of a range of activism that was carried out by the PD in its early 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Niall Ó Dochartaigh, From Civil Rights to Armalites, Derry and the Birth of 
the Irish Troubles (Cork University Press, 1997). Also see, Lorenzo Bosi, Truly 
Days of Hope and Anger: the Northern Ireland civil rights movement as a case 
study in the development, outcome and legacies of social movements, 
unpublished PhD thesis (Queen’s University Belfast, McClay library, 2005).  
38 Chris Harman, The Fire Last Time: 1968 and After (London, Bookmarks, 
1998). Martin Klimke and Joachim Scharloth, 1968 in Europe: a history of 
protest and activism, 1956-1977 (New York, Palgrave and Macmillan, 2008).  
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years. However, it also suffers from the lacunas highlighted above. Although 
Arthur’s study claims to be an analysis of the PD until 1973, in reality the book 
is heavily focused on the first two years of the PD’s existence and the longer life 
span of the organization is deprived of serious historical treatment, with the post-
1970 period being dealt with in a short postscript and conclusion. This is 
problematic in that it vastly overlooks some of the most significant periods of PD 
activism, particularly in relation to internment and its aftermath in 1971, and thus 
it fails to root the changing politics of the PD in its historical context. Instead, 
Arthur utilizes a somewhat abstract sociological model in order to explain the 
radicalization of the PD, which seems superimposed upon the movement and 
disconnected from the reality of the historical process. There is also a tendency 
to focus primarily on the PD’s own actions during the civil rights period in order 
to explain the organizations fate, in a way that both downplays the repression 
that met the PD, and ignores the strategies of others on the left and thus the 
possibility of contingent outcomes during the civil rights movement.  
Through this type of approach Arthur presents the PD as having 
transgressed from a legitimate ‘fragment of that strong wave of civil rights 
agitation which protested against genuine grievances in a dignified manner’, to 
being led by naïve radicals and ideologues who ‘lacked a sense of proportion and 
perspective.’39 The PD thus began life as an ‘organization to be reckoned with’, 
but as the civil rights campaign intensified it negated its original progressiveness, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Paul Arthur, The People’s Democracy 1968-73 (Belfast, Blackstaff Press, 
1974), p. 101.  
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embarking on a ‘slow and ponderous’ journey toward the isolation of radical left 
politics.40  
Ultimately the analysis presented by Arthur of the early period of the PD 
is a common one that is concurrent with many of the main academic works on 
the civil rights movement. Those works that have aimed to explain the role of the 
PD are almost all based on a similar perspective; advancing a hostile 
interpretation toward the politics and tactics of the PD that views the 
movement’s role as counterproductive, serving to push the civil rights campaign 
to the brink of disaster and provoke a violent response from both the state and the 
Protestant community. The dominance of this consensus itself says something 
about the way that historiography has drawn a final line under the role of radical 
socialists in the civil rights movement.   
Among an academic community that was strongly shaped by the conflict 
that raged in the aftermath of the civil rights movement, much debate has ensued 
over the causes of the ‘troubles’ and historians have been keen to attach 
culpability to those seen to have brought about sectarian violence; toward this 
end the PD present an easy target.41 On a basic level this seems to rely upon a 
process of victim blaming, in which civil rights activists are denigrated for 
having provoked sectarian violence, but it also involves a more specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ibid, p. 23.   
41 Dan Finn provides an excellent critique of this tendency in, ‘The Point of No 
return? The People’s Democracy and the Burntollet march’, Field Day Review 
(Dublin, Field Day Publications, 2013).  
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argument that views the PD as having impeded the possibility of peaceful 
political transition at the beginning of the troubles.42 
A brief survey of the literature illustrates this point. In his history of 
Ireland since 1939, Henry Patterson entertains the argument that reform of the 
state may have been realized through the administration of Terence O’Neill, 
which possibly contained the potential to appease Catholic grievances. The PD, 
which is said to have pressed too far ahead with civil rights protests, ruined this 
opportunity. The central moment here is of course the ‘Burntollet march’ when 
the PD rejected the truce agreed to by NICRA, and led the most controversial 
demonstration of the early civil rights period. Burntollet emerges at the centre 
point of criticism against the PD, with historians presenting it as a moment when, 
through either misguidance or malice, civil rights activists provoked sectarian 
reaction.43 The single most authoritative account of the civil rights movement is 
Bob Purdie’s Politics in the Streets— The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement 
in Northern Ireland (1990). A former leftwing activist, Purdie was sympathetic 
to the civil rights movement, yet singled out the PD for direct criticism. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 The former point is taken up by Michael McCann in a review piece that looks 
at Thomas Hennessy’s take on the origins of the troubles. McCann points out 
how, ‘The "tragedy of modern Irish history" can be traced back to the civil rights 
agitation of the 1960s, Hennessey suggests: not to partition or the extraordinary 
policing structures and discrimination required to sustain it, but to those who 
challenged the status quo. "The left-wing agitators of Derry might protest about 
the oppressive nature of the Orange state but it was they who unleashed the 
forces of sectarian violence", Hennessey writes. At some level this is a book 
about blaming the victims.’ Available online, 
http://www.irishdemocrat.co.uk/book-reviews/origins-troubles/, accessed on 
2/8/2016. Also see, Thomas Hennessy, Northern Ireland: The Origins of the 
Troubles (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 2005).  
43 On the question of Burntollet Henry Patterson argues that, ‘If the march had 
not taken place, he might have least been forced to grasp the nettle of franchise 
reform.’ Henry Patterson, Ireland Since 1939: the persistence of conflict (Dublin, 
Penguin Ireland, 2006), p. 209. 
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narrative argues that the PD naively adopted an unsuitable and counterproductive 
method of protest from the US, which was at odds with local circumstances.44 
Street marches in Northern Ireland had an inevitable sectarian significance, ‘with 
vast potential for upsetting the tacit understanding between the two 
communities’. Therefore, although those among the ranks of the PD may have 
been ‘perfectly sincere’ in their non-sectarian ideals, ‘It was a perception that 
was not widely shared.’45    
This has been taken up by more recent historians who are less nuanced in 
their approach, arguing that the PD provoked violence. In his Northern Ireland's 
‘68: Civil Rights, Global Revolt and the Origins of the Troubles (2007), Simon 
Prince draws an overt connection between the politics of the left with the 
sectarian polarization that challenged the civil rights movement. Prince 
counterpoises the moderates of the civil rights movement with the PD, who are 
unequivocally charged with trying to bring about a violent situation. For 
example, PD leader Michael Farrell is seen to have been directly at variance with 
those in NICRA who advanced peaceful means: ‘a violent confrontation, 
however, was exactly what Farrell wanted to provoke…’46. Ultimately for 
Prince, ‘The leftists had acted like sorcerers’ apprentices: they had unleashed 
powerful forces that they little understood and that ultimately mastered them.’47  
Thus, the left had, ‘been battling the plague while at the same time carrying the 
bacillus themselves. The struggle against imperialism, capitalism, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Bob Purdie, Politics in the Streets: the Origins of the Civil Rights Movement in 
Northern Ireland,  (Belfast, Blackstaff Press, 1990), pp. 244-45. 
45 Ibid, p. 244.   
46 Prince, Northern Ireland’s ’68, p. 205.  
47 Ibid, p. 211. 
	   43	  
bureaucracy brought in its train Leninist sects and terrorist cells.’48 The 
implication that the left contained the seeds of sectarian violence is a prevalent 
one, but as Dan Finn has pointed out in a hard hitting rebuttal of this consensus, 
‘Much of the criticism directed at the student militants is unfounded, basing itself 
on a caricature of their motives and a largely speculative view of the potential for 
reform under O’Neill’s leadership.’49   
Nevertheless, the tendency to blame the PD for provoking violence is 
common, and it should firstly be recognized that this echoes an establishment 
view that developed during the period. Indeed, the real genesis of this narrative is 
not to be found in academic histories, it is to be found in the Cameron Report, 
which has greatly shaped the historical reading of the civil rights movement. It is 
the contention of this thesis that the conclusions Cameron presented regarding 
the PD are somewhat problematic; further, historiography has largely accepted 
these conclusions and repeated them without sufficient examination or criticism. 
For this reason some comment on the Cameron Report is useful, in order to 
contextualise the historical interpretation of the PD that has been drawn out 
above.   
 Established by the Unionist government in 1969 in order to investigate 
the causes of disturbances associated with the early civil rights period, its 
findings have set the acceptable terms of academic interpretation of the civil 
rights movement and have strongly influenced historiography surrounding the 
PD, particularly in regard to the Burntollet march. In effect, Cameron concluded 
that while the civil rights movement was a genuine project for reform, it 
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contained within it a cabal of radical militants who held unrealistic aspirations 
and were in large part responsible for directing the movement down a path of 
sectarian unrest. Therefore in relation to the Burntollet march at the beginning of 
1969, the PD emerges as a target to direct criticism at the civil rights movement, 
and in the end Cameron directed his major criticism toward civil rights activists 
not at republicans, nor at the moderate forces in the campaign. It was the PD who 
are presented as having explicitly set out to ‘increase tensions’.50     
Cameron’s analysis of the PD has major shortfalls.51 The methodology 
and line of questioning deployed by the inquiry seems to have been premeditated 
with a view that the PD played a harmful role in the civil rights movement. 
Cameron himself at times comes across overly interested in the role of the PD, 
their finances and support, and the political persuasions of their leading members 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Cameron Report - Disturbances in Northern Ireland, report of the commission 
appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland (Belfast, Published by Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office 1969), para. 100. The report concludes with negative 
assessment of the PD’s role in the civil rights movement:  ‘There was early 
infiltration of the Civil Rights Association both centrally and locally by 
subversive left wing and revolutionary elements which were prepared to use the 
Civil Rights movement to further their own purposes, and were ready to exploit 
grievances in order to provoke and foment, and did provoke and foment, disorder 
and violence in the guise of supporting a non-violent movement… People's 
Democracy provided a means by which politically extreme and militant elements 
could and did invite and incite civil disorder, with the consequence of polarising 
and hardening opposition to Civil Rights claims.’ Summary of conclusions on 
causes of disorders, 10- 12, available online, 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/cameron2.htm#chap16, accessed on 13/6/2016.  
51 As Finn observes, ‘When we approach Cameron’s report […] it soon becomes 
clear that it arranges the evidence in line with a particular agenda. The authors of 
such reports often camouflage their personal leanings by adopting the voice of an 
omniscient narrator, as is the case with Cameron: although we are given a list of 
the people who submitted evidence to the inquiry, we are not told whose 
evidence has been granted priority, and on what basis. Such literary devices 
cannot be taken at face value.’ Challengers to Provisional Republicianism, p. 42.  
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when he interviewed them.52 Further, his own hostility toward the left is easy to 
glean from interview transcripts. When questioning the Derry socialist Eamonn 
McCann about his role in civil rights protests, Cameron was forthright in 
challenging McCann’s account and offering his own opinion, stating that his 
consistent exposition of non-violent tactics and opposition to violence were 
simply ‘intellectual language’, and that ‘you were really encouraging an outbreak 
of violence’.53 This is easily contrasted with his treatment with leading figures in 
the Unionist government, which are subject to a much more lenient and friendly 
form of interview.54 Such a contrast is not particularly surprising; the report was 
initiated by the British government and led by Lord John Cameron, a Scottish 
Judge who likely approached the investigation with ideological coloration that 
reflected and informed the British establishment’s approach toward both the 
Unionist state, and the spectre of student radicalism that was gripping Britain in 
the late 1960s. Although the Cameron Report is a crucial historical source its 
conclusions should not be accepted uncritically. This research has benefitted 
from an in-depth reading of the inquiry, which has been cross-referenced with a 
plethora of other sources available from the period, and such a process allows 
one to challenge the central thesis presented by Cameron surrounding the PD.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 This comes across strongly in Cameron’s interview with Betty Sinclair, a 
leading member of the Communist party in Northern Ireland, yet someone who 
exercised a moderate influence on civil rights affairs. Evidence Submitted to the 
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Sinclair Submission, PRONI, GOV/2/1/130. Also see, Evidence submitted to the 
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53 Evidence submitted to the Cameron Commission by Eamonn McCann, 
PRONI, GOV/2/1/218,  
54 Evidence submitted to the Cameron Commission by Robin-Chichester Clark 
MP, PRONI, GOV/2/1/251.  
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While the Cameron Report provides much that is useful in analysing the 
PD, it concluded that the PD contained subversive, ‘extremist’ and ‘violent’55 
elements, which were not out for reform but were out to ‘destroy the 
constitutional structure of the state’.56 The hostility is again easily contrasted 
with the apologetic treatment of the police and security services, which although 
criticised for their evident bouts of violence, are as an institution exonerated for 
their actions.57 In contrast, the PD is presented as a central cause of disorder.58 
The historiography has endorsed Cameron’s conclusions on PD. Joseph Lee’s 
Ireland 1912-1985, Politics and Society (1993), almost repeats Cameron’s 
conclusion verbatim, stating that the intention of the PD was to ‘increase tension’ 
at the beginning of 1969.59 One obvious problem, however, is that these 
conclusions run counter to almost everything that PD members said about 
themselves. The PD explicitly claimed to be non-violent, anti-sectarian, and 
interested in appealing to both sections of the community. Indeed, it is somewhat 
suspect that the PD has been subjected to this much criticism for helping to 
create a type of conflict that was undoubtedly counter posed to its very raison 
d’être. So what were the motives of the PD and what assessment should we have 
of the movement during the civil rights campaign? To answer this question this 
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Also see, para. 150.  
56  Ibid, para. 235.  
57 Thus, while the RUC are at criticized, particularly during 5 October (1968) and 
5 January (1969) in Derry, they are on the whole exonerated for having ‘acted 
with commendable discipline and restraint under very great strain and 
provocation from various quarters’, Cameron Report, Para. 168.  
58 Again to quote the report directly; ‘People’s Democracy provided a means by 
which politically extreme and militant elements could and did invite and incite 
civil disorder, with the consequence of polarizing and hardening opposition to 
Civil Rights claims’. Ibid, conclusions: 10- 12. 
59 Joseph Lee, Ireland 1912-1985, Politics and Enmity (Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), p. 423.  
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thesis presents an in-depth account of the PD’s role in the civil rights movement, 
highlighting the non-violent and anti-sectarian strands of thought that influenced 
the movement and the rational of the PD inside the civil rights campaign. 
Moreover, this thesis will illustrate the systemic opposition that emerged against 
the civil rights movement inside the Unionist state throughout 1968-1969, which 
directly met the PD, serving to expose the undemocratic and nature of the 
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1.4. The pursuit of socialism after 1968 
In Karl Marx’s writings on class struggles in France in 1848, he distinguished 
between the ‘beautiful revolution’ of February and the ‘ugly revolution’ that 
followed in June:  
The February revolution was the beautiful revolution, the revolution 
of universal sympathy, because the contradictions which erupted in it 
against the monarchy were still undeveloped and peacefully dormant, 
because the social struggle which formed their background had only 
achieved an ephemeral existence, an existence in phrases, in words. 
The June revolution is the ugly revolution, the nasty revolution, 
because the phrases have given place to the real thing, because the 
republic has bared the head of the monster by knocking off the crown 
which shielded and concealed it.60 
Marx himself took a keen interest in revolutionary Ireland during his lifetime, 
and his insight into France provides a useful lens through which we can view the 
Irish civil rights movement over a century later. The ‘beautiful revolution’ of 
1968— one of universal sympathy and ephemeral existence— gave way to the 
ugly revolution of 1969, exposing the real contradictions central to the Unionist 
state and baring the sectarian division and repression on which the state relied to 
exist. The history of the PD in the aftermath of this period is in one sense the 
history of an organization that tried to make sense of the ‘monster’ revealed by 
the civil rights movement. Moreover, it is the history of an organization that 
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consistently tried to shape events as Northern Ireland was engulfed in a 
tumultuous conflict for over a decade.   
Literature on the PD stops when the civil rights movement was met with 
widespread repression, which is an obvious reflection of the way that the PD no 
longer occupied a significant role in history against the increase in violence from 
the early 1970s onward. But this also presents a gap in the historiography of the 
left. Although the PD dropped from the centre stage of politics after 1969, the 
organization did not cease activity. If anything, PD activists increased their 
activity and after forming into an organized socialist party at the beginning of the 
1970s, its members would continue to play an active role in politics for over a 
decade, cultivating a socialist tradition that informed and overlapped with 
various aspects of the ‘anti-imperialist movement’ in the North. Indeed, when 
popular protest re-emerged in the aftermath of internment, or later during the 
period of mobilization for prisoners’ rights, the PD was central to political 
campaigning and instigating civil disobedience. The period of political 
mobilization after internment deserves attention in its own right, and although 
this thesis will not attempt a full blow by blow account of what is termed the 
mass ‘civil disobedience campaign’, it will chart the role of the PD in pressing 
ahead with mobilization in this period. That such a major period of grassroots 
activism has received little academic attention illustrates the extent to which 
forms of politics that broke beyond the boundaries of either paramilitary 
initiatives or constitutional politics has been neglected by historiography.    
The three decades of violence and instability that followed the civil rights 
movement have, however, been subject to a litany of historical works looking at 
different features of the troubles, many of which overlap with the history of the 
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PD. The republican and socialist traditions have been an obvious focus for 
attention, and recent scholarship has informed this thesis. Hanley and Millar’s 
The Lost Revolution: The story of the Official IRA and the Worker’s Party 
(2010), delivered an in-depth history of ‘Official republicanism’, charting its 
influence within the civil rights movement and the movements long tension 
between the armed struggle and electoral politics.61 The PD did not occupy as 
central role in history as the Official republican movement, but this thesis 
forwards an historical account that is similar to Hanley and Millar’s in its 
methodology and its subject area, although it considers a movement with a 
different form of politics.  
Throughout this thesis the assessment of the PD is often strengthened by 
examining the strategy of the PD against the larger battalions of the Irish left, for 
example, the Communist Party of Northern Ireland (later the Communist Party of 
Ireland) and the Official republican movement. The division between the PD and 
these currents reflected one of the major junctures of the international left, 
namely, the division between Communist movements who viewed the Eastern 
Block as offering some form of actually existing socialism that could be worked 
toward in the western world, generally through a strategy of gradual, state 
centred reform in what the American Marxist Hal Draper described as ‘socialism 
from above’, and ‘Trotskyist’ influenced organizations adhering to a 
revolutionary form of politics centred upon the emancipatory power of the 
working class, and the tradition of ‘socialism from below’62. The PD would not 
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officially become a Trotskyist organization until the late 1970s, but such 
influences were evident from its beginning.  
These divisions surrounding socialist thought and action are important 
when discussing the history of socialist and republican movements in Ireland. 
Indeed, among the modern republican movement its socialist content entering the 
late 1960s was predominately informed by a current of thought that, in an Irish 
context, fit Draper’s category of socialism from above. Kieran Allen, in his 
appraisal of Ireland’s revolutionary tradition since 1916, points out how the 
strongest influence of socialist philosophy on the republican movement in the 
late 1960s came from the communist tradition, which postponed a struggle for 
socialism until after a united Ireland had been achieved. It was known as the 
‘stages theory’ and forwarded a strategy of first democratizing the Stormont state 
through its institutions as the first stage in achieving a united Ireland through 
political as opposed to military means.63     
But 1968 ushered in a new left that articulated a vision and strategy of 
fighting for socialist politics in the here and now, based on a mass upsurge of 
working class struggle across both states. The breakdown of democracy from 
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1969 onward was seen to confirm that the Northern state could not be reformed, 
and those who based their politics on mass struggle from below were now forced 
to confront the question of the state. In doing so they increasingly backed the 
resurgent republican movement’s efforts to smash the ‘Orange State’. Therefore, 
while the ‘moderate’ socialists of the civil rights movement developed a 
relationship with the Official republican movement, the radicals in the PD would 
increasingly support the Provisional republican movement.  
The best treatments of the Provisional movement encompass both 
academic histories and works of investigative journalism, including Richard 
English’s Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (2012), and Peter Taylor’s 
Provo’s: The IRA and Sinn Féin (1997). Both works offer an insightful internal 
and external view of the movement, making them two of the most important 
pillars in a wider canon of literature on Provisional republicanism, against which 
the history of the PD can be measured, honed and illuminated.64 The growth of 
the Provisional IRA was the first time that Irish republicanism emerged 
substantially among urban working class communities in Northern Ireland—
during a period that saw widespread social unrest off the back of the upsurge of 
civil rights struggle. Although the PD criticized the politics and strategy of the 
republican movement, it viewed the movement as a progressive component in 
the fight against repression and for national liberation. PD members interacted 
with republican organizations, for the most part at a rank and file level, and this 
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reached its height in the post internment period during the eruption of civil 
disobedience action. This mass movement still awaits a full historical 
investigation, —anti-internment activity reached almost every town and city in 
nationalist Ireland and saw involvement from significant sections of the 
populace—but the importance of this campaign has been appreciated by Martin 
McAleery in his forensic look at internment and its impact across Ireland, 
Operation Demetrius and its aftermath: A new history of the use of internment 
without trial in Northern Ireland 1971–1975 (2015).65  
Although the activist tradition developed by the PD following the demise 
of the civil rights movement has to some extent been neglected, the politics of 
the PD has attracted significant attention throughout academia. The resurgence of 
socialist activism in 1968 brought about a resurgence of Marxist theory and the 
‘anti imperialist’ tradition of the PD has been recognized as a contributing force 
to the political history of Ireland. In his landmark study Interpreting Northern 
Ireland (1990), John Whyte attributed Marxist interpretations of the Northern 
conflict with as much significance as traditional Unionist and Nationalist 
considerations, noting that the current of Marxism that emerged with the PD in 
1968 updated Connolly’s account to cover the five decades that had passed since 
his execution.66 McGarry and O’Leary have also commented upon the influence 
that this generation had among the republican tradition in Ireland, particular in 
relationship to Sinn Féin in the early and mid-1980s, observing that this was 
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most visible in the writings of Gerry Adams, the current Sinn Féin President and 
de facto leader of modern Irish republicanism.67  
The Marxism developed by the PD—in particular what is contained in the 
writings of Michael Farrell—has indeed strongly influenced sections of the 
republican movement in Ireland. It has also attracted its share of criticism, 
mostly from academic writers whose Marxism was of a different hue. In order to 
draw this out, it is worth briefly delving into the broad theoretical strokes that 
came to shape the socialist tradition in Ireland. There is some truth to the claim 
that the PD was to the forefront of revitalising and updating the Connollyite 
tradition of Irish Marxism in the late 1960s and 1970s. The life and legacy of 
James Connolly is a hotly contested subject, which there is only scope to touch 
upon here.68  
For the purpose of this thesis, it is suffice to say that Connolly’s main 
contribution to Irish Marxism lay primarily in his belief that the national and 
social question should be fused, establishing a Marxist position that viewed the 
pursuit of Irish independence as central and necessary to the development of 
socialism. A product of the radical traditions of the Second International, 
Connolly castigated the Irish nationalist movement, which he viewed as being 
tied by a ‘thousand economic strings’ to British capitalism through the native 
Irish bourgeoisie, and therefore not to be trusted to carry out a social 
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transformation of society in the interests of the labouring classes.69 Instead, 
Connolly looked to the then emerging Irish working class as the ‘incorruptible 
inheritors of the fight for Irish freedom’70. This led to a unique framework for 
understanding Ulster through the prism of anti-imperialism and anti-partitionism, 
and a rejection of the pan-class nature of the ‘Orange’ and Unionist projects that 
were deepening their grip upon the north, and the advocacy of a 32-county 
socialism based upon revolutionary class politics, and Protestant and Catholic 
workers’ unity.71  
Although Connolly offered a comparatively consistent Marxist position 
on Ireland, his ideas have been subject to challenge and differing interpretation 
since his death. A perennial point of ambiguity on the Irish left, from Connolly 
onward, has been the relationship between radical republicanism and 
revolutionary socialism. Indeed, as labour historian Conor Kostick notes, 
Connolly himself ‘left open the question of how Marxists should analyze radical 
Irish nationalism’72. This question would continue to wrack generations to come 
and this thesis will explore how the those who founded the PD and went on to 
rediscover the socialist tradition five decades after Connolly’s death did so often 
with this uncertainty at the centre of their problems.   
The proliferation of research into the conflict that erupted in Northern 
Ireland also saw a different current of Marxian scholars, which could be 
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appropriately described as a rise in ‘academic Marxism’, due to its development 
being primarily driven within the academy rather than from within political 
organisations or social movements. Much of this literature sought to challenge 
the theoretical positions forwarded by Farrell and popularised by the PD. The 
most important work that attempted to do this was The State in Northern Ireland, 
1921-1972 (1979), by Paul Bew, Henry Patterson and Peter Gibbon, which 
offered a revised Marxist analysis of the Northern state.73 This work essentially 
tried to locate a progressive working class agency within the confines of the 
Protestant community in the North. Taking aim at Farrell in order to counter his 
critique of the ‘Orange State’, it contested that ‘the pre-1972 state in Northern 
Ireland was in many respects an ordinary bourgeois one’.74 The authors thus 
argue that the major dynamic inside the Unionist state was not the dictates of an 
all-class block, but was in fact the outworking of tension between a populist form 
of Unionism—which reflected and mediated the concerns of the Protestant 
working class—and ‘anti-populist’ Unionism, which reflected the sectarian and 
regressive agenda inside the Unionist class alliance.75  
This work provided a useful contribution to the historiography of 
Northern Ireland, particularly in the way that it considered the internal dynamics 
of Unionism. However, as Paul Stewart points out it is built upon a weak 
theoretical foundation.  The Marxism of Bew et al used the advanced industrial 
base of the Protestant working class to justify a primary orientation to this 
constituency. Protestant workers were thus equated with a more progressive form 
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of labourism; the assumption being that the ideology of the Protestant working 
class is more progressive than that of its Catholic counterparts.76  Indeed, the role 
of Catholic labour in the North is at times ignored as is the structural 
sectarianism within the Protestant labour movement, which is a result of its 
attachment to the state.77 The result is a theory that bases its strategic orientation 
toward a politics that, at heart, is ‘exclusionary rather than all-encompassing’.78 
It is an approach that favours a reformist method inside the Northern state and 
thus almost invariably supports the status quo. Through looking at the role of the 
PD during the outbreak of the troubles, this thesis will draw out the difficulties in 
asserting class politics in this period, which ought to be deeply considered by all 
who hope to construct a theoretical framework of the Northern state, and better 
understand those who tried to challenge it.  
Other literature relevant to this study includes the work of Austen 
Morgan, who offered a pessimistic summation of the state of Marxism in Ireland 
some ten years after the emergence of the PD. Clearly jaded by the violent events 
of the 1970s, Morgan argued that the crisis in the north and the re-emergence of 
the national question essentially destroyed much that was progressive about 
Marxism in Ireland. Arguing that ‘red socialism’ had been eclipsed by forms of 
‘green’ and ‘orange’ socialism —each of which latched on to competitive 
nationalisms—and with the PD being the most pertinent group among the former 
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category.79 Again, this approach seems problematic in that, at best, it equates 
both ‘Orange’ and ‘Green’ positions and assumes that the demands of both anti-
imperialists and pro-imperialist leftists to be mutually regressive.80 In terms of 
the PD, Morgan does not sufficiently explain why the organisation took the very 
positions that he criticises, and this seems evident in the conclusions that Morgan 
draws surrounding socialist strategy in Ireland. Therefore, the PD is charged with 
‘exploitation’ of the Catholic struggle and their anti-imperialist trajectory is seen 
to be an exercise in dressing nationalism up in Marxist clothes.81 Morgan then 
goes on to conclude that the development of a progressive left in Ireland 
demands socialists reject the national question in all of its forms.82 This 
conclusion seems both disconnected from the actual process of political practice 
in the north, but also somewhat obtuse to the changing politics of the PD and its 
own professed strategic orientation. As this thesis will show, the PD approach 
towards the Northern state was largely a product of recognising the necessity of 
the left to make itself relevant to the national question in Ireland. This thesis does 
not propose that the PD sufficiently responded to this problem; however, it does 
hope to present a more in-depth analysis of the history and politics of the PD 
than what has hitherto been offered.   
Ultimately, this thesis does not focus solely on the ideological terrain 
traversed by the PD in the style of much of this academic literature. Instead, it 
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will chart the history of the PD and draw upon these ideas in so far as they 
emerged as relevant to the development of the organization and informed the 
activity of the PD, therefore making the important connection between theory 
and practice. In this regard this thesis shares much in common with two recent 
works that focus heavily on the political perspectives deployed by the PD and 
shows how they influenced social and political mobilization. Stuart F Ross’s 
Smashing H-Block, The Rise and Fall of the popular Campaign against 
Criminalization 1976-1982 (2011) and Dan Finn’s Challengers to Provisional 
Republicanism: The Official Republican Movement, People’s Democracy and the 
Irish Republican Socialist Party, 1968–98 (2013) have both provided timely and 
important works that address the history of the PD, through their own respective 
approaches. Finn’s work constitutes one of the most powerful scholarly accounts 
of the radical left during the troubles and its treatment of the PD is particularly 
insightful, serving to ‘peel back layers of misunderstanding’ surrounding the PD 
and the civil rights movement and charting the ideological influences of the 
grouping throughout later years.83 This thesis is informed by Finn’s work, and 
aims to strengthen and build upon some of the conclusions that it draws. Ross’s 
account of the prison movement in the early 1980s focuses on the role of popular 
protest in enacting political change during this period, and it pays sufficient 
attention to the role of the PD and revolutionary left more generally in their 
efforts to build a broad based movement in support of republican prisoners in the 
early 1980s. It shows that although the PD was a small group, the ideas and 
strategy deployed by its activists allowed it to punch above its weight during the 
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Smash H Block/Armagh campaign.84 This thesis extends this type of analysis 
toward the PD’s wider history of socialist activism. 
The PD is an organization that uniquely links the different phases of mass 
mobilization and mass political action that engulfed nationalist Ireland during the 
troubles. Beginning with the civil rights movement in 1968, throughout the 
campaigns for civil disobedience in the early 1970s and during the mass 
movement to support republican prisoners in the early 1980s, the PD was 
consistently found to be a small but central player amidst the different forms of 
social and political agitation, often in a pioneering way.85 This thesis therefore 
presents a novel look at the history of grassroots activism during the troubles 
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1.5. A short historical introduction 
Any historical work addressing the period known as the Northern Ireland 
troubles must begin with at least some recognition of the states troubled 
beginnings. The origins of the Northern conflict were rooted in events during the 
early 20th Century, which saw the partition of Ireland and the birth of the 
Northern Ireland state. Although Ireland had been Britain’s oldest colony—a 
relationship that ensured a long line of almost generational struggles against the 
colonial power—the Northern Ireland state emerged after a profound national 
and constitutional crisis that swept Britain and its oldest subject, culminating in 
the Irish War of Independence and Irish Civil War, between 1916-1923. The 
story of Ireland’s revolutionary period is far beyond the scope of this 
introduction. Important for this study, however, is some understanding of the 
origins of the Northern state and the decades that preceded the 1960s. The 
partition of Ireland arose as the last best hope for the British state, and its Ulster 
Unionist allies in the North of Ireland, to maintain the most politically loyal and 
economically important parts of Ireland within the British Empire in the face of 
popular revolution and anti-colonial resistance.           
From the perspective of Ireland’s socialist tradition, the establishment of 
two partitioned states in Ireland represented a major setback for the working 
class and labour movement, which had played a considerable role in the 
revolutionary period.86 The outlook has been immortalised in James Connolly’s 
well-known warning that partition would create a ‘carnival of reaction’ on both 
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sides of the border.87 The two states that emerged after partition reflected one 
another in social conservatism and power structures, with an Irish state in the 
south based around the power and influence of the Catholic Church, and an 
Ulster Unionist state in the North built upon Protestant majority rule. The 
Northern Ireland state was established in the image of Unionist Party and the 
Orange Order. It was based on the ideology of Unionism and the position of the 
minority Catholic community was always insecure, with strife commonplace 
from the beginning.   
The extent to which partition represented the maintenance of a colonial 
project was illustrated by the military support that the new state could call upon 
in any hour of need. This included a number of battalions of the British army, the 
newly formed RUC, and the formation of the Ulster Special Constabulary, an all-
Protestant quasi-paramilitary police force that essentially absorbed the 
membership of the pre-partition loyalist movement of the UVF. The USC was 
made up of three categories; A Specials, numbering 2,000, B Specials, 
numbering 19,500 and an unknown number of C Specials.88 One Nationalist MP 
would remark in the House of Commons that the formation of the USC was an 
effort to ‘arm pogromists’.89 The warning was not an exaggeration, between 
1920 and 1922 large-scale pogroms and sectarian violence occurred, 
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predominately directed at the Catholic community, although ‘rotten prods’, i.e. 
those deemed to be disloyal to the new state such as Protestant socialist activists 
were also targeted. In Belfast Catholics made up only one quarter of the 
population but had suffered 257 civilian deaths out of 416 in a two-year period. 
Historian Jonathon Bardon notes that between 8,700 and 11,000 Catholics had 
been driven out of their jobs, that 23,000 Catholics had been forced out of their 
homes and up to 500 Catholic businesses had been destroyed.90 While the 
violence represented the extreme end of repression, sectarian dominance became 
enshrined into the state in more permanent ways. The year 1929 saw the 
abolition of the proportional representation voting system, ensuring that 
parliamentary oppositional forces, such as labour and nationalist, were pushed 
aside in a first past the post system.91 Afterward, each election effectively took 
the form of a referendum on support for the new constitutional status of the state. 
Further, election boundaries were designed in a way that ensured the Unionist 
Party would return solid majorities in areas where the Catholic community 
dominated. The government itself boasted an all-Protestant membership that 
included a high ratio of members of the Orange Order, and preferential treatment 
toward Protestants was often encouraged.  
Challenging discrimination was the central raison d’être of the civil rights 
campaign, and the academic literature has seen differing interpretations as to the 
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91 John Whyte, ‘How much discrimination was there under the unionist regime, 
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extent of such practice.92 Leaving aside some of the intricacies of these debates, 
it is reasonable to suggest that discrimination against the Catholic community 
happened on a significant level in three key areas, electoral practice, employment 
and public housing. The most authoritative assessment of discrimination is John 
Whyte’s study of the Unionist regime, in which he illustrated how discrimination 
was particularly evident in Unionist controlled local authorities west of the river 
Bann. The city of Derry became the classic example of electoral discrimination: 
The fate of Londonderry County Borough aroused the most 
bitterness. It had a substantial, and growing, Catholic majority - 
by 1961 Catholics were more than 60 per cent even among the 
adult population… Yet unionists won back control under the 
ward division imposed in 1923, and when, after some years, it 
looked as if the nationalists might capture one of the unionist 
wards, the boundaries were redrawn so as to perpetuate 
unionist rule…93 
At local government level Unionists had significant command over the 
arrangement of the franchise, with nationalists manipulated out of control in a 
number of councils where they had a majority of electors, ‘This is one of the 
clearest areas of discrimination in the whole field of controversy’.94 Regarding 
employment practices, a system existed which marginalised the Catholic 
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community and often confined them to lower skilled and lower paid jobs. This 
happened to some degree in both the public and private sector, but was most 
acute in the former. Therefore, in one assessment of local government 
employment in 1951, those from a ‘nationalist’ background made up 40 percent 
of manual labouring jobs, but of the 1,095 senior posts, ‘nationalists’ held only 
130, or 11.8 percent.95 The divide was even more acute within the higher 
echelons of the state. Thus, at senior civil servant level only one Catholic reached 
the rank of Permanent Secretary between 1921-1968, and in the judiciary no 
Catholics were appointed to the Supreme Court from 1925 to 1949.96 In 1971 the 
Northern Ireland census gave an overall working figure where of 1,383 
government officials only 11 percent reported themselves as Catholic. At this 
time the Catholic community made up 31.4 percent of the population, indicating 
the extent to which it fell short of such appointments.97 
The other major area of grievance centred on housing. This was 
inextricably linked to the restricted voting franchise that existed inside the 
Northern state, where a small number of property owners had more than one 
vote, and a much larger number of the population, amounting to over a quarter of 
the parliamentary electorate in 1961, were not able to vote at all, due to the 
franchise being restricted to owners or tenants of homes, or to the spouses of 
such owners or tenants.98 The lack of public housing provision in the interwar 
period meant that complaints were relatively scarce, as there were so few houses 
to allocate. It was in the context that arose after the Second World War, however, 
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that grievances around housing intensified. The building of public housing after 
1945 saw Unionist controlled local authorities hold significant sway over the 
allocation of new homes. In many areas ‘loyal’ Unionist voters were favoured for 
new builds. The Cameron Report would later conclude how there existed ‘many 
cases’ where planning permission had been withheld in order advantage 
Unionists electorally. It went on to document the ‘mass of evidence’ that in 
‘Unionist-controlled areas it was fairly frequent for housing policy to be operated 
so that houses allocated to Catholics tended, as in Dungannon Urban District, to 
go to rehouse slum dwellers, whereas Protestant allocations tended to go more 
frequently to new families.’99 Thus, for the next number of decades the minority 
community found itself in a precarious position at the helm of a Protestant 
dominated Unionist government.  
Although Unionist ideology implied that all Protestants had interests in 
common, living standards for both Catholics and Protestants at the poorer end of 
the social and economic spectrum were on the whole lower than the British 
average, and class antagonisms often developed within the state.100 The most 
notable instance was the outdoor relief riots of 1932, a moment of sustained class 
struggle when, amidst global depression, unemployment and poverty reached 
such a height that it united Catholic and Protestant workers in bitter struggle for 
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outdoor relief. This represented the most intense period of class struggle in the 
post-partition era, and it would impact significantly upon the politics of the 
1930s.101 However, when class politics did emerge it always foundered against 
the strength of communal division, which had long confounded the small and 
marginalized forces of the organized left in the North of Ireland.   
Across Europe, the growth of both social democratic and communist 
forces had been a common theme during the interwar years, and although 
Northern Ireland was not immune to this pattern, it did not happen on any great 
scale. The NILP had been formed in 1924 and although its potential to form a 
substantial electoral opposition had been restricted, it built a notable base in 
Belfast and Derry over some decades. In 1925, the party saw an electoral 
breakthrough, taking three seats in parliament, but this would be reduced to one 
after the introduction of the first past the post system. From its inception the 
party was categorised by its refusal to take a position on the ‘border question’, 
and while the NILP at times appealed to a cross section of both Catholics and 
Protestants, this non-committal stance ultimately left it dazed and confused in the 
face of re-emerging sectarian division.102  
The different traditions inside the Belfast labour movement co-existed in 
the NILP during the interwar period, and were illustrated in the rivalry between 
two leading figures, Jack Beattie and Harry Midgley, the former a proponent of 
Irish unity, and the latter essentially a ‘labour unionist’, who would go on to join 
the Unionist Party and serve as a Minister in the Brookeborough government 
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(1949-50).103 Events came to a head, however, in 1949 when the NILP’s 
conference voted in favour of support for the union with Britain, signalling an 
end to the non-committal position on the national question and triggering a 
decline in Catholic support. The economic, social and political climate that 
followed into the late 1950s and 1960s allowed the NILP to grow its base, and 
the party pulled a large section of unionist voters toward it. In both the 1958 and 
1962 general elections the NILP returned four MPs to the parliament, and in 
1965 it became the official opposition to the Unionist government.104    
To the left of the NILP, the communist movement had historically been 
the main organisation of left radicalism; it could claim credit for instigating and 
leading the aforementioned struggles of the unemployed during the 1930s and it 
enjoyed a modest growth in this period. The Communist Party of Ireland was 
launched in 1933 by the Revolutionary Workers’ Groups, which had rose to 
prominence during the agitation of the great depression era in Belfast. The period 
also saw important shifts to the left in the republican movement, with 
communists and republicans founding the Republican Congress (1934).105 Yet if 
the early 1930s displayed important moments of class unity, the decade was later 
gripped by communal strife, most notably in the sectarian riots of 1935. Any 
gains the communists had made in Northern politics were lost amidst these 
circumstances, and the organisation remained a marginal force.106  
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The political trajectory of the communist movement in Ireland over the 
course of its existence was one that was strongly aligned to the Russian 
Comintern, and much like its global counterparts, Irish communism often shifted 
its strategy and tactics to adapt to the changing perspectives and foreign polices 
espoused by Stalin’s Russia.107 As Mitchell shows, the Irish communists were 
certainly capable of political self-initiative, but ultimately, their activity was 
‘geared toward an overall political perspective that was set elsewhere’108, and 
this meant that their position on the Irish question often vacillated. For example, 
when the Communist Party began life it did so as an anti-partitionist organisation 
that stood for independence and worker’s socialism in the tradition of James 
Connolly— as distinct from the reformist social democracy espoused by the 
NILP—, but, by the late 1930s, the ‘popular front’ strategy of the Comintern, 
which emerged in response to rising fascism across Europe, was heavily adopted 
by the Irish organisation and it had significant implications toward its politics in 
the North. This perspective favoured unity with ‘progressive’ bourgeois forces, 
and thus the Northern communists essentially dropped all reference to the 
national question for a period, instead uniting uncritically with social democratic 
and labour organisations that were supportive of the Northern state.109  
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When Russia entered the Second World War Stalin’s foreign policy 
drastically shifted again— away from his previous non-aggression pact with 
Hitler, to supporting the war effort— and as the communists were now the most 
vociferous opponents of fascism, their representatives in the North of Ireland 
essentially became pro-British in both deeds and words. As Milotte argues, the 
party ‘was able to build on British chauvinism; support for the party was one 
expression of patriotism— British patriotism.’110 This even went as far as 
agitating against the industrial militancy of workers in the war industry in 
Belfast, who were taking strike action against conditions imposed by the wartime 
government.111 In 1941, the Communist Party of Ireland suspended activity south 
of the border and its northern operation was renamed the ‘Communist Party of 
Northern Ireland’ (CPNI). By the time the Second World War had ended, then, 
the CPNI had a small following in Protestant working class areas and was 
confronted with the problem of having to appear ‘anti-imperialist without being 
anti-partitionist’,112 so as to retain this base. Membership of the CPNI only 
reached a couple of hundred by the early 1950s, but the organisation would go on 
to develop an important foothold in the trade union movement.113 As we shall 
see, it would exercise an important political influence during the civil rights 
campaign in this regard. 
The left had therefore experienced a relatively stagnant existence 
throughout the decades after partition up until the 1960s. The two main traditions 
of oppositional politics that existed within the Catholic community were the 
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constitutional nationalism of the Irish Nationalist Party, and the republican 
tradition of the IRA. Both traditions were based near solely upon the nationalist 
constituency and both essentially espoused a form of anti-partitionism, albeit 
through very different means. By the 1960s neither could claim much success in 
their respective endeavours— either through advancing the position of the 
minority community through constitutional politics, which was often debilitated 
by the long-standing tactic of parliamentary abstentionism, or through the 
republican pursuit of armed struggle. The IRA had embarked on an ill-fated 
‘border campaign’ between 1956-1962, but even the organisation itself 
recognised it failed miserably in winning popular support.114 By the late 1960s 
then a political vacuum had emerged and oppositional politics in the North was 
reaching an impasse, as the traditional methods of politics had failed to achieve 
significant advances.   
Underlying the vacuum were profound social and political changes that 
swept Northern Ireland in the aftermath of the Second World War. The Unionist 
project had emerged as a bourgeoning part of the British Empire, where pillars of 
industry including linen, textiles and shipbuilding provided the sustained 
economic ties that helped define Unionist ‘Ulster’, and its unique relationship to 
Britain. The state that emerged after partition reflected this economic 
relationship, but the irony was that although the Unionist state had seemed 
powerfully intact since partition, the underlying economic trends were ones that 
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pointed to the historic decline of the traditional base of the state. From 1921 to 
1968 the only real period of economic boom occurred in the context of increased 
production for the Second World War. It was a brief exception fuelled by the war 
economy, and the broader picture was one of steady economic decline since 
partition.115 By the 1950s the linen industry had virtually collapsed, and 
shipbuilding entered permanent decline in these years.116 Economic regression 
saw factory closures and higher unemployment, and as permanent decline 
loomed in the 1960s the historic position of the Protestant working class looked 
to be increasingly under threat.   
For the Northern Ireland government these economic changes demanded 
a new consensus, precipitating a form of liberalising Unionism heralded by 
Terence O’Neill, who was elected in 1963. O’Neill tried to revitalize the 
Northern economy through a strategy that entailed attracting international 
investment, and this meant appealing to sections of foreign capital that were 
outside of the traditional employment patterns of the Northern state. Demand for 
economic change in the North coincided with the southern state moving away 
from a protectionist economic structure and opening up to British and foreign 
capital. Therefore, by the late 1960s the economic and material basis for the 
historic partition of Ireland was beginning to erode and this was expressed in 
attempts at new political relations. The meeting between Terence O’Neill and 
Sean Lemass in 1965 signified the changing economic tides of the two states.117  
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The ‘post-war consensus’ that characterized Britain therefore also saw a 
realignment of consensus in Ireland. Another major contributing factor to this 
generational shift was the introduction of the welfare state. Proposed by a British 
Labour government and reluctantly implemented by the Unionist party, the new 
welfare state delivered a large expansion of the public sector, including homes 
and jobs. Particular importance in regard to the emergence of the civil rights 
movement was the expansion of the education sector, which contributed to a 
growing Catholic middle class capable of raising its voice against the grievances 
practiced by the Unionist state. Post-war housing schemes saw more public 
homes being built and these were distributed through local authorities. But in 
particular areas where Unionist majorities were marginal, serious discrimination 
was at times exercised in order to maintain gerrymandered boundaries, and in a 
context where housing was already scarce this became a central focal point for 
the civil rights movement.118  
Therefore the 1960s brought about a contradictory process; social and 
economic changes intensified the practices of discrimination against the Catholic 
community, but they also created the conditions that saw a challenge to Unionist 
rule being mounted. The Catholic community began to sense an opportunity for 
advancement, while sections of the Protestant community were gripped by a 
sense of regression, due to the decline of the traditional economy and the 
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emergence of a confident minority community. This contradiction was central to 
the emergence of the civil rights movement and would continue to define the 
period that followed.  
External political changes also seemingly shifted favourably toward those 
who would assert grievances against the Unionist government. After thirteen 
years of uninterrupted Conservative Party rule the election of a British Labour 
government in 1964, led by Harold Wilson, heralded an administration that was 
ostensibly more susceptible to efforts articulating the hardships that impeded the 
Catholic community.119 This emboldened those who sough to highlight the 
injustices practiced by the Unionist state during the first phase of civil rights 
action, when activists publicised the issues of housing, jobs and voting 
discrimination. The emerging confidence of the minority community had been 
expressed in early efforts at exposing housing inequality in Dungannon, an area 
that was evenly balanced between Catholics and Protestants, but where housing 
was firmly under the control of Unionist representatives. In May 1963 the 
Homeless Citizens League (HCL) was formed, which was predominately made 
up of Catholic women who initiated some of the first instances of direct action of 
the 1960s; pickets were launched outside the local council and afterward the 
HCL took the situation into their own hands by occupying empty homes with 
squatting families.120 HCL activity ranks among the first efforts to take up 
localised grievances in this way, and it precipitated a wider and more generalised 
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expectations within the Catholic community, and rising political expectations 
generated by the choice of a new Unionist Prime Minister, Terence O’Neill, in 
1963, and the election of a Labour government in 1964, led by a sympathetic 
Prime Minister, Harold Wilson’. McGarry and O’Leary, Explaining Northern 
Ireland, p. 257.  
120 Purdie, Politics in the Streets, pp. 82-88. 
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campaign, with the founding of the Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ). Launched 
in 1964 by two leading figures of the HCL, Patricia and Conn McCluskey, it 
functioned as a pressure group and focused on gathering the extent of 
discrimination across the North, its membership was solidly of the professional 
Catholic middle class.121 The CSJ essentially appealed to the British government 
to exercise its legal authority and intervene decisively in the affairs of Northern 
Ireland, producing a number of important publications documenting 
discrimination against the minority community.122 These efforts were strongly 
complimented by the Campaign for Democracy in Ulster (CDU), formed in 
1965; it was largely a lobby inside the British Labour Party made up of MPs who 
were sympathetic to the cause of challenging discrimination. The formation of 
the CDU signalled a more serious step in raising awareness surrounding the Irish 
question in British politics; it gained impressive support, including from a 
number of prominent Members of Parliament, including Michael Foot and Roy 
Hattersley.123 However, despite the ‘hard hitting’ propaganda forwarded by the 
CDU it had little success in forcing action, with one historian going as far to 
conclude that it ‘had no discernible effect on the Labour government’124.  
Although these organisations played a crucial role in documenting and 
publicising Unionist abuses of power, any success they had in doing so was 
outweighed by frustration at the lack of action to address their complaints. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Ibid, p. 94.  
122 For example, Northern Ireland: The Plain Truth, Issued by the Campaign for 
Social Justice in Northern Ireland (Dungannon, 1969).  
123 Michael Foot was an MP and later a leader of the Labour Party (1980-83). 
Roy Hattersley was an MP and later a Deputy leader of the Labour Party (1983-
92).  
124 Geoffrey Bell, Troublesome Business, The Labour Party and the Irish 
Question (London, Pluto Press, 1982), p. 104.  
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strategy of both the CSJ and the CDU was essentially one of highlighting and 
documenting discrimination in order to urge constitutional action. Yet as Bob 
Purdie shows in his examination of the civil rights movement, these efforts were 
largely in vain. Early efforts at redressing the sectarian imbalance faced 
considerable obstacles; such as the parliamentary convention at Westminster that 
ensured issues related to Ireland would not be raised in the house, and a system 
of legal redress that lacked any real avenue for change and greatly lagged behind 
the movement that would soon begin to gather on the streets.125 It was against 
these obstacles that the best known of all civil rights organisations was born, the 
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA).  
The initiative behind the establishment of NICRA had initially come 
from the republican movement, which had undergone a political realignment 
after the failed border campaign. A rethinking had taken place among a section 
of republicanism, categorized by a rejection of armed struggle and a 
championing of reform, or ‘democratisation’ of the Northern state as the first 
process in establishing socialism in Ireland. Two intellectuals, Roy Johnson and 
Anthony Coughlan, who were influenced by the aforementioned stages theory of 
Communist Desmond Greaves, which forwarded a form of state led communism 
that gained traction inside the republican movement, were central to driving the 
shift in republicanism. Coughlan in particular was close to Greaves’ line of 
thinking, the central assumption being one of ‘working-class unity developing 
through the struggle for bourgeois democracy’ in the north.126 This ‘six-county 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Purdie, Politics in the Streets, pp. 118-120.  
126 Milotte, Communism in Modern Ireland pp. 266- 267. Also see Hanley and 
Millar, The Lost Revolution, p. 38. 
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reform strategy’ was crucial to those republicans taking a political turn toward 
civil rights agitation in the mid-late 1960s.   
The idea of setting up a broad civil rights body was first raised at a 
conference of the Wolfe Tone societies over the 13-14 August 1966.127 However, 
the aims and objectives of the organisation were far from what would have been 
considered traditionally ‘republican’, saying nothing about the British presence 
in Ireland nor even the concrete grievances of the minority community, and 
instead focusing on issues of civil liberties such as freedom of speech and 
assembly.128   
NICRA itself was formally launched in 1967 and its broad basis appealed 
to a coalition of forces, including nationalists, sections of the Catholic middle 
class, republicans who had moved away from the tactic of armed struggle and 
elements of the organised left and labour movement. It also had some tentative 
support and involvement from liberal Unionists.129 In its early formation NICRA 
espoused an agenda of defending citizens rights through documenting legal 
abuses. The organisations’ own history would later explain: 
For the first 18 months of its existence NICRA was nothing more 
than a pressure group. Its main activity was writing letters to the 
Government, mainly to Bill Craig as Minister of Home Affairs, 
complaining about harassment of political and social dissidents 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Purdie, Politics in the Streets, p. 123.  
128 The key demands were: ‘To defend the basic freedoms of citizens. 2. To 
protect the rights of the individual. 3. To highlight all possible abuses of power. 
4. To demand guarantees for freedom of speech, assembly and association. 5. To 
inform the public of their lawful rights.’ Ibid, p. 133. 
129 Milotte, Communism in Modern Ireland, p. 264.  
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ranging from Republicans to itinerants. But it rarely went beyond the 
stage of dignified written protest.130 
This was an approach that the organised left had signed up to inside NICRA. 
Both the CPNI and the NILP were represented on the NICRA steering 
committee. Throughout the early period of NICRA’s existence these groups had 
been united in urging caution with regards to political mobilisation around the 
civil rights issue, with both advancing distinct strategies that warned against 
openly challenging the anti democratic practices of the Unionist state. These 
reflected ideologically reformist methods that sought to use the state structures as 
an arena to transform society. For example, the NILP had essentially advocated a 
parliamentary solution to the social question and the issue of discrimination, 
arguing that a return of a Labour majority in elections would best secure the civil 
rights demands.131 The CPNI favoured an effort to reform or ‘democratise’ the 
Northern state along traditional ‘bourgeois’ lines as the first step towards a 
socialist society. As Milotte points out, the CPNI saw NICRA ‘as the first step 
towards a broad electoral alliance for replacing the Unionist regime with a 
‘progressive’ government at Stormont.’132 This meant an acceptance of the 
constitutional position of the Northern state and a postponement of raising 
questions such as partition or workers’ control until a later date, presumably until 
after Northern Ireland had experienced a stage of democratic reform.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 NICRA, “We Shall Overcome…” available online, 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/crights/nicra/nicra78.htm, accessed on 08/08/2015.  
131 As Aaron Edwards explains, ‘Arguably, the NILP was ill equipped to meet 
the challenges posed by the transformation of politics in the late 1960s… 
because it was deeply wedded to the process and fundamentals of British 
parliamentary democracy. As such, it could not (and would not) fathom or 
condone a turn to street politics or civil disobedience.’ Edwards, A History of the 
Northern Ireland Labour Party, pp. 145-146.  
132 Milotte, Communism in Modern Ireland, p. 264.  
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Such positions existed inaudibly inside NICRA since its inception and 
reflected conservatism among the left with regard to direct action. However, this 
cautious approach would be superseded as small signs of public protest began to 
find a much wider resonance. Therefore, while the early campaign for civil rights 
had hitherto been conducted through respectable and acceptable means, the 
potential for a new kind of movement soon emerged out of changing local 
conditions and the powerful influence that the global revolts of the late 1960s 
had on Northern Ireland. In these circumstances the student movement at 
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Chapter 2: Global revolt and the birth of the People’s Democracy 
2.1. Introduction 
Much like the rise of student struggles across various parts of Europe in 1968, 
the birth of radical student protest in Belfast was a watershed moment that 
represented a rupture in contemporary politics. It was a rupture that had its roots 
in economic and social changes in the post-WWII period. The PD emerged in 
October 1968, bearing many hallmarks of the global revolt associated with the 
late 1960s. A mass student movement that originated in Queen’s University, the 
PD surfaced as the militant edge of the civil rights campaign in Ireland and 
would steer the movement in an increasingly radicalized direction, contributing 
to the destabilization of the Unionist state in early 1969.   
In its early formation, the PD functioned on the basis of mass student 
assemblies and direct action, embarking on a series of protests that embodied the 
‘street politics’ and civil disobedience of the late 1960s, against the practices of 
the Unionist government. Throughout the heady days of October 1968 members 
of the PD marched, picketed, organized ‘sit-ins’ and ‘teach-ins’ and produced a 
range of political propaganda against the government in order to champion their 
cause. The appearance of this form of student protest in Belfast was met with a 
hostile reaction from sections of the extreme right inside the Protestant 
community, in the form of counter mobilizations, but intense opposition also 
came from the centre of the Unionist state. The adverse reaction and repression 
directed at the PD would later prove a major factor in increasing communal 
tension and sparking the most contentious moments of violence in 1969.  
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This chapter considers the social and economic changes that swept across 
Northern Ireland in the post-war era and impacted upon student life and politics, 
qualitatively changing third level education and laying the basis for a student 
revolt. Research charts early civil rights agitation among the student left in 
Belfast and analyses the explosion of activity among the student population at 
Queen’s University in 1968, including the first major PD protests. The politics of 
protest and non-violent civil disobedience that inspired a generation of activists 
represented a break from past forms of oppositional politics in the Northern 
Ireland state. For a brief period, it seemed to offer a way forward from the cul-
de-sac both of traditional nationalism and the discredited militarism of the 
republican movement.  
These developments have at times been downplayed within an academic 
community that tends to view the civil rights movement as representing a 
straightforward rise of nationalist or republican aspirations.133 Although 
historiography on Ireland’s troubled past is limited in its appreciation of the 
global influences on politics in this period, recent scholarship has highlighted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 This consensus runs through much of the academic literature surrounding this 
period. For the foremost attempt to paint the civil rights movement as an 
expression of nationalist grievances, see, Hennessy, A History of Northern 
Ireland. Hennessy offers this conclusion on the civil rights period: ‘What the 
evidence, from survey data and perceptions of the participants themselves, 
suggests is that many of the old fears, myths and prejudices that Protestants and 
Catholics held of each other at the state’s formation survived well into the second 
half of the twentieth century. While many of the leading actors might perceive 
themselves as adopting new perspectives, they were not only prisoners of the 
fears of their own communities but were also, as we shall see, fundamentally 
governed by traditional interpretations of their opponents ideology.’ Hennessy, A 
History of Northern Ireland, p. 170.  
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how in 1968, Northern Ireland emerged as part of the European wide revolt that 
served to challenge existing ideologies.134 
This chapter builds on this emerging literature and argues that the rise of 
the PD— its politics, organization, ideological influences and associations— 
represented a juncture in oppositional politics inside Northern Ireland. Through 
emphasizing the global context and international influences that shaped the civil 
rights movement and by examining the aims, values and actions of the early PD, 












	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Simon Prince, Northern Ireland’s ‘68.  
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2.2. The Roots of the Student Revolt 
There is a time when the operation of the machine becomes so 
odious, makes you so sick at heart, that you can't take part; you can't 
even passively take part, and you've got to put your bodies upon the 
gears and upon the wheels, upon the levers, upon all the apparatus, 
and you've got to make it stop. And you've got to indicate to the 
people who run it, to the people who own it, that unless you're free, 
the machine will be prevented from working at all - Mario Savio, 
Berkeley Free Speech Movement.135 
We were born into an unjust system; we are not prepared to grow old 
in it136- Bernadette Devlin, Queen’s University student. 
 
The roots of the student revolt in 1968 lie in the intersection of changing local 
conditions and the powerful influence of the global revolts of this period. The 
year 1968 would see Britain and Ireland engulfed in a wave of radical activism 
that drew parallels and connections with movements across the globe. From Paris 
to London, Rome to Berlin, Prague to Chicago, student and worker mobilisations 
emerged in an explosive fashion to challenge established orders and to radicalise 
a new generation of left wing activists. In Northern Ireland, October 1968 would 
see the civil rights movement burst onto the streets of Belfast and Derry in what 
would become the Irish dimension to the global revolt.   
Underlying the eruption of civil rights agitation were the economic and 
social changes that swept the post-war Northern Ireland state and created the 
conditions in which a militant student population could flourish in 1968. The 
rapid expansion of education was a central feature to the emergence of student 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 From a famous speech delivered by Mario Savio, leader of the Berkeley Free 
Speech Movement, on 2 December 1964, available online, 
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mariosaviosproulhallsitin.htm, 
accessed on 03/02/2014.  
136 Bernadette Devlin, ‘Foreword’, The Price Of My Soul.  
	   84	  
revolts in the 1960s. The French May is the most profound example, but this 
development occurred on a global level, in the US, Italy, Germany and Britain.137 
In Northern Ireland, this took place on a smaller scale but contributed directly to 
the rise of the civil rights movement. 
Historically, the student population in Northern Ireland was not known 
for its radicalism or political militancy. In 1935 students from Queen’s 
University infamously intervened in a nation-wide railway strike on behalf of 
employers, by breaking picket lines. The role of the students in breaking the 
strike gained them much rancour from the most militant section of Belfast’s 
working class.138 Moreover, this footnote in the history of Ireland’s labour 
movement illustrates the traditional social composition and character of the 
student population in Northern Ireland, from its founding years in the 1840s, 
until the post-WWII era.  
Traditionally, universities were the preserve of the ruling elite in Britain 
and Ireland and reflected the acute class divide that characterised pre-WWII 
capitalism. The university performed a function as a training ground for sections 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Tariq Ali, 1968 and after- Inside the Revolution, (London, Blond and Briggs 
1978), pp. 10-15. Also see Harman, The Fire Last Time.  
138 ‘The scabs were drawn mainly from railway management and from the 
Queen’s University student body, and were paid twice the normal rate for a rail 
worker. The students were treated especially well for their service: special 
provisions were made for them at a local hotel, and detectives were put in place 
to guarantee their protection. The use of students as strike-breakers received 
widespread condemnation. NILP politician Harry Midgley moved a motion that 
the Belfast Corporation should rescind the £7000 per annum that the Corporation 
gave Queen’s University in grants and remission of rates because of its role in 
the strike. Other students at Queen’s were also critical of the scabs: the 
University’s Literary and Scientific Society passed a resolution condemning 
students for involving themselves in “a purely private dispute between railway 
companies and their employees.’ Mitchell, Struggle or Starve, pp. 122-123.  
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of the middle classes and the higher echelons of the establishment.  Thus, in its 
early years the small student population of Queen’s College was exclusive to a 
certain middle and upper class that was predominantly Protestant in religious 
composition, reflecting the high level of Catholic disenfranchisement in the 
state.139  Throughout the 1850s and 1860s Catholics made up roughly 4-5 percent 
of the student body.140 As late as 1909 Catholics accounted for less than 6 
percent of students and although the percentage increased somewhat during the 
interwar years it remained low. 141   
Queen’s University in Belfast was an elitist institution; this was reflected 
in both the composition of students and lecturers but also in the very nature of 
the university experience. As one Liberal Unionist commentator, writing in the 
1890s about Queen’s, expressed it,  
The Queens’ College graduate is not a visionary: the education he 
receives stimulates him to make his way in the world, and especially 
in the services of our Colonial and Indian Empire.142  
This greatly changed in the mid twentieth century for a variety of reasons. By the 
late 1960s the education system had vastly expanded in line with the changing 
needs of industry and capital in Northern Ireland. In the post-WWII era the 
economic power base of Ulster had shifted away from the traditional industries 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 The university was originally chartered as ‘Queen’s College’ in 1845.  
140 Theodore William Moody and James Camlin Beckett, Queen’s Belfast, 1845-
1949-The History of a University (London, Faber and Faber, 1959), p. 194. 
141 Liam Clarkson, A University in Troubled Times- Queen’s Belfast, 1945-2000 
(Four Courts Press, 2004), p. 132. 
142 Quoted in Owen Dudley Edwards, The Sins of Our Fathers- Roots of Conflict 
in Northern Ireland (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1970), p. 252.  
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central to Unionist power, toward British, American and continental firms.143 
This shift coincided with the development of the welfare state and an increased 
level of integration between the free market and the government.144 Such 
transformation demanded a more modernised education system in order to 
accommodate the new economic and social order. Therefore, Queen’s, the main 
centre for higher education, experienced an increase in government grants from 
£216,000 in 1948/9 to almost £24 million in 1965/6.145 The major piece of 
legislation that led to this transformation was the Robbins Report (1963)146, which 
heralded large-scale investment in higher education in Britain. Its Northern Irish 
parallel, the Lockwood Report (1964) had much of the same effect, yet it also 
illustrated the evident sectarian dynamics to such investment. The report led to 
the establishment of a new university in Northern Ireland based at Coleraine, 
much to the dismay of large sections of the community in Derry— the North’s 
second biggest city— who felt that their hometown was far more deserving of 
investment, and that the decision reflected the Unionist desire to both disinvest 
and maintain dominance in the majority Catholic city. The decision precipitated 
the launching of a widespread campaign for a university in Derry, which is often 
seen as a forerunner to the campaign for civil rights in the city.147 
The pattern of investment that was brought with these changes was central 
to the emergence of the student revolt across both Britain and Northern Ireland. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Farrell, The Orange State, p. 229. 
144 Harman, The Fire Last Time, p. 39.  
145 The figures were announced by then Prime Minster Terence O’Neill, see the 
Irish Times, 14 March 1968. 
146 The ‘Robbins Report’ was a report of the committee on Higher Education in 
1963, led by Lord Robbins. It recommended immediate expansion of the 
education sector and its conclusions were accepted by the government on 24 
October 1963.  
147 See, Niall O’Dochartaigh, From Civil Rights to Armalites, pp. 22-24.  
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its most basic form it had a quantitative effect on the number of entrants into third 
level education. At the outbreak of the Second World War there were only 69,000 
students in Britain, but by 1964 it had reached 294,000: ‘In 1900 students had 
been 1 percent of their age group; in 1950 they were still only 1.5 percent, but by 
1972 they were 15 percent.’ 148  
In Belfast this had the combined effect of introducing more students from 
a working class background into the university system but also, crucially, further 
opening up access to education to the Catholic community. Therefore, at the 
beginning of the academic semester in 1968, Queen’s, which was home to 
roughly 5,500 students overall, could claim an influx of 1,574 new 
undergraduates the great majority of whom were from Northern Ireland.149 In the 
same semester the Catholic chaplaincy at Queen’s welcomed 440 new students 
into its ranks.150 By 1968, Catholics made up nearly 30 percent of the student 
body at Queen’s.151 
The education system took on a much wider societal remit and this 
transition had a cumulative effect on the university and student life in general. 
Entry into university was no longer a pathway into the future ruling elite and 
students’ place in society was ill determined, uncertain and subject to many 
variables. The social composition of the student body became defined by this 
‘transitional situation’, in that students now made up a substantial group engaged 
in education, whose future pathway and role in society was yet to be fully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Harman, The Fire Last Time, p. 39. 
149 Irish News, 9 November 1968. 
150 Belfast Telegraph, 10 October 1968. 
151 Clarkson, A University in Troubled Times, p. 132. 
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established.152 In this respect Northern Ireland had experienced many of the 
general preconditions for the rise of a student revolt.153  
The University experience in Belfast was thus opened up to a hopeful 
generation of young Catholics who later ensured that demands for further 
empowerment gained traction. Significantly, these same developments would 
also produce a layer of young Protestants who, for a brief period, identified more 
strongly with the cause for civil rights and the ‘global student rebellion’ than 
with the conservative Unionist state. Indeed, the early student protests of the PD 
saw a notable level of involvement from the Protestant student body and those 
who were at the centre of it testify to the way in which a variety of factors— not 
least the liberalizing climate of the 1960s— helped them with break away from 
the ideological dogmas of ‘their community’.  
PD activist John Gray provides a good example that was indicative of the 
wider experience.154 Born in raised in Belfast to Protestant English parents, Gray 
humorously describes the self contained and largely middle class community 
around Queen’s University, where he came of age, as being akin to the ‘legation 
quarter in Imperial Peking’. As a teenager Gray recalled knowing only one 
Catholic— an English friend of Irish origin— and reminisces that at some point 
he felt it bizarre that he had reached the age of sixteen without really knowing 
anyone from the local Catholic community. Gray’s upbringing coincided with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Alex Callinicos and Simon Turner, ‘The Student Movement Today’, 
International Socialism Journal, No.75 (London, 1977), pp. 9-15. 
153 Gareth Jones, ‘The Meaning of the Student Revolt’, Student Power, 
Problems, Diagnosis, Action, Ed. Alexander Cockburn and Robin Blackburn 
(Penguin Books, 1969), p. 41.  
154 John Gray played a central role in the PD between 1968-1972. Active in both 
Belfast and London Gray launched the Anti-internment League in 1971 and 
acted as its chairperson.  
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the ‘truly terrifying’ rise of Ian Paisley; and he recalls going along to Paisley’s 
early rallies in Belfast’s Ulster Hall, initially as a joke in order to put Italian Lira 
in the collection plate, and being completely hostile to the content of the meeting. 
Overall Gray reflects that ‘I had a perception certainly by 16, 17, that there was 
shall we say… something rotten in the state of Denmark.’155 Initially these 
perceptions would manifest politically with involvement in the Liberal Party156, 
but as more radical movements emerged he would become heavily involved in 
leftwing activism. 
Such liberalization and radicalization in young people was reflected in 
attitudes, and there is much evidence to show the growing disconnect between 
young people and traditional communal politics. Generally, young people had 
become apathetic toward traditional politics with a major survey indicating that 
they were moving away from ‘Orange and Green’ issues and were, for example, 
less concerned with the issue of partition than ever.157 In November 1968 the 
Belfast Telegraph carried out an in-depth opinion poll among young people in 
Northern Ireland. Its findings were an example of the ideological ripples within 
the student populous. Of those surveyed, participants expressed support for 
‘liberal’ leaning policies and such attitudes were much higher among those who 
remained in education. For example, two out of three young people expressed the 
view that the Orange Order had a harmful impact on society and those who 
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157 Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus- An Irish Perspective (Boston, 
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stayed in education were far more critical of the Order.158 On the question of the 
Vietnam War, the acid test for student radicalism across Europe, a 57% majority 
of young people voiced opposition to the war. Again, the longer one stayed in 
education the more likely one was to be against the war.159 The survey also 
highlighted another important factor to early student life, the global awareness 
that was developing among young people.   
As movements for change swept across the ‘Global Village’ of the 1960s, 
activists in Northern Ireland drew inspiration from international events in a way 
that they had never done before. Technological advancements played a part in 
this, and the introduction of television had a major impact in bringing 
international issues to the lives of those in Ireland. In terms of the PD the major 
influences were the black civil rights movement in the US, the French May, the 
campaign against the Vietnam War and the Prague Spring160. Of all the struggles 
that were taking place across the globe it was the movement against racial 
discrimination in the US that provided the major influence on activists here; and 
although the comparisons have been sometimes overstated, it is obvious to see 
how the connections were drawn at the time when we consider the level of 
Catholic discrimination that existed in the Unionist state.161   
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160 The ‘Prague Spring’ was a popular movement against repression and 
censorship in Czechoslovakia in 1968. It led to an intense struggle against the 
Russian military and signaled an important moment of opposition to the form of 
rule prevalent in the Communist Eastern block.  
161 See Dooley, Black and the Green, for an in-depth appraisal of these 
connections. The most obvious case of discrimination was in Derry. As John 
Whyte put it, ‘when it comes to gerrymandering of local government 
boundaries... Nationalists were manipulated out of control in a number of 
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For those instigating civil rights action in the North these connections 
were at first simply drawn through the medium of television and newspaper 
reports, which provided examples of successful direct action. On the first 
housing protest of the HCL in Dungannon in 1963 demonstrators carried 
placards that read, ‘They talk about Alabama, Why don’t they talk about 
Dungannon?’ and ‘If our Religion is against us, ship us to Little Rock.’162 As 
agitation increased in 1968 the links would become more direct and all of the 
leading activists in the civil rights movement would later testify to the influence 
of the black civil rights struggle in the US. John McAnulty, a working class 
Catholic from the Falls Road area in west Belfast, one of the ‘48’ generation who 
entered Queen’s in this period recalled, ‘Everybody on the nationalist side— 
who ten years ago would have had a mild tinge of racism around them— all of a 
sudden saw themselves as black, they looked at Martin Luther King, they looked 
at the marches.’163  
Nor were the comparisons confined to those out to challenge the Unionist 
state.  As late as April 1970— at a time when the British government’s sympathy 
with the plight of the civil rights movement had generally waned — the UK 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
discrimination in the whole field of controversy.’ Whyte, How much 
discrimination was there under the unionist regime 1921-1968? 
162 Dooley, Black and Green, p 30.  
163 Interview with John McAnulty, Belfast, 23/07/2015. Fionnbarra 
O’Dochartaigh, a native of Derry explained further: ‘Many of us looked to the 
civil rights struggles in America for our inspiration. We compared ourselves to 
the poor blacks in the US ghettoes and those suffering under the cruel system of 
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partitionist statelet that no Irish elector had cast a vote to create.’ Fionbarra O’ 
Dochartaigh, Ulster’s White Negroes, from Civil Rights to Insurrection (AK 
Press, Edinburgh, 1994), p. 14.  
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representative in Northern Ireland, Ronnie Burroughs, would write to then Prime 
Minister James Callaghan that,  
The most casual observer of the Northern Ireland scene cannot avoid 
drawing parallels with the Southern states of America; the ‘poor 
white’ Protestant is convinced that if the Roman Catholic minority is 
given an inch it will take an ell, become ‘uppity’, and encroach on his 
entrenched and often minimal prerogatives.164  
Burroughs continued to draw the parallels with the Unionist Party, which in his 
view contained ‘people whose views can be with difficulty distinguished from 
those of Governor Wallace and Senator McCarthy.’165 The tentative inspiration 
that was evident from the mid 1960s would become more established as 
campaigns developed and activists borrowed strategies and tactics from their 
global counterparts, making direct connections with the black freedom struggle. 
Indeed, it would be student activists in Belfast, members of the PD, who went 
furthest in taking influence from the militancy of the US movement. This was 
largely down to the way in which the US experience seemed to give direction to 
a movement that was, by its very nature, disorganised and lacking in ideological 
clarity. But if the US movement was important in giving political direction to the 
PD, it also owed a great debt to the experience of student protest campaigns 
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across Europe, most particularly the awakening of student radicalisation in the 
Sorbonne in Paris, May 1968—the high peak of student radicalism in Europe.166  
The changing composition of the student community drawn out above 
was a feature throughout western capitalism. But it was most profound in France, 
where the huge expansion of education partly laid the basis in which widespread 
struggle— combining students and workers— brought the country to a halt and 
almost threatened revolution, nearly toppling the government of Charles De 
Gaulle. The French ‘68 began with relatively small-scale student protests that 
were met with hard levels of repression from the police and university 
authorities, provoking mass student strikes, occupations and protests, which 
culminated in the ‘night of the barricades’, when up to 30,000 students fought 
pitched battles against state forces.167 The student revolt precipitated a much 
wider wave of workers struggle culminating in a mass general strike, during 
which De Gaulle temporarily left the country. Politically, the events in France 
had a major impact on even the smallest forces of the European left, as they 
signified a new fusion between student and workers struggles. One major 
influence was the idea of the ‘spontaneity of resistance’; it was best expressed by 
the most known leader of the French student revolt, Daniel Cohn-Bendit.168 The 
new student revolts rose rapidly and moved fast, and Cohn-Bendit counter posed 
this with the old left’s models of patiently building a Party with a structure and 
leadership, contesting that ‘our movement does not need leaders to direct it… it 
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can perfectly well express itself without the help of a ‘vanguard’.169 The 
problems arising from such an approach will be drawn out later in this thesis, for 
now it is sufficient to note that the French example clearly influenced the PD. 
One year on from ‘Mai 68’, Michael Farrell insisted that the PD was a 
‘revolutionary association’, one that was ‘considerably influenced by the 
Sorbonne Assembly and by concepts of libertarianism as well as socialism.’170 
Throughout Europe in 1968 sections of the burgeoning student community 
entered a process of radicalisation, it often began with a realisation that that their 
governments and those who ran their education system did not live by the 
‘liberal’ ideology with which they tried to justify their existing societies.171 In 
Northern Ireland the first signs of student protest would emerge in opposition to 
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2.3. Early student activism 
Among the new generation who benefitted from post-war reforms there had been 
early efforts to investigate the issue of civil rights at Queen’s University. Indeed, 
it was here that a number of individuals who would later make their mark in the 
PD gained their first real experiences of political activity. In 1964 a group 
centred on student activists including Bowes Egan, Eamonn McCann, and 
Michael Farrell embarked on a fact-finding mission under the auspices of the 
‘Working Committee on Civil Rights in Northern Ireland’. They collected oral 
evidence and researched the level of discrimination in towns across the north.172 
It was an example of the type of activity that was carried out by small groups of 
socialists at Queen’s, many of whom found an ephemeral home in the QUB 
Labour Group.  
 Of all the activists that emerged from the leftwing student milieu in the 
mid 1960s, Michael Farrell would prove to be the most influential in the PD. A 
glance at his early political record reveals an already notable history of activism; 
a former member of the Trotskyist Irish Workers’ Group173, at undergraduate 
level he had been chairman of the QUB Labour Group, Vice President of the 
Union of Students Ireland 1965-6, External Relations Officer of QUB Students 
Representative Council and an executive member of the Northern Ireland Labour 
Party. His potential was recognised early by the university when he won the 
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Queen’s Orator award for two successive years.174 Many of his contemporaries 
had moved in similar circles; Eamonn McCann, a native of Derry, also claimed a 
record of leftwing activism. A former chairman of the QUB Labour Group 
between 1962-1963, McCann was another notable orator who served as President 
of the university debating club, the Literific society. After a stint living in 
London, where he was active in the IWG and served as editor of its paper the 
Irish Militant— a role that saw him organise support for workers struggles and 
partake in Campaign against Nuclear Disarmament (CND) marches— McCann 
returned to Derry just in time for the outbreak of civil rights activity.175 Bowes 
Egan and Cyril Toman had been active in the QUB Labour group of 1963. 
Toman had visited Moscow in 1964 and was a member of the NILP. Egan 
became a founding member of the PD and a leading activist at Queen’s. He 
would later move to London to practice law. A similar type of recruit had 
gravitated to socialist labour politics in small numbers by 1968. ‘Red’ Rory 
McShane was a member of the NILP and was active on the Student 
Representative Council at Queen’s. He had also written for the Irish Militant.176 
Although the influence of the student left was marginal throughout the early to 
mid 1960s, these activists would prove capable of making a much wider impact 
when a mass movement erupted in 1968.  
 Generally, the political climate at Queen’s was seen as liberal in 
comparison to the entrenched traditions that existed outside the university’s 
walls. The largest student political society was the QUB Labour grouping and the 
other main political societies included the New Ireland Society and the National 
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Democratic Group, and the main Unionist grouping, the Conservative and 
Unionist Society, was dominated by ‘O’Neill’ supporters. Around this time the 
society even elected a Catholic, Louis Boyle, as its chairman.177 Despite the 
tolerant political atmosphere sectarian divisions still shaped student politics at 
Queen’s. One former student from the mid 1960s remembered the sharp social 
cleavage that was present throughout the entire university system. Students’ 
social lives were divided on religious lines and there were ritualised communal 
confrontations, such as the annual ‘border debate’, when factions from each 
community voted ‘for’ or ‘against’ partition.178 Another student, Ciaran 
McKeown recalled that those societies who controlled the student council, and 
therefore the purse strings of student politics, were almost all Protestant, while 
Catholic societies tended to participate in ‘powerless’ debates.179  
 Within this atmosphere there was little radical left wing tradition, nor 
evidence that an explosion of student radicalism was imminent in the mid-late 
1960s. In hindsight, Michael Farrell described Queen’s’ political climate pre-‘68 
as being one of the ‘most docile campuses in western Europe’180, and Bernadette 
Devlin, a Celtic studies student with an increasing appetite for radical politics, 
found on her entry into Queen’s that most of the political societies remained 
disconnected from the realities of Northern Ireland: they were interested in 
abstract ideas not action and gave her little opportunity for expanding her 
political worldview. Although radical organisation was lacking at Queen’s, songs 
of the counterculture were beginning to travel across the globe: 
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There was more real politics in the Folk Music society than any of 
the parties. They sang black civil rights songs in the folk music 
society before anybody else in Queen’s was interested in the race 
problem, and they were singing songs about unemployment in 
Belfast long before the civil rights movement took it up.181  
The first instances of student mobilisation emerged behind the cause of free 
speech and freedom of political assembly. On 7 March 1967 the Minster of 
Home affairs, William Craig, authorised a banning of Republican Clubs across 
Northern Ireland under the Special Powers Act, labelling them as subversive 
fronts for the IRA. The actions of the government in restricting republican 
organisation and the university’s acquiescence to the ban would spark a notable 
reaction within the student community at Queen’s, initiating protests for freedom 
of speech and showing the potential for student mobilisation.   
 In reaction to the ban, a group of young republicans immediately set up a 
Club the following day at Queen’s. On 10 March a small demonstration of 80 
students held a protest march, and on 11 March the Young Socialists182 marched 
through the city centre in support of their republican counterparts.183 That May 
the Republican Club was approved by the Student Representative Council, but 
the following semester the University’s Academic Council banned the Club, in 
compliance with the government’s orders. It provided the catalyst for the first 
instances of major student protest reaching Belfast.   
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The University’s acquiescence to Craig’s order was met with hostility by 
sections of the wider student populace and in a late night session of the Student 
Representative Council, on 6 November, the issue was debated and a resolution 
against the ban was passed by 108 votes to 5, with 8 abstentions.184 Two days 
later, the Union’s debating society passed a motion by 315 votes to 1, declaring 
that students had a right to organise under whatever banner they chose. 
Opposition to the ban was organised within a Joint Action Committee of 
various groups, including the New Ireland Society, the Republican Club, QUB 
Labour grouping and the Young Socialists. It gathered hundreds of students and 
agreed to organise a protest to Unionist Party headquarters in Glengall Street on 
Wednesday 15 November.185 Among those who led the students was Rory 
McShane, chairman of the QUB Labour group. McShane conveyed the concerns 
of the students when he asserted; ‘the crux of the matter is not the support of the 
Republican Club, but that public representatives could ban a word.’186  
 The ban epitomised the irrational opposition to any political grouping that 
challenged the basis of Unionist power. In reality, the Republican Club was 
inactive and politically innocuous, its only real meeting was held months later on 
13 March 1968; it was a discussion on the Special Powers Act. The futility of the 
Club was recognised by both the police and the Minister of Home Affairs’ legal 
advisors. When tasked with investigating the issue the Attorney General, E. W. 
Jones, concluded that the ban was wholly unjustified and that the Republican 
Club at Queen’s had no connection with the IRA. The claim was even supported 
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by County Inspector of the RUC, Bill Meharg, who went on to state that he 
found, ‘no evidence before me that this Republican Club has any affiliations or 
connections with Sinn Fein or any other Republican Club who might be engaged 
or interested in subversive activity’187.  Despite these later revelations on behalf 
of state officials the ban was enforced, its result was to polarise the student body 
and bring to light the question of freedom of political organisation inside the 
university. 
 Opposition to the ban inside the campus was countered by support for 
the government from hard-line loyalists, with the Unionist Labour Association 
calling on supporters to ‘educate these so called intellectuals.’188 Ian Paisley and 
his Ulster Protestant Volunteers189, who declared their intention to physically 
stop the march, led opposition to the students. Faced with the possibility of a 
direct confrontation, the police intervened to re-direct the student march. Instead 
of passing through Shaftesbury Square, where Paisley supporters were gathered, 
the students marched to the home of the Minister for Home Affairs at Annadale 
Avenue. The march mobilised up to 1,000 people and student leaders then 
delivered a letter outlining their reasons for protest.190 The march passed off as a 
jovial enough affair, but it was in many ways a practice run for events to come 
and had served as an example of student activists acting within a semi organised 
structure. If anything, the students had displayed a willingness to avoid 
confrontation and abide by the direction of the police.  
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Apart from this instance of mobilisation, student politics remained muted 
throughout the early months of 1968. Outside the campus, however, the forces 
that would begin to coalesce civil rights activity were beginning to be 
established. By the summer of 1968 the NICRA strategy of lobbying was 
becoming exhausted, and sections of the association were realising the necessity 
of direct action. On 19 June, MP Austin Currie raised a specific case of 
discrimination in housing in the area of Caledon, a small village in Tyrone. The 
case concerned a nineteen-year-old unmarried Protestant woman and secretary of 
a Unionist parliamentary candidate, who had been allocated a home despite a 
number of more qualified Catholic families in need. Currie joined a group of 
local republican activists and squatted in the home in an effort to highlight the 
issue. The action worked and local newspapers and television crews descended 
on the home sparking a formidable interest in the issue.191  
 Currie returned to the NICRA leadership to propose a public civil rights 
march. Although the call was supported it was met with caution from some on 
the NICRA leadership, with long-standing communist Betty Sinclair voicing the 
strongest opposition to the idea of a demonstration. Sinclair would become the 
most vocal opponent of efforts to mobilise civil rights marches whilst attempting 
to steer the campaign in a constitutional direction, thus maintaining moderate 
support from both Unionists and nationalists. Nevertheless, Currie’s proposal 
saw support and the NICRA executive called Northern Ireland’s first ‘civil 
rights’ march from Dungannon to Coalisland on 24 August.192 The 
demonstration attracted a broad base of support from the nationalist community 
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and mobilised over 2,000 people.193 Importantly, it also gave a handful of 
Queen’s students, mostly centred on the Young Socialists, an opportunity to 
intervene in support of what was to become the defining political issue of their 
generation.  
The Young Socialists had been sporadically active at Queen’s throughout 
the year, particularly in organising solidarity around international issues such as 
the Vietnam War, but never managing to amass more than a small audience. On 
the day of the Dungannon to Coalisland march the group had organised their own 
demonstration in Belfast city centre, to protest against the Russian invasion of 
Czechoslovakia. The connection between the global and the local was not lost on 
the activists: ‘For us it was a symbolic fusion of the international student 
rebellion with the smouldering revolt against the specific grievances of Northern 
Ireland’.194 Padraigin Drinan, an undergraduate student at Queen’s, recalled the 
efforts to produce material for the march: ‘I was the person who made the 
posters, so I had placards that had double placards. On the front of them it said 
‘Russia Get Out of Czechoslovakia’ and then you took that off and it said ‘One 
Man One Vote’.’195  
 The group set off to Dungannon in cars from Belfast, but when they 
arrived their propaganda was not welcomed on the rally. Both their red banner 
and flags in support of the Vietnamese Liberation Army were a cause of 
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grievance to the stewards who demanded their removal.196 The efforts of march 
organisers to ‘keep politics out’ of the protest was an early sign of the division 
between the older left and a new generation of activists determined to further 
politicise the movement. Evidently, the march would not reach its destination 
and was blocked from entering the town centre of Dungannon by the RUC, in the 
face of a Paisleyite protest. In the middle of the march small scuffles broke out 
between the police and young demonstrators and at least four of the marchers 
were injured. Eventually appeals from some of the more moderate leaders of 
NICRA were accepted, and after speeches were delivered the march was wound 
down. However, not before the crowd began to sing ‘We Shall Overcome’.197 
The international anthem for civil rights had made its way to the streets of 
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2.4. October 1968 
Civic unrest, particularly among the young, seems to be almost 
endemic around the world at present. Scarcely a day passes that sit-
downs, teach-ins, parades, student protests etc, do not feature in the 
news in some country. It became the turn of Northern Ireland on 5 
October, 1968, when a large scale civil rights protest was held in 
Londonderry, followed soon afterward by a student protest 
movement in Belfast and later other marches and meetings…198- 
Northern Ireland information service, Stormont Castle.   
The events in Dungannon provided the opportunity for a group of radicals in 
Derry to call a civil rights march in their city. Derry had for long been the most 
explicit example of the Catholic community’s grievances in the Northern Ireland 
state. For some months a loose network of socialists had been agitating with 
some success around the issue of housing and unemployment. Members of the 
Derry Labour Party, republicans and independent activists were leading local 
activity and much to the consternation of the Nationalist Party called a civil 
rights march for 5 October.199 
The march was to pass directly through the main Unionist area, and after 
haphazard negotiations they managed to get the support of NICRA. On 1 
October the Apprentice Boys announced a march on the same route as the civil 
rights demonstration, in what seemed an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of 
the civil rights cause. William Craig reacted by banning both marches.200 The 
ban on marching troubled the NICRA leadership who wanted to call off the 
demonstration. However, the radicals in Derry ensured otherwise, and with the 
support of the Belfast Young Socialists, informed NICRA that the march would 
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go ahead with or without their involvement.201 In the event, NICRA agreed to 
march and thus, on 5 October, when hundreds of civil rights protestors marched 
up toward a police cordon, conflict of some form had become almost inevitable.  
The demonstration saw a political shift from the previous civil rights 
march and with socialists at the helm of organising affairs, the march took on a 
distinctly class character that forwarded labour slogans. The placards distributed 
by Derry activists read, ‘Tories are Vermin’.202 On this occasion a busload of the 
newly launched ‘Young Socialist Alliance’ (YSA) from Queen’s had attended 
the march. The YSA was essentially an independent version of the Labour Party 
Young Socialists, established by Michael Farrell in order to coalesce socialist 
activism at Queen’s and he took its name directly from its US counterpart.203 
Despite arriving late, the activists joined the demonstration concurrent to 
a tense stand off occurring between the organisers and the police. While the civil 
rights activists held a public meeting, some of the more moderate leaders of 
NICRA, particularly Betty Sinclair, began to call on people to disperse. Michael 
Farrell describes what happened next from the perspective of the Young 
Socialists: 
We were not having that. It was 1968, the year of student revolutions 
in Paris and Prague, of Mexico City and the Chicago Democratic 
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convention. We did not think of ourselves in quite that league but 
going home peacefully meant letting Bill Craig and the RUC walk all 
over us. We would have been angrier still if we had known that the 
RUC had already attacked the head of the march, batoning Gerry Fitt 
and Eddie McAteer, leader of the opposition in the Stormont 
Parliament, and the leaders’ response had been the meeting and the 
plea to go home. We only heard all that afterwards. Our group of 30 
or 40 protestors pushed to the front and up against the RUC. We did 
not attack them. In fact we lectured them about gerrymandering and 
how they were being exploited by the Unionist bosses too, and then 
we appealed to them to let us march. But we intended to stay put: if 
they wanted us to go home they would have to make us. Suddenly an 
RUC man rammed a baton into the belly of the man beside me. I did 
not even see the baton that hit me on the head and the next few 
minutes were hazy. I only know that in the TV film of the events I 
can be seen on the ground being belaboured by an RUC officer with 
a blackthorn stick. After that it was chaos.204 
The RUC baton charged the protestors, including MPs, in a frenzied attack to 
break up the march. For the first time in Northern Ireland a water cannon was 
used to hose the demonstrators, and various eyewitness accounts from the march 
described the brutality of the police in attacking protestors without 
provocation.205 The official government report into the disturbances in Derry 
would later admit that the police broke ranks and, ‘used their batons 
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indiscriminately’ on protestors in Duke Street.206  While a burden of blame was 
placed on the individual police officers that had attacked the demonstrators there 
was also a high level of blame directed toward the government who justified the 
attack. Three MPs from the British Labour Party who witnessed the violence 
went public with harsh criticism of the police and claimed to have seen innocent 
people being clubbed and police striking protestors on the testicles, among other 
acts.207 In the aftermath, the Northern Ireland Cabinet released a statement 
‘deploring’ the organisers of the march and speaking strongly in support of the 
RUC, whom they claimed had prevented ‘an extremely dangerous situation from 
developing’.208 The events of 5 October 1968 in Derry marked a turning point 
and acted as the catalyst to further civil rights action. The bloody scenes were 
broadcast on television sets across the country and covered in detail by most 
major newspapers. That evening the first major rioting began across the city and 
barricades began to appear in Catholic areas.  A mass movement was emerging.    
The reaction to Derry among the student population was angry and 
palpable, something that was immediately seized upon by those who had taken 
part in the march, and it was the Young Socialists who drove forward the PD 
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from its beginning. As the students returned from Derry on the YSA bus, 
preparations were discussed for a march that Wednesday, and the following day 
a group of activists met in Michael Farrell’s house where they arranged to further 
advertise the march. Cyril Toman explained the thinking behind the march to the 
Cameron Commission: ‘it would be better supported if it was organized by a 
broader group than just the Young Socialists, so the joint action committee which 
had organized the protest to Craig’s house over the banning of the Queen’s 
Republican Club was reconvened and undertook to liaise with the Young 
Socialists in organizing the march’.209 Fred Taggart, a moderate student activist 
who emerged as the official leader of the march, confirmed this narrative of 
events and added that in reality the Joint Action Committee played little role in 
calling the march:  
I came home in the Young Socialist Alliance bus which left at 11pm 
and on the way home we arranged a march for the following 
Wednesday. This was done by the Joint Action Committee. I was the 
only office bearer of that committee left, and I therefore gave notice 
to the police about the march. There was really no Joint Action 
Committee organisation available…. In this way I emerged as the 
organiser of the march in the public eye but this was pure chance.210 
On 6 October a group of 60 students picketed the home of the Minister of Home 
Affairs in protest at events in Derry,211 Craig responded abrasively describing the 
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students as a ‘bunch of bloody fools’212. The YSA released an immediate 
statement condemning the ‘dictatorial’ and ‘provocative’ actions of the police 
and called for all socialists and democrats to hold an immediate demonstration in 
opposition to police violence and Unionist dictatorship.213 The call was heard.  
 On campus, there were two big meetings in the run up to the march, 
organised by the Union Debating Society and the New Ireland Society, both 
voted to support the march and individuals who had been involved in supporting 
the Republican Clubs the previous year got behind it. A leaflet printed by the 
students and distributed around the campus declared support for civil rights 
demands, including freedom of procession and freedom of speech. It read, ‘We 
will defy any further repression of protest against such flagrant and continuous 
injustice.’214 On 9 October, J E Greeves, an official at the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, enclosed a copy of a leaflet sent to him by students in a letter to Harold 
Black. It forwarded the civil rights demands and, among other things, called for a 
full inquiry into the events of 5 October in Derry. In his correspondence, Greeves 
stated that he did not propose to send any formal acknowledgement to the 
students.215 The indifference of the Northern Ireland state toward student protests 
would not last long. 
 The march had been planned to leave the university area and pass through 
Shaftesbury Square on route to the city centre, but predictably, Ian Paisley called 
a counter protest in the square. The evening before the march the RUC served a 
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notice banning the march under the 1951 Public Order Act and student leaders 
agreed, for the second time, to a re-route of the march in the face of likely 
disorder. Rory McShane called on the RUC to intervene: 
It seems that every time anyone decides to make a move concerned 
with anything so basic as human rights. Mr. Paisley’s organisation 
raises its ugly head…. The time has come for the police to say to Mr. 
Paisley that he must turn away. It is up to the police to make sure that 
Mr Paisley is not there. It is up to the police to show that anyone can 
march anywhere in this city.216  
That evening the students’ union debating society held a discussion on the march 
and support was reaffirmed with 353 votes to 80 in favour of marching.217 The 
march mobilised some 2,000 students, including up to 20 lecturers and teaching 
staff. The decision to re-route the march was put to vote, but the crowd voted in 
favour of defying the ban. In reaction the police proposed a more amicable path 
for the march, taking the students through University Street and the Ormeau 
Road and into the city centre. After another close vote, the alternative route was 
accepted and the students took off under the banner of the Joint Action 
Committee.  
The students’ placards mocked the political establishment, with slogans 
such as ‘Royal Ulster Gestapo’ and ‘We want Craig’s Head’.218 At the other end 
of the route Paisley’s crowd had marched from Shaftesbury Square to the 
students’ destination point at City Hall, where he launched into a tirade of 
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criticism of the government. Between the two stood the RUC, who formed a line 
in Linenhall Street at the rear end of the City Hall. In some of the students’ eyes 
it further showed the partisan nature of the police in allowing Paisley’s tactics to 
triumph. One student remembered a look of ‘gleeful anticipation’ on the faces of 
some police officers.219 
Faced with another stand off, the students collectively sat down on the 
road in protest at their treatment. They were replicating well-used tactics from 
their counterparts across the globe. One lecturer recalled that they, ‘sat down 
because that is what students did. They had seen it happening around the 
world.’220 The scenes provided some of the most famous of the early civil rights 
period. Margaret Ward was a school student at the time and joined in on the 
protest. Her memory of the sit-down depicts both the innocence with which some 
attended the protest, but also the experience of street politics:  
A collection was made to buy sweets to pass the time and relieve the 
tedium of this particularly non-violent protest. As we sat down 
someone placed a ‘Smash Stormont’ placard in my hand. At that time 
I don’t think I had a clear idea of what Stormont was.221  
After some time a vote was taken as to whether the demonstration should attempt 
to march ahead or return to the university. One journalist on the scene noted that 
the crowd was overwhelmingly in favour of moving forward against the 
Paisleyite counter demonstration, and as tensions flared the police joined ranks to 
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form a solid wall across the street.222 The whole scene was one of anger and 
frustration with very little political direction. Poet Seamus Heaney, then a 
lecturer at Queen’s, watched in awe, and described ‘embarrassed, indignant 
young Ulstermen and women whose deep-grained conservatism of behaviour 
was outweighed by a reluctant recognition of injustice.’223  
 After warning pleas from organisers the students eventually began to 
disperse back to the university, while a hardcore group of around 200 remained 
on the road. Significantly, Young Socialists such as Farrell saw the opportunity 
to give direction to the crowd and helped persuade the remaining students to turn 
their backs on the police and loyalists and return to the university in order to 
discuss future action.224 On return to the campus, hundreds of students packed 
into the MacMordie Hall at the students union where an open-ended meeting was 
conducted through the night. The mass meeting was outside of the ‘official’ 
structures of student politics, indeed, some student representatives refused to 
participate in civil rights action. Ian Brick, President of the Students' Union, had 
already stated his opposition to the march and organised an alternative meeting at 
the university, which attracted a small crowd.225   
To those who attended the meeting it was an explosion of political 
discussion and energy that replicated the democratic forums of debate thrown up 
by student protests across Europe. One anarchist newspaper compared it ‘to the 
kind of free debate of which the Sorbonne in the May Days was the best 
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example’226. The crowd was intent on continuing civil rights mobilisation and 
decided to establish a movement to drive forward the campaign in Belfast. That 
night the PD was born, although its name would not be formally announced until 
later. What emerged was greatly in line with the new political forms thrown up 
by the ‘New Left’ across the globe in 1968. A central trait was their rejection of 
the dominant ideologies of the day, namely, western liberal capitalism and soviet 
state communism. In Belfast, the PD followed this pattern and rejected 
established ideologies and political traditions in favour of a vague, but sincere, 
aspiration to unite people behind their platform of social justice and equality. The 
US Marxist, Hal Draper, a keen observer of the American campus revolts of the 
1960s noted that the ‘non ideological’ character of student uprisings accounted 
for their radical potential and unpredictability, ‘This was the explosiveness of 
uncalculated indignation, not the slow boil of planned revolt…the first discovery 
of the chasm between the rhetoric of Ideals and the cynicism of Power among the 
pillars of society.’227 It was uncalculated indignation and anger that would drive 
the PD forward in its early formation.  
 Organisationally, the PD embraced what could be described as an 
autonomist political formation. Instead of a formal leadership, the group, fearful 
of the influence of conventional political organisations, elected a ‘faceless 
committee’ of 10 activists who were chosen partly for their independence and 
lack of ties to other parties. The first committee included the following;  
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Ann McBurnley (a recent graduate), Joe Martin (a recent graduate), 
Patricia Drinan (undergraduate), Eddie McCamely (undergraduate), 
Bernadette Devlin (undergraduate), Kevin Boyle (lecturer), Fergus 
Woods (a recent graduate), Malcolm Myle (worker), Ian Goodall 
(undergraduate), Michael O’Kane (undergraduate).228   
The committee was conceived as ‘a body elected to administer and carry into 
effect the decisions of the people’, and was intended to possess solely 
coordinating powers.229 The discussion produced a clear set of demands centred 
on the civil rights programme: One Man one Vote, fair boundaries, Houses on 
need, Jobs on merit, Free speech and repeal of the Special Powers Act.230  
 The PD captured the youth radicalism associated with worldwide student 
protests in this period; it embraced no formal ideology and showed a distain for 
traditional forms of politics and a distrust of bureaucratic structure and 
organisation. In lieu, it counterpoised spontaneity and militancy as their method 
to drive forward the civil rights movement. Power and authority was derived 
from the mass meeting, which would begin to occur on campus on a weekly 
basis and constituted a form of open participatory democracy. The Cameron 
commission later summed up the nature of participation in the PD: 
People’s Democracy has no accepted constitution and no recorded 
membership. At any meeting any person attending is entitled both to 
speak and to vote: decisions taken at one meeting may be reviewed at 
the next - indeed during the currency of any given meeting. No 
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subscription, entrance fee or membership qualification is required of 
members (if they can be so-called) of this movement, and the 
requisite finance is obtained from collections at meetings, 
subscriptions or contributions from well wishers and supporters both 
within Northern Ireland and elsewhere.231  
The name itself conveyed the idea of mass people power. John Murphy, who was 
tasked with printing the first political material from the group, recalled that the 
name originated from the sit down protest in Linenhall Street, when he said, 
‘This is the only democratic street in Northern Ireland. This is a People’s 
Democracy.’232 The following morning leaflets were printed under the title ‘PD’ 
and by 11 October a mass meeting of students had approved the name. The first 
poster of the organisation depicted a lean, outstretched, red hand with the slogan 
‘March for your rights’, it was a parody of the loyalist ‘Red Hand of Ulster’.233 
PD activists would prove very able in the usage of new medium to convey their 
ideas, their material punctuated with humour and satire directed at establishment 
figures such as William Craig, ‘Billy Liar’, the first of many politicians to be 
ridiculed.234   
 The launching of the PD struck a chord among a layer of students who 
had become alienated and frustrated at the situation in Northern Ireland. 
Politically ill defined, the PD emphasised anti-authoritarianism and set out to 
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further expose the Unionist government; its short term raison d’être was to 
mobilise students behind the six civil rights demands. Primarily made up of 
Queen’s students, involvement in the PD was open to all and this allowed more 
seasoned activists, or recent graduates, to contribute to the meetings. The PD 
would in time become the main political and ideological pole of attraction for 
civil rights activists in Belfast.  
 When students at Queen’s University began to make the headlines across 
Ireland the spectre of revolutionary ‘student power’ was sweeping Europe. Tariq 
Ali, a leading figure of the British new left, remembered that in 1968, 
‘Internationalism reached a new peak’235, as student movements rose that were 
inextricably linked to the social and political organisation of society outside of 
their respective campus.236 In Belfast, the PD emerged as a direct result of events 
external to the university campus and was defined by its commitment to the 
campaign for civil rights. This has been contrasted with other student movements 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 Ali, 1968 and After, p. 35.  
236 See Hal Draper, Berkeley- The New Student Revolt (Centre for Socialist 
History, 1965). Available online, 
http://www.marxistsfr.org/archive/draper/1965/berkeley/index.htm, accessed on 
10/02/2015.  
237 Arthur, The People’s Democracy 1968-73. For example, the initial student 
protests during the ‘French May’ arose as a fight to allow mixed sex dormitories, 
this later generalized and transformed into a much wider student social struggle.  
	   117	  
2.5. Street politics and civil disobedience 
The immediate plan of the students was to return to the streets and march to the 
centre of Belfast, although there was uncertainty about when this should happen. 
The next march was postponed from 12 October to 16 October to prevent a clash 
with two Paisleyite counter protests.238 At a meeting of at least 500 students, it 
was agreed to persevere with a march to City Hall and as the day approached 
Paisley called counter protests presenting a now familiar scenario, with the 
march being rerouted by the RUC.239  
 The march assembled over 2,000 students who gathered behind a newly 
fashioned ‘People’s Democracy’ banner. The movement now attracted a 
formidable police presence, with up to five RUC vans in the vicinity adjacent to 
the students union; the police would flank the march throughout.240 When the 
marched reached its destination around 150 Paisley supporters gathered at the 
City Hall to taunt and jeer the students, with 200 police separating the two 
camps. Police reports documented the various speeches that were delivered, 
lecturer Kevin Boyle spoke on behalf of the ‘faceless’ committee, ‘We are the 
future in the eyes of the workless, the homeless, those that have been misled by 
politicians. We are the future in fighting for civil rights’241, and Bernadette 
Devlin posed the question; ‘Should people be deprived of their right to a day’s 
work simply because they go to a different place of worship. Is this a healthy 
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society?’242 During the rally speaking rights were open to all, and at one point the 
loudspeaker was offered to the counter protestors, a proposition which none of 
them accepted. A consistent theme among those that did speak was the non-
violent and anti-sectarian nature of the movement, and speakers continually 
appealed to the Paisleyite crowd to view their interests in common.243  
 The hopes of Protestant and Catholic unity were not unfounded. Early PD 
marches galvanised a notable level of Protestant support behind the civil rights 
demands, representing the highest point of cross-communal action in the 
movement. In a campus of roughly 5,500, the majority of whom were 
Protestants, the PD could claim to have mobilised a substantive layer of this 
constituency, a fact that was often stressed by those emerging as leaders of the 
movement. The wide-ranging involvement even extended to Unionists on 
campus. Louis Boyle, a Catholic and former chairperson of the Conservative and 
Unionist Society at Queen’s, spoke at the PD rally on 16 October: 
I am a Unionist and in company with a number of Unionist 
colleagues of mine I took part in this march today because I believe 
in civil rights. I took part in this parade, this march, today because 
this march is non-sectarian.244  
Another notable feature of the PD was the changing gender dynamics that were 
signified in the movement. Indeed, the expansion of higher education had 
delivered a significant increase in women at university and they would emerge to 
the forefront of the PD. The first PD committee contained three women activists 
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and one student recalled a memorable meeting, when the crowd was uncertain 
about who would contact the police to seek permission to march. A young 
Bernadette Devlin raised her voice, ‘If there’s not a man in this hall with the guts 
to sign it, I will’.245 It seemed to encapsulate the voice of a new layer of 
confident women activists before feminist politics had reached Belfast.  
The extent to which the PD represented a break with past traditions was 
seen in the way that it approached the national question. Eamonn McCann 
explained how, ‘The partition issue had for so long been the property of 
contending Tory factions that mere mention of it smacked of jingoism.’246 For 
the new left, partition was seen as irrelevant and the notion that the border was 
the primary cause of strife was discarded by a layer of young people who could 
see the tenacity to which conservative clerics and politicians held on to this issue, 
on both sides of the sectarian divide. PD treatment of the ‘Orange Tories’ in the 
North was thus consistent with its criticism of ‘Green Tories’ south of the border. 
When Irish Prime Minister, Jack Lynch, was forced to address the crisis and 
declared that partition was the ‘cause of all ills’ the PD hit back against the 
record of the Southern state in securing civil rights.247  
The logical conclusion of the PD demands was that reform of the 
Northern state was possible. In a letter to the British Prime Minister, Harold 
Wilson, the PD asked; ‘Reform can be effected within the union. Why not?’248 
Later, the PD would explicitly assert that, ‘the border is not the issue, civil rights 
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is.’249 To some extent this allowed for a critical mass of activists at Queen’s to 
participate in PD, but it would subsequently prove problematic as the civil rights 
struggle intensified. The focus, therefore, was on ‘bread and butter’ issues as a 
way of uniting both communities. Throughout October the PD called weekly 
meetings and its early actions encompassed basic welfare campaigns, discussions 
proposed group fact-finding activities on issues such as company votes and the 
number of people with no vote in local government affairs. Other suggestions 
included helping couples find deposits for homes and helping voluntary bodies 
like the Citizens Advice Bureau, or turning old properties into flats and waste 
ground into playgrounds for children.250  
Around the university campus members of the Unionist government were 
met by placard waving students whenever they entered the public eye. On 10 
October the government Education Minister, Captain Long, was heckled and 
jeered at by students as he attempted to address the universities committee for 
civil rights.251 The cat calling and ridicule thrown at the minster was the cause of 
consternation within the more respectable echelons of civil society. One 
Councillor and ‘rate payer’ conveyed his anger at a generation of children 
beyond the command of their parents. In the pages of the Belfast Telegraph he 
argued that student protests were a drain on ratepayers pockets; ‘I have always 
regarded our students as sensible…but now I am beginning to wonder?’252  
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More adverse criticism came directly from the government. On 16 
October William Craig made a speech in Stormont in which he denied 
allegations of police brutality in Derry and hit out at the civil rights protestors 
who, he alleged, shared a similar agenda to the IRA. Craig blamed the Irish 
Workers’ Group253 for much of the student activity and named Rory McShane, 
Eamonn McCann and Gerry Lawless as leading members.254 Alas, his 
information was inaccurate. The IWG was effectively defunct and had played no 
role in the student unrest or the PD.255 Craig’s claims echoed those of Paisley, 
who had gone to great lengths to portray the PD as an offshoot of militant 
republicanism. Paisley’s main organ, The Protestant Telegraph, was littered with 
sensational sectarian propaganda against the civil rights movement and argued 
that the PD was nothing more than a ‘Republican front pseudo-student 
organisation’, intent on creating, ‘disturbance, riot and bloodshed in Belfast’.256 
Despite the reaction of the hard-line loyalist right and the Unionist Party, the 
response to the PD in its early stages was largely positive. The students received 
support from Methodist Church leaders who complimented their ‘restraint and 
non-violence’, and the Liberal Party lauded their ‘effective’ and ‘responsible’ 
actions.257   
 The next major PD action involved taking the tactics of civil 
disobedience into the chambers of government. On 24 October a rally of almost 
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300 students descended onto the Stormont parliament buildings on the outskirts 
of East Belfast. The protest was planned to mark International Human Rights 
Day and after a section of the crowd listened to a parliamentary debate on civil 
rights, around 70 students occupied the great hall where a three-hour sit in took 
place and a ‘mock Parliament’ was conducted. Up to 200 students gathered 
outside the building and Unionist MPs were forced to run the gauntlet through 
the students in order to exit. Afterward, the students sat down on the road and 
blocked traffic.258 When William Craig attempted to leave the parliament 
buildings a number of students tried to block the route of his chauffeur driven 
car. One student was knocked to the ground, as he arose to his feet shaken but 
unharmed, he told a journalist, ‘I was sure the car would slow down, but instead 
it accelerated. The only thing I could do was to jump on the bonnet.’259 The 
young man had no idea how symbolic his words were.   
 The PD emerged as a militant current of civil rights activity, but it also 
projected an ‘anti political’, or apolitical image. Bernadette Devlin spoke to a 
journalist with candid innocence in the early days of the movement:  
We are not out to embarrass the government or cause civil strife or 
divide the people on any issue. Our movement is non-political, non-
sectarian, and if we can get civil rights established we can return to 
our books and our studies with the satisfying knowledge that we have 
achieved something in the interest of the community.260 
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This liberal outlook could not last long amidst a deeply repressive society. 
Moreover, as students searched for direction and a wider strategy the left would 
step in to further shape events. Throughout October mass PD meetings were 
occurring on a weekly basis and attracting up to 800 people. These meetings 
encompassed almost all strands of politics at the university, but the most 
ideologically coherent and organised group within the movement was the YSA. 
A process of radicalisation was taking place across the student body, in which 
militant action and ideas were debated and the student struggle was transforming 
into something more fundamental.261 The first few weeks of October 1968 
transformed student politics. Devlin herself expressed the change in the political 
climate:  
People used to sit around and discuss their own subjects or criticise 
the other groups in the snack bar…Now it’s fantastic, everywhere 
you go in the snack bar people are talking about civil rights and the 
People’s Democracy, even if they’re attacking it. I don’t think 
Queen’s can ever be the same again, because we’ve had such a rude 
awakening.262  
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This outburst of debate and discussion offered the small forces of the radical left 
a mass hearing and Michael Farrell was remembered as someone who 
consistently received a ‘thunderous applause’ from student audiences. The YSA 
presence in the PD is said to have numbered roughly about 70-100 activists, and 
although this figure may be an exaggerated claim, they nonetheless acted as a 
hard socialist core.263 The YSA would come to have a significant role in pushing 
the movement forward and its inspirations again testify to the global influences 
on the Irish movement. The group was initially modelled on the Trotskyist 
Young Socialist Alliance in the US and took inspiration from the militant 
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committees (SNCC). The YSA operated 
inside the PD alongside a much wider body of students in which political 
opinions varied, but it was the radical left who pushed ahead with protests at a 
time when activists were searching for a wider strategy. The group’s first 
newssheet, Billy Liar, demanded an escalation of action and a serious approach 
toward non-violent civil disobedience:  
Militant Action by the People’s Democracy should receive much 
more consideration at meetings. Militant Action does not mean 
violence, but could be used in making the Establishment Unworkable 
i.e. by non-violent direct action. The idea of civil disobedience has 
been tossed around by many people, but there would not appear to be 
any organisation or groups of individuals prepared to set the ball 
rolling.264 
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In the coming months the PD would launch different initiatives in this direction. 
Already the organisation had taken the lead on civil rights activity in Belfast and 
the actions of the students had garnered the support and admiration of civil rights 
activists in Derry. Both the Derry Citizens Action Committee and NICRA 
welcomed the PD’s initiatives and had sent messages of support to their 
demonstrations. The PD was also invited to attend marches in the city that 
included a march involving thousands of people on 2 November.265 As the tempo 
of the civil rights movement increased, the PD would begin to spread the protest 
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2.6. Conclusion: a real change 
October 1968 transformed the political landscape in Belfast. One striking feature 
about the early civil rights movement was its optimism. Seamus Heaney thought:  
A real change is taking place under the thick skin of the Northern 
Ireland electorate. Catholics and Protestants, Unionist and 
Republican, have aligned themselves behind the civil rights platform 
to examine the conscience of the community. There are naturally vast 
resources of prejudice and complacency still around, but there are 
many shattered ivory towers among educated and articulated people 
who had opted out of political affairs from embarrassment or 
disillusion.266 
The PD was just one strand of the civil rights movement, but it was distinguished 
by its emphasis on cross-communal politics. It had also begun to chip away at the 
isolated existence that had for long characterised the student left in Belfast. 
Through advocating mass political action— based upon Catholic and Protestant 
unity— in direct confrontation with the sectarian practices of the state, the PD 
had created a space in which activists could potentially reach wider numbers of 
people.  
The emergence of the PD was the product of a growing generational gap, 
post-war education reforms, youth radicalisation, and anger against police 
repression in Derry. It reflected the global patterns of student revolts in the 
1960s, but its emergence itself was contradictory. It included a broad plethora of 
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opinion ranging from radical socialist to moderate liberal, and although it posed 
many questions surrounding the nature of Northern Irish society, it did not 
provide many answers. Nevertheless, the PD briefly provided a political space 
that broke with past forms of political opposition within the Northern state, 
including the armed methods of the IRA and the parliamentary opposition of the 
Nationalist Party.  
The PD shared many traits with global student movements in terms of its 
social and economic basis, its influences and ideological flexibility, and its 
tactics. Yet, unlike many student movements, the PD was not founded on 
predominantly student issues and thus did not assume a wholly student character. 
The PD emerged as a direct challenge to social and political grievances outside 
of the university campus. As opposition to it mounted, the PD would pursue an 
increasingly radicalised trajectory. Already, the students had helped push the 
grievances of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland to the forefront of 
politics and had garnered a level of support. The protest movement had been 
confronted both by the Unionist government’s aversion to reform, and the 
reactive forces of loyalism. In the process, the PD had reached a wide audience, 
becoming a primary protagonist in the developing crisis of Irish politics. The 
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Chapter 3: Civil Rights at the Crossroads                                                                       
3.1 Introduction 
The experience of October 1968 had a radicalising impact on the PD, as the 
centre of gravity shifted away from the University campus and into the mainly 
urban and working class communities across the North. The government was 
becoming increasingly unstable: caught between an intensified street agitation 
demanding civil rights and a loyalist backlash that sought to thwart it. 
Acquiescence was no longer an option, and O’Neill’s government was forced to 
act. In late November the Prime Minister announced a series of reforms aimed at 
quelling the growing disturbances, including; a commission to take over powers 
of Derry Corporation, an ombudsman to investigate complaints against 
government, the introduction of a points system to allocate housing on need, a 
review of the Special Powers Act and the abolition of the business vote in 
elections.267 The move was a significant climb-down by O’Neill, though the 
reforms fell far short of the civil rights movement’s full set of demands. It was 
against this background that O’Neill gave his famous ‘crossroads speech’: an 
appeal for suspension of civil rights protests to facilitate a period of calm during 
which normality and presumed reform could ensue.  
 There was a mixed response within the civil rights movement to 
O’Neill’s overtures. Within NICRA, the dominant reaction was one of 
accommodation and acceptance, and thus a winding down of protest was 
announced. The PD, however, would pursue a very different strategy, pressing 
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ahead with civil rights agitation in early January 1969, and emerging as the only 
political current unwilling to abide by the truce. PD embarked on the so called 
‘Long March’ from Belfast to Derry which was met by a high level of violence 
and signalled a new phase in the civil rights movement, during which the tactics 
of non-violent disobedience became marginalised. This set a precedent for later 
developments in 1969.  
This chapter looks at the role of the PD from November 1968 until the 
aftermath of the ‘Long March’, in January 1969. By providing an in-depth 
account of PD activity it challenges existing interpretations of the PD, which are 
under researched and caricature the politics of the group, thus distorting the 
rational of the radical left inside the civil rights movement. This research 
highlights the non-violent and anti-sectarian politics of the PD and shows how 
the sectarian reaction that met civil rights protests was widespread and systemic. 
This process revealed much bigger questions about the nature of the Northern 
state, and the level of repression that met the civil rights movement greatly 
superseded the brief moment in which the radical left had a small foothold in 
politics. This chapter argues that the role of the PD essentially exposed the 
contradictions that were already present inside the Northern Ireland state and 





	   130	  
3.2 After October 
With the glare of the world’s media firmly fixed on Northern Ireland, increasing 
pressure was being brought to bear on the Unionist government to enact reform; 
it found expression in the highest corridors of power. On 4 November Unionist 
leaders, including Terence O’Neill, William Craig and Brian Faulkner, met 
Harold Wilson in London where the British Prime Minister stated his 
unequivocal support for the Northern Ireland government, but also expressed a 
determination for electoral reform.268 To coincide with the meeting, PD 
sympathisers in London held a small picket at Downing Street, and the Queen’s 
students called their third march from the university to Belfast’s City Hall. It is 
worth drawing out the sequence of events in order to illustrate the disparity 
between the way that the police treated loyalists compared to student protestors.   
The march followed a similar pattern to the previous protests. The route 
was challenged by Paisley, who announced a public meeting organised by the 
Ulster Constitution Defence Committee along the direction of the march. It is 
likely that the student demonstrators had grown increasingly frustrated with the 
acquiescence of the police in allowing physical resistance to legal protest. This 
time the students refused to comply with the police dictum and pressed ahead 
with the march. The march met an RUC cordon along University Road resulting 
in scuffles with the police as students tried to filter past; in reaction police 
officers broke ranks and activists testified that some of them were assaulted and 
then arrested. Again, the students resorted to the tactic of sitting down on the 
road and began discussing their next step; they decided not to abide by the police 
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ruling and moved in small groups to the City Hall, where already about two-
dozen students had entered to lobby councillors and the town clerk, only to be 
ejected from the building by police. Outside Paisley’s crowd awaited them and 
one journalist noted that students were attacked.269 Other sources testify to 
incidents of violence against the students. The local student newspaper 
interviewed one female who tried to enter city hall: 
Several Paisley supporters and Mr Paisley himself jeered and 
insulted us. I approached him and said ‘I hope you understand, Mr 
Paisley, that we are demonstrating for your civil rights as well as our 
own’. At that he kicked me in the shins and I stopped talking.270  
When the bulk of the students gathered around city hall a meeting was held that 
decided on a mass sit-down. Initially, the police attempted to break up the protest 
and forcibly remove people from the road, but it was to no avail. Eventually, the 
RUC told the march organisers that if they ended the sit-down they would be 
allowed to return along the original route of their march. The students agreed, 
although as they returned the RUC again re routed the march away from the 
square. The police appeared determined not to allow the students to march along 
the flashpoints most contested by Paisley’s followers.   
The protest witnessed increased levels of violence and affected student 
attitudes toward the RUC, whose heavy-handed response toward the march was 
contrasted with appeasement of Paisley’s followers. Much hostility had come 
from Paisley’s supporters; Rory McShane claimed that loyalists chased him 
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through Belfast city centre. Others reported being attacked by crowds with one 
student being beaten with a stick.271 The threat also displayed itself in more 
sinister possibilities. After the march, Major Ronald Bunting, a militant loyalist 
and right hand man of Paisley, led a small occupation of the university’s halls of 
residence on the Malone Road, where they warned of mass loyalist resistance.272 
The threat never materialised but it was a warning of things to come.273  
According to some participants on the PD side, however, the most 
malicious treatment of the marchers came from the RUC. Students were angry 
that the police had failed to offer protection against the loyalist 
counterdemonstrators. They were aggrieved, too, about their own treatment at the 
hands of the RUC. One student claimed that an officer told him bluntly, ‘We are 
not London policemen. Now you will get what you deserve.’274 Others reported 
that they were aggressively handled and beaten by policemen. The perception 
that sectarianism was rife within the force was reaffirmed when one officer spat 
in the face of a student and said, ‘You have not long to live, you Fenian 
bastard.’275 Police handling of the demonstration undoubtedly impacted on the 
attitude of many—including those from a Protestant background—towards the 
RUC. One protestor expressed what was undoubtedly a section of student 
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opinion in the aftermath of the march: ‘As a staunch believer in the principles of 
Unionism, I was not inclined to believe the allegations of police brutality in the 
past, but now my faith in the RUC is at a rather low ebb.’276  
 The protest resulted in the arrest of nine people, and up to 50 members of 
the PD protested in Belfast when they brought before the courts the next day. 
The legal implications for participants was not, however, the most significant 
result of the demonstration. A pattern was beginning to emerge throughout civil 
rights protests in which the actions of the students were continually restricted, 
contained and harassed by the police, whilst loyalists counter protests, who set 
out to challenge the students, were appeased. In the aftermath of the protest the 
PD questioned the role of the police and their sincerity in protecting their right to 
march from the Paisleyites, who had always numbered a much smaller crowd.277     
There is evidence from a variety of sources, including newspapers and 
student documentation, that relations between police and PD activists were 
growing increasingly hostile and violent in this period. For example, on 13 
November the PD hastily organised a picket of a Methodist College prize 
ceremony that Terence O’Neill was speaking at. The ceremony was disrupted 
with members of the Revolutionary Socialists Student Federation (RSSF) — a 
radical student organisation launched in Britain in 1968— being blamed for 
inciting disturbances that involved scuffles with the police. Although the RSSF 
did launch a brief newssheet at Queen’s, there is little evidence that the 
organisation developed in any serious way in Belfast. Nevertheless, moderate 
opinion inside the PD forced a public apology from the organisation, blaming the 
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trouble on a ‘small number of militant students.’278 The students on the ground 
that day claimed that the source of the trouble was the overreaction of the police, 
who, alongside Special Branch officers brandishing firearms, had assaulted 
students.279 Others around this time also reported being violently attacked by 
police around the university campus.280 Considering the evidence, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that the tension building between RUC officers and PD 
protestors was exacerbated by a police force that was deeply embedded into the 
sectarian machinations of the state. This happened during a period when the 
spectre of student protest had emerged more widely throughout Britain. 
 There existed some difference of opinion within the RUC about how the 
force should deal with the PD, with some in the leadership more cautious than 
the rank and file regarding the use of physical force. It reflected the necessity to 
avoid the negative media coverage that had followed police violence, particularly 
after the 5 October march in Derry. On 18 November Albert Kennedy, Inspector 
General of the RUC, wrote to county inspectors relaying instructions designed to 
ensure that force was a last resort. Kennedy’s letter concluded, ‘It therefore 
follows that the use of physical force by the police… would be difficult to justify 
in the present situation on which world attention is focused.’281 It was a clear 
admission that the further use of force ought to be avoided due to the threat of 
‘world attention’. Although such pressure was felt at the top of the RUC 
command structure, the overall agenda of the security forces was to restore order 
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and thereby reinforce the rule of the Unionist state. Professor John Newsinger, in 
his assessment of security policy in Northern Ireland, convincingly shows how 
successive governments had never relied on conventional methods of policing. 
Instead they depended on wide mechanisms of control and coercion, the latter of 
which included usage of the RUC, the B Specials, and the Special Powers Act.282 
As civil rights agitation increased their utilisation would become more prominent 
and this was precipitated by PD efforts to mobilise across the country.   
PD was at its genesis a university-based movement. Yet the group had 
always sought to broaden its appeal, and PD members were keen to link their 
political demands with an agenda that could relate to the wider population. This 
political orientation was evident in PD’s ‘Plan to inform the people’: a direct 
challenge to O’Neill’s ‘Programme to enlist the people’. O’Neill’s programme 
represented the height of his civic outreach campaign, which attempted to appeal 
for cross community support through ‘civic weeks’ events. It was predominately 
taken up by the middle classes and largely based upon rhetoric, as opposed to 
any commitment to reform.283 The PD plan counterpoised ‘civic weeks’ with 
‘civil rights’ and it included meetings and protests in towns such as Omagh and 
Dungannon, and leaflet campaigns throughout Belfast. Central to this shift was a 
radicalisation of the demands of the civil rights movement to, ‘one man- one 
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vote’ and ‘one family- one house’284. It was a conscious effort to direct the civil 
rights movement outside the Catholic community and appeal to Protestant 
support, representing a distinct class basis to the politics of the PD and driven by 
the Young Socialist core inside the movement. This, alongside a willingness to 
confront the state and opposition forces, began to define the PD against others in 
the civil rights movement. By organising in areas across the country the PD 
established new networks of support, including a Newry branch that acted as a 
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3.3. The November reforms 
The early period of PD activity documented above is rarely a subject of dispute; 
it is seen as a modest contribution to a movement that had real grievances. It was 
in the changed situation after the announcement of the reform package in 
November, and in particular after Terence O’Neill’s appeal for a period of calm 
in December, when the PD rejected the proposed truce and embarked on a march 
from Belfast to Derry, which has received criticism.  
By November 1968 the civil rights movement had gathered an 
unprecedented momentum. Regular rioting was occurring in Derry in what was 
becoming an unacceptable and untenable level of discontent for the government. 
Increased pressure was also brought to bear on the Unionist Party by Harold 
Wilson, who at one point even threatened the ‘liquidation’ of ‘financial 
agreements with Northern Ireland’ if some degree of reform toward the electoral 
system was not delivered.286 With the situation reaching a critical point O’Neill 
acted; on 22 November the Unionist government announced a five-point 
programme for reform, it was reached after discussions with the British 
government and much debate inside the Unionist cabinet. The package included; 
a points system for public housing allocation, a complaints ombudsman to be 
modelled on the British system, a review of the Special Powers Act to look at the 
possibility of its withdrawal ‘when the situation permitted it’, a development 
commission to implement the Londonderry Area Plan and the abolition of the 
company vote.287 It was a significant development that served to vindicate and 
justify the actions of the civil rights movement. In a matter of weeks the 
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campaign had secured a better political advancement for the minority community 
than decades of political stalemate. But although it was a significant climb-down 
by O’Neill, the package fell short of the programme of reform envisaged by the 
civil rights movement; in particular, the fundamental grievance of ‘one man one 
vote’ would not be addressed, as the manipulated electoral boundaries remained 
intact. Furthermore, the notorious SPA was to remain for all intents and 
purposes.  
Indeed, if the reforms were intended to placate the civil rights movement 
there was initially little indication that they would be successful. Speaking in the 
confines of his cabinet, O’Neill himself acknowledged that the reform package 
would be unlikely to satisfy the civil rights movement. His inhibitions were 
proved correct.288 When the package was announced it was rejected by all of the 
main civil rights bodies as insufficient.289 Central to O’Neill’s concerns would 
also have been the hostile reaction among loyalist grassroots and the right wing 
of the Unionist Party, some of whom had clear intentions of challenging his 
leadership, including Craig and Brian Faulkner. Viewed in this context the 
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‘balancing act’ of Terence O’Neill seemed doomed to failure, indeed, as Michael 
Farrell would later reflect the reforms package was ‘enough to enrage the 
Loyalists without satisfying the civil rights movement at all.’290 
As civil rights protests continued in the aftermath of O’Neill’s 
announcement, PD members were soon to find out how enraged the opposition 
was. Events that occurred at a PD protest in Dungannon on 23 November—one 
day after the reform package was announced— provide a snapshot into how the 
backlash against the civil rights movement was emboldened by the idea of 
marginal reform, and how the forces of law and order were centrally involved in 
stoking violence against protestors. The PD attempted a public rally in the town’s 
market square, which was forced to disperse after it was confronted by a large 
crowd of 300 loyalists, led by Major Bunting. Bunting’s assemblage then 
directed their fire at more known local figures, targeting the workplace of Jack 
Hassard, a local NILP councillor and NICRA supporter. In political terms 
Hassard was a moderate social democrat. A military veteran and former member 
of the USC, he himself proclaimed that he was, ‘quite willing to die in support of 
the constitution of Northern Ireland…I am a 100% supporter of the union with 
Great Britain.’291 
Hassard’s support for civil rights cast him as an enemy of local loyalists 
who surrounded the post office where he worked. Meanwhile, the PD activists, 
now numbering roughly 250, moved to a nearby restaurant, they were joined by 
Conn McCluskey and here a local branch of the PD was founded. When the 
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loyalist crowd entered the restaurant, mayhem ensued; windows, doors and 
furniture were broken and the owner’s pregnant wife was punched in the face. 
Later that night there was several other violent incidents reported.292 In the 
aftermath Hassard filed various complaints to the government regarding the role 
of the RUC and the USC, who he claimed joined with the crowd to abuse and 
intimidate civil rights activists. Hassard reserved his strongest criticism for the 
local sub district commandant of the USC, Mervyn Patterson, seen to be, ‘the 
main agitator and organiser. He agitated physically by mass hysteria. He abused 
me by shouting terrible names at me.’293 Hassard brought complaints about 
Patterson, and a number of other RUC officers, to the highest level of the 
Unionist government. Yet they were to no avail and no action was taken to 
investigate them. Indeed, County Inspector of the RUC, William Meharg, likely 
conveyed the perspective of the government when he defended the police force 
and dismissed Hassard as a ‘trouble maker.’294  
Mervyn Patterson later appeared in front of the Cameron Commission to 
offer evidence about these disturbances. Although reluctant to talk about the 
events in Dungannon, Patterson admitted being in the town’s Market Square on 
23 November. His testimony shows a local commander who presented himself as 
a staunch defender of the practices of the Unionist state displaying a deep level 
of anti-Catholic sectarianism. A supporter of Paisley’s efforts to uphold 
‘Protestant rights’, Patterson’s attitude toward civil rights protests revealed the 
level of sectarian opposition amongst the police force. He told the commission 
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that he wholly disagreed with the civil rights movement, attesting that houses 
were allocated fairly and that counterdemonstrators were justified in taking 
action to stop civil rights rallies in town centres. Endorsing the position of the 
Unionist state he declared himself in favour of ‘one rate-payer one vote’, and 
displayed distrust of the Catholic community; he did not think it acceptable for 
any Catholics to be recruited to the USC, nor did he think that any members of 
the USC should be permitted to engage in mixed marriages. Incidentally, if these 
things were to occur he claimed that current members would refuse to serve with 
them.295 In articulating a traditional Unionist response to the civil rights 
movement, militant loyalists had begun to win the support of members of the 
police force; it was this type of scenario that continually confronted the 
movement and laid the basis for a protracted period of civil unrest.    
Faced with such opposition PD members began to think more seriously 
about the application of non-violent tactics in the run up to a major NICRA 
march in the city of Armagh on 30 November. The Armagh demonstration pulled 
a broad range of civil rights forces together in protest at O’Neill’s limited 
reforms, and those attending were forced to recognise the increased possibility of 
violence. In one document produced in preparation for the march, titled 
‘Guidelines for Armagh’, Kevin Boyle emphasised the necessity of non-violence 
and offered advice on how to practice this philosophy. Marchers were 
encouraged to form into small groups so as best account for one another. They 
were advised to wear heavy and suitable clothing to protect against attack, but 
Boyle warned, ‘protection for heads is good, but not crash helmets which are 
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construed as provocation by onlookers and police’. If the march was bombarded 
by Paisleyites, PD members were encouraged to go through without retaliation, 
‘Non violence means, in practice, hands down and it means a great deal of 
frustrating self discipline for the marchers.’296  
The document offers some insight into how the PD approached potential 
violence, and events in Armagh meant such an approach was more necessary 
than ever. Up to 5,000 civil rights protestors gathered to march, but their path 
was blocked by some 1,000 Paisley supporters, who had descended on the town 
earlier that morning. Paisley’s crowd resembled an insurrectionary challenge to 
both the police and civil rights demonstrators; shops and businesses were forced 
to close as the loyalist crowd assembled, heavily armed with cudgels and wooden 
planks. Paisley himself carried a blackthorn stick.297 A PD activist who ventured 
amongst the loyalists recorded the scene in which police officers chatted 
amicably with loyalists ‘who carried broken off planks and vicious six inch nails 
protruding from their ends, with young girls and boys of 15 who had metal bars 
and lead piping and with men who sported bill-hooks, axe handles and table 
legs.’298 The march was thus prevented from reaching the town centre and 
sporadic scuffles broke out throughout the day. At the end of the day five people 
were held in connection with firearms, while eight police officers and twenty 
civilians were reported injured.299  
Ultimately, the day had been one in which a legal march had been 
blocked by an armed loyalist force, to which the police had been, at best, 
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incapable of challenging. As hard-line opposition to the civil rights demands 
strengthened, the Unionist Party itself was bitterly divided over the reforms. 
William Craig led the charge, and in the aftermath of the November 
announcement made sweeping sectarian speeches, attacking the Catholic Church 
and blaming the civil rights demonstrators for the violence in Armagh.300 
Therefore, when O’Neill appeared on television on 9 December to give the 
defining speech of his political career, it was amidst circumstances of intense 
polarisation; with right-wing Unionists infuriated at the prospect of reform and 
civil rights activists increasingly alienated from his premiership. However, the 
violence that categorised the previous few weeks also created the context in 
which calls to reassert order found a hearing. 
 In declaring, ‘Ulster is at the Crossroads’, O’Neill appealed for calm 
toward the civil rights demonstrators, arguing for a cessation of activity and an 
acceptance of a timeframe to implement the November reforms. Hitting out at a 
‘minority of agitators determined to subvert lawful authority’ within the civil 
rights movement. To the Paisleyite current he denounced the ‘bullyboy tactics’, 
of Armagh and articulated the need for some form of democratisation within the 
state.301 The speech brought events to a head inside the Unionist Party, and by 11 
December William Craig was forced to resign his position of Minister of Home 
Affairs. One of the PD’s demands had been fulfilled.  
 The yearning for calm had a resonance. On 12 December the majority of 
MPs at Stormont backed O’Neill, and over 100,000 people lodged support for 
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O’Neill in a poll conducted by the Belfast Telegraph. At Queen’s 2,000 students 
also handed in a message to support the Prime Minister’s efforts.302 It matched 
the mood of many of the moderates inside the civil rights movement, some of 
who had been cautious of action from the very beginning; both NICRA and the 
Derry Citizens Action Committee declared a suspension of civil rights 
mobilisation.303 On 11 December in the university campus the PD met to 
consider the situation. It was a long and contentious meeting, in which liberal 
voices were loudly broadcast. In his evidence to the Cameron commission some 
months later, Michael Farrell recalled that the meeting had been packed by the 
University Unionist Association, who handed out a leaflet requesting that the 
march be called off.304 One leaflet reasoned that the students should back Captain 
O’Neill’s ‘sincere request’ for restraint.305 After a heated debate during which 
the students debated the merits of the ‘truce’, it was decided by a narrow 
majority to call off a planned rally in Belfast on 14 December and a ‘long march’ 
to Derry the following week, on 21 December.  
 For the socialist left of the PD, the call to cease mobilisation was a 
capitulation to the Unionist Party, who had given no commitment to fundamental 
reform. In effect, the civil rights movement was being asked to help stabilise the 
Unionist state by putting their faith in O’Neill. Leaving aside O’Neill’s wider 
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304 ‘Well, the meeting which called off the march in Belfast had, it was generally 
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put out by a gentleman in the Unionist Association requesting that people go to 
this meeting and call off the march. So it was felt that this was not a terribly 
democratic decision.’  Evidence submitted by Michael Farrell to the Cameron 
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305 Student leaflet ‘A call to moderates’, available online, 
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record— he had led an administration since 1963 that did almost nothing to 
remedy Catholic grievances— O’Neill’s record on reform since the beginning of 
civil rights protest was open to question and speculation about it should be 
tempered with a recognition of this.306 O’Neill had staunchly defended police 
violence against the civil rights movement since its beginning, and had 
consistently stalled against full reform.  Responding to one journalist in late 
1968, on the question of immediate electoral reform, O’Neill replied ‘I think 
immediate is a silly word to use in this context…. Sensible reforms come out of 
careful study.’307 His attitude was further revealed in an exchange of letters 
between himself and representatives of the NILP. After being pressured to 
introduce electoral reform by NILP representative William Boyd, O’Neill replied 
on 17 October; ‘I have no intention of committing myself, or my colleagues, to 
the making of any statement in Parliament within a period to be prescribed by 
you.’308 O’Neill had shown little appetite for reform until the civil rights 
movement gained momentum. The reason was obvious; implementation of the 
full civil rights demands called into the question the basis of Unionist Party 
power. O’Neill had been forced to concede ground, but to dismantle the 
apparatus of electoral dominance could have split the Unionist Party and 
threatened his leadership.  
Michael Farrell looked back on his decision to call another meeting in 
order to press ahead with civil rights mobilization. Farrell was the most persistent 
advocate of action, and felt that the previous meeting had been stacked against 
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his position, ‘it was like playing an away game’ contended Farrell, ‘My feeling 
about it was that if this is the way that mass democracy works, then OK, let’s 
have another meeting!”309 It took place on 20 December, when the Christmas 
break ensured a lower turnout of students. In the meeting the YSA, who had 
already announced their intention to organise a demonstration with or without the 
PD, argued for a march to Derry immediately in the New Year.310 Anne Devlin, 
then a school student from west Belfast who supported the march, attended both 
meetings and recollected that this second meeting felt like it had been made up 
primarily of the militant working class elements of the PD, observing that the 
moderate, and perhaps middle class, elements had stayed at home.311 Others 
recalled that the manoeuvre by Farrell to call another meeting meant that 
‘obviously it was a bit rigged’.312 The whole affair reflected the nature of the PD; 
it was a movement with no real fixed programme or objectives, in which any 
decision could easily be overturned in the next meeting and the most militant 
‘leaders’ could set the agenda. Thus, it was agreed to launch a four-day march 
from Belfast to Derry, commencing in the New Year on 1 January. 
The decision to march on 1 January has been presented by historians as 
one that had the support of a tiny minority of students, who were warned against 
marching by the great and the good of the civil rights movement. For example, 
Henry Patterson has stated that the PD march was, ‘Criticised by the mainstream 
leaders of the civil rights movement and with the support of only a few dozen 
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students…’313 It is a frequent misrepresentation.314 The only public caution came 
from Eddie McAteer, who had a track record of opposing civil rights 
mobilization.315 Certainly, there was private disagreement within NICRA and 
other civil rights bodies, with Betty Sinclair and John Hume undoubtedly among 
the most wary of marching. Yet much of the criticism of the march was only 
revealed in hindsight. At the time there was significant support and indeed 
admiration. NICRA and the DCAC had committed to a month’s long truce, until 
11 January, and therefore physically joining the march was ruled out, but they 
did support the students in other ways. NICRA donated £25 to help fund supplies 
for the duration of the march and its general secretary, John McAnerney, 
publicly supported their endeavour, stating, ‘Captain O’Neill has not produced 
the goods, and we must keep up the pressure. We are wholeheartedly behind the 
People’s Democracy in this.’316 The DCAC, under the leadership of John Hume, 
announced that it would meet the marchers when they arrived in Derry, and the 
Dungannon Civil Rights Committee urged its supporters to take part in the PD 
march. Both the Falls Divisional Labour Party branch in Belfast, and the Derry 
Labour Party voiced support for the students.317 NILP chairman, Paddy Devlin, 
who was soon to be elected as an MP, also supported the march and organised 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 Patterson, Ireland Since 1939, p. 209.  
314 For example, Bew and Gillespie virtually repeat this line, stating that ‘There 
was little support for the march from the outset— only a few dozen left Belfast— 
and proscribing it might have brought little reaction.’ Bew and Gillespie, 
Northern Ireland, a Chronology of the Troubles, p. 12.  
315 McAteer did not support the march in Derry on 5 October and warned that it 
‘isn’t good marching weather in more than one sense’, Irish News, 30 December 
1968.  
316 Sunday News, 29 December 1968.  
317 Irish News, 31 December 1968.  
	   148	  
food for the marchers along their route.318 Therefore, although a small contingent 
set off on the march, they could claim a wider level of support, something that 
increased over the course of the march.  
The politics of the demonstration were shaped in a socialist direction. 
Eamonn McCann, who joined the march to his native city, stressed that they 
were marching, ‘conscious of the class nature of the issues that we are attempting 
to dramatise…we march against Tories of both Green and Orange variety.’319 
One the eve of the march the PD released a statement, it conveys a message that 
is as relevant to contemporary interpretations of the march as to those it was 
originally addressed. Its opening lines read, ‘To those of you who talk of 
provocation we can only say that a non-sectarian protest against injustice can 
offend only those who uphold injustices’, the statement continued: 
We are marching because nothing has really changed since the 
Government’s package of reforms in November, which was 
condemned as inadequate by the entire Civil Rights Movement and 
even the British Prime Minster, Mr Wilson. Captain O’Neill’s 
television performance may have impressed some, but we have had 
too many fine words from the Captain. This time we want action. It 
is, perhaps, as well to repeat that we are demanding not privileges but 
rights and that in marching to Derry we are merely exercising another 
fundamental democratic liberty.320 
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The march was modelled on the Selma to Montgomery march, led by Dr Martin 
Luther King, in Alabama in 1965. A pivotal moment in the US civil rights 
struggle thus inspired what would become the most eventful march in the 
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3.4. The Long March; four days that shook Northern Ireland 
Flashing for the warriors, whose strength is not to fight, 
Flashing for the refugees, on the unarmed road of flight, 
An’ for each and ev’ry underdog, soldier in the night, 
An’ we gazed upon the chimes of freedom flashing- Bob Dylan. 
 
The ‘long march’ to Derry constituted a 75-mile trek across Northern Ireland. Its 
route traversed both Unionist and nationalist areas; its intention was to reinstate 
the central aims of the civil rights movement, showing that the reforms offered 
by O’Neill were both insufficient and largely promissory. Beginning at Belfast 
City Hall at 9am on 1 January 1969 the small gathering of mainly students, 
numbering no more than 50, were flanked and observed by police from the outset 
and special branch officers identified some of the most known activists, 
including Michael Farrell, Kevin Boyle, Paul Arthur, Ronald Bunting (junior)321, 
Paul Campbell, Patricia Drinan, Eilish MacDermott, Rebecca McGlade, John 
McGuffin, Louden Seth and Cyril Toman.322 This motley crew of activists and 
those who would later join them, were to face obstruction, intimidation, 
harassment and violence throughout the course of the next four days during 
events that would expose the deep backlash that was developing against the civil 
rights movement. The determination of the marchers to maintain non-violence in 
the face of continual attack gained them much emotive support, one ballad 
commemorates their efforts:   
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It was on the first day of the year in l969, 
We gathered at the City Hall, the weather being fine. 
With McCann in front to lead us, Michael Farrell in the van, 
Off on the long march to Derry. 
 
As we marched to Antrim Town, the bridge we found was blocked, 
There stood a certain major with a feather in his cap; 
“No Fenian foot shall e'er pollute this sacred ground we hold, 
We'll soon stop your long march to Derry”. 
 
They ambushed us at Irish Street and at Burntollett, too, 
And the air was thick with stones and bricks, and the missiles fairly 
flew. 
But we got up and struggled on, though battered black and blue, 
To finish the long march to Derry.323 
The demonstration was billed as an ‘anti-poverty march’ and banners led the 
procession reading, ‘Houses and Jobs for All’, ‘Anti Poverty March’ and ‘Civil 
Rights 1969’. Surviving participants remember it beginning with an almost 
comical atmosphere. As they gathered they were confronted with loyalist 
protestors, led by Major Bunting, who shouted sectarian chants and rushed ahead 
of the march flying the Union Jack, giving the impression that they were leading 
the students out of the city.324 The violence that would face such an innocuous 
protest was revealed early on when scuffles broke out as some loyalists tried to 
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seize a PD banner; afterward a group of cameramen were manhandled with one 
reportedly being assaulted.325 
 The march departed Belfast relatively amicably, but the first 
confrontation came as they approached Antrim Town, where a Paisleyite crowd 
made the first of many attempts to prevent it from continuing. At a bridge 
entering the town loyalists gathered to block the march and a long stand off 
ensued, which was later described as a situation teetering ‘from pantomime to 
near pogrom’ by civil rights activists. The marchers testified to the hostile 
attitude of the police, and some claimed to have been physically assaulted by 
officers.326 Criticism from PD marchers was strongly directed at the leading 
officer on the ground outside Antrim, County Inspector Cramsie, who was said 
to have displayed a hostile attitude from the beginning.327 RUC reports of the 
march contrast to the story told by PD marchers, with claims of police hostility 
and indeed violence continually absent from police reports. County Inspector 
Cramsie’s report of this phase of the march is notable in this sense, and although 
he was critical of the role of Bunting in the whole affair, he did state that by that 
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evening he had suggested to the Deputy Inspector General of the RUC that 
consideration ‘to a ban on the continuance of the march’ should be given.328   
At Antrim, Unionist MP Nat Minford had arrived on the scene where he 
helped convince the RUC to facilitate the transport of the marchers to their 
resting place for the night, a community hall in Whitehill. That night the RUC 
entered the hall to evacuate the premises, claiming that a bomb alert had been 
raised. Evidently no explosives were in the hall, but that morning a bomb did 
explode in Toome, destroying a statue of Roddy McCorley.329 On 2 January the 
students made their way from Antrim to Maghera. Before setting off they were 
informed by the RUC that armed gangs were now gathering at points along their 
route, particularly in Randalstown. Indeed, if the police had been caught unaware 
by the counter protest at Antrim, opposition to the march was now known and 
expected, yet once again the loyalists were able to disrupt the march with no real 
opposition from the police.  
The first major obstacle gathered at Randalstown, where hundreds of 
counter-demonstrators gathered and awaited the students.330 The dubious 
relationship between Unionist politicians and the loyalist mob continued at 
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Randalstown, where under pressure from constituents Nat Minford arrived to 
speak to counter protestors. Minford’s association with the police decision to re-
route the march the previous night meant that he was initially met with hostility, 
but this was short-lived. Speaking to the loyalist crowd, Minford stated that he 
had asked the Minister of Home affairs to ban the march; he was met with ‘roars 
of approval’.331 Randalstown saw another long stand off against a potentially 
violent crowd, and after discussion the marchers decided to travel in cars 
provided by supporters to Toome. When the loyalist crowd realised that the 
marchers were leaving they surged forward and scuffles broke out with the RUC. 
Police reports testify that Nat Minford and his wife were at the forefront of this 
melee alongside Major Bunting.332 By the time the marchers were making their 
way to Toome it had become clear that their legal right to march would not be 
protected or enforced with any serious vigour on behalf of the RUC. The Belfast 
Telegraph, a paper that had initially spoken out against the PD march, offered a 
critical line on the days events; it amounted to a hard-hitting critique of the 
police:  
After three months of counter-demonstrations of this sort, the police 
should have no difficulty in picking out and detaining the ringleaders 
around whom the ‘bully boys’, of whom Capt. O'Neill and Mr. 
Wilson have spoken, gather. There is a risk, to be sure, but it is not to 
be evaded indefinitely if the principle of ‘one law for all’ is to be 
preserved. 
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Already it has become questionable whether this right has been 
defended with sufficient determination by the police, first in Antrim 
and again in Randalstown. On each occasion the route approved by 
the Minister of Home Affairs has been blocked by so-called ‘loyal 
citizens’, and on each occasion this has been enough not only to stop 
the march, but all traffic going about its ordinary business…. 
If the ‘loyal citizens’ are still capable of rational thought, they should 
realise that, by preventing the passage of peaceful procession, they 
are providing living proof that their loyalism, as well as the 
prevailing standard of social justice, is suspect. Their loyalty cannot 
be to Stormont or Westminster, which they are defying, but only to 
their grotesque conception of Protestantism.333 
Toome was a majority ‘nationalist’ town and the marchers arrived to a rousing 
reception from locals, likely due to the previous days bomb attack. From Toome 
the march continued to Maghera. Up ahead were two strongly ‘loyalist’ areas in 
which organised opposition would have been more likely, Hillhead and 
Knockloughrim. Confronted with this the police were able to persuade the 
marchers to re route through the town of Bellaghy. However, when the march 
ventured in this direction it was once again met by Major Bunting, and a large 
crowd of his supporters. Participants in the march, who travelled the original 
route to inspect the threat, including Inez McCormack, testified to the fact that no 
loyalists were gathering along the areas of Hillhead and Knockloughrim. Instead, 
Bunting’s assemblage was massing to face the march head on in what had the 
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hallmarks of a premeditated trap. Bowes Egan and Vincent McCormack, who 
later pieced together a forensic analysis of the march, presented much evidence 
in favour of their central conclusion: that the police consistently facilitated 
loyalist counterdemonstrators in challenging the march throughout its route. 
Another stand off ensued, and again the marchers rallied to discuss what their 
next move would be. It was agreed to use ‘concerted peaceful action’ and as the 
marchers linked arms, pressing ahead, they were hemmed in from front and back 
by lines of RUC officers. Eventually the police did try to move the loyalist 
counter protest.334 One PD activist explained how when the march took off a few 
hundred yards along the road, Bunting’s men and their local supporters were able 
to stand beyond an ‘inadequate’ string of police to toss abuse and objects at the 
marchers: ‘Showers of nails, and nuts and bolts rained down as men openly 
pulled handfuls out of bags. A shower of six-inch nails rained on me. No attempt 
was made to stop them. And no one was arrested.'335 
The RUC account of this phase of the march again contrasts with activist 
accounts. It was provided by a local District Inspector, M. Forde, who penned a 
detailed report of this part of the march; Forde had earlier helped persuade the 
marchers, through discussion with Michael Farrell, to divert along this route as a 
safer option. The above attack is suspiciously absent from Forde’s report, which 
instead contested that this phase of the march ‘continued unimpeded for a 
distance of two and a half miles’ and that, ‘no incident, save-booing, jeering and 
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335 Egan and McCormark, Burntollet, p. 14.  
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cat-calling took place as the marchers passed’.336 The marchers were growing 
increasingly concerned that the police were not only offering no defence against 
counterdemonstrators, but were in fact acquiescing in loyalist attack along the 
route. As they proceeded on to the village of Gulladuff, en route to Maghera, 
their own skirmishes along the intended destination of travel confirmed this. PD 
activists who had travelled in cars to meet the march ahead in Maghera observed 
scenes in which crowds of loyalist counter protestors gathered armed with sticks 
and cudgels. One eyewitness testimony recalled an RUC officer openly 
fraternising with the crowd.337  
The loyalists used Maghera Orange Hall as a base for their activity, and 
that evening Major Bunting gathered with some 700 supporters, having declared 
an intention to march through Maghera.338 Bunting’s march did not materialise, 
but the potential for serious trouble was evident, and thus the PD marchers 
decided to travel by car to the other side of the town. Their cars were attacked 
along the route, and up to 1,000 people were reported to have been involved in 
mass rioting, which saw damage to property and attacks on the press.339  
 The next day, 3 January, the PD march took off to Dungiven, and then 
made its way to Claudy in what was the most peaceful section of the march. The 
temporary reprieve was likely a result of the fact that Ian Paisley and Major 
Bunting had made their way to Belfast to meet the Minister of Home Affairs, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 People’s Democracy march from Belfast to Londonderry, M. Forde, then 
District Inspector of the RUC to A. Kennedy, 11 January 1969, PRONI, 
HA/32/2/28.  
337 Egan and McCormack, Burntollet, p. 14.  
338  People’s Democracy march from Belfast to Londonderry, M. Forde, then 
District Inspector of the RUC to A. Kennedy, 11 January 1969, PRONI, 
HA/32/2/28.  
339 Cameron Report, para, 94.  Egan and McCormack, Burntollet, p. 15.  
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Captain Long. That evening Long appeared on television to commend the 
‘congenial’ and ‘courteous’ nature of the two men and their non-violent 
opposition to the march, a contrast to what he saw as the non-peaceful actions of 
the students, who had ‘thrown pepper, at police’.340 It was another significant 
political intervention from the Unionist government, which undoubtedly 
emboldened the gangs of loyalists who were following the PD along their route. 
The Dungannon civil rights committee responded in kind: 
Whatever doubts a few faint-hearted may have had about the 
necessity of this march, Capt Long most certainly must have 
dispelled them. His conduct on this programme was in keeping with 
the partisan conduct of the police along the route when they refused 
to clear a path for the marchers and allowed cudgel waving 
extremists to roam the roads and streets.341 
Outside Dungiven, the police warned of a suspected ambush in the townland of 
Feeny and proposed a different route. By now the marchers had grown 
suspicious of the RUC agenda in re-routing the march, besides, their claims of a 
loyalist counter protest conflicted with testimonies from PD members who had 
scouted the area. Not trusting the RUC’s proposed route, the marchers decided to 
link arms and push ahead, after which they made their way through Feeny, where 
no organised opposition emerged.342 The march then settled in Claudy that night 
to what seemed a reasonably hospitable atmosphere, but the quiet reception only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 Long spoke on the BBC ‘24 Hours’ programme. A report can be found in 
Belfast Telegraph 4 January 1969.  It is likely that a student did throw pepper at 
the police as it is reported in a number of sources, including Egan and 
McCormack’s account.  
341 Belfast Telegraph, 4 January 1969. 
342 Egan and McCormack, Burntollet, pp. 22-23.  
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masked more serious efforts to mobilise opposition miles ahead of their route, in 
Derry, where Paisley and Bunting had organised a packed rally inside the 
Guildhall in order to preach opposition to civil rights.    
Although the precise details of the meeting are vague as journalists were 
denied entry into the Guildhall and little eyewitness testimony exists, it is clear 
that in the meeting effort was made to organise opposition to the march the 
following day, near Burntollet Bridge. The Cameron Report notes that it was 
here that Bunting encouraged people to gather with the Ulster Protestant 
Volunteers to help ‘see the marchers on their way’343. While the level of 
organisation among loyalists is almost irrefutable, the claims from civil rights 
activists that the police force was complicit in either the planning or the 
execution of attack have been open to question. After the attack many civil rights 
activists contended that the police had essentially led the march into an ambush. 
One activist told a journalist that ‘the only feasible construction that can be 
placed on the sequence of events is that the march was led into an ambush. The 
police formation was such that the march became extremely vulnerable to an 
ambush.’344 Historians have not investigated such claims with any rigor and 
Cameron rejected them as ‘wholly unjustified… baseless and indeed 
ridiculous’.345 Testimonies from the Cameron Report itself, however, suggest 
that undercover police officers were in the Guildhall that night, where they were 
made aware of a planned attack the next day. The commission explained to 
Unionist MP, Robin Chichester Clark, that they had found evidence that Bunting 
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344 Irish News, 6 January 1969.  
345 Cameron Report, para 183.  
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had urged all of his supporters to ‘concentrate the following morning in the 
neighbourhood of Burntollet Bridge’, Cameron continued;  
We know that there was at least one Special Branch officer, if not a 
number of others, in the audience that night taking a note of what 
was being said and the position then was that they regarded the 
situation as being so serious that they carried out a reconnaissance in 
the vicinity of Burntollet Bridge. The obvious idea of which was to 
spot any snipers that there might be in the area on the day in 
question. Obviously they were afraid or must have been afraid that 
people would not only concentrate there with something like scatter 
guns but that there would be something there which would be much 
more lethal. At this time there was information available to the RUC 
of possible very serious consequences.346   
The actions of the civil rights activists in Derry that evening contrasted to that of 
the loyalists. While Bunting and Paisley were encouraging opposition to the 
march inside the Guildhall, civil rights leaders intervened outside in an effort to 
diffuse the volatile situation as Catholic crowds gathered in the Guildhall Square. 
Eamonn McCann, who had participated in the march for three days, travelled up 
to his hometown and delivered a speech that encapsulated the intention behind 
the PD demonstration.  
You know I am not a moderate. I want to see a lot of radical changes 
in our society, and I want them as soon as possible. Tonight I would 
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achieve these if it could be done. But nothing, nothing whatsoever, 
can be gained by attacking or abusing the people in the Hall. Don't 
you see, that this kind of action is precisely what the clever and 
unscrupulous organisers expect and hope will happen? Paisley and 
Bunting will be delighted if there is uproar and disturbance here 
tonight. It will give strong support to the idea that the Civil Rights 
movement is anti-Protestant, set on destroying one section of the 
population on sectarian grounds.347 
Inside the Guildhall that evening, Major Bunting conferred with the RUC 
District Inspector on duty, where he reiterated his plans to oppose the march the 
following day and threatened ‘that his party would carry loaded shotguns if 
necessary’.348 Eventually, after negotiation with the police, the loyalists emerged 
from the hall, many were armed with chair legs, chair backs and staves, and 
serious clashes ensued between loyalists and civil rights supporters.349 Further 
rioting broke out that night in Claudy and as the march entered its final leg it 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
347 Egan and McCormack, Burntollet, p. 26.   
348 Letter from District Inspector McGimpsey to Londonderry County Inspector, 
14 January 1969: Incidents at Guildhall Square, Londonderry, on the evening of 
Friday, 3rd January, 1969, when a meeting was being held in Londonderry 
Guildhall, PRONI, CAB/9B/312/5.  
349 Ibid.   
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3.5. The ambush at Burntollet Bridge 
‘As I stood in Derry on Saturday a People’s Democracy 
marcher fell like a log at my feet when a stone bigger than a mans fist 
smashed on to his head and blood poured down the side of his 
face’— Rob Batsford, Belfast Newsletter.351  
 
As the march set off on its fourth day its ranks were swelled by an influx of 
supporters who had watched events transpire over the previous days. Television 
crews and journalists who covered the last leg of the demonstration would follow 
them. Outside Claudy, the march was again halted and the demonstrators were 
warned of potential violence up ahead. Early that morning police information 
once more indicated that Major Bunting and his supporters were gathering in the 
area of Burntollet Bridge. Warning the marchers that ‘they would be stoned and 
some people may be hurt’, the RUC nevertheless informed the PD that ‘if they 
wished to proceed the police would endeavour to escort them past the 
opposition’.352 The directive was a marked difference to previous police tactics 
in dealing with confrontation to the march. Up until now, the RUC had 
consistently tried to re-route the march and although a different route to Derry 
was present at this point, through the Ardmore Road, it was not enforced by the 
RUC. After the marchers asserted their wish to continue along their intended 
route, the RUC instead moved to escort them through; two police platoons 
donned steel helmets and protective shields along the front of the march.353   
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352 Letter from District Inspector Harrison to County Inspector: Civil Rights 
March from Belfast to Londonderry, 1st—4th January 1969. PRONI, 
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Roughly seven miles outside Derry, at Burntollet Bridge, the march 
passed adjacent to a hill on the right, to the left ran the river Faughan. Acting on 
police advice, the marchers kept to the right-hand side of the road, where a large 
hedge would provide some cover from anticipated missiles; it also obscured the 
size and scale of the loyalist crowd that gathered in the surrounding field, who 
were equipped with weaponry and at whose feet lay tonnes on stones, which 
were likely transported beforehand.354 The attack began with a fusillade of stones 
and missiles raining down upon the marchers from the adjacent field. Then, as 
they pressed ahead an armed and organised loyalist crowd emerged from behind 
the hedge line, within whose ranks were individuals carrying bats, cudgels and 
sticks spiked with nails. The assailants wore white armbands, presumably to 
distinguish themselves from the civil rights marchers and although those at the 
front of the march passed through relatively unscathed, the bulk of the marchers 
were cut off and therefore left to the mercy of the loyalist mob.355 One journalist 
described the scenes as young men and women pledged to the policy of non-
violence were ambushed:  
They were scattered screaming into the fields near the road. Some of 
those near the river were grabbed and thrown over the bridge to fall 
eight feet into knee deep icy water. Many were then unable to leave 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354 ‘The Burntollet affair hears the marks of careful preparation…The place was 
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the river because of men stoning them on each side, and they had to 
wade for about half a mile before reaching comparative safety.356  
That weekend television stations were lit up with scenes of the attack, one young 
woman in a state of distress described how there was ‘not one policeman in 
sight’ as marchers were beaten, and witness after witness would later testify to 
the experience of violence that was inflicted upon them at Burntollet Bridge.357 
Judith McGuffin, a school teacher from Belfast, was amidst the crowd who were 
pelted with rocks, as she cowered to avoid injury she recalled how, 
… a middle aged man in a tweed coat, brandishing what seemed to 
be a chair leg dashed from the left-hand side of the road, hit me on 
the back, then pulled down the hood of my anorak and struck me on 
the head. I then tried to crawl away, but, teeth bared, he hit me again 
on the spot of my skull.358  
McGuffin’s ordeal was far from unique and a variety of sources documented 
both the severity and the sheer volume of such attacks.359 The consensus among 
marchers was that the police had walked them into the ambush. Police reports 
paint a different picture by presenting their role as being caught in the middle of 
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357 ‘Not one policeman in sight’, Peoples Democracy march exhibition, RTE 
archive. Available online, http://www.rte.ie/archives/exhibitions/1031-civil-
rights-movement-1968-9/1039-peoples-democracy-march-belfast-to-
derr/319670-eyewitnesses-describe-attack-day-4/, accessed on 10/10/2014.  
358 Egan and McCormack, Burntollet, p. 33.  
359 Local newspapers provided detailed commentaries of the Burntollet march 
and television stations captured footage of the attack. See, Irish News 6 January 
1969, Belfast Telegraph 6 January 1969 and Newsletter 6 January 1969. For 
video footage see, ‘There is a good possibility that some stone may be thrown’ 
RTE archive. Available online, http://www.rte.ie/archives/exhibitions/1031-civil-
rights-movement-1968-9/1039-peoples-democracy-march-belfast-to-
derr/319668-civil-rights-march-attacked-day-4/, accessed on 10/10/2014.  
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the attack, and contesting that the RUC strove to bring the marchers to safety. 
The RUC report of the final stage of the march was penned by District Inspector 
Harrison and submitted on 6 January, after news of the attack at Burntollet 
Bridge had exploded throughout the media. Harrison explained that no arrests 
were made because ‘the police were fully engaged with getting the marchers 
through and crushing the attack’, he also claimed that, ‘the loyalists were 
attacked and baton charged by the police’.360 The credibility of the RUC reports 
ought to be called into question considering such claims, as no other sources 
testify to a police baton charge against the loyalist attackers, or anything that 
resembled a ‘crushing’ of the attack. The overwhelming evidence testifies that 
the violence at Burntollet was directed at PD marchers, and violence continued 
as they made their way into Derry.  
After walking the gauntlet of violence along Burntollet Bridge the 
marchers regrouped and, while some were immediately transported to hospital, 
the rest stumbled on. When they made their way to the boundaries of Derry they 
were again victim to attacks, the scale of which again clearly involved a level of 
organisation and pre-planning. As the march passed through Irish Street and 
Spencer Road, bricks, bottles and petrol bombs reigned down at the marchers 
and another crowd brandishing sticks attacked the demonstration.361  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360 Letter from District Inspector Harrison to County Inspector: Civil Rights 
March from Belfast to Londonderry, 1st—4th January 1969, PRONI, 
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occurred at Irish Street, on the outskirts of Londonderry. Among those present 
was the Rev. John Brown, a District Commandant, as we have previously noted, 
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Here there was even more stone-throwing than there had been at Burntollet. 
Some Londonderry people who had joined the march replied in kind to a limited 
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Eventually, the marchers made their way over the Craigavon Bridge and 
into Derry City, where, by now, a crowd of at least 3,000 had swelled into the 
Guildhall Square launching a major civil rights rally.362 It was met by up to 500 
loyalists and various clashes ensued, soon a riot developed between the police 
and civil rights supporters in the Bogside. PD members entered Derry labelling it 
the ‘capital city of injustice’363. Their perception was reinforced that night when 
a large section of off duty B Specials descended into the Bogside smashing 
windows and doors and assaulting residents. In the aftermath of the attack local 
youths gathered in the Bogside to prepare defence against the police, barricades 
were erected and residents vowed to take control over the area. A makeshift 
piece of graffiti was dabbed on a gable wall entering the Bogside, ‘You Are Now 
Entering Free Derry’; it was a slogan coined by Eamonn McCann, and inspired 
by the campus revolt in Berkley College during the US civil rights movement.364 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
extent.’ Cameron Report, para, 100. Also see, Egan and McCormack, Burntollet, 
pp. 46-47.  Adrian Kerr, Free Derry, Protest and Resistance, (Derry, Guildhall 
Press, 2013), p. 59.  
362 Kerr, Free Derry, p. 59.  
363 This phrase was coined by Bernadette Devlin from the platform outside 
Guildhall Square on Saturday 4 January 1969.  
364 Eamonn McCann took the slogan from ‘You are now entering Free Berkeley’ 
in Berkeley College, 1965.  
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3.6. Civil rights reignited 
To blame non-violent marchers for attacks launched on them by 
thugs is ludicrous. To say that marchers destroy good community 
relations is sententious when all they do is reveal the hatred and 
bitterness that lie so little below the surface in Northern Ireland. - 
Michael Farrell. 365  
 
In the aftermath of Burntollet many PD activists held the view that they had 
fallen victim to an attack that had the tacit support of the RUC. Despite the 
presence of ‘two county inspectors, two district inspectors, seven head 
constables, seventeen sergeants and one hundred and sixteen constables’366, who 
were aware of oppositional movements, no physical defence was provided to the 
marchers. Incidentally, it later emerged that scores of the attackers were off duty 
B Specials.367 The identity of many of the assailants was an open secret, and 
when effort was made to highlight their role in parliament by MP Paddy Devlin 
it was met with hostility by the Unionist government.368   
 Opposition to the PD was not confined to the hard-line loyalists that 
populated the route of the march, or to sections of the RUC and B Specials. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
365 Irish Times, 10 January 1969. 
366 These figures were provided to civil rights activists by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs. See, Egan and McCormack, Burntollet, p. 41.  
367 The estimation from PD members stated: ‘But what is the overall conclusion? 
We can name individual after individual, but the sum of our researches indicate 
that about three hundred and twenty people took part in the attack. Of these we 
have identified two hundred and fifty-seven. Nearly a hundred have records of 
service with the constabulary. And these people uniformly appear to have had 
direction and control of the attack.’ Ibid, p. 52.  
368 Devlin’s daughter, Anne, was one of the PD marchers and was beaten 
unconsciously into the river Faughan at Burntollet. Throughout May, June and 
July, he took to parliament over the issue, and named many of the attackers that 
civil rights activists had identified, he also offered this evidence to the Cameron 
commission, but it was rejected, see, Paddy Devlin MP- Evidence submitted to 
the Cameron Commission, PRONI, GOV/2/1/240. 
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Important figures in the Unionist government had continually sided with those 
attacking the march, and their role further illustrates how opposing loyalists were 
given free reign to challenge the PD. For example, both Robin Chichester Clark, 
MP for Londonderry, and William Anderson, former Mayor and then MP for the 
City of Londonderry, were open about their opposition to the march, and both 
were present to monitor its progress. The testimony given by both men to the 
Cameron Commission reveals much about their knowledge of the attack, 
Anderson admitted that ‘I had heard there was likely to be trouble for the march 
and I and Chichester-Clark went out to Burntollet, where we heard there was 
going to be some trouble.’369 Later, Anderson backtracked on this initial 
statement and offered an abridged version, stating, 
I went to Derry that day and I met a certain gentleman who told me 
certain things in conversation. I asked him what he thought would 
happen that day and if there was any chance of any trouble taking 
place. He said that there was a possibility of trouble when the march 
was coming in ... Among these places he mentioned he did name 
Burntollet.370 
More revealing were Chichester Clark’s comments, who knew of ‘more extreme 
Protestant groups’ in the community who had began counter activity, adding ‘I 
have no intention of naming them but I was pretty certain that for various reasons 
there were some of them who were about at that particular time.’371 One does not 
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370 Ibid.   
371 Evidence submitted by Robin Chichester Clark MP to the Cameron inquiry, 
PRONI, GOV/2/1/252.  
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need to engage in speculation surrounding these comments to draw two 
conclusions; firstly, that high-ranking Unionist politicians were aware of an 
attack and its location, but also, that they were privy to the identities of those 
implicated in the attack. Taken alongside the evidence already presented that 
suggests the police knew about the planned attack, it seems feasible to conclude 
that the ambush happened with the knowledge of key elements of the security 
forces and the government. Of course it does not necessarily follow that every 
RUC officer on duty, or every member of the Unionist Party, was guilty of such 
action, but the institutions of the state had clearly acquiesced in the attack. 
Although the sources of violence and sectarianism were evident, an immediate 
backlash developed against the PD, which has strongly influenced the historical 
reading of the march. The Cameron Report laid down the now conventional 
interpretation of the long march when it concluded:  
We are driven to think that the leaders must have intended that their 
venture would weaken the moderate reforming forces in Northern 
Ireland. We think that their object was to increase tension, so that in 
the process a more radical programme could be realized. They saw 
the march as a calculated martyrdom.372 
The claim that organizers intended to ‘increase tension’ is an arguably 
contentious one when measured against the above account of the march. Further 
scrutiny of both the words and actions of those on the march contradicts this 
claim. On the final leg of the march, not long before the ambush on Burntollet 
Bridge, Eamonn McCann spoke to the crowd emphasizing the need to maintain 
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non-violence and avoid conflict no matter what the circumstances; ‘I am afraid 
this is the policy we must support to a lunatic extreme,’ said McCann, arguing 
that not one single person must retaliate against attack and that a policy of 
pacifism must be adhered to for the duration of the march,  
Physical intervention by a marcher must only be employed in order 
to save another whose life is in danger or who may suffer serious 
injury without your help. And even then your intervention must be 
confined purely to giving aid to those in danger, and not to 
retribution…I have no enemy on the road to Derry, except those in 
influential positions who have created this false hatred of us.373  
Michael Farrell expressed similar sentiments, even after being beaten 
unconscious during the attack at Irish Street, when he returned from hospital to 
speak to the mass crowd who awaited the marchers in Derry: 
Since January 1st, we have been attacked and harassed by groups of 
people who think they are hostile to what we represent. Today our 
marchers have been stoned and beaten, and right now many are in 
hospital. But these attackers are not our enemies in any sense. 
Largely, they are the Protestant people who are impoverished under 
the same predatory system. Impoverished they are, and wholly 
misled. We must show that we have no quarrel with them, but work 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
373 Egan and McCormack, Burntollet, p. 26.  
	   171	  
only for the kind of society that will allow the deprived people, 
irrespective of religious views, to combine for their common good.374 
Farrell’s words were consistent with his role throughout the march and 
recollections from surviving participants confirm this. Fergus Woods recalls 
events in Maghera, while being urged by the RUC to accept a third reroute, the 
socialist republican activist, Gerry Lawless, made a ‘really war like speech’ that 
encouraged confrontation. Woods remembers how ‘Michael Farrell got up and 
he just made one of the greatest speeches I’ve ever heard, you know, where he 
said that is so ridiculous and counterproductive and he swayed the whole 
thing’.375 The continual efforts of the organisers to avoid provocation contradict 
the claim that they intended to increase tension, but what was the overall 
motivation behind the march? 
 The march was modelled on the Selma to Montgomery marches of 1965. 
A seminal moment in the black civil rights struggle in the US; the first march 
was beaten back and brutalised by the racist police of the Southern state, but 
afterwards federal courts intervened and upheld the right to march. This 
instigated the process that led to the Voting Rights Act (1965), a landmark piece 
of legislation that granted voting right to blacks in the Southern states of the US. 
PD activists took inspiration from the march, their statement in the run up to the 
demonstration posing the question ‘Is Northern Ireland worse than Alabama?’376. 
Michael Farrell, the principal organiser of the march stated that he wanted to 
replicate a similar process by forcing the British government to intervene and 
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enact reform over the heads of the partisan Unionist Party.377 The effort to 
reform the state through appealing to the British government was a central 
strategy of the civil rights movement since its inception, and the actions of the 
marchers indicate as much. For example, on the first night of the march 
Bernadette Devlin and Fred Taggart slipped off to a nearby house in order to 
make telephone contact with Harold Wilson’s government and appeal for help. 
There they demanded, however naively, that Wilson send British troops to 
safeguard their passage to Derry.378 The request that the British state intervene 
militarily in the crisis was not what would be expected from those attempting to 
subvert and destroy the constitutional status of the Northern Ireland state, but it 
was a logical demand from a movement that sought ‘British rights for British 
citizens’379. 
Of course the intentions of the marchers were not to be realised and the 
opposition they met far outweighed their expectations. However, this does not 
mean that they desired such a response.380 The PD had wagered that O’Neill 
could not be relied upon to deliver fundamental reform, and the actions of the 
government both during and after Burntollet suggest that the little faith the PD 
had in the agency of the Unionist Party as a vehicle for reform was vindicated. 
Sympathy flooded toward the marchers from various quarters, but the Unionist 
establishment pushed a tough line against the PD. On 5 January O’Neill, who 
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had been silent throughout the duration of the march, released a statement that 
was primarily critical of the PD:  
The march to Londonderry planned by the People's Democracy was, 
from the outset, a foolhardy and irresponsible undertaking... It is also 
high time that certain students returned to their studies for which they 
have the support of the taxpayer and learned a little more about the 
nature of our society before displaying such arrogance… Enough is 
enough. We have heard sufficient for now about civil rights, let us 
hear a little about civic responsibility.381  
The statement dedicated the majority of its attack to the PD and reaffirmed 
support for the police force. It has been at times portrayed as an ill thought out 
statement, and one that did not reflect O’Neill’s attitude toward the civil rights 
movement, but was it? Clearly, O’Neill had already shown little sympathy with 
civil rights demonstrators, and even less gumption in dealing with loyalist 
opposition to peaceful protest. Internal British governmental files indicate his 
attitude to the problem in December 1968.  In a private letter to the Foreign 
Office, from Andrew Gilchrist, UK Ambassador to Ireland, Gilchrist summarised 
a meeting with O’Neill which took place on 8 December, one day before the 
Prime Minister took to the airwaves in his ill-fated call for calm. Gilchrist noted 
that O’Neill was ‘extremely tired and depressed’ that all of his work over the 
years had been undone overnight and that the IRA had achieved ‘remarkable 
success through its new strategy of working on ‘civil rights’ through penetration 
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and incitement of student and other left-wing groups.’382 For O’Neill, this was 
driving ordinary decent Protestants to arms and onto the streets with people like 
Paisley.383   
The impression is that O’Neill had identified the PD as a major source of 
trouble. Indeed, if this source is accurate it seems that O’Neill had in private 
repeated the most outlandish of slurs against the PD, that of IRA infiltration. 
O’Neill had consistently placated opposition to the civil rights movement and 
while briefly this took subterranean form in late 1968, it came to the surface in 
early 1969. Burntollet indicated how opposition to the civil rights movement was 
systemic—uniting militant loyalists with sections of the police force, including 
the RUC and USC, and hard-line representatives of the Unionist government.  
It also reignited the civil rights movement. Both NICRA and the DCAC 
announced an end to the truce after the violence in Derry, and January saw a 
succession of marches. The PD called a major demonstration in Newry on 11 
January. Immediately, Bunting announced plans to prevent marchers walking 
down what he termed ‘Unionist streets’ in Newry. But Newry was a majority 
nationalist town and there was no popular local opposition to the march, indeed, 
cross community calls to the Paisleyites to ‘keep out’ of Newry included two 
leading Unionist councillors, who circulated a statement stating that they had no 
objection to the PD march, which they claimed ‘almost everyone’ along the route 
supported.384 Two days before the march Bunting met the RUC, where he agreed 
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to call off his counter protest, seemingly content that the march would not be 
allowed to proceed.  
Thus, when up to 6,000 civil rights demonstrators met police lines to be 
denied their march route along sympathetic ground, and in the aftermath of 
Burntollet, small scale rioting broke out against the RUC. By the end of the day 
police tenders were up in flames.385 One journalist noted that the local Newry PD 
branch did not have enough stewards to control the crowd, eventually, PD 
members tried to offer some direction by instigating sit-down protests and an 
occupation of a post office. Some 17 PD activists would later be summonsed 
with disorderedly behaviour related to the occupation.386 
The Cameron Report later concluded that a major cause of disturbance in 
Newry was the police decision to force a restriction on the march.387 The PD 
went further, arguing that the only feasible explanation was that senior RUC 
officers had struck a bargain with Major Bunting. ‘Bunting had been promised 
that his counter-demonstration would be unnecessary. The RUC were determined 
to keep their bargain, even at the expense of the people of Newry.’388 The 
demonstration lost the PD some authority over the civil rights movement, some 
time later the PD committee that had organised the march would elect a new 
leadership and change its name to the ‘Newry and district civil rights 
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association’.389 It signalled a wider problem surrounding the lack of political 
coherence of the organisation, since October 1968 the PD had grown rapidly but 
not tightly, and the activists who continued to press ahead with action were 
unable to channel their newfound support base into a lasting organisation.   
On the wider political front the resumption of civil rights activity 
precipitated crisis in the Unionist Party. When O’Neill announced a government 
inquiry into the disturbances, key figures in the government resigned, including 
Brian Faulkner.390 When twelve MPs met in Portadown to rally against O’Neill it 
was clear that a parliamentary backlash was underway. O’Neill announced a 
general election for 24 February. It would become the most contested election in 
the history of the Northern Ireland state. It also presented the opportunity for the 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 Meeting of the People’s Democracy- Newry branch, PRONI, CAB/9B/312/5. 
Also see, Belfast Telegraph, 16 January 1969.  
390 Faulkner claimed that he had resigned over the way in which O’Neill was 
introducing reforms and even said that he was in favour of one-man one-vote. 
However, two weeks after he had resigned he stated that he ‘did not accept that 
the minority had suffered grave social injustices.’…  ‘It is nonsense to talk of 
Roman Catholic ghettoes and second class citizens,’ Andrew Boyd, Brian 
Faulkner and the crisis of Ulster Unionism, p. 50.  
	   177	  
3.7. Conclusion 
The PD has since been blamed by the right and the reformist left for 
deliberately provoking sectarianism. It needs to be said that the PD 
leadership were the most determined anti-sectarians of the time.391 -  
Eamonn McCann.   
Eamonn McCann’s words, written on the twentieth anniversary of 1968, were a 
refutation of the established narrative that had emerged surrounding the role of 
the PD. Near three decades on and the effort to blame the PD for provoking 
sectarianism has become common across historical literature. As this thesis has 
argued, this often reflects the narrative conveyed by the political establishment in 
the immediate aftermath of the civil rights movement.  
Thus, former Prime Minister Terence O’Neill— whose term of office 
ended amidst the crisis and instability generated against the civil rights 
campaign— would state in his autobiography some three years after his political 
downfall that, ‘Any Liberal-minded person must admit that the Civil Rights 
movement brought about reforms which would otherwise have taken years to 
wring from a reluctant Government...but I doubt whether the history books will 
show that ‘People’s Democracy’ played a useful role in the advancement of 
necessary reforms.’392 The then ‘Lord O’Neill of the Maine’ was not far off on 
his latter point when he sat down to pen these words. Many historians that have 
since tried to make sense of the transition from civil rights protests to violence 
have constructed a similar perspective; holding the PD responsible for bringing 
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about violence and wrecking the possibility of reform, in an extremist effort to 
precipitate a radical uprising. This research has shown that much of this literature 
contains a number of lacunas and misrepresentations, which are consistently 
repeated in the most authoritative historiography on this period. In offering a 
different perspective, this research has highlighted the non-violent and anti-
sectarian politics that drove forward the PD and contributed to the development 
of the new left in Ireland.  
Having presented the period between the birth of the PD in October 1968 
to early 1969 in detail, it seems clear that civil rights activists were consistently 
met with systemic opposition, which involved hard-line loyalists, both the RUC 
and USC and members of the Unionist government, to an extent that is often 
overlooked among historians who tend to focus upon the moments of 
‘provocation’ from civil rights activists.393 It should not be assumed that the 
Unionist state acted as some form of mediator between the movement for civil 
rights and the opposing loyalist countermovement. Rather, the state was central 
to obstructing the civil rights movement and emboldening the loyalist backlash.  
To conclude, this thesis does not suggest that the PD should be 
approached uncritically. It is clear that the group sparked events that they had 
little ability to control, and it is more than obvious that there is a relationship 
between these developments and the violence that came later. This will be further 
drawn out in the following chapters. However, the PD was by definition a 
conscious attempt to challenge sectarian division through the power of Catholic 
and Protestant self-activity. It was the inability of the civil rights movement to 
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overcome sectarianism that resulted in the re-emergence of political traditions 
that the PD sincerely set out to transcend. The PD was indeed among the most 
anti-sectarian political forces of the time in the 1968-1969 period. The way in 
which historiography has attributed blame to the PD for bringing about violence 
has served to distort the history of the civil rights movement and misdirects 
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Chapter 4: From civil rights to civil strife 
4.1. Introduction: 1969 the fateful year 
‘Neglecting, or worse still, despising, so-called ‘spontaneous’ 
movements, i.e. failing to give them a conscious leadership or to 
raise them to a higher plane by inserting them into politics, may often 
have extremely serious consequences.’ – Antonio Gramsci.394  
 
The next period of PD activity showed how precarious its role would be as a 
more serious situation confronted the civil rights movement. 1969 was the fateful 
year of the Northern Ireland troubles, when the civil rights campaign was 
overcome by violence and repression. Among historians it is often presented as 
the moment when genuine civil rights mobilisation ended and opposition to the 
Unionist state took on more regressive atavistic forms. Thus Henry Patterson 
argues that the post-Burntollet period ‘marks the pivotal point at which the civil 
rights phase of the ‘Troubles’ ended and the conflict began to focus on more 
ancient disputes over national and religious identities.’395 Another survey history 
of the troubles presents an almost identical assessment of what followed 
Burntollet: ‘It could be argued that the march marks the pivotal point at which 
the Troubles changed from being primarily about civil rights to being about the 
more ancient disputes concerning national and religious identities.’396 By treating 
the violence of 1969 as being driven by ‘ancient’ and atavistic disputes scholars 
have denoted the idea that sectarian conflict lay in fixed notions of identity and 
ethnicity, which presents a sense of inevitability to the emergence of conflict.   
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This chapter will argue that the crisis of 1969 cannot be explained in 
terms of the harking back to old or ‘ancient disputes’, but was a product of 
existing political structures and social relations at the centre of Northern Irish 
society that reacted aggressively against reform, reinforcing sectarian divisions 
and precipitating large-scale communal conflict in Belfast and Derry. The 
intensification of conflict saw the national question reemerge as the central 
feature in Northern politics, and it proved most problematic obstacle for those 
who had considered the border irrelevant in the struggle for civil rights. Events in 
1969 would show that, far from irrelevant; the existence of the Unionist state— 
which continually showed an inability to concede reform— was the central 
obstacle facing those who set out to change the balance of social and economic 
power in Northern Ireland. As the PD mobilised the initial grievances that 
activists had set out to challenge were surpassed by greater grievances that far 
outweighed the original mobilising issues of civil rights.397 Amidst the intense 
crisis that engulfed the state in 1969, the civil rights movement proved wholly 
incapable of directing and giving leadership to the forces unleashed by its 
activity, and thus offering an alternative to the sectarian impasse.  
Throughout this fateful year PD activists were continually active, 
marching and picketing in their campaign of  ‘civil rights for all’. In February the 
PD contested in the historic ‘crossroads election’ polling a sizeable vote that 
signalled a high level of support for the radical wing of the civil rights 
movement.  Yet the rise in support for the civil rights campaign was ruptured by 
division over the strategy, tactics and the very raison d’être of the civil rights 
movement. When support increased, so too did the movements internal 
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contradictions and as NICRA faced into 1969 splits emerged in almost all civil 
rights groups across the country. After the February election PD activists waged 
a battle inside NICRA to remobilise the civil rights movement along class lines, 
and were present in many of the major instances of protest.   
The parliamentary highpoint for the radical left came when Bernadette 
Devlin was elected to Westminster in the Mid Ulster by-election of April 1969. It 
also encapsulated the obvious weakness in the entire PD project. Devlin was the 
most recognisable face of the civil rights movement and an able articulator of 
socialist politics. Distance between Devlin and the PD would soon grow, an 
evident result of the way that a loose and unorganised movement like the PD was 
unable to utilise such a prominent position.  
The PD existed throughout most of 1969 as a militant ginger group inside 
the broader civil rights movement; they were active throughout the violence of 
August and subsequent introduction of British troops, and present behind the 
barricades of ‘Free Belfast’. Central to the PD was an attempt to insert socialist 
politics into the movement, based upon Catholic and Protestant mobilisation. The 
rational behind the PD argument ought to be highlighted, as there exists a 
tendency within historiography to distort the politics of the PD at this time. Thus 
it is argued that the PD was ‘prepared to settle for a solely Catholic 
insurrection’398. This thesis will show how, in later years, the PD did indeed base 
their socialism predominantly in the Catholic community, however, the above 
statement bears little resemblance to their involvement in the movement for civil 
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rights between 1968-1970.399 Indeed, it was the failure of the civil rights 
movement, and the entire ‘68 experiment in Ireland, that led to the later 
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4.2. The February election 
Captain O’Neill is desperately trying to don a liberal and progressive 
mask, which is wide enough to cover the bones of the grisly 
skeletons from the Unionist past which clank behind him. He is 
facing in all directions at once, but is determined to stand still.401 - 
Michael Farrell.    
The ‘crossroads election’ presented a different situation to previous electoral 
contests in the Northern Ireland state, with a Unionist Party fractured and divided 
over its approach to the civil rights movement, and an opposition awakened by 
new forms of mobilisation illustrating the depth of change that had taken place in 
the nationalist community. In this context the PD met to discuss putting 
candidates forward for election to the Stormont parliament.  
 Instinctively, some were against the very idea of electioneering; 
participation in elections forewarned bourgeois careerism and threatened 
compromising with the very system they had marched against, some warned of 
becoming a standard ‘parliamentary party’.402 The idea was first rejected at a 
meeting, but a few nights later another meeting was organised and the decision 
was overturned. Not for the first time the left around Michael Farrell pressed 
ahead with the intention to further politicise the movement, and provided the 
political edge to the campaign. The PD would enter the election not as a 
parliamentary party, but as a militant strand of the civil rights movement.  
They approached the election with sole intention of using it as a platform 
to spread the civil rights movement. Declaring that this election, like all others 
was a ‘sham’, a ‘non event’, its major purpose would be to increase the grip of 
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the Unionist government and return a one party state. The election itself was a 
vindication of the existence of the civil rights movement; after all, it would be 
conducted among the gerrymandered constituencies that the civil rights 
movement had set out to reform.403 Instead of being about issues that affected the 
social and material lives of working class people the election was a dispute over 
two forms of sectarian rule, ‘It is about whether sectarianism is to be polite and 
covert— the O’Neill approach— or paraded as something to be proud of, the 
approach of his so-called right wing colleagues.’404 The PD strategy throughout 
the campaign was thus to expose the ‘confidence trick’ of O’Neill, who had 
continually talked of the need for reform, but whose very political survival 
rendered him incapable of challenging the obstacles to reform within the state 
itself.405 
The election allowed the PD a greater outreach to working class areas 
across the North and students from outside Belfast would return to their 
hometowns to campaign. Fergus Woods, PD candidate in South Down, recalled: 
‘My memories about that were, again, there was a great sense of comradeship, 
and people would come down into the constituency and speak on your behalf and 
help out and whatever.’406 Initially the PD announced 12 candidates, but in the 
end 8 registered.  The candidates and their constituencies were as follows; Eddie 
Wiegleb, (Belfast Cromac); Cyril Toman, (Mid-Armagh); Michael Farrell, 
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404 Belfast Telegraph, 10 February 1969.  
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population that the Border and their privileged position were not at stake. On the 
other hand it involved convincing the Catholic that inviting a few nuns and 
bishops to the Governor’s garden party meant an end to poverty and 
discrimination’. Michael Farrell, Struggle in the North (Pluto Press, 1969), p. 10.  
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(Bannside); Bowes Egan, (Enniskillen); Malachy Carey, (Lisnaskea); Peter 
Cosgrove, (South Fermanagh); Bernadette Devlin, (South Derry); Fergus Woods, 
(South Down). The constituencies that the PD selected were ones that were 
traditionally defined as ‘Unionist’ or ‘Nationalist’ safe seats, which returned 
comfortable majorities. The strategy was more of a political statement than it did 
offer chance of electoral success.407   
The PD manifesto conveyed solid social democratic demands.408 For 
example, to solve the housing crisis it called for an end to discrimination and the 
establishment of ‘freely elected democratic councils’ to control estates. On the 
unemployment issue they demanded an emergency programme of state 
investment and ‘the extension of workers control to all branches of industry’. It 
also called for an end to segregation within the education system and the 
introduction of a democratically integrated schooling system. The extent to 
which the PD represented a rejection of sectarian politics was aptly illustrated in 
their statement on the national question:  
Since we are making our demands for Civil Rights within Northern 
Ireland and recognising that the people of Northern Ireland have the 
right to determine their own political future, we regard the border as 
irrelevant in our struggle for civil rights.409  
The election was an audacious effort for a group of activists whose average age 
ranged somewhere in the mid-twenties. Even funding the campaign proved 
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problematic and the PD generally relied on supporters to do so through 
donations, candidates also conducted fundraising drives amongst their supporters 
and collections in their constituencies. They also received financial solidarity 
from the British student movement. The students’ union at Manchester 
University put a penny on the price of drinks to finance the PD raising £400, and 
at Norwich University the students’ union donated £100.410  
One activist, Peter Cosgrove, was fortunate to be on leave from a 
relatively well-paid job and thus able to self fund his campaign, spending 
roughly £400. He also remembered that Bowes Egan ‘had plenty of money and 
he greatly enjoyed spending it’, reckoning that Egan spent £1,000 on his 
campaign.411 This image of the eccentric Bowes Egan is confirmed by John 
Gray, who was also active in Fermanagh. The three Fermanagh campaigns 
worked out of the same base, Mahons Hotel in Irvinestown, ‘Egan was the 
mastermind of the Fermanagh campaign, he financed it, or didn’t finance it as the 
case may be’. Gray recalled that up to twenty people stayed at the hotel on a 
regular basis throughout the campaign, ‘Egan never paid the bill, and almost 
ruined the hotel because the Protestant community subsequently boycotted the 
hotel.’412  
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It perhaps comes as little surprise that media pundits talked down the 
possibility of the PD gaining support at the polls.413 But the collapse of the old 
Nationalist Party vote against the rising tide of support for the civil rights 
movement dictated otherwise. Over the next few weeks PD members canvassed 
door to door, handed out thousands of leaflets, held open-air meetings that often 
attracted large crowds,414 and took part in debates across their constituencies. 
Equipped with a programme and manifesto the activists broke off into groups 
across the country and embarked on ambitious vote winning drives. The loose 
organisation that had defined the movement’s activity had immediate problems; 
anyone who agreed with the manifesto and was willing to organise a campaign 
was allowed to stand. The Cromac PD candidate, Eddie Weigleb, ran a 
haphazard campaign in a constituency that included an NILP candidate and the 
PD received public criticism from Labour members. The Cromac campaign was 
poorly organised and Weigleb received only 752 votes, losing his deposit. But 
the intervention in Cromac was not typical; every other campaign had a 
significant impact in registering support for the civil rights movement.  
The campaign across Fermanagh was typical of the wider intervention 
and conveys both the inexperience of the activists, but also the way that they 
were received as a new and refreshing political force. Peter Cosgrove stood as a 
candidate in South Fermanagh; he recalled the instant problems of facing their 
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campaign from the offset, where they struggled to get enough people to sign his 
election papers, but he also documented an inrush of activism and a solid level of 
support for the student’s efforts,  
We flooded the county with rented cars full of students and others. 
Some of the cars had expensive loudspeakers mounted on their roofs. 
We held public meetings. We gave out leaflets… We spoke at 
Church gates after Mass. We were very, very active.415  
Rural nationalist constituencies had a long tradition of ‘Chapel Gate’ meetings, 
where candidates spoke to the Catholic community after Sunday mass, but the 
PD broke tradition and spoke outside Protestant as well as Catholic churches, and 
activists remember receiving support in both endeavours.416 Peter Cosgrove 
himself received 33.8% of the vote in his constituency. John Gray confirms the 
influx of support that met the PD in Fermanagh, and offers telling memories of 
how their political intervention challenged some of the most traditional political 
positions: 
I remember the first night we were down there we went to try and 
hold a meeting in one of the main Catholic estates outside 
Enniskillen, Kilmicormick. And all the local hoods attacked us, 
threw snowballs at us and rocks, whatever. And we thought we’re 
not going to get too far with this. Within a week the entire estate was 
for it…similarly there was an occasion… when we were driven up 
into the hills above Brookeborough somewhere. Miles and miles in 
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the dark along these icy little rotted roads, until we reached a Nissen 
hut, right, in the middle of a frozen bog, no electric light, tele lamps, 
and the Nissen hut was full of men in trench coats as I remember it… 
These were the local republicans, and so we duly delivered our little 
tirades about how actually these are new times. You had the '56 
campaign, it was an absolute failure. What were going to do now is 
demand civil rights, within the jurisdiction we’ve got, and that is 
going to be far more disabling to the state than any 56 style 
campaign, a most interesting discussion… I think some of them were 
well on for it, some weren’t, and that was to be the picture with 
republicanism as it went along in the future.417 
The national focal point of the election was Terence O’Neill’s constituency of 
Bannside, where he had previously been elected unopposed for over 20 years. 
O’Neill squared off with Ian Paisley, and Michael Farrell flew the PD flag 
amidst what was the most contentious electoral contest in the history of Ulster 
Unionism. Farrell had little chance of being elected in such a strong Unionist 
constituency, but the media hype around the campaign allowed him to amplify 
the politics of the PD. The notoriety of the PD meant there was some opposition 
to their canvassing efforts, at one point Farrell was heckled,418 and when he 
visited the leafy village of Ahoghill, home of O’Neill, he was met with an angry 
crowd of local women who screamed ‘out out!’ and ‘go home you bum’.419 
Considering the level of opposition and violence that had met civil rights 
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activism previously, the February election passed off fairly amicably; perhaps the 
fact that students were now taking part in a socially acceptable form of political 
campaigning temporarily quelled opposition. 
When the ballots were counted the PD won a highly respectable vote. 
With 23,645 votes polled in the 8 constituencies, it amounted to 4.23% of the 
vote spread across all 52 constituencies.420 Broken down into their constituencies 
it is evident that PD candidates took significant portions of the turnout, taking 
roughly 30% of the vote and indicating strong support for the PD wherever their 
candidates were on offer. For example, Cyril Toman achieved 27.7% of the vote 
in mid-Armagh, while Bowes Egan 27.6% in Enniskillen. Likewise Bernadette 
Devlin polled 38.7% with 5,812 votes, and even in Bannside, Michael Farrell 
managed to poll 2,310 votes amounting to 14%. In South Down 4610 voters cast 
in favour of Fergus Woods. Woods came within 220 votes of being elected into 
the Stormont parliament and claimed 48.8% of the vote. The PD had no 
expectation to be elected— and thus no plan in the advent of such a high vote— 
and Woods recounts that it became a running joke amongst PD members that he 
himself had argued for a recount of his vote to avoid potentially taking a seat in 
the Stormont parliament.421 The PD vote registered alongside a much more 
general radicalisation of the Catholic community. As journalist Mary Holland 
noted in the aftermath of the election,  
The election shows that the Catholic minority is on the move, not 
perhaps toward Captain O’Neill and his policies of moderate reform, 
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but towards a more militant demand of equality of opportunity within 
Ulster.422 
It was best illustrated in the electoral breakthroughs of three candidates 
associated with the civil rights movement— John Hume, Ivan Cooper and Paddy 
Devlin. Hume’s election in particular took on a symbolic significance as he 
defeated the sitting Nationalist Party leader, Eddie McAteer, representing a 
definitive shift in oppositional politics. On a wider level the election revealed 
how much the middle ground had receded across the north, with O’Neill failing 
to achieve a substantial majority and to register a significant degree of Catholic 
support. The election had not delivered a strong mandate for the government; 
immediately afterward the PD announced that they would ‘return to the streets’ 
indefinitely and it was facilitated by wider support networks.423 During and after 
the election the PD tried to capitalise on its gains by establishing local branches, 
including Armagh, Fermanagh, Toomebridge, Dunloy, South Derry, Newry and 
Cromac.424 Their success varied and some made little headway. The Cromac 
branch managed to organise two marches into the city centre to protest over 
‘chronic housing conditions’ in the area before seemingly collapsing into 
inexistence.425 Other branches played a role in leading civil rights agitation in 
parts of the country, beginning a process where PD could potentially cultivate a 
more permanent base. The most active was in Armagh where a number of 
activists had helped out during Cyril Toman’s campaign, including brothers Niall 
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and Brian Vallely.426 Again the main mobilisation issue in Armagh throughout 
the summer of 69 was housing, and the branch organised actions aimed at re-
housing tenants in deprived estates to get a fair points system that ensured the 
equal distribution of homes. In May PD activists disrupted the council chamber 
several times, only to be eventually banned from entering the public gallery. 
When they attempted to force their way into the chamber they were refused entry 
by the RUC; the Vallely brothers led the charge, followed by some 30 
supporters, but the police prevented the activists from entering the room and 
scuffles ensued.427 Both Vallely brothers were arrested alongside two other 
activists.428   
 Another notable area of PD activism was Fermanagh, where their three 
election candidates had together polled well over 6,000 votes.429 Fermanagh was 
an evident illustration of sectarian imbalance, as despite having a majority 
Catholic electorate non-Unionists only held one third of the seats on the 52-seat 
council. The PD viewed this level of disenfranchisement as by-product both of 
Unionist discrimination and the complicity of the Nationalist Party, whom were 
guilty of a ‘silent agreement’ that left them secure in South Fermanagh and 
allowed the Unionists to dominate Enniskillen and Lisnaskea. Fermanagh PD 
amounted to about 15-20 members and they spearheaded similar activity to their 
comrades in Armagh, instigating local action around housing and 
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unemployment.430 These efforts played out alongside a much deeper crisis across 
the civil rights movement, the focus of which will be the next section.  
The February election saw the PD register a high level of support, giving 
the movement a national profile and enabling the activists to establish better 
networks across the country. It also solidified a more permanent turn toward the 
working class and away from the university campus. This was the natural course 
of the movement, but also worth noting was the way that much of the liberal 
support that existed among the student population was beginning to wane as 
protests ended in violent scenes. By April 1969 the students’ union at Queen’s 
had passed a motion stating that ‘the PD does not represent the opinions of all 
students in this University and we, as the Students’ Union, wish to disassociate 
ourselves from their recent activity.’431 The university management also took a 
tougher line toward some students: in March Bernadette Devlin was denied the 
opportunity to complete her final exams on the grounds that she had ‘brought the 
university into disrepute’.432  
After the election then the PD held an amorphous existence, between its 
former base in the university campus, and its newfound role as a leading current 
of the civil rights movement. Cyril Toman relayed the problem facing the PD to 
a journalist:  
The Stormont Election completely dispersed us. Which may prove to 
have been beneficial, in that it forced us to break clear of our student 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430 Peter Cosgrove, Peoples Democracy member 1969, part 1.    
431 QUBSU conference motions, 22/4/1969, People’s Democracy file, NIPC.  
432 Devlin, ‘Recollections on the role of students: a personal-political account’, 
Spirit of 68, Beyond the Barricades, p. 71.  
	   195	  
base whilst at the same time we established ourselves as a national 
force. But it did mean that we lost the physical proximity necessary 
to strengthen ourselves politically and organizationally. Now in fact 
we face the problem of organizing PD from scratch.433  
This problem would be compounded by a much wider division surrounding the 
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4.3. The politics of civil rights 
The PD radicalised the civil rights movement from the beginning of 1969 
onward, however, its role also sharpened the existing divisions over the nature of 
the campaign and soon these divisions were so acute that the movement 
fractured. From the advent of street mobilisation tension had existed between the 
older established left and young radicals and as a broad social movement 
developed— encompassing contradictory strands of politics, ranging from 
conservative nationalism to radical socialism— division over strategy and 
politics wracked the movement. Indeed, immediate division existed across the 
radical left over the very question of protest action. In the terminology of the 
time it was described as a rift between the ‘radicals’ and the ‘moderates’ of the 
movement— the former represented by the PD and its likeminded supporters, 
who were committed to action since October 1968, and the latter represented by 
a broader assortment of established left forces, ranging from trade unionists, the 
NILP and the CPNI, who held an influential position in NICRA. 
These organisations tended to be led by older political operatives, often 
quite cautious in their political approach, and wedded to an ideological outlook 
that had been formed over many decades. The dominant strategy among the 
established left was to develop the civil rights movement along the route of 
reform, championing civil rights as a ‘non-political’ cause and hoping to 
strengthen the position of the Catholic community inside the Northern state, thus 
democratising the state through parliamentary mechanisms. Much of this stood in 
contradistinction to tactics applied by the PD, who tried to push the campaign 
ahead in a more radical fashion, based upon working class mobilisation and 
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Protestant and Catholic unity in action. The PD did not necessarily have fixed 
positions or an agreed agenda of any depth, but it was defined by a commitment 
to street protest, anti-sectarianism, and a willingness to challenge the forces of 
law and order through non-violent civil disobedience. This meant an orientation 
toward working class self-activity as both the agency for radical transformation 
and in combating sectarianism.434  
The tension between the PD and the established left is easy to source 
across the historical record and is well illustrated in the relationship that 
developed between the PD and Betty Sinclair, the leading member of the CPNI 
in the early days of NICRA. Sinclair had been the principle opponent of 
marching since the beginning of the civil rights movement, disagreeing initially 
with the first march in Dungannon, and as street agitation increased she became 
more openly opposed to the tactics of the radical left.435 In time, Sinclair would 
develop much acrimony toward Bernadette Devlin and the PD more generally. 
Her diaries reveal attacks on the ‘stupid young students’ of the PD who were 
‘playing with politics’ and had no idea of the realities of Northern Ireland.436 
Michael Farrell drew particular attention; for Sinclair, he was the ‘spider who 
weaves the webs’.437 
The hostility that existed from the beginning was generally submerged 
throughout the early period of mobilisation due to the seemingly forward march 
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of the movement. Events came to a head, however, in the aftermath of Burntollet. 
When the PD announced their intention to march to Derry, Sinclair privately 
hoped that bad weather and snowfall would prevent the march from taking 
place.438 Alas, her hope was in vain and what followed saw these disagreements 
enter the public arena. By the time that the Cameron enquiry spoke to Betty 
Sinclair she expressed strong differences with leftist attempts to politicise the 
civil rights movement, and when asked directly about the role of Michael Farrell 
she reacted as such:  
Q: Now as far as Mr. Michael Farrell is concerned could you tell the 
Commission anything that you know about him [...]? A: I do not 
want certain things to be printed. I do not want to see things with my 
name appended to them. Anything I do say I will stand over. Would 
it be possible to go off the record here?439  
The Commission interview then broke off before resuming. The prospect of 
Belfast’s leading Communist going ‘off record’ to converse with a British judge 
concerning the activities of the radical left illustrates the level of animosity 
toward those who had taken on the role of building socialist politics outside of 
the realms of the Communist Party.  
From the outset much of the criticism levelled at the PD by the 
Communist Party and other voices of moderation fell on deaf ears among a 
generation who felt they had experienced the ‘reality of Northern Ireland’ in full 
fashion and who could also claim, with some degree of truth, that their efforts 
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had done more to expose the true nature of the Unionist state in a few months 
than years of patient campaigning from the established left. Yet if the 
communists in the civil rights movement can be charged with hostility to the new 
left, then it should be qualified by recognising that the impatient, and at times 
ultra-left, nature of the PD often prevented the movement having any serious 
influence on the forces of the wider left.  
Much PD activity existed upon the belief that their actions alone could 
spark the struggle capable of transforming the political situation, and a more 
general rejection of official politics, including the established left and social 
democratic organisations. There is little evidence to suggest that the PD had a 
rapport with other sections of the left and labour organisations on a substantive 
basis, instead they remained disconnected from the big battalions of working 
class organisation. Indeed, the PD at times seemed as charged against ‘reformist’ 
currents inside the civil rights movement as they did their class enemies in the 
government. Thus, with more than a touch of humour Bernadette Devlin would 
describe the communists ‘as reactionary as the Unionists.’440  
As the civil rights movement was met with increased opposition, division 
over future action began to split the movement. This was precipitated by PD’s 
increase in support. After January 1969 two leading members of the PD, Michael 
Farrell and Kevin Boyle, were voted on to the NICRA executive. Their presence 
quickly brought objection from those on the leadership who wanted the 
campaign to stay within safe grounds. In March a split was triggered after 
Bernadette Devlin announced a joint NICRA/PD march that was planned to go 
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from Belfast’s city centre to the Stormont parliament, and thus through the 
heavily loyalist area of East Belfast. It soon became apparent that the NICRA 
executive had no knowledge of the demonstration and an executive meeting was 
held to discuss the matter. Three different proposals to resolve the issue were put 
forward by Farrell and Boyle, but the committee could not reach agreement and 
was split down the middle. Crucially the new chairperson, Frank Gogarty, who 
was known for more radical views than the previous chair, Betty Sinclair, voted 
in support of the PD proposals. After a heated debate on 14 March four leading 
members of the NICRA executive, Sinclair, Fred Heatley, John McAnerney and 
Dr Raymond Shearer, resigned in protest against the PD. The four released a 
joint statement that called for a secession of protests and strongly condemned the 
student radicals: 
All we needed was time…a lull in which to see if Captain O’Neill is 
going to carry out the reforms he had promised. But the PD would 
not give us time and their political views are infringing on the non-
political aims of NICRA…We have been taken over by people 
preaching the most extreme form of revolutionary socialism, the sort 
of politics that have been causing trouble in France, Germany, Japan 
and many other parts of the world.441 
The statement illustrated the extent of the political gulf across the left. Ironically, 
Belfast’s most prominent communist was to rally against the ‘extreme socialism’ 
of the PD, instead counter posing faith in the reforming capacity of the Unionist 
government to bring ‘non political’ change to the minority community. The 
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decree to ‘keep politics out’ of the civil rights movement was seen simply as an 
attempt to silence the voice of the radical left. One activist responded in kind:  
Of all the arguments used against the left, this is the most spurious. 
All the demands of the civil rights movement are political. If the 
demand for the abolition of the Special Powers Act, for example, is 
not political then just what kind of demand is it?442  
The PD reacted confidently to the walkout. Michael Farrell countered that talk of 
the PD infiltrating NICRA was ‘arrant nonsense’, claiming that the four who 
withdrew did so ‘in a fit of temper’ after they had unsuccessfully challenged the 
PD proposal. In Farrell’s view no mention of infiltration had been made until 
after the walk out had taken place and the former executive members proposed 
no alternative motion or mode of action. Furthermore, the very idea of a ‘take 
over’ by the PD was in itself problematic, considering that there were only two 
PD members on the eighteen-person strong NICRA executive. Thus, what really 
happened at the meeting was that others on the NICRA had agreed with the PD 
around the question of returning to the streets, to the dissatisfaction of the 
Sinclair et al.443  
The division in NICRA was reflecting one of the patterns of the global 
left, as predominately young militants clashed with passive and reformist 
currents of the established left. This process had indeed taken place in France, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442 Eamonn McCann, Whose wrecking civil rights? (1969) Available online, 
https://cedarlounge.files.wordpress.com/2008/04/emc.pdf, accessed on 
12/03/2016.  
443 Irish News, 17 March 1969. 
	   202	  
Germany, Britain and other parts of the world.444 It would then play out across 
various civil rights groups. After the Belfast walkout eight out of thirteen 
members of the Omagh NICRA committee resigned in protest against what they 
perceived to be leftwing subversion: ‘We feel that C.R. is being undermined by 
extremist movements for whose actions we cannot hold ourselves 
responsible.’445 Then, in Fermanagh, five members of the NICRA committee 
resigned citing similar grievances.446   
 It was against this backdrop of internal crisis that the PD and NICRA 
embarked on joint protests against the Public Order Bill, which further curtailed 
the right to protest and further called into question the liberal image of 
O’Neill.447 On 22 March demonstrations were called in towns and cities across 
the North including Belfast, Derry, Newry, Toomebridge and Enniskillen, where 
turnouts varied. Incidentally, the day passed fairly peacefully, apart from in 
Armagh where four people were arrested. The PD claimed to have had a 
successful outing, having handed out over 30,000 leaflets explaining their 
opposition to the Bill.448  
 The rifts between activists were largely absent from the day, but the way 
in which the state reacted to the protests suggests that the politicisation of the 
civil rights movement was not something that could not be avoided. A consistent 
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theme throughout internal police reports on the 22 March protests was the effort 
to draw out republican involvement in civil rights protests. In Enniskillen, where 
the PD mobilised hundreds of supporters behind strictly civil rights banners, 
senior RUC Inspector Bill Meharg labelled the demonstrations republican 
orientated, stating, ‘most support from those who have in the past been identified 
as supporters of the Irish Republican movement in Fermanagh.’449 In Newry, 
Meharg concluded that, ‘The Republican element is clearly the prime mover in 
the local agitation and the Newry committee is unable to control this element.’450 
In Belfast, where the PD held a student led city centre rally, Meharg was again 
keen to draw out republican involvement in the protest, by warning of a number 
of redacted names who were ‘prominent members of the Republican movement 
in Belfast.’451 Certainly, republicans were involved in civil rights protests, but 
the RUC reports seem to overstate their role in a contrived way. The RUC 
viewed the hidden hand of republicanism as a major source of provocation; it 
was a reflection of a dominant consensus across the Unionist state, which served 
to mutually reinforce sectarian opposition to the movement from both inside and 
outside the government. Therefore, the state responded with an overtly political 
response to civil rights protests and the movement was unequipped to react 
politically, with many in NICRA favouring an avoidance of politics altogether— 
a calculated amnesia toward the sectarian obstacles that faced the movement.  
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The PD led protests in Belfast against the Public Order Bill provided a 
telling example of the ideologically incoherent nature of PD activity. A crowd of 
students had gathered in the centre of Belfast but they were met with a two 
hundred strong crowd of loyalists who shouted down their demonstration. After 
some thirty minutes the students were forced to wind up when they broke into 
discussions surrounding themes as diverse and topical as ‘Paisleyism, Civil 
Rights, Maoism and Chinese Communism’452.   
 The size of the loyalist counter protest at this particular protest illustrated 
the extent of opposition that was now to be expected toward student civil rights 
protest. For the more politically astute members of the PD the only hope for the 
survival of the civil rights movement was in its ability to reach across the 
sectarian divide and herein lay its problem. By early 1969 it was evident that, 
despite the continual efforts to articulate an anti-sectarian message, the 
overwhelming perception of the civil rights movement among the Protestant 
community was that of an all-Catholic movement concerned with advancing only 
solely Catholic interests. This was arguably reinforced by the role of the 
‘moderates’ inside the movement. The effort to ‘keep politics out’ of the civil 
rights movement was intended to ensure maximum unity of the ‘anti Unionist’ 
community, thus uniting the forces of nationalist Ireland around the cause of 
equal treatment for Catholics. The PD adopted a distinctly different approach 
prioritising cross-communal mobilisation and struggle from below, to counter the 
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image that the civil rights campaign was a pan-Catholic movement intent on 
subverting the North into the Southern Irish state.453 
 The next PD initiative was an attempt to challenge the pan-Catholic 
image of the movement and show that the causes of civil rights were both 
universal and applicable to both Irish states. The march from Belfast to Dublin 
on 4 April was an effort to spread the civil rights movement across the border 
and into the southern state. It drew a further line between the radical left and the 
moderates of the civil rights movement. Calling the march under the slogan ‘civil 
rights north and south’, the PD made contact with groups on the southern left, 
student organisations and the Gluaiseacht Cearta Sibhialta na Gaeltachta, the 
Gaeltacht civil rights movement in Galway, which organised a march from their 
city. The march provided an opportunity to connect movements against 
oppression in the Irish state with the struggle for rights in the North, and the 
Gaeltacht community saw the civil rights framework as a means of protesting 
their own perceived neglect within the Irish state.454 The Minister for Home 
Affairs banned the march walking from Belfast to Newry and the PD instead 
organised public meetings that precipitated the activists setting off from 
Dundalk. In Lurgan one meeting was marred by police violence, with twenty-one 
people arrested including a group of activists who had travelled over from 
Britain. Anne Devlin, already a victim of violence during the Burntollet ambush, 
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was beaten unconscious by a District Inspector of the RUC wielding a blackthorn 
stick.455  
From Galway, the newly founded Western Civil Rights Movement 
marched alongside PD to highlight issues as broad as housing, unemployment, 
the decline of the Gaeltacht and discrimination against the travelling 
community.456 Naturally, it was not wracked by the violence now commonplace 
at demonstrations North of the border, but controversy did emerge after PD 
activists made policies of the Irish state a central theme of their demonstration. 
When the PD challenged the power of the Catholic Church by highlighting the 
illegality of divorce and contraception, it caused consternation among civil rights 
supporters and conflicted with some of the new base that the PD had garnered 
across the North. Before the march had set off activists in Fermanagh PD 
disagreed with attacking the Catholic Church.457 After the march left Newry, 
Cyril Toman held a press conference where he criticised the church’s record and 
challenged the state’s censorship laws by producing two books The Ginger Man 
(1955) and The Girl With Green Eyes (1962); the latter was banned at the time. It 
was a small stunt, but it managed to arouse the anger of the southern media. It 
also brought criticism from other activists on the Irish left who were reticent 
about such tactics and refused to complete the march.458   
The march was met by some 5,000 people in Dublin representing a 
notable level of support and the organisers had trouble keeping control of events, 
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with around 800 breakaway activists protesting at the British embassy.459 
Marchers attacked Jack Lynch for using the issue of civil rights to divert 
attention from the appalling housing and unemployment conditions that existed 
in the Irish state, and afterward the PD released a statement contending the 
march:   
Did not expect to precipitate a revolution in the south. It did hope to 
arouse the anger of the working people against the exploitation of 
Green Tories as well as Orange ones, and against the fact that the 
40,000 unemployed in the north were matched by 60,000 in the 
south; the 4,000 homeless in Derry by the 10,000 in Dublin; the 
6,000 annual emigrants in the north by the 17,000 in the south.460 
Although the PD was positive in its press statements there is evidence to suggest 
that the march precipitated some division and demoralisation privately in its 
ranks.461 Years later, Michael Farrell would reflect on the aspirations behind the 
march; the PD activists expected the civil rights movement to explode in the 
south in similar fashion to that previously in the north.462 The belief that the 
southern working class would be easily mobilised in order to come to the aid of 
Catholics in the north was a common one in this period, but the hope that the 
Northern rebellion would produce a wave of radicalisation among southern 
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workers and witness them challenge their own ‘Green Tory government’ on mass 
did not to materialise.463 The PD had seen the Unionist state rocked by the advent 
of people power and thought they could act as a detonator for similar struggle in 
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4.4. The election of Bernadette Devlin MP 
By the time the PD was marching from Belfast to Dublin, Bernadette Devlin was 
heavily involved in the election campaign for the Mid Ulster seat in the 
Westminster Parliament. Devlin’s electoral breakthrough was one of the most 
pivotal moments of the Northern Ireland civil rights campaign; it propelled her 
on to the world stage as the de facto leader of the rebellion in Northern Ireland 
and created a media frenzy. It also etched the name of the PD into the history of 
the European left as the only new left grouping during the rebellious 1968-1969 
period to have a student member elected into parliament. The fact that a 21-year-
old radical socialist with only 8 months political experience was elected into the 
British parliament with over 33,000 votes, beating the Unionist candidate, Anna 
Forrest, by a majority of over 4,000 testifies to the radicalisation around the civil 
rights campaign. Devlin’s own personal journey— from unknown student 
activist to champion of a socialist Ireland— embodied the leaps and strides of the 
student movement since October 1968.464  
 The election victory became possible after the death of Unionist MP 
George Forrest in December 1968. There had been long speculation about the 
potential for a civil rights candidate to take the seat in the subsequent by-
election. Republican Tom Mitchell had previously held the seat from his jail cell 
on an abstentionist ticket.465 Both Kevin Agnew and Austin Currie had put 
themselves forward as candidates, but a yearning for a united candidate 
dominated the build up to the election throughout a number of ‘unity 
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conventions’ organised by Patricia McCluskey, where various candidates put 
themselves forward. With the main political pillars of republicanism and 
moderate nationalism split over proposed candidates, Devlin emerged as a 
mediator between both currents, radical enough for the republicans but also 
acceptable to moderates.466  
Initially, Devlin was reluctant to put herself forward, hoping that Michael 
Farrell would instead contest the seat, but Farrell opted out of the whole ‘unity’ 
project expressing uneasiness as it involved working alongside sections of the 
Catholic middle class and besides, he was unacceptable to some of the other 
factions in the convention, undoubtedly due to his role in driving forward the 
most militant aspects of civil rights action.467 It was somewhat ironic that Devlin 
was seen as the tolerable choice, as she would prove to be far from moderate. 
Following the withdrawal of Austin Currie and Kevin Agnew, 225 delegates 
selected Devlin at a unity convention.468  
Amidst the groundswell of momentum that developed around Devlin’s 
campaign PD activists were overshadowed by larger political forces. Peter 
Cosgrove recalled that when he and other activists went to help out with the 
campaign they were almost irrelevant, because the combined effort of both 
republican and nationalist election machines ‘needed little help from even the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466 Conn McCluskey recalled how, ‘At that time she was everyone’s darling. We 
were delighted with her dynamism and her absence of posturing. We hoped that 
from then on she would consolidate her position, fusing together the disparate 
elements of minority life. Unfortunately this did not happen.’ Conn McCloskey, 
Up off their Knees, a commentary on the civil rights movement in Northern 
Ireland (Published by Conn McCluskey and Associates, 1989), pp. 142-143.  
467 Devlin, The Price of My Soul, p. 166.  
468 Irish News, 3 April 1969.   
	   211	  
most enthusiastic amateurs’469. Nevertheless, PD members did play a role in the 
election campaign, regularly sharing platforms at meetings; Bowes Egan, 
Michael Farrell, Peter Cosgrove and Fergus Woods spoke in support of Devlin at 
different events.470  
The climate had heated since the February election and Devlin’s 
campaign was met with more sizeable opposition. Public meetings were 
regularly confronted with hostile crowds waving union jacks and flinging 
missiles at Devlin’s supporters. In such an instance in Bellaghy, Devlin pleaded 
to her followers that anyone ready to fight their Protestant neighbour had nothing 
in common with the civil rights movement.471 In the village of Moneymore the 
campaign faced more serious opposition when a mob of loyalists pelted 
campaigners with stones, bottles and eggs. It was so fierce that the planned 
meeting was cancelled. However, Devlin responded by stating publicly that she 
would return the next day, which she did.472  
Devlin entered Westminster as the youngest-ever female MP. For the 
next five years she would march, picket and protest in support of a variety of 
working class causes in Ireland, Britain and in the US; becoming Ireland’s 
internationally renowned rebel MP. The victory encapsulated both the militancy 
and the internationalism of the movement, but it was also the apex of a 
contradiction, in that the loose fringe of socialists now had an MP who seriously 
broke with the grain of conventional politics. When elected, Devlin apparently 
declared, ‘There may not be 30,000 socialists in this constituency but it has a 
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socialist MP anyway’473. The statement perfectly summed up the contradiction of 
the PD, which had made sizeable gains but was incapable of retaining the inrush 
of support and developing socialist organisation against the tide of sectarian 
conflict.474  
Devlin’s election focused the eyes of the world onto the Irish civil rights 
movement. Her parliamentary career defied both the republican tradition of 
abstentionism toward the British parliament, and the normal practices inside the 
House of Commons. Standing on the slogan of ‘I will take my seat and fight for 
your rights’, Devlin entered Westminster and her maiden speech set the tone for 
her future as an MP, breaking the parliamentary tradition of making 
uncontroversial speeches during inauguration to parliament, she delivered a fiery 
oration that hit out at the Unionist government and Britain’s record in Ireland.475 
Her commitment to politics in the streets over politics in parliament was 
substantiated in August ‘69 when she led the resistance to police repression 
during the ‘Battle of the Bogside’ in Derry. The image of Devlin breaking up 
paving stones to arm the Catholic youths with ammunition to drive back the 
RUC is one of the most iconic images of the civil rights period. Equally 
infamous were Devlin’s exploits in America, where she drummed up support for 
the Irish struggle and offered solidarity to blacks fighting against racial 
inequality, setting her further against the trend of nationalist Ireland and the 
conservative reception of Irish American support. 
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A cursory glance at Devlin’s record as an MP would contradict the 
conventional view that her support was based upon traditional Catholic 
nationalist fervour.476 Indeed, if Devlin’s socialist politics were obscure in April 
1969— perhaps due to relative anonymity— they were in full view during the 
June 1970 general election when she again topped the poll with 37,739 votes. 
Devlin’s election put the PD in a favourable position, but the reality of having an 
MP immediately confronted the group with problems. Michael Farrell recalled 
that after the election the PD was ‘confounded’; an ultra left rejection of 
parliament combined with the PD’s own loose structure ‘meant we did not know 
what to do with an MP’. The result was confusion and some resentment between 
Devlin and others in PD.477 Divisions surfaced after the election and it was clear 
that there was no common perspective between activists. 
In a now iconic interview with New Left Review (NLR), on 20 April 
1969, some of the leaders of the PD met to discuss strategy and tactics. The 
interview allowed the PD activists to present their account of the civil rights 
movement, and they came across united both in their desire for working class 
action to thwart the rise of sectarian tension and in their criticism of the 
moderates of the civil rights movement. Yet while what transpired on the pages 
of NLR testified to the feeling of possibility that encapsulated the late 1960s, it 
also showed how disorganised and divided the PD was. Cyril Toman reckoned 
that the coming together of the activists was probably the first time they had 
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discussed their strategy in any depth for a couple of months.478 But events had 
moved quickly since student protests at Queen’s and the movement had come up 
against immeasurable obstacles. Hitherto, the radicals had been united on one 
substantial point; the necessity to drive forward civil rights mobilisations in a 
socialist direction. However, the central problem facing the movement was the 
increase in sectarian division and the failure of the campaign to win significant 
support from the Protestant community. Disagreement over how this could be 
achieved was evident, as the newly elected MP put it, ‘The fact of the matter is 
that everybody knows where they don’t want us to go, but nobody really knows 
what they do want and nobody is prepared to organize’.479 A clear line of 
disagreement emerged between Eamonn McCann and Michael Farrell, two 
individuals who can be said to have done the most to develop the ideas of the 
left. Recognising that the civil rights movement was leading to an upsurge of 
activism predominately within the Catholic community, the activists clashed 
over the balance of sectarianism among supporters of civil rights. Farrell’s self-
described ‘humorous’ use of the term ‘Catholic Power’ to portray the situation in 
which the left could advance the struggle in Catholic areas was also strongly 
challenged by McCann. For the time being it was a theoretical debate, but it did 
illustrate the likely road down which Farrell would steer the PD in the future, as 
sectarian division intensified the organisation would shift toward basing itself on 
the militancy of the Catholic community.   
Overall, the NLR interview exposed how much of a mess the PD had 
found itself in, with various disagreements emerging. The Mid Ulster election 
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campaign itself emerged as a topic of division; Farrell disapproved of the type of 
unity that had developed between nationalist politicians during the campaign, 
who had addressed election meetings and emphasised sectarian issues over class 
issues. He also expressed concern that Devlin did not stand on an openly socialist 
ticket. While different opinions were aired during the interview, the clear 
overriding weakness was that the lack of political agreement was exacerbated by 
the absence of a functioning organisation, and this was evident in the political 
assessment of those who had done most to champion the development of the PD. 
Farrell began the interview by explaining that the PD was not just part of the 
civil rights movement, but was a  ‘revolutionary association’. He went on to 
argue that the loose nature of the PD was becoming a fetter on the development 
of socialist organisation and the furtherance of class politics, hinting that the left 
had sacrificed its identity to the broader civil rights movement:  
I think it will be necessary, within the overall framework, to find a 
way of introducing a little more co-ordination. I had hoped that the 
PD would realise the necessity of taking a stand on class issues, and 
would therefore transform itself into a broadly socialist body, though 
a non-sectarian one in which socialists of several different tendencies 
could co-operate. I no longer think this will happen of its own 
accord.480 
Farrell’s comment identified another problem that had dogged the PD from its 
inception; a hope in the spontaneous nature of class struggle as a substitute for 
the building of socialist organisation, it was a common trait of new left 
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organisations. As the North teetered from civil rights to civil strife, the PD 
existed more as an idea than an organisation; it had not developed as a concrete 
pole of attraction capable of retaining support and strategically intervening in 
Northern politics. PD members thus increasingly found themselves reacting to 
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4.5. Drift to disaster 
The extent to which the civil rights movement was losing control over the forces 
unleashed by demonstrations was shown in events over the weekend of 18-21 
April. On 17 April members of the Derry Civil Rights Association attempted to 
re-trace the final leg of the Burntollet march outside of the city. It was met with 
loyalist opposition and sparked three days of widespread and intense rioting. 
During the trouble the RUC pursued rioters into a home and proceeded to assault 
residents, resulting in the death of Samuel Devenney.481 It provided the context 
in which Devlin thundered against the ‘stark human misery’ perpetuated against 
the people of Derry by the Unionist Party during her first sitting in parliament.482  
 NICRA and the PD responded to the violence by calling for 
demonstrations across the country in order to take police pressure off Derry. In 
Belfast an extraordinary general meeting of NICRA was held at the Wellington 
Park Hotel to discuss events in Derry. After an emotional tape recording from the 
Devenney family was played, Michael Farrell made an urgent appeal that 
activists organise to ‘take pressure off Derry’. Then, ‘the country delegates were 
told to go back to their own areas and to arrange peaceful demonstrations’ 
although crucially ‘no arrangement was made for a demonstration in Belfast’.483 
NICRA’s reluctance to organise action that would likely be met with sectarian 
opposition stemmed from a genuine desire to retain peaceful protest, but it also 
amounted to an abdication of responsibility. As news of Derry’s troubles reached 
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west Belfast the initiative was taken by local republicans who had a proven track 
record of agitation in the area. Among their ranks was a young Gerry Adams.484 
The protests that played out in Belfast illustrated the political vacuum that 
emerged in the city. Indeed, by April 1969 there was no functioning NICRA 
branch in Belfast and up until now the main strand of agitation had been the PD, 
which had been based in the university area.  
On 19 April 300 people gathered at Casement Park and established the 
Andersonstown Civil Rights Committee. The crowd was joined by the Belfast 
Housing Action Committee and marched to Hastings Street police station to hand 
in a petition against police brutality. This form of protest would be repeated in 
Belfast over the next few days, again on 22 April a similar pattern played out.485 
On this occasion the crowd split into two groups with a breakaway faction going 
to hold a separate rally some fifty yards away. The splinter group was led by PD 
activist Fergus Woods who reasoned; ‘we believe in action but it must be 
planned action’. Woods urged the 300 people who had gathered not to protest, 
‘but instead invited them to a meeting the following week-end where they could 
discuss civil rights.’486 The calls for planned action were not enough to calm the 
crowd and that evening many of the youths that gathered set off on sporadic 
attacks on the police.487 Belfast was beginning a slow descent into violence and 
PD members found themselves ever more on the sidelines with little option but 
to observe. Tony Cliff, who was in contact with the PD through his International 
Socialist group, based in Britain, recalled, ‘They had started an avalanche but 
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they did not know what to do, or how even to organise themselves.’488 As the 
summer approached this would become tragically apparent.  
The disturbances in April coincided with a heightening of tension when 
loyalist bombs destroyed key instillations on 20, 24 and 26 April.489 The 
explosions were the final straw in Terence O’Neill’s long and unsuccessful 
balancing act. On 28 April O’Neill resigned, citing regret for the failure to 
surmount the religious divide. Yet some of his preceding comments also revealed 
the more sectarian persuasions that imbued unionisms most able reformer.490 In 
the end it was not the civil rights movement that ended O’Neill, but its antithesis, 
the loyalist backlash. The PD saw O’Neill’s demise as proof that he was a victim 
of his own myth; he had merely tried to meddle with the exterior of the Unionist 
state through superficial gestures that could not address the root causes of 
division and inequality, ‘His ultimate dismissal reveals the stuff of which 
unionism is made.’491 O’Neill was replaced by Chichester Clark who, on 1 May, 
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attempted to make a break with the past and announced an amnesty on all those 
involved in disturbances since 5 October. It was received by some as a welcome 
gesture that alleviated the crackdown against civil rights activists, but others 
viewed it as a deliberate ploy that allowed the government to sweep aside the 
many abuses that had been carried out against civil rights activists. The attackers 
at Burntollet and the various examples of police violence would be ignored.492   
The new political context saw the civil rights movement take a step back 
from activity and offer the new administration breathing space to introduce 
reforms. After a four hour meeting NICRA announced a retreat from 
demonstrations in favour of a campaign of civil disobedience, which included 
pickets and squatting actions across the country.493 The decision did not take 
place without division in NICRA; one activist described its regional council 
meetings as ‘dog fights’ over whether or not activity should be suspended, with 
some representatives favouring a return to the streets.494 However, differences 
were sunk for the sake of unity.495 Crucially, PD members publicly agreed with 
the decision to suspend activity, but internally tension continued. At a meeting of 
the newly established civil rights association in Belfast, several members of the 
PD walked out after a debate with members of the Communist Party over the 
democratic functions of the group. In the end the dispute was resolved and PD 
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members returned; at this meeting Fergus Woods was elected as chairman of the 
Belfast Civil Rights Association.496  
It was against this backdrop of internal rancour and stalemate that the 
civil rights movement announced a return to the streets. Time had elapsed since 
the suspension of activity and it was clear that Chichester Clark would not 
indicate publicly the dates for the implementation of all reforms outlined by the 
civil rights movement four weeks previously. The remobilisation began with a 
NICRA rally in Strabane on 28 June, where the platform erupted in open debate 
over the very raison d’être of the movement. The stage encompassed 15 speakers 
representing the various strands of the campaign. Eamonn McCann led the 
charge from the left stating that the civil rights movement was proving unable to 
overcome sectarian division. McCann argued that the movement had not defined 
what type of unity it had hoped to see and attacked Austin Currie MP, who was 
also on the platform, for having accepted the government’s timetable of reform. 
Bernadette Devlin followed by making it clear that as the newly elected MP she 
was firmly in the camp of the radical socialists,  
I was elected as MP to Westminster as a Unity candidate; but if you 
picked me for the same kind of unity that Austin Currie stands for 
then I can’t serve you and the sooner you get rid of me the better. I 
stand for Eamonn McCann’s unity, and let there be no mistake about 
it.497  
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Farrell spoke on behalf of both PD and the NICRA executive; ‘Our struggle is 
not just against unemployment, discrimination and gerrymandering but against 
the whole rotten corrupt system which the Unionist clique of proprietors, 
landlords and company directors use to keep themselves in power.’498 The 
demonstration coincided with an important initiative in Dungiven, where PD 
members helped prevent a potential outbreak of violence in the face of a large 
Orange march. Just two weeks previously confrontations between nationalist 
youths and the police developed after stones had been thrown at an Orange 
parade through Dungiven.499 More violence looked inevitable but for the 
intervention of the PD who, alongside the local Dungiven Action Committee 
prevented physical resistance to the march. Led by Kevin Boyle, the activists 
produced a leaflet arguing against obstructing the march and canvassed the local 
area for support. As an alternative, they proposed stunts of civil disobedience by 
shutting the shops and plastering the town in posters reading, ‘you can march, 
can others?’500. They also argued with young people that the best way they could 
support the civil rights cause was to travel to the Strabane demonstration. Two 
busloads of youths travelled to the rally.501  
The intervention served to diffuse sectarian tension and no significant 
trouble occurred on the day. It was a small microcosm of the potential for 
preventing sectarian violence in the run up to the most sustained period of 
Orange marches. The PD hoped that the experience could be replicated, but their 
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hopes did not materialise.502 The anger that was building up in working class 
areas was far surpassing the efforts to prevent confrontation, and it had been 
displayed on several occasions. Serious rioting had broken out in May in 
Ardoyne, an indicator of what was to come. Throughout July reports of Catholic 
families being intimidated from their homes in Belfast filtered through and 
sectarian assaults increased, particularly in Derry.503  
As Northern Ireland entered its most destructive summer the PD 
continued to function as a militant ginger group inside the civil rights movement, 
with its activists present in various local bodies. However, the movement itself 
was beginning a rapid decline amidst division and confusion. In Armagh Civil 
Rights Association a number of activists resigned after a dispute with the PD 
over further action.504 Moreover, as civil rights crowds were shrinking they were 
also being met with parallel numbers of counterdemonstrators.505 In Newry on 5 
July around 2,500 people marched over the route that had been previously 
banned on 11 January in the face of a mob of Paisleyites.506 When the Orange 
marching season reached its crescendo on 12 July; sustained riots broke out with 
the most serious instances in Belfast, Derry and Dungiven. In response to the 
violence civil rights activists were reluctant to demonstrate. Fermanagh PD 
pressed ahead with a march on 26 July that focused on unemployment and 53 of 
their supporters were arrested by the RUC, with 37 of them being held overnight 
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in jail.507 The clampdown on civil rights had begun and it would intensify over 
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4.6. ‘Falls Road burns, Malone Road fiddles’- Behind the barricades 
in Free Belfast 
There is only one solution. It is not a new one. It is to fight Toryism, 
North and South and build Connolly’s Workers’ Republic. We serve 
neither Lynch nor Clark, but an Irish socialist Republic – Citizen 
Press.508 
Considering the past year’s events the flashpoints for conflict in the summer of 
1969 were predictable, but faced with the level of violence in previous months 
the general policy of NICRA was to avoid taking action.509 It reflected the 
situation the civil rights movement was now in; its role reduced to defensive 
reaction against the explosion of sectarian attacks in Belfast in August, which 
were overwhelmingly directed against the Catholic community. In turn, this saw 
PD members take part in their first serious activity inside the Catholic ghettos of 
Belfast.  
At the height of the marching season in Derry on 12 August serious 
clashes ensued between the RUC and Catholic youths. The next day saw similar 
scenes spread across the North.510 In Belfast, the NICRA executive met on 13 
August where they were inundated with calls to alleviate pressure on Derry 
through protest action. The belligerence toward demonstrating in Belfast— 
because of fear of sectarian reprisal— left NICRA pacified, the strategy of not 
acting meant no strategy at all. Again, the groundswell of anger saw local 
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republican activists in Belfast organise support for those fighting the RUC in 
Derry.511  
In the final hour NICRA was compelled to support demonstrations. Both 
Michael Farrell and Kevin Boyle were central to NICRA activity in these days, 
and Boyle urged those who were organising to ‘make sure it’s a non-violent 
demonstration and that it’s designed to block roads, to draw off police, to involve 
the use of police in other parts of the province.’512 John Gray recalls how the PD 
attempted to send activists to each area where action was likely; he would go to 
Lurgan, Peter Cosgrove to Enniskillen and Cyril Toman to Armagh. In all places 
that demonstrations were called, riots happened ‘it wasn’t too difficult to start 
them’. Gray recalls watching the Specials ‘wrecking the area’ in Lurgan. He then 
joined other PD members in Belfast where the most vicious fighting had taken 
place.513  
Belfast experienced unprecedented repression after Catholic crowds 
marched on police stations during 13 and 14 August. A violent backlash ensued 
against the Catholic community where members of the RUC and the B Specials 
were at the forefront of attacking residents alongside loyalists, during scenes that 
included the deployment of armoured vehicles, which traversed west Belfast 
unleashing heavy machine gun fire.514  
By 15 August hundreds of Catholic homes had been burnt to the ground. 
The worst disturbances were in the west of the city, where Bombay Street was 
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set ablaze, as well as the Catholic enclave of Ardoyne in north Belfast. In Belfast 
alone the violence saw six people killed, including a nine-year-old Catholic boy, 
Patrick Rooney. The Scarman Report, set up to investigate the disturbances in 
the summer of 1969, estimated that 1,820 families fled their households between 
July, August and September; 1,505 of these households were Catholics, which 
made up 82.7 percent, or 5.3 percent of all Catholic families in the city.515 The 
instability brought about the introduction of the British Army, in Derry on 14 and 
in Belfast on 15 August; it was a hugely significant turning point in the 
developing conflict. PD members were present as Belfast erupted, and Michael 
Farrell recalled that ‘the whole thing seemed unreal’516. 
The violence saw the Catholic community mobilise to defend the most 
troubled areas, with residents erecting barricades at flashpoints across the city. 
The main method of organisation was through local defence committees, which 
had sprung up sporadically in response to previous violence, particularly in 
Ardoyne.517 A number of committees were established and formed the ‘Belfast 
Central Citizens Defence Committee’ (CCDC). The CCDC had representatives 
from Ardoyne, East Belfast and Andersonstown among other areas. It claimed to 
represent the tens of thousands of people in the areas behind the barricades, now 
aptly named ‘Free Belfast’, an appellation that stuck after being painted on 
barricades throughout the city.518 Like Free Derry, the liberated parts of Free 
Belfast became ‘no go’ areas that briefly opted out of the Northern state. 
Described as almost ‘revolutionary communes’ the no-go areas saw local people 
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appoint their own forces of law and order and administer forms of self-control.519 
The CCDC organised defence of the barricades as well as patrols of the area, it 
also held social events such as ceilis and administered a curfew on residents and 
publicans.520 PD activist Fergus O’Hare, who was a young man behind the 
barricades, recalled, ‘It became very much a community activity or a community 
struggle’521. 
PD members were active in Free Belfast, and although they had very little 
base in the liberated areas they possessed a formidable experience that allowed 
the small group to get a hearing.522 Consequently, while the CCDC was directed 
mostly by older republicans and community figures — the overall chairman was 
republican Jim Sullivan—523 PD members were active at rank and file level. The 
major function of the PD behind the barricades was to propagate socialist ideas 
and agitate for the maintenance of militant action to secure the civil rights 
demands, as the British Army moved in to work alongside the Unionist state to 
remove the barricades and restore order.  
Their role is most memorably contained in the propaganda that was 
plastered across Free Belfast. After making contact with left-wing activists in 
London who introduced them to the techniques of silkscreen printing, first 
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popularised by radical leftists during the Paris uprising of May 1968, PD 
activists produced a stream of posters demanding that the ‘Barricades stay up 
until our demands are met’. The most famous stated ‘Falls Road burns, Malone 
Road fiddles’524. It seemed to encapsulate the class nature of the violence that 
had torn the city apart, drawing a contrast between the tranquillity of the upper 
class suburbs in the city centred on Belfast’s Malone Road, with the working 
class quarters that were ablaze. A PD leaflet distributed behind the barricades 
explained: 
The people who suffer in these troubles live on both sides− though 
the last weeks events have been very one sided, and the people who 
live in the squalid backstreets of the Falls, Shankill and Crumlin 
Roads, they are working people earning low wages and many of 
them have lost all their possessions. The burning and wrecking never 
reach the Malone Road, the rattle of the machine gun fire never 
disturbs the tranquillity of the residents there. But that’s where most 
of the Unionist bosses live: the people who have been preaching 
hatred and violence but who are never around to see the effects of 
their oratory. It is always the working class who suffer.525  
Class politics informed PD activity behind the barricades. The two main areas of 
activity were the barricades’ bulletin commissioned by the CCDC, Citizen Press, 
and the pirate radio station Radio Free Belfast. On both these outlets PD activists 
worked alongside republicans. The Citizen Press was printed on a daily basis, its 
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fourth edition reaching a print-run of 5,000526, and activists recall that it 
immediately gained a large readership.527  
The paper provided a daily communication and coordinated activity, for 
example, by advertising meetings to be held in Leeson Street where members of 
Defence Committees from across the city would come to participate.528 The 
politics of the PD are visible throughout. Citizen Press hit out at the Unionist 
government’s record and forwarded the civil rights demands; it also maintained a 
consistent anti-sectarian line arguing for defence of areas, but against sectarian 
attacks on Protestants:  
For members of the Catholic community to attack Protestants is to 
sink to the same level as the B Specials and the Unionist extremists. 
It is even worse because, while sectarian hatred is part and parcel of 
an unjust system, it dishonours and disgraces a just cause.529  
An early edition presented the demands of those behind the barricades, 
contending that the barricades should stay up until these were met:530 
1. Disband the B Specials. 
2. Disband and reorganise the RUC. 
3. Release political internees and a general amnesty for all those 
involved in recent disturbances that fought to defend their homes. 
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4. Westminster intervention to grant civil rights now, including the 
abolition of all repressive legislation (including SPA).531 
The other major source of PD activity was Radio Free Belfast. Described by 
internal British intelligence reports as a ‘highly professional’532 station that 
broadcast from ‘an anarchist or revolutionary socialist point of view’533. Radio 
Free Belfast delivered a mixture of serious political commentary and 
entertainment. PD members Michael Farrell, Cyril Toman and Peter Cosgrove 
were primarily responsible for the popular ‘Profiles in Carnage’ and ‘Profiles in 
Corruption’ sketches that mocked Unionist and nationalist politician alike.534 The 
comedy at times received a mixed reception inside west Belfast. John Gray 
explains his own role on Radio Free Belfast and one startling reaction to it:  
My main role on Radio Free Belfast was, believe it or not, to give 
sermons purporting to come from the reverend Ian Paisley and these 
required me to drink about 3 or 4 pints of Guinness in the Long Bar 
and think up some lunatic idea and then just go and do it straight to 
mic. And I had one on the dangers to British troops of drinking 
Catholic tea and the duty of Orangemen to paint every blade of grass 
in Ireland orange and so forth… There was a guy turned up with a 
gun saying ‘where’s the fucker’, he was drunk too, ‘I want to get the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
531 Citizen Press, Bulletins No 2, D2560/5/21 and No 9, D2560/5/25.  
532 Jamming of illegal radio stations in Belfast and Londonderry, exchanges 
between UK ministers, Northern Ireland officials and HQ Northern command. 
SECRET- Illegal broadcasting stations in Northern Ireland (1969), NAUK, 
CJ/4/425.   
533 Ibid, Illegal radio stations in Northern Ireland, 10 September 1969.  
534 Interview with John Gray, Belfast, 21/04/2015.  
	   232	  
fucker’, ‘where’s the fucker’… and he had to be restrained. It had to 
be proved to him that actually this was an imitation.535   
Less confusing, perhaps, was the political message that the radio broadcast.  
Communications called for Protestant and Catholic unity in the face of rising 
sectarian tension, echoing the words of the Communist Manifesto; ‘Workers of 
Belfast unite— you have nothing to lose but your Unionist government.’ 
Transmissions were addressed to the British troops in an attempt to explain the 
roots of the crisis and appeal to the soldiers on class grounds, 
We call on you as workers to protect the ordinary people of this city, 
Catholics and Protestants, […] We appeal to you not to do the 
Unionists’ dirty work for them, not to help them to oppress the 
people any longer.536  
The radio even addressed the RUC, and while the message was unreserved in 
criticising the actions of the police, it directed its most vocal criticism at the 
Unionist elite and appealed to rank and file RUC officers to embrace reform. 
Reminding listeners of the events of the 1907 Dock strike in Belfast, when 
members of the police force sided with striking workers against employers, one 
broadcast humorously urged, ‘Today another Tory government is using you in its 
campaign to crush a section of the people by Orange terror. What about another 
strike? We’ll support you.’537  
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It is unlikely that such a message received support from members of the 
RUC. However, it does contradict the claim that the ‘the socialist content of the 
radio was virtually non-existent’538. The evidence clearly suggests that the PDs’ 
role behind the barricades, through Radio Free Belfast and other outlets, gave a 
distinctly anti sectarian and socialist content to the politics of the ‘liberated’ area. 
Radio Free Belfast was not the only pirate station to air. At least five stations 
sprang up including Radio Ulster and Radio Orange, which were broadcast from 
Protestant estates and drew a stark contrast with both Radio Free Belfast and 
Radio Peace, a moderate station. Indeed, internal British files suggested that 
‘extremist Protestant’ stations played a specific role in organising bouts of 
violence and helped force events to a head in September 1969. Radio Orange 
was involved in ‘issuing orders— telling sections to go to various places and do 
various things’.539 Oliver Wright— a senior civil servant dispatched to Stormont 
Castle in the aftermath of the August violence— confirmed that ‘extreme 
Protestant’ stations were almost wholly responsible for an outbreak of violence 
on 7 September at Percy street,540 and police reports testify that Radio Orange 
mobilised up to 3000 people that got involved in the riots, which saw the military 
use C.S. gas.541 The next evening Chichester Clark appeared on television to 
announce that the barricades would be removed forcefully, if not voluntarily.542 
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That same day the Army took steps to jam the radio stations as the British 
government worked hard to remove the barricades altogether.543    
From the British establishment’s perspective the situation in Belfast 
could not continue, and as the days and weeks passed the removal of the 
barricades became the priority of British Home Secretary James Callaghan. He 
was aided by moderate forces within the nationalist community who wanted to 
see a restoration of order. MP Gerry Fitt had gone to some length to bring 
complaints about both the PD and republicans to the British government, 
personally telling Prime Minister Harold Wilson ‘he would condemn the IRA 
and the extremist People’s Democracy’544. In another private meeting between 
Fitt and Callaghan he complained that ‘the IRA and the People’s Democracy had 
been allowed their heads too much behind the barricades.’545 Michael Farrell 
argued that both these parties worked behind the scenes to ensure that this 
situation was short-lived, as protracted contact developed between the British 
government and representatives of the Catholic middle class, local politicians 
and the Catholic Church546.  
The insistence to keep the barricades up until the demands were met soon 
shifted to being demands, ‘that will have to be assured before the army can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
543 Illegal Radio Stations in Northern Ireland (no date), NAUK, CJ/4/425.  
544 Note of a meeting between Gerry Fitt and Harold Wilson, 9 September 1969.  
Meetings with Gerry Fitt MP and other Roman Catholic representatives about the 
political and security systems in Northern Ireland, Sep 04- Sep 23, 1969. NAUK, 
CJ 3/53,  
545 Report from Brian Cubbon, 10 September 1969. PRONI, CJ/3/53.  
546 Farrell, The Orange State, p. 267.  
	   235	  
leave.’547 On 11 September a meeting took place in London between a delegation 
of CCDC representatives. Significantly, the central figure of the Belfast CCDC, 
Jim Sullivan, a long-term member of the republican movement, was barred from 
attending as Callaghan refused to meet anyone associated with the IRA.548 The 
delegation that met Callaghan included Gerry Fitt, Paddy Devlin, Tom Conaty 
and Catholic priest Patrick Murphy. Here it was agreed to remove the barricades 
and restore military control within a week. In reality, the British Army had 
already begun to remove the barricades on 10 September.549 
There is evidence to suggest opposition to the decision; one journalist’s 
account from the period noted that angry residents gathered to throw stones at the 
military in some cases.550 The Citizen Press also reported that while the 
appointed CCDC representatives were negotiating the removal of the barricades 
in London, a straw poll was conducted across several streets in Belfast where 97 
percent of those asked voiced their support for maintaining the barricades.551 
Although PD members agitated to keep the barricades up, they were ineffectual 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
547 As the Citizen Press put it: ‘They are not demands that had to be met before 
the barricades could come down. They are things that will have to be assured 
before the army can leave.’ Citizen Press, Bulletin No 12, PRONI, D2560/5/27.  
548 Report from Brian Cubbon, 10 September 1969. PRONI, CJ/3/53.  
549 Ibid.  
550 Hastings, Ulster 69, p. 170.  
551 Citizen Press, Bulletin No 11, PRONI, D2560/5/27.  
	   236	  
4.7. Conclusion 
The PD set out at the beginning of 1969 with ‘Catholic and Protestant unity’ as 
their watchword, but the pursuit of these ideals proved an altogether difficult 
affair. By the summer of 1969 the brief moment when radical socialists played a 
leadership role in civil rights movement had passed. Although there is a clear 
line of development from the Burntollet march to the violence in August 1969, 
the drift to disaster should not be seen as inevitable. Central to the emergence of 
the crisis were various moments of state repression that provoked mass Catholic 
resistance in both Derry and Belfast.552  
The state’s reaction to the campaign for reform changed the terms upon 
which oppositional politics was to be conducted, and it is evident that the tactics 
of non-violent civil disobedience had been strained to breaking point by the end 
of 1969. Defence of the Catholic community became a necessity and the 
republican movement moved from the background into the foreground of 
politics. Moreover, the experience of repression and violence that met the 
Catholic community in 1969 suggested that the strategy championed by the civil 
rights movement, based upon reforming the state, was not achievable. It had 
obvious repercussions for all forces within the civil rights movement. For 
example, by late 1969 the ‘stages theory’ approach looked very problematic, not 
least considering that the supposed first stage— a period of gradual 
democratisation— had been unattainable. In terms of the PD, its activists had set 
out on journey that began with them launching an optimistic movement, 
inseparable from the global rebellion of the 1960s, only to be engulfed in a 
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communal conflict that was difficult to comprehend. More than one student of 
68’ would drop out of PD activity around this time.553  
For the radical left who had driven the PD since its inception the crisis of 
1969 demanded a more serious approach toward politics, organisation and 
strategy. Although the PD had carried out much activity it was clear that the 
organisation had failed to get its politics to large numbers of people. Eamonn 
McCann presented a critique of their record; the reason they had failed to get 
their position across, argued McCann, was that they had failed to wage any 
serious political fight within the civil rights movement, and this was a reflection 
of their inability to relate to the mass audience that emerged in 1968. Throughout 
the years the left in the north had been prone to talking to small groups of people:  
Now suddenly, since October the 5th, we have found that we have an 
audience listening to us and applauding us, of tens of thousands of 
people. We got carried away by this, and submerged the Young 
Socialist Alliance in the PD; we submerged our politics into the Civil 
Rights movement. All that we managed to get across was that we 
were more extreme than the Civil Rights people. We have never 
made it clear that this difference in militancy stemmed from a 
political difference, we never made it clear why we were more 
militant; and the reason for that, I believe, is that we have been 
frightened of scaring off our mass audience.554  
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The socialist identity of the PD had been submerged into the broader civil rights 
movement and the left’s pursuit of a different forms of struggle— class over 
communal — had been lost. The left lacked a coherent organisation that could 
direct the street movement and as the barricades in Belfast came down, only to 
be replaced with more permanent fences of division, the socialists of the PD set 
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Chapter 5: Free Citizens 
5.1. Introduction: making the left relevant 
The conclusions drawn by the PD in the aftermath of the civil rights struggle 
were put into action in the period following August 1969, as activists formed a 
revolutionary socialist party and engaged in various forms of activism. This 
coincided with a long period of unrest that witnessed the breakdown of order in 
the North— when the Unionist state experienced a disintegration of relations 
between the Catholic community and British military, setting in train events that 
led to a more prolonged outbreak of violence from 1971 onwards.   
The lack of research surrounding the PD leaves much to be unearthed and 
documented in order to assess the development of the revolutionary left. The PD 
played a considerable role in grassroots politics at this time, most notably in the 
mass civil resistance movement that erupted against internment in the post-
August 1971 period.555 Writing the history of the PD throughout the 1970s 
requires one to hone in on a small current of politics, whilst navigating through 
an intense period of conflict and change. The unfavourable terrain inhabited by 
those espousing a message of working class unity will be emphasised, but so too 
will the strategy of the wider left, including the NILP, the Communist Party and 
the broader labour and civil rights organisations, who advanced different 
strategies to the PD. As loyalist reaction deepened and sectarian division 
increased — both on the streets and in the political arena— the common 
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perspective across the left was one based on caution and support for the 
reforming capacity of British military intervention in Northern Ireland.  
For the PD, the experience of August 1969, British intervention and the 
entrenching of Unionist reaction, necessitated an immediate move to build a 
relevant left based upon class politics and the day-to-day struggles of working 
people. That such a movement never developed should not lead us to conclude 
that history did not contain other possibilities, nor should we discard the 
potential that existed for a more substantial left-wing intervention. Indeed as has 
been argued elsewhere, it was the failure to fill the ‘vacuum of the left’, which 
emerged in 1968 that facilitated the resurgence of republicanism.556 The clear 
lesson from the 1969-1972 period was that the Northern state had strongly 
reacted against any effort to enact reform, and that the left had proved incapable 
of confronting this reaction. Whereas the left were incapable of this task, other 
more experienced forces were able in challenging the state. This chapter looks at 
the aims and activity of the PD amidst this unfolding crisis.  
The kind of political perspective developed by the PD was, arguably, a 
strategy that — through a commitment to class politics and opposition to both 
the Unionist state and British imperialism— contained within it the possibility to 
address the national question on socialist grounds, and potentially offer a 
different direction to militant oppositional politics amidst the outbreak of 
conflict. However, the PD never developed into a properly organised force 
capable of implementing its ideas.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
556 As Eamonn McCann put it, the Provisional IRA were the ‘inrush that filled 
the vacuum left by the absence of a socialist option’, McCann, War in an Irish 
Town, p. 243.    
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The failure of the PD to grow was largely a result of the way that the 
organisation was formed and developed. Consistently ‘on the move’ and with 
little roots in society, the PD generally shifted with the tide, reacting to events as 
opposed to influencing them. This meant that there was often a disconnect 
between the politics and ideology of the PD and their ability to translate this into 
practical results. Further, the PD strategy failed to reach wider forces in society 
and the small membership of the organisation found it difficult to relate to others 
outside of their own ranks. In this regard, holding the politics of the PD against 
the strategy of the bigger battalions of the organised left will continue be a 
central theme of this thesis.   
Instead, PD members were often forced to act alone and can be seen to 
have at times forwarded an overoptimistic perspective surrounding their own 
ability to construct a current of socialist politics, as the Unionist state fractured 
and fissured in the post-1969 period. The failures of such endeavours— in a 
context of far-right reaction, state repression and shrinking horizons for the 
radical left— helps explain the later demise of the PD and its retreat into the 
Catholic ghettos of the North.  
This chapter begins by looking at the formation of the PD into a 
revolutionary socialist organisation at the end of 1969 and considers its political 
and ideological development. The PD argued that pursuit of a 32-County 
‘Workers’ Republic’ necessitated working class agency and self-emancipation on 
both sides of the border, in a challenge to both states that was capable of 
approaching the national question in the interests of the Irish working class. 
Crucially, they contested that any such movement demanded unity of Catholic 
and Protestant workers in the North.  
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This perspective, which reflected the global trend of ‘socialism from 
below’— to borrow a term from Hal Draper557— stood in contradiction to the 
politics of the wider labour movement and the organised left. Therefore, when 
these ideas were put into action they were largely done so in an amateurish way 
with the PD acting alone throughout 1970-1971, organising a variety of social 
and economic struggles. The impact of this period of activism was thus minimal, 
and the PD failed to develop a real influence. Finally, this chapter looks at how 
the PD version of 32-county socialism viewed the republican movement as it 
experienced splits, reorganisation and resurgence in the post 1969 period. The 
way in which Marxists should relate to the republican movement has long 
wracked the many groups that populate the history of Irish socialism, and 
perhaps none more so in recent times than the PD. This will be a central theme 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
557 Draper’s emphasis on socialism from below was toward those forces that saw 
active workers struggle as the driving force for change; ‘How does a people or a 
class become fit to rule in their own name? Only by fighting to do so. Only by 
waging their struggle against oppression – oppression by those who tell them 
they are unfit to govern. Only by fighting for democratic power do they educate 
themselves and raise themselves up to the level of being able to wield that power. 
There has never been any other way for any class.’ Hal Draper, ‘The Two Souls 
of Socialism’, New Politics 5, no.1, winter 1966, pp.57-84. Available online, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/draper/1966/twosouls/index.htm?PHPSESSID
=35fb8e862c3404829cd69fc281a1c371, accessed on 14/05/2016.  
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5.2. The launching of a socialist party 
There is no liberal way out of this dilemma558- PD conference 
motion. 
The PD was launched as a socialist party in a conference in Belfast on 12 
October 1969. A motion proposed by Michael Farrell gave the organisation’s 
intent; ‘The People’s Democracy, which has been active in the struggle for civil 
rights, for more jobs and houses, and against Toryism, North and South, believes 
that its objectives can only be obtained by the ousting of both Tory governments 
and the establishment of an Irish Socialist Republic.’559 It outlined three areas 
where the PD needed to clarify its thinking:  
1. The Protestant backlash and the threat of Orange Fascism.   
2. The use of 7,000 British troops in Northern Ireland.  
3. The necessity for support from the South.  
The PD was hereafter formed into a centralised party, adopting individual 
membership and establishing a permanent leadership committee made up of nine 
activists elected every 6 months at an all member’s conference, the membership 
worked through local branches. The official organ of the PD was the Free 
Citizen newspaper, which emerged from the shutting down of the Citizen Press 
after the dismantling of the barricades in Belfast. Over the next two years the 
Free Citizen was produced on a weekly basis.      
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
558 People’s Democracy conference motion, 1969, People’s Democracy file, 
NIPC.  
559 Ibid.  
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The activity of the PD would feature in British government intelligence 
reports, which recognised that ‘the People’s Democracy leaders are skilful 
agitators’560, and that their ‘capacity for troublemaking must not be 
underrated’.561 Internal PD documentation suggests that the group began to 
develop a notable structure and financial dependency, at least by the limited 
standards of the left in Northern Ireland. Its financial breakdown for the year 
1970 reveals that the group could afford to employ a full time organiser, hire 
premises to run meetings and a bookshop, purchase a minibus and pay for a 
substantial output of printing and advertising.562  
The PD also began to produce a respectable output of political literature. 
The Free Citizen became a regular outlet of anti establishment ideas with an 
early print run of up to 3500, similarly, the PD journal The Northern Star, with a 
print run of 1500, acted as a theoretical medium through which the group 
cohered its ideology over the next period.563 The intellectual abilities of the PD 
were best illustrated in Michael Farrell, an able pamphleteer and perhaps the one 
individual who can be said to have exercised the most influence over the 
ideological development of the left in the North post-1968. In late 1969 Farrell 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
560 Memorandum by the secretary of state to the Home Department. Northern 
Ireland political situation: Home office appraisal and correspondence with UK 
representative. Formation of the UDR, civil rights activity, 1969 Dec 01-1970 
Nov 06. NAUK, CJ 3/9.  
561 Director of operations- Intelligence committee Northern Ireland- 31 March 
1970.  Northern Ireland internal situation, setting up of new defence force; 
possible amendment to police bill, part 8, 1970. NAUK, PREM 13/3386.  
562 PD expenditure 1970, PRONI, D3297/7.  
563 PD Central Committee minutes, 25/1/1971, 11/1/1971, PRONI, D3297/7.  
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produced his first pamphlet titled The Struggle in the North, it was a novel 
socialist intervention into the situation since the civil rights movement.564  
Farrell was primarily responsible for instigating a major ideological 
transformation in the PD by adopting an anti-partitionist position from 1970 
onward. Having refused to raise the national question throughout 1968-1969, the 
PD now spoke against partition and in support of a ‘32-County Socialist 
Republic’, using language that expressed the vision of James Connolly, Ireland’s 
most renowned Marxist. This could be viewed as a natural enough trajectory for 
those radicals who were products of the nationalist community; after all, activists 
such as Farrell were already on record as being against partition and in support of 
an all Ireland socialist state before the upsurge of activism in 1968.565       
However, anti-partitionism had not featured heavily— if at all— in the activity 
of the PD throughout this period. The PD now challenged the Northern state on 
class grounds, arguing that Catholic and Protestant workers were the agency 
capable of carrying out a revolutionary transformation in Ireland. 
This was not a perspective universally shared throughout the left in Ireland, 
among whom the re-emergence of the national question saw acute theoretical 
differences. The PD was beginning a journey that would see it develop into one 
of the most vocal and active anti-imperialist socialists organisations. Other 
currents defended the Northern state and supported partition, such was the case 
with the Irish Communist Organisation (ICO), later the British and Irish 
Communist Organisation (BICO). This grouping was a small Stalinist inspired 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
564 Farrell, The Struggle in the North.  
565 Others who came from a ‘Catholic’ or ‘Nationalist’ background and had 
expressed anti-partition views pre-1969 included Bernadette Devlin and Eamonn 
McCann. 
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organisation who were to the forefront in developing the ‘two nations theory’, 
which essentially contested that both the North’s Protestant Unionist and 
Catholic nationalist communities formed two separate nations, ‘each with 
distinct and equally legitimate traditions that had to be protected’566. BICO, 
therefore, viewed the idea of Irish reunification as a potential form of national 
oppression. The practical implications of this led BICO to ignore state led 
violence against the nationalist community, and support the loyalist backlash that 
was developing. As socialist writer Brian Trench has documented:   
While state forces attacked the opponents of the Unionist regime, and 
the nationalist population in general, the advocates of ‘two nations’ 
theory were so concerned with distancing themselves from supposed 
Catholic nationalist desires to oppress the Protestants, that they were 
unable to oppose actual repression! Thus it was, that one month after 
the introduction of internment in August 1971, a leaflet was 
published by the ‘Worker’s Association for the Democratic 
Settlement of the National Conflict in Ireland,’ which omitted to 
mention internment or repression. Nor was there any mention of the 
British Army or of imperialism.567  
Ultimately, BICO did not develop as an active political current in the way that 
the PD did. Nevertheless, the organisation produced a steady stream of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
566 Brian Kelly, ‘Northern Ireland: The Left, Sectarian Resurgence and the 
National Question Today’, Irish Marxist Review, Vol. 2 No. 8 (Dublin, 2013) p. 
52.  
567 Brian Trench, ‘The Two Nations Fallacy’, International Socialism, No. 51, 
April-June 1972, available online, 
https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/isj/1972/no051/trench.htm, 
accessed on 4/2/2016.  
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publications that exercised a significant ideological influence in the North.568 The 
main individual responsible for the politics of BICO was Brendan Clifford, and 
PD meetings in 1970 were said to have often consisted of debates between 
Clifford and Farrell, both of who were developing their ideas at this time.569 
Farrell went on to produce a notable critique of the two nations theory, pointing 
out that by very definition it was problematic, not least because the Protestants of 
Ulster had never viewed themselves as an independent nation, nor had they ever 
presented their demands as such.570 Instead, Protestant Unionism had emerged 
and developed as a component of British nationalism, and was closely related to 
the role of British imperialism in Ireland.  
The political development of the PD from 1969-1970 signalled a more 
serious turn to Marxist ideas and this was expressed in how the organisation 
situated itself among the wider schisms of the global left. In one meeting, Farrell 
argued, somewhat simplistically, that there existed three mainstreams of socialist 
thought dominating the globe, ‘the Communist Party, the social democratic 
parties and the revolutionaries’. Farrell placed the PD in the camp of the 
revolutionaries, stating that they rejected the totalitarian class-ridden society of 
the Eastern European states and the ‘sham socialism’ of the social democratic 
parties.571 Identification with the global ‘anti-Stalinist left’ had been central to 
the PD from its inception, but while currents of socialism from below emerged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
568 The publications of BICO have been particularly noted for their influence in 
academic circles. See, The Economics of Partition, British and Irish Communist 
Organisation (1972). Connolly and Partition, British and Irish Communist 
Organisation (1972).  
569 Trench, ‘The Two Nations Fallacy’, available online, 
https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/isj/1972/no051/trench.htm, 
accessed on 4/2/2016.  
570 Farrell, The Orange State, p. 30.  
571 Irish Independent, 7 August 1970. 
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outside of the official communist and social democratic organisation in this 
period, they were all tempered by different national contexts. In Northern Ireland 
the dark clouds of communalism were gathering as the PD attempted to assert 
class politics, and the problems that had met efforts to reform the state were 
glaring. The civil rights movement had radicalised the Catholic community, 
but— despite the efforts of those in the PD, was met with sustained opposition 
from the Protestant community. This demanded an assessment of the experience 
of the civil rights movement and an appraisal of how socialists could win a 
section of Protestant workers away from the ideology of the Northern state.  
For the PD the loyalist backlash was rooted in the advantageous social 
position that Protestant workers held over their Catholic counterparts. ‘Civil 
rights’ for Catholics threatened the privileges that the Protestant working class 
enjoyed— for example, through access to skilled jobs and better housing— by 
demanding a levelling up process within the state.572 As the second issue of the 
Free Citizen recognised, ‘Civil rights will mean a redistribution of power from 
the badly off (Protestant working people) to the worse off (Catholic working 
people) – there lies the whole strength of the Protestant backlash.’573  
The call to end discrimination against the Catholic community, posed 
within the confines of the Unionist state, suggested that it was necessary to direct 
resources away from the Protestant working class— who were themselves living 
in conditions of poverty— toward the Catholic community. This balancing out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572 Farrell viewed this as an important driving force behind what he identified as 
‘Orange Fascism’. A term that was somewhat ill defined at this point, but would 
become more central to the PD’s analysis as they tried to grapple against the 
intense loyalist. For my account of this, see Chapter 6.  
573 Free Citizen, No 2, 1969.  
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process created the real fear that Protestants would lose out to Catholics, and 
contributed to anger against reform. Indeed, if working class anger had fuelled 
the ranks of predominantly Catholic civil rights supporters, similar discontent 
formed the bedrock of— and was being directed by— the loyalist backlash 
against the civil rights movement. To challenge the perception among the 
Protestant community that dismantling the Northern state was against their 
interests, the PD argued that it was necessary to move beyond a campaign based 
upon undoing Catholic discrimination inside the structures of the Northern state 
and fight for the social and economic advancement of both communities, as part 
of a wider vision of working class empowerment.  
However, the political terrain had become more problematic. The arrival 
of British troops temporarily relieved the Catholic ghettoes, creating the ironic 
situation in which British troops were welcomed onto the Falls Road and met 
with hostility on the Shankill. The PD warned against those— including much of 
the left and the labour movement—who attached a progressive role to British 
military intervention in Ireland. Arguing that the primary role of the troops was 
to stabilise the Northern state, safeguarding British capital and restoring 
territorial order, they could not be relied on to implement adequate reform:  
British troops are here to serve British interests and will only protect 
threatened people so long as that is what Britain wants….the 
presence of British troops is a sharp reminder of the reality of British 
imperialism in Northern Ireland.574  
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The PD’s anti-imperialism was expressed in class terms that challenged the 
narrative perpetuated by Irish nationalists. It argued against the ‘anti partitionist 
solution’, which sought to unite all Catholics in the North to ‘secure a Green 
Tory united Ireland’, and warned that such a movement could ‘spark a communal 
bloodbath in the Six Counties’.575 In opposition the PD counterposed working 
class action and alliances with the southern left. Only the pursuit of a 32 county 
socialist movement across both states could create the force necessary to solve 
the national question in the interests of the working class. The combination of 
rejecting Irish nationalism while opposing the Unionist state on socialist grounds 
was seen to hold the potential to fuse the national and the social question.576   
Liberal preaching of anti-sectarianism would not win Protestant workers: 
‘They will only be won away from Paisleyism by involving them in struggles— 
with their Catholic fellow workers— against redundancies, for higher wages, and 
for more houses.’577 Class politics and an emphasis on workers’ unity and self-
emancipation were forwarded by the PD, in an effort to construct a current of 
socialist politics in a society that was becoming increasingly polarised. With the 
hindsight of history it is clear that these pursuits bore little fruit. Nevertheless, it 
is worth examining how the PD viewed the potential for socialist politics to 
develop, as the experience of this failure helps explain the development of the 
organisation.  
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People’s Democracy Conference motion, 1969. 
577 Ibid.  
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The fracturing of the Unionist all-class alliance was viewed as a positive 
development that could present greater potential for socialist politics to emerge. 
The fissures within Unionism were evident in the way that loyalist forces were 
beginning to emerge among sections of the Protestant working and middle 
classes. A major problem, however, was that the forces of the left were rarely in 
competition with loyalism in any serious way. Considering this, it seems that the 
PD often forwarded an overoptimistic view about the immediate opportunities to 
win Protestant workers and offer a socialist solution to rising sectarian division. 
An edition of the Free Citizen in early 1970 commented:      
The situation is full of promise. The break-up of the Unionist 
monolith is shattering traditional loyalties. Unionist supporters are 
confused and uncertain. They are open to new ideas. Class 
antagonisms are creeping in, small farmers against the big house, 
workers against their bosses, local small businessmen against the big 
monopolies. The leaders are irresolute and undecided, incapable of 
firm action. Never before has there been such an opportunity for 
winning large numbers of Protestant workers and farmers away from 
the Unionist Party.578  
Although working class Protestants were breaking from ‘big house’ Unionism, 
there existed no sizeable left-wing pole of attraction capable of intervening in the 
situation, let alone win large numbers of people away from the ideology of the 
Unionist state. The PD, therefore, suffered from some confusion about the 
immediate nature of the Protestant backlash. For example, after the publication 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
578 Free Citizen, 1 May 1970.  
	   252	  
of the Hunt Report (10 October, 1969), which recommended the replacement of 
the USC with a new force, the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), intense rioting 
erupted along the Shankill Road, resulting in scores of injuries and the death of 
two rioters, as well as one member of the RUC.579     
The Free Citizen reacted by arguing that Protestant workers had been 
‘betrayed and abandoned by their traditional leaders’ and that the ‘alliance of 
Protestant worker and big business had been broken’, heralding a new situation 
in which ‘the common interest of working people, Protestant and Catholic, will 
become clearer for all to see’.580 The class dimension to the Shankill disturbances 
was not in doubt, but such a situation of ‘common interest’ was not emerging. 
Instead, sectarian forces were entrenching as loyalist groupings, which were the 
dynamic forces inside Protestant communities, were mobilising opposition to 
reform among those who felt they were losing out due to the dismantling of the 
B Specials— an important employer within Protestant communities and central 
arm of the ‘Orange State’. 
Nevertheless, the PD continued to espouse enthusiasm toward 
transcending sectarian politics, and the new direction had implications for its 
relationship to NICRA. Both PD representatives in NICRA— Michael Farrell 
and Kevin Boyle— withdrew from the leadership, although they still formally 
supported the organisation.581 At NICRA’s annual conference in February 1970 
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during the troubles. See, Bardon, A History of Ulster, p. 674.  
580 Free Citizen, No 3 1969.  
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no member of the PD will be standing for the NICRA executive. We will be 
interested to see how our critics will fare without us.’ Free Citizen, No 19, 13 
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the main PD intervention consisted of a motion calling for the extension of 
NICRA’s campaign into the south. The motion was narrowly defeated after a 
recount, with 90 to 88 delegates voting to ‘refer back’ the debate.  
Afterward the PD stated that they expected the traditional nationalist 
strand of NICRA to vote against the motion, but expressed disappointment with 
radical republicans, represented by the Wolfe Tone societies, who joined them.582 
It was a formal indicator of the type of leadership that now dominated NICRA 
and signalled a gulf across the left. At the February conference the new NICRA 
leadership was largely made up by the Communist Party and Official 
Republicans, both of whom rallied around the proposal for a ‘Bill of Rights’ to 
be implemented at the behest of the British government as a mechanism for 
reforming the Northern state into a ‘normal democracy’. In effect, this position 
meant that the Communist Party was now championing the reforming zeal of 
British imperialism in Ireland, an attitude that undoubtedly made them more 
irrelevant among the generation of working class Catholics who were becoming 
evermore experienced in street politics.583 The departure from NICRA saw the 
PD concentrate on its own independent campaigns.  
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583 Mike Milotte explains the rational of this position as such, ‘This attempt to 
focus all attention on Westminster rested on the belief that the British state had 
both the will and the ability to establish normal democracy in the Six Counties. 
This in turn was underpinned by the belief that ‘monopoly capitalism’ was 
diametrically opposed to the Unionists because big business required a degree of 
stability that the unionists could no longer provide.’ Milotte, Communism in 
Modern Ireland, pp. 274-275.  
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5.3. Smash Toryism  
This must be our task in the seventies- SMASH TORYISM - Free 
Citizen. 584 
The socialist left looked to the labour movement as the main harbinger of 
working class unity in the North, and those versed in labour history could point 
to the historic moments of Catholic and Protestant struggle— including the 1907 
dock strike, the 1919 engineers’ strike and the outdoor relief strike of 1932— all 
of which were major episodes that displayed both the potential for class politics, 
but also the inability to sustain such a movement in the context of sectarian 
reaction and fledgling socialist initiatives.585 Workers struggle of such intensity 
had not emerged in the late 1960s, and while elements of the labour movement 
had been involved in pushing class politics to the forefront of civil rights 
agitation they had done so in a largely formal and tokenistic way during the early 
period of NICRA, when letter writing and lobbying was the order of the day, as 
opposed to active street mobilisation. The most celebrated moment of labour 
activism came amidst the violence of August 1969, when trade unionists stopped 
violence spreading toward Catholic workers in the East Belfast shipyards. 
Although undoubtedly a courageous moment, the politics of those fighting 
sectarianism in East Belfast’s key workplaces revealed the limitations with what 
could be called the ‘labourist solution’ to sectarianism.     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
584 Free Citizen, No 14, Friday 9 January 1970.  
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Strike of 1907 (Belfast, Blackstaff, 1985). Emmet O’Connor, A Labour History 
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On 15 August, as tensions were quelled in the shipyards, anti-sectarian 
trades unionists organised a mass meeting where they forwarded a motion that 
gave some indication of their solution to the crisis. The motion demanded that, 
‘the government and the forces of law and order take stronger measures to 
maintain the peace.’586 The call for the Unionist government, through the RUC 
and B Specials, to maintain the peace raised obvious difficulties after the 
violence of that weekend. Arguably, the situation showed that even the most 
advanced militants of the trade union movement, although capable of preventing 
the further spread of sectarianism, were not able to offer any political solution to 
sectarianism.587 It pointed to a deeper problem with the labour movement in the 
North, one that rendered it problematic in confronting sectarian discrimination 
and division in the past, and later throughout the troubles. The very composition 
of the trade union movement meant that it was wedded to the existence of the 
Northern state and strongly reflected the prevailing ideology of Unionism.588  
By extension, this conservatism—which in Marxist terms stemmed from 
the social position of the trade union leadership and its bureaucracy, leading it to 
mediate between the Northern working class and the employing class589— would 
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Withdrawal (London, Pluto Press, 1984), p. 80.  
587 Ibid, p. 81.   
588 For a leftist critique of the trade union movement in the North see, Andrew 
Boyd, Have the Trade Unions Failed the North? (Dublin, Mercier Press 1984).   
589 Cliff and Gluckstein describe the trade union bureaucracy as a ‘basically 
conservative, social formation. Like the God Janus it presents two faces: it 
balances between the employers and the workers. It holds back and controls 
workers’ struggles, but it has a vital interest not to push the collaboration with 
the employers to a point where it makes the unions completely impotent. For the 
official is not an independent arbitrator. If the union fails entirely to articulate 
members’ grievances, this will lead eventually either to effective internal 
challenges to the leadership, or to membership apathy and organisational 
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strongly influence those sections of the left that operated through the official 
structures of the labour movement and equated such structures with the working 
class, including the NILP and the Communist Party.590 As the civil rights 
movement was increasingly repressed the labour movement’s role in ‘avoiding 
the issue’ had become more acute and essentially more conservative, as it 
unequivocally supported the Northern state.591 The process of uniting Catholic 
and Protestant workers in a political challenge to the Northern state did not, 
therefore, feature in the politics of the labour movement and it was something 
that the major forces of the left distinctly stood against. But this was central to 
what the small body of PD members set about to build in the period after August 
1969.  
Over the next eighteen months the PD embarked on campaigns and 
actions in support of struggles to win working class support. Considering the 
future trajectory of history it would be easy to dismiss these actions. Indeed, 
efforts to unite the working class in the post 1969 period were ineffective, but 
such activity was seriously pursued and a record of this is crucial to 
understanding how the PD developed. Further, the fact that an organisation of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
disintegration, with members moving to a rival union. If the bureaucracy strays 
too far into the bourgeois camp it will lose its base. The bureaucracy has an 
interest in preserving the union organisation which is the source of their income 
and their social status.’ Tony Cliff and Donny Gluckstein, The Labour Party: A 
Marxist History (London, Bookmarks, 1988), p. 27.  
590 As Andrew Boyd explains, once the Northern Ireland leadership of the ICTU 
had been officially recognised and ‘brought in from the cold’ by the unionist 
state ‘… the leaders of the ICTU in the six counties proved themselves more than 
willing to cooperate with the O’Neill government, and with every administration 
since then. Among the institutions of Northern Ireland the Northern Ireland 
committee of the ICTU is the most reliable and most loyal.’ Boyd, Have the 
Trade Unions Failed the North? p. 38.  
591 For a well-rounded historical analysis of the labour movement as it dealt with 
the outbreak of conflict in the North, see, O’Connor, A Labour History of 
Ireland.  
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PD’s size managed to organise any form of action during this period, however 
limited, deserves attention, and activists recalled that these efforts had some 
success in shaping the image of the PD as distinctly socialist, and away from that 
of a nationalist orientated organisation.592  
The post-1969 phase of the PD was another period of hyper-activity; the 
organisation cultivated a reputation for constant activism and, for example, 
immediately took to the streets to continue protests against repression. PD 
activists were among the first to protest against the type of repression that would 
continue in the wake of British intervention. Against bans on demonstrations, 
they launched a series of pickets in late 1969 calling for the release of 
republicans who remained interned under the Special Powers Act, including 
Malachy McGurran and Proinsias MacAirt.593 Such small-scale protests largely 
went ahead unhindered, but more crucially during the stage often termed as the 
‘honeymoon period’, —in which relations between the Catholic community and 
the Army seemed amicable—was the extent that activity was violently opposed 
by loyalist forces, who by now, were capable of mobilising a substantial section 
of the Protestant community.  
One notable incident occurred in Portadown, where the PD organised a 
public meeting in March 1970. It was met with up to 500 loyalists. Internal 
British government reports paid considerable attention the meeting and noted 
that although only a handful attended,  
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local indignation mounted and a crowd of several hundred assembled 
and had to be cordoned off by the RUC, assisted by the military. The 
PD were pelted with stones and bottles and had to abandon the 
meeting. The subsequent rowdyisn was barely contained by the RUC 
and the military.594  
The report concluded that, ‘The PD gathering of 10 persons was obviously 
provocative and its is noteworthy that it took 200 police and 150 soldiers to deal 
with the situation they had created.’595 John Gray’s recollections suggest that the 
provocation came from loyalists; he was threatened with a gun as they were 
forced to leave the town, and remembers feeling demoralised about their ability 
to create any non-sectarian momentum in the aftermath.596 Nevertheless, the PD 
responded to what happened by reaffirming their commitment to winning 
Protestant support.  
We will not abandon our conviction that if our movement is to be 
successful, it must recruit Protestant and Catholic workers. Socialism 
is as relevant to the Protestant workers of Ireland as to the Catholic 
workers. Both must play their full part in the struggle for the 
Workers’ Republic…To abandon this programme, to fight for 
Catholic socialism would be to adopt the sectarian logic of 
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Paisleyism, the Nationalist Party, […] and to consign our own 
movement to the already over-cluttered dustbin of Irish History.597 
After 1969 any form of activity in Protestant estates was extremely difficult, 
although the PD did continue to make links where possible. Fergus O’Hare 
recalls that even during the most intense bursts of sectarian violence that would 
come later in the 1970s the PD would always sell their paper in the city centre to 
ensure contact with Protestant workers.598 However, for the most part 
circumstances dictated that the organisation was confined to working within 
Catholic areas in the North.  
The potential to change these circumstances lay in wider action across the 
trade union movement and radical left. The PD argued that this was an 
immediate necessity against the tide of sectarian reaction, thus, in the aftermath 
of the historic election of Ian Paisley in 1970— a certain sign that the sectarian 
response to civil rights was finding resonance, the Free Citizen would argue that:  
It is imperative that the working class struggle be pushed to the 
forefront instead of the sectarian dispute. To do so means a 
movement combining the socialist militancy of the People’s 
Democracy with solid trade union backing. That movement must be 
built and quickly. In it there should be a place for the PD, left-wing 
labour party branches [….] militant trade unionists, and social 
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Republicans fed up with the leadership of both sections of their 
movement.599 
The connections between the PD and the wider left and trade union movement 
were tentative and there appears to have been little appetite for such united front 
action. The timidity of the labour left toward launching any political challenge to 
sectarianism was indicated on May Day, 1970. Traditionally a day of trade union 
marching, where Protestant and Catholic workers gather in a show of anti-
sectarian working class strength, it was perhaps more necessary than ever. The 
PD hoped that it could serve as a springboard to launch a broader political 
vehicle. However, the ICTU leadership —with support from the NILP and 
Communist Party— called off the march citing the threat of sectarian tension. As 
the PD pointed out sectarian tension had arisen because of the lack of working 
class unity and would only deepen in the absence of any effort to establish such 
unity. The PD called its own May Day march that year, but it was not supported 
by ICTU, the NILP or the Communist Party, although the Newtownabbey branch 
of the Labour Party did take part as well as other trade unionists. The Free 
Citizen reported that up to 400 people marched and hoped that a broader alliance 
of the left could be built from it in order to put class demands centre stage in the 
coming period, but such an alliance did not materialise.600 In much similar 
fashion the PD campaigned throughout 1970 and 1971 engaged in various 
initiatives in what was a turn towards solidarity actions and workers’ struggles. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
599 Free Citizen, 1 May 1970.  
600 Free Citizen, No 31, 8 May 1970. 
	   261	  
5.4. The turn to social agitation: cement strike, bus fares campaign 
and the campaign for the Lough Neagh fisheries. 
The PD turn toward workers’ struggles was illustrated in their efforts to support 
750 Irish cement workers who took strike action in 1970. Ongoing since 
February, striking workers had began to regularly clash with those breaking 
picket lines and a central point of contention became the role of firms in Britain 
and Northern Ireland in importing cement into the south to break the strike. The 
PD took part in various acts of solidarity such as collecting money and 
challenging strike-breakers transporting cement over the border. Funds were 
collected in Armagh and Belfast and as the strike wore on solidarity actions were 
organised in the North.601  
On 16 June a meeting was organised in the coastal village of Ardglass 
where cement was being unloaded to take over the border. After a clash with 
supporters of the strike, the RUC intervened resulting in the arrest of 15 PD 
members, totalling 57 months imprisonment and £140 in fines.602 As police 
action increased so too did the militancy of the strikers. One account noted that 
in Armagh within two weeks some 21 lorries owned by ‘cement scabs’ were 
burnt.603 Unsurprisingly, the PD got involved in the more militant aspects of the 
dispute and some PD members ended up in court. When the strike ended after 22 
weeks, many activists were fortunate enough to receive suspended sentences, 
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while both Brian Vallely and Eugene Cassin were sent to prison.604 Although the 
PD could claim a consistent record of activity during the cement strike, there is 
little evidence to suggest that the PD recruited any workers during the dispute.  
Perhaps more successful in this area was the PD campaign to prevent a 
rise in bus fares in Belfast. The campaign was launched after Belfast Corporation 
threatened to raise the price of bus fares by 50%. Beginning with a protest 
outside Belfast City Hall on 11 August 1970, twenty PD members carrying 
placards and posters were joined by members of the public.605 Regular protests 
around the issue would from then on be mounted on Corporation meetings.    
The next action of the campaign was to launch a petition against the 
increase; the PD maintained city centre stalls each day for a fortnight amassing 
signatures, eventually collecting 50,000 names.606 When the increase in fares was 
eventually voted through the council it was met by what the PD described as ‘the 
largest demonstration Belfast has witnessed for some time’, with support from 
sections of the NILP, the Communist Party and various trade unions.607 
Demonstrations were also launched outside six businesses belonging to Belfast 
Mayor, Joseph Cairns, in an effort to highlight how the business interest of the 
city benefitted from the changes by decreasing subsidies from ratepayers. This 
was a problematic action on the Shankill Road where activists were met by local 
youths who tore up placards and threatened tougher action if the protestors did 
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not disperse.608 Later, Michael Farrell would claim that in the aftermath of this 
protest he was informed by an RUC Special Branch officer that the UVF planned 
to shoot him if he returned to the Shankill.609   
The last phase of the campaign was an attempt to organise a boycott of 
the buses. In November 1970 newspapers reported scenes of activists, said to be 
from the PD and the Republican Clubs who were wearing handkerchief masks in 
order to hide their identity, commandeering buses on the Falls Road and 
organising alternative transport to carry people along the road.610 Other reports 
conveyed how even basic mobilisation over public transport had the potential to 
break out into violence, with one describing a ‘mob of 100 youths’ that stoned 
Hastings Street RUC station on their way home from a bus fares 
demonstration.”611  
Eventually, the campaign petered out and failed to prevent the increase in 
fares. Importantly, however, Farrell claimed that this campaign recruited some 
working class Protestant trade unionists that worked in the aircraft and shipyard 
industries of East Belfast, but there is no evidence that this development turned 
into something more substantial.612 Although Protestant workers were at times 
pulled into supporting economic struggles, this did not automatically translate 
into socialist consciousness and the PD found it difficult to win wider layers of 
activists. Even marginal campaigns around bus fares proved to be restricted and 
deterred by sectarian forces. John McAnulty remembered the ‘height’ of the bus 
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fares campaign; when the PD mobilised what he described as a sizeable crowd in 
Belfast city centre, it led to confrontation with the police. After the rally— and 
subsequent melee with the RUC— McAnulty remembered proudly returning to 
the Falls Road with his peers, whereas Protestant activists were forced to hide 
their role in the protest when they arrived home, for fear of coming under 
physical attack for their association with the PD.613  
One other campaign that is relevant in drawing out the social activism of 
the PD was their efforts to mobilise in rural areas around the campaign to defend 
the rights of local fishermen in Lough Neagh against the Toome Eel Fishery 
Company. For Farrell, this struggle represented a microcosm of the way in which 
power and privilege had passed from British ‘Robber Barons’ during the Ulster 
plantation to the Protestant aristocracy in Ulster, and was now being taken over 
by emerging multinational capital serving to rob the Irish people of their natural 
resources.614 The ownership of Lough Neagh had historically been the privilege 
of Lord Shaftesbury, Marquis of Donegal, since the aftermath of the plantations. 
In more recent times fishing rights had been sold to the Dutch controlled Toome 
Eel Fisheries Company, who, through advanced methods and technologies made 
a lucrative business in the Lough, whilst being able to restrict the trade of local 
fishermen through granting limited licences.615  
The dispute began in late 1969 when fishermen clashed with the company 
and were charged with illegally trespassing on the land and obstructing 
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bailiffs.616 The PD viewed it as a struggle ‘which must be fought on the farms, in 
the factories and on the housing estates. It is the struggle to win back the land 
and the natural resources of this country to its people.’617 On 13 February 1970 
the short-lived Ardboe Fishermen’s branch of the PD held a picket outside of the 
courthouse in solidarity with those charged. Activists from Belfast and Armagh 
joined the demonstration.618 Later, the activists attempted to bring the culture of 
protest from the city to the countryside and set up the ‘famously ill-fated and 
totally unsuccessful Free Radio Lough Neagh, which was established in a pig sty 
and failed to get any signal out to anyone.’619  
As the campaign intensified PD members were again typically to the 
forefront of more militant actions. On 18 May thirteen fishermen, alongside PD 
member Oliver Cosgrove were arrested after challenging company bailiffs. 620 
The arrests sparked a mass meeting on 23 May and one week later PD members 
occupied the offices of the Toome Eel Fisheries Company; they stayed until they 
were escorted out by the RUC.621 In June, PD involvement reached its height 
when they mobilised 500 people in Toome to demand the expropriation of the 
lough from the company.622 The intensification of action was met with tougher 
police methods. In July two fishermen were sentenced to three months in jail and 
others received suspended sentences. Later, on 28 October eighteen PD activists 
were served eighteen-month prison sentences, suspended for three years, and 
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fined £25 for taking part in the occupation of the company’s offices. When the 
dispute petered out the PD attacked the unwillingness of the Fishermen’s 
Association to champion their cause.623 The PD may have been able to claim a 
role as militant supporters of the fishermen, but their role ended with such a 
claim.   
Throughout the 1970-1971 period the PD engaged in a number of actions 
aimed at achieving working class support. These actions in themselves were not 
enough to construct any formidable current of socialist politics. Further, this 
activity was not part of any wider movement in society and quickly dissipated. 
This meant that the PD entered into a period of increased repression in violence 
restricted to reacting to events inside the Catholic ghettos.  
On a wider level the experience since 1969 suggested that that campaigns 
aimed toward working class unity were limited in a context of state repression, 
and likely to come under serious opposition from militant loyalists, much in the 
same way that the campaign for civil rights had. The pursuit of working class 
unity inside the Northern state as attempted by the PD was proving ineffectual, 
and this happened as relations between the Catholic community and the British 
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5.5. The end of the honeymoon and resurgent republicanism 
Between 1969 and 1971 Northern Ireland experienced a breakdown in relations 
between the Catholic community and the British military. The context of 
repression and Catholic alienation saw support for the republican movement 
surge and we now turn to these developments to assess how they shaped the 
politics of the PD. August 1969 spurred an historic split in the Republican 
movement, with the breakaway Provisional IRA espousing criticism of the left-
wing political turn of the movement as resulting in the failure to adequately 
defend Catholic Belfast. In response, the PIRA re-established the traditional 
commitment to armed struggle.624   
The PD had already set out its stall against the ‘anti-partitionist solution’, 
but its alternative had primarily been one of small-scale campaigns around ‘bread 
and butter’ issues that had limited impact and were increasingly disconnected 
from the growing conflict emerging between the Catholic community and the 
British Army. The Northern state was beginning to resemble a militarised 
conflict where anti-Unionist opposition was strongly repressed. Relevant to this 
study, then, is how these developments gave rise to a new phase of armed 
republicanism and how this related to the socialist left. To draw this out, a brief 
detour into the split in the republican movement is necessary.  
The rupture in the IRA in 1969 was the culmination of tensions that had 
built up over some time and although the catalyst was the issue of defence, it 
represented a much wider schism between the established leadership of 
republicanism— which had dictated the movement’s trajectory since the failure 
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of the border campaign (1956-1962) in favour of a politicised movement, 
culminating in its participation in civil rights agitation—and traditional 
republicans committed to physical force. Among the many criticisms directed at 
the IRA leadership by the emerging ‘Provisionals’ was the dropping of the 
republican principle of abstentionism toward both Irish and British parliaments 
and the strategy of the ‘National Liberation Front’.625 Therefore, on the surface 
the republican split looked a straightforward left-right divide, with the ‘Officials’ 
espousing a socialist orientated republicanism and the Provisionals the champion 
of the old method of physical force, intent on overthrowing the Northern state. 
Yet the division was never a simple left-right divide, as is always the case, 
formal political positions would be tested against the reality of events.      
The central obstacle that faced the left from 1968 had been the persistent 
opposition to reform and the level of violence that was waged against the civil 
rights movement. Increased repression meant that the Provisional demand to 
fight for the abolition of Stormont and the overthrow of an irreformable state 
would find greater traction among the minority community. This position, later 
aptly summed up in the popular slogan ‘Smash Stormont’, stood in 
contradistinction to the Official movement, who drew heavily upon the ‘stages 
theory’ method of democratising the Northern state, which, as we have already 
seen was regarded with aversion by the PD.        
In the aftermath of the split the PD laid out its differences with both 
factions. In the first edition of the Northern Star Farrell argued that the leftward 
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turn of the movement had been driven by a rise of Stalinist influenced socialism 
that forwarded a reformist strategy, in favour of first democratising the Northern 
state and fighting for a united capitalist Ireland as a necessary precursor to a 
workers’ republic. In line with various trends of the global new left, Farrell 
argued that this negated the revolutionary kernel of Marxism by advocating unity 
with a section of the Irish bourgeoisie in pursuit of a ‘national revolution’, to take 
place before a socialist revolution. It had the obvious complication in Ireland in 
that it offered little hope of appealing to any section of the Protestant working 
class. Farrell explained: 
In colonial and semi colonial countries all over the world the 
Communist Parties cling rigidly to the theory that the struggle for 
‘national independence’ must be completed before the struggle for 
socialism can be commenced. What that means in practice is that 
Ireland must become an independent 32 County Capitalist Republic 
before the Workers’ Republic can be considered. Therefore socialists 
must ally themselves with progressive ‘national capitalists’.626  
Thus, although the PD had a working relationship with the Official 
republicans— throughout the civil rights period and later in some of the small-
scale campaigns outlined above, such as the bus fares protests— theoretical 
differences existed. On 8 March 1970 a meeting took place in Armagh in which 
PD activists engaged in ‘a wide-ranging discussion’ with members of the 
Official republican movement. However, the central committee noted ‘serious 
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disagreements over the role of the stages theory. PD members emphasised that 
the only revolution will be a workers revolution.’627  
Although relations between the PD and the Officials had been strained 
from the beginning the PD initially reserved its strongest criticism for the 
Provisionals. Recognising that a major impetus behind the appeal of the 
Provisional IRA was the necessity to defend Catholic areas against further attack, 
and that the grouping did indeed contain some ‘genuine if confused radicals’628. 
The PD was heavily critical of the politics and philosophy of the Provisional 
wing and their dogmatic adherence to traditional republicanism, which mixed 
rightwing conservatism with popular anti imperialism. It was a strategy that 
rejected ‘politics’, instead advancing a sole commitment to armed struggle, based 
in the Catholic community. The orientation of the Provisionals was such that 
they would often say the Rosary at commemorations.629 Ideologically they 
justified their struggle with traditional republican discourse, rejecting British 
sovereignty in Ireland and claiming an historic commitment to the democratic 
republic of the Dail, elected in 1918.  
The PD regarded much of this political thinking with animosity. The first 
issue of the PD journal, The Northern Star, contested that, ‘The claim that 
elections held 52 years ago have any authority today when most of the 
participants are long dead is potent nonsense. It has nothing to do with 
socialism.’630 The article pointed out how any mention of socialism within the 
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628 Northern Star, Vol 1, 1970.  
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publications of the Provisional’s was couched in distinctly nationalist rhetoric 
that advanced ‘Irish and Christian’ values.631 The PD replied that these 
statements sounded ‘dangerously of Hitler’s ‘National Socialism’ declaring that, 
‘There are not separate varieties of socialism, foreign and Irish. Socialism is 
internationalist.’632 Moreover, the PD strongly hit out at the tactics of the 
Provisionals, which they argued were based upon the illusion that an armed 
campaign waged within a minority community could deliver a successful victory 
over imperialism. By February 1971 the Free Citizen was critical of how, ‘For 
months now the Provisionals have encouraged young Catholic workers to believe 
that imperialism could be defeated by military force alone— and force based 
only on the Catholic section of the population.’633 Instead, the paper argued for 
the necessity of class struggle across both states,  
We see imperialism as an entire system of social and economic 
injustice, not just military force. The way to fight imperialism is to 
build a workers movement North and South based on the everyday 
struggle against injustices which immediately effect all workers.634  
The PD denunciation of the Provos illustrated the extent to which the re-
emergence of traditional armed force was seen as a negation of the original 
struggle for civil rights. But the focus on unity with southern workers also 
pointed to how the PD was developing its own unique position on the northern 
question, based on class struggle against both the Unionist state in the north and 
the conservative clerical state in the south, as an alternative to armed actions 
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waged by a small section of he population. However, the PD did not develop any 
substantial links with southern workers and remained as a small current in the 
north. Therefore, their 32-County perspective was often confined to statements 
and pronouncements, although the organisation did launch limited actions that 
reflected this strategy. For example, in May 1970 the PD launched another cross-
border march, which traversed Leitrim, Donegal and Fermanagh, and attempted 
to highlight the ‘unemployment, low-wages, emigration and bad-housing’ 
synonymous with the southern state.635 The central premise was to show that it 
was ‘no good replacing the Orange government at Stormont with a Green Tory 
one— or a Green Tory one in Dublin. The Free State has the highest emigration 
rate in W. Europe and the highest unemployment rate in all occupations other 
than agriculture. The Green Tories in the South are even more blatantly in favour 
of inviting in fly-by-night exploiters.’636 Farrell had already laid out the 
perspective more succinctly when he offered a frank view of the border:  
The border must go, but it must go in the direction of a socialist 
republic and not just into a republic which might at some future date 
become socialist. Firstly the border must go because it is a relic of 
imperialism, and in order to root out imperialism we have to root out 
the neo-imperialist set-up in the South and the neo-colonial one in 
the North. Secondly, Northern Ireland is completely unviable 
economically and only exists as a capitalist entity at the moment 
because of massive subventions from Britain. Similarly the South on 
its own is an area of small farms with very little industry. It too is 
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completely unviable on its own and as a result is also dependent on 
Britain. The unification of Ireland into a socialist republic is not only 
necessary for the creation of a viable economy, it must also be an 
immediate demand, because only the concept of a socialist republic 
can ever reconcile Protestant workers, who rightly have a very deep-
seated fear of a Roman Catholic republic, to the ending of the 
border.637 
Therefore it can be said that as the question of partition was remerging in the 
north, the PD had attempted to shape it in a socialist direction in a way that was 
opposed to the politics and strategy of the Provisional movement, who 
essentially forwarded a form of crude physical-force republicanism. However, 
the formal ideology of the Provisional’s leadership—who were at that time 
mainly based in Dublin— was not the most important factor in determining their 
potential to grow and gain support.  The key-determining factor in the growth of 
the Provisional IRA was their ability to channel the anger and frustrations of the 
Catholic working class into action against the Stormont state. The crucial 
importance surrounding the rise of Irish republicanism in the post-1969 period 
was that it intersected with a mass uprising of the urban Catholic working class. 
Throughout 1968-1972 the lived experience of the Catholic community saw it 
question the viability of the Northern state and in this context the Provisional 
fight to smash the Stormont state was increasingly appealing; for the first time in 
history the Irish republican movement grew with a substantial working class 
base. This dynamic partially explains why the Provisional strand of 
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republicanism grew as the dominant faction; it also helps explain the way in 
which the PD position toward this movement changed.  
The conflict that developed between the Army and the Catholic 
community from 1970 onward signified that the British state had shifted from 
‘peacekeeping’ toward working through the Unionist state, in order to deal with 
an increasingly militant and resurgent Catholic population. The most significant 
moments of violence are well documented: in April 1970 the first large-scale 
confrontations between Catholics and the British Army took place in 
Ballymurphy. On 28 June a gun battle between PIRA volunteers and loyalists in 
north Belfast signalled the first major military outing from the Provisionals. As 
the marching season approached the military deployed a whole scale crackdown 
on the Lower Falls area. The battle that developed included a three-night curfew 
on residents during which four people were killed. Catholic alienation from the 
state happened en masse, alongside a growing support for those republicans 
wishing to launch both defensive and offensive actions.638  
The PD operated throughout these bouts of conflict, and had formed a 
small but active branch in west Belfast where they churned out leaflets and 
propaganda against the actions of the military.639 For the most part this meant 
reacting to disturbances in the aftermath by trying to give them a political 
direction. For example, after the riots in Ballymurphy the British Director of 
Operations Intelligence Committee report would note that, ‘PD were marginally 
concerned with the Ballymurphy disorder. They were not in evidence at the 
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beginning although two students arrested on the third night asked for Kevin 
Boyle, one of the PD leaders.  After the disturbances were over PD held an open-
air meeting in the area and elected a committee to represent the young people.’640  
Military repression throughout 1970-1971 reflected tougher British 
policy that sought to strengthen the civil power by dealing more decisively with 
anti-Unionist opposition. In its early phase this took the form of searches and 
raids in Catholic areas in an effort to uproot republican arms, in what was a 
clearly partisan approach toward the nationalist community that greatly 
contrasted to the approach in Protestant areas, where, as the PD often pointed 
out, many more licensed firearms existed. 641 Although this was not often 
admitted openly, in November 1970 a senior secretary in the British Foreign 
Office would relay the reality to the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Having studied 
the previous searches throughout the year he concluded:  
The new figures indicate that arms searches in Catholic areas, even 
excluding the Falls Road operation, were twice as many relative to 
population as in Protestant areas: this is just the impression we would 
not wish to see given in public.642  
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The perception of impartiality was greatly undermined and opposition to the 
military grew, as did the capacity for republican attacks against the Army, who 
now resembled an occupying military force. The indiscriminate nature of 
military violence was palpable when tougher ‘shoot to kill’ orders resulted in the 
death of Danny O’Hagan in north Belfast on 31 July 1970. Further, the legal 
dispensation that was implemented offered no avenue for grievance and largely 
reflected the balance of power inside the state. Therefore, while Bernadette 
Devlin was jailed for her part in the battle of the Bogside, on 26 June 1970, those 
B Specials and RUC members who had carried out serious acts of violence in 
1969 were not punished.643  
The violence throughout this period was far from one sided, however, the 
conclusions drawn by the PD surrounding the nature of British intervention were 
seemingly vindicated. Subsequently, the PD shifted its position surrounding non-
violent tactics. In part, this meant facing up to the reality of events since August 
1969. Fergus O’Hare— who by 1970 was active in the west Belfast PD— recalls 
that after the violence of 1969 the situation moved quickly away from the 
‘peaceful, non-violent don’t react attitude of the early marches. To suddenly 
people having to organize to defend themselves in their own areas’. Enforcing 
the politics of non-violence was relatively easy in small numbers or in committed 
groupings of activists. However, as whole areas came under attack, ‘Suddenly 
that’s no longer relevant, its actually a situation where you say ‘we have to stop 
this, we have to defend against this’.’644  
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Those challenging military repression inside nationalist communities 
were considered to be taking part in justifiable acts of defence. After the ‘battle 
of the Falls’ the Free Citizen stated that, ‘the people have a complete right to 
defend themselves from attack’.645 As Catholic youths engaged in pitched battles 
with the Army— a common occurrence in nationalist areas by mid-1970— the 
PD supported those fighting: 
When we see young Irish workers, regardless of religion, in conflict 
with imperialist troops, or a Unionist police force, we support those 
young workers. And we know too that when the struggle for the 
workers’ republic enters its final stage we will have to fight the same 
enemy.646  
A major question of course was how such fighting should manifest itself, and the 
PD, now down to a hardcore of committed members, would play no role in 
influencing this. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the organisation grew 
in membership. Evident, however, is the sizeable growth of republican 
organisation in this period, particularly the Provisionals, their ranks were filled 
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5.6. Conclusion 
The PD’s effort to develop a current of class politics during the period after the 
civil rights upsurge in 1968-1969 should be of interest to historians of the radical 
left, as they constitute some of the most serious efforts at agitation in Northern 
Ireland as conflict mounted. This chapter has shown how the organisation began 
to develop its own unique perspective on how socialist politics could develop 
across Ireland. It was based upon challenging partition, but also on a firm belief 
that class struggle and working class unity were the key to the pursuit of a 
workers’ republic. However the PD was never able to put down roots outside of 
small constituencies in the north. Its 32-county orientation toward southern 
workers was genuine, but largely based upon political propaganda. Indeed, a 
rival leftist writing in 1975 would reflect upon the problem: 
Had PD really cared about establishing an independent working class 
presence in the Northern anti-Unionist, anti-repression camp, it 
would have made more than half-hearted, rhetorical attempts to 
involve itself in distinctly working class struggles in the South. In the 
main, its activity in the South, such as it has been, is an extension of 
its involvement in the anti-repression struggle in the North […] PD 
has generally shown a haughty indifference (and ignorance) to the 
economic concerns of the Southern workers. They still have to refer 
to the activity in solidarity with striking cement workers in 1970 to 
demonstrate that they have ever shown any interest in them.647 
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The broader picture throughout this period was one in which relations 
deteriorated between the Catholic community and the British military, a result of 
heightened repression and the rise of republican organisations, which were 
beginning to launch a sustained offensive against the Northern Ireland state. The 
PD continued to hold a critical line against the emerging armed campaign and 
was, for example, scathing against attacks that resulted in civilian casualties.  
The PD regards a physical force campaign against the British Army 
as futile and doomed to failure…. It can never win the support of the 
majority in the north…. But while we can sympathize with the 
motives of those who would launch such a campaign we have 
nothing but contempt for those who would try to build a Republic on 
the bodies of dead or maimed Protestant Irishmen…. For the only 
Republic that can be established today is the Workers’ Republic— 
and it can only be built with the aid of those very Protestant workers 
whom these men seek to murder.648  
By 1971 the potential for such aid had long receded and the PD, who had 
‘effectively been beaten back into the Catholic ghettoes to await Faulkner’s next 
move alongside the other anti-Unionist forces’649, recognised that the single most 
important issue facing the left in the North was the level of repression it faced, 
and the necessity to launch broad anti repression action.650 This reflected the 
reality of life on the ground in the Catholic community, but it was also in 
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anticipation of the many calls that had been made by hard-line elements in the 
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Chapter 6: Unfree Citizens 
6.1. Introduction 
Armoured cars and tanks and guns, 
came to take away our sons, 
but every man must stand behind, 
the men behind the wire.651 
 
The 1971-1972 period ranks as the most tumultuous phase in the history of the 
troubles. In August 1971 the government introduced internment on a widespread 
scale. Now almost universally accepted as a disastrous policy that generated 
mass resistance to the Northern state, internment has been widely examined 
throughout historiography. It was followed by a surge in support for militant 
republicanism. However, the historiography surrounding the post-internment 
period lacks in its treatment of the much wider emergence of mass protest and 
civil disobedience during what has been termed the ‘civil resistance 
movement’.652   
Internment resembled an assault on the nationalist community, which 
signified the culmination of a long period of disintegration of relations between 
northern nationalists and the British military, spurring mass resistance to 
Unionist rule. The armed campaign of the republican movement was the most 
crucial destabilising force that met the Unionist government after internment, yet 
it is far from the whole story. No treatment of the collapse of the Unionist state in 
1972 would be complete without an assessment of the mass extra-parliamentary 
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resistance movement that emerged at this time. Various forms of protest saw the 
civil rights movement reignited under more militant terms, and this phase of civil 
disobedience generally ended in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday.  
This chapter charts the role of the PD in these events and shows how the 
post internment period allowed the small forces of the revolutionary left to again 
play a role in street protests. The remobilisation of the civil rights movement saw 
a closer relationship develop between the PD and the republican movement as 
mass struggle re-emerged throughout 1971-1972. PD activists were interned in 
August 1971, and the detention of socialists and civil rights activists who were 
not members of the IRA did much to expose the indiscriminate nature of the 
operation. But the Unionist government vastly miscalculated the extent of social 
unrest that internment would create. Various forms of political action met 
internment including mass protests, rallies, marches and strikes, all of which 
strengthened the terrain that the republican movement was operating in. Amidst 
this explosion of agitation, the PD attempted to offer some coordinated direction 
and remobilise the civil rights movement on the basis of civil disobedience and 
mass protest. In doing so the organisation argued that it was necessary to launch 
an outright challenge to the northern state.  
In late 1971, the PD formed the Northern Resistance Movement (NRM) 
alongside republican activists who were willing to press ahead with street 
protests. This brought about a unity between the PD and the Provisional 
movement, which involved a deeper political alignment surrounding the 
necessity to overthrow the Northern state. Therefore, the PD played an important 
role in reigniting civil rights protests at the beginning of 1972 and the 
organisation had shifted its position toward supporting the republican struggle, 
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essentially arguing that both the military campaign and the mass struggle of the 
people could bring down the Stormont state and solve the national question in the 
interests of the working class. This chapter explains how these developments 
emerged and suggests that they continued to define the fate of the PD as the 
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6.2. The Introduction of Internment 
You are dragged from your sleep by the dual crash of front and back 
doors being kicked in by the fascist kidnap squad. You are dragged 
from your bed; wrists lashed together, cotton wool stuffed in your 
mouth with a sack thrown over your head into a waiting jeep. Behind 
you your wife and family are being terrorised and your home is being 
wrecked in an army search. You get to the interrogation camp and the 
treatment begins…653 Unfree Citizen, 10 August 1971.  
Throughout 1970-1971 division inside the Unionist Party continued, in what 
Michael Farrell described as a ‘steady drift to the right’— a similar process that 
had brought down O’Neill now wracked his successor, Chichester Clark, in a 
more intense way.654 This had profound implications for the left, as the pre-
internment period was one in which loyalist forces began to mobilise significant 
sections of Protestant workers. In March 1971— after three British soldiers were 
killed by the PIRA— thousands of shipyard workers marched on Stormont 
calling for the introduction of internment. It illustrated the extent to which a large 
section of the Protestant working class were now willing to back state repression 
and it was the culmination of a more serious shift in East Belfast’s centre of 
industrial strength, where some of the best labour militants that had prevented 
violence in 1969 were now calling for internment. The inability to challenge 
Unionist ideology inside the labour movement directly facilitated a resurgence of 
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loyalism in the early 1970s.655 The trade union movement was effective in 
curbing sectarianism on the shop floor, but not in eliminating it.  
The call for internment was, however, one that emanated primarily from 
the higher echelons of the Unionist government. Brian Faulkner, who took 
leadership of the Unionist Party after the resignation of Chichester Clark on 23 
March 1971, consistently raised it. Faulkner viewed internment as a tried and 
tested method of putting down the IRA and would apply persuading pressure on 
the British military to act.656 Faulkner’s new dispensation also attempted to shift 
its relationship to the Catholic middle class by appointing an NILP Minister to 
the cabinet and offering opposition parties the chance to act as chairperson in two 
of three new functional committees. Although the committees would exercise 
little power the SDLP welcomed the announcement, with MP Paddy Devlin 
describing the announcement as ‘Faulkner’s finest hour’657.      
To the Unfree Citizen it all amounted to a ‘sham attempt’ to buy off the 
Catholic community, isolate the Provisionals and create the illusion that Catholic 
grievances could be reconciled with the Unionist state.658 Incidentally, 
Faulkner’s finest hour ended when the military killed two Derry men, Seamus 
Cusack and Desmond Beattie, in what were widely viewed as executions by 
Derry’s Catholic community. The SDLP withdrew from Stormont in protest and, 
simultaneously, the Provisionals embarked on a heightened campaign of 
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bombing throughout April, May and June.659 In this context Faulkner was able to 
persuade the British government, now headed by Edward Heath’s Tory cabinet, 
to resort to methods of repression that the military was familiar with in other 
colonial expeditions. 
As early as August 1970 PD members were warning about the possibility 
of internment.660 Later, on 14 February 1971 at a conference organised by the 
civil rights association in Belfast, Michael Farrell proposed concrete actions in 
the event of internment being implemented, including mass protests and weekly 
marches. The conference could not reach agreement and instead was imbued by a 
typically divided atmosphere over whether the movement should seek to 
mobilise toward an outright challenge to the state, or whether it should seek 
reform.661 The PD called for preparations to challenge internment, but nothing 
came of these calls and as the military descended into Catholic estates to enforce 
imprisonment it came on a scale that most had not expected. Therefore, the civil 
rights movement took a significant blow when internment was introduced at 4am 
on 9 August, as some of the most important activists were targeted.  
In the first swoop 342 men were arrested and despite Faulkner’s 
consistent contention that the operation had been a success in capturing known 
IRA volunteers who were engaged in violence, the immediate evidence 
suggested otherwise. While many republicans were targeted the majority of the 
Provisionals either evaded capture or were not on the military’s intelligence 
radar. For the most part, those republicans detained were either retired veteran 
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activists— the old guard of the movement— or from the Official wing.662 Some 
of the internees were general political opponents of the Unionist state including 
civil rights activists, socialists and militant trade unionists. Others were simply 
innocent civilians.663   
The fact that socialists and civil rights activists were arrested under the 
presumption of violence revealed the indiscriminate nature of the operation. Prior 
to the arrests operational instructions stated that, ‘Both factions of the IRA, 
NICRA and PD have contingency plans for a campaign of violence and civ[sic] 
disobedience if internment should take place.’664 Afterward, despite much 
evidence to show that many internees were not involved in violence, Brian 
Faulkner, who personally oversaw each internment case, consistently defended 
each decision:  
I have made no internment order without being satisfied on evidence 
placed before me that the person interned was and still is an active 
member of the Official or Provisional wing of the IRA…. It is 
because of such involvement that persons are being held and not 
because they oppose the government. Persons who may be members 
of the Civil Rights movement or the People’s Democracy, or of other 
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organisations, are being interned only if they are also members of the 
IRA or actively involved in it….665  
It was on this basis that 9 members of the PD were arrested. Gerry Ruddy, who 
had been involved in the PD since October 1968, received a phone call in the 
early hours of the morning to tell him that internment was under way and he beat 
a hasty retreat to Newry.666 In the end, the Army did not come for Ruddy but 
other PD members were not so fortunate. Those detained on 9 August were; 
Michael Farrell, Dermot Kelly, Eugene Cassin, John McGuffin, Liam Begley, 
Malachy McRoe, J. D. Murphy, Oliver Cosgrove and Liam Shannon.667 PD 
members were important in documenting the abuses that went on during the 
early phase of internment, initially through writing letters to local newspapers. 
John McGuffin would write the first serious analysis of internment, which 
documented his own arrest and interrogation.668 As accounts filtered out 
surrounding the treatment of internees it was evident that almost all had been 
mistreated in some form, with experiences varying from verbal and physical 
abuse to more extreme torture techniques.669  
The reaction to internment was angry and palpable and both factions of 
the IRA battled it out with the British military, the violence far surpassing 
anything the state had ever experienced. As the Free Citizen put it on 15 August, 
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‘there has been more violence in the North of Ireland in the past week than at any 
time during the past three years’670. The observation was correct, one 
authoritative historical record noted that in the four days after the introduction of 
internment twenty-two people had been killed and up to seven thousand people 
(mainly Catholics) were left homeless, as their houses had been burnt to the 
ground. In terms of 1971 as a whole, 34 people had been killed before 9 August, 
while a further 140 were to die before the year ended.671  
The violence that followed internment has been well documented in 
pushing Northern Ireland over the Rubicon into a period of intractable 
conflict.672 However, there was a much wider dynamic of protest and popular 
resistance that gripped nationalist areas. As the first internees were arrested 
working class Catholic estates erupted in riots, and barricades were erected in 
order to keep the military out. They were among the first instances of a 
widespread community struggle. The main pillar of the ‘civil resistance 
campaign’ against internment was the mass withholding of rent and rates, which, 
alongside the increase in IRA action brought about a new level of instability to 
the Unionist state. Throughout this turbulent period the PD played a role in re-
igniting street protest and civil rights mobilisation.  
The PD had taken a notable blow to its small organisation, with some of 
its most prominent members being detained. Immediately, the remaining activists 
reacted to internment by renaming the Free Citizen the Unfree Citizen 
overnight— which initially appeared much deteriorated in layout, likely down to 
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PD printer John D. Murphy being interned— and set out to propagate support for 
the internees. After August ‘71 political activism took on a higher level of risk, 
and with PD member’s interned tension occurred more regularly with the 
security forces. The Unfree Citizen often complained of Special Branch 
harassment, and members were allegedly being picked up and interrogated for 
hours when selling the paper. One young man was said to have been detained for 
thirty six hours and beaten up whilst being questioned about the whereabouts of 
their printing equipment.673  
Many of the more experienced leaders of civil rights and anti-repression 
activity had been detained, and this forced others to take a position of leadership. 
Fergus O’Hare recalls: ‘I remember standing in Andersonstown and having been 
involved in organising a protest meeting about the whole situation, and 
somebody handing me a megaphone and suddenly you’re the speaker, and that 
was the first time you suddenly had to get up and do all that.’674 The way in 
which the pace of events took over and working class areas experienced an 
eruption of grassroots activity was conveyed by the Unfree Citizen in later years:  
The internment swoop on August 9th created a mass movement even 
greater that the civil rights movement. The imperialist’s last 
desperate weapon blew up in their own faces. Street by street, the 
people built barricades and defended them. Estate by estate they 
stopped paying rent and rates. Town by town they held one day 
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protest strikes. They ignored the timid bleatings of political leaders, 
trade union officials and church dignitaries.675  
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6.3. The Northern Resistance 
The mass civil resistance movement against internment has arguably been 
overlooked among historians who have focused primarily on the level of armed 
activity between republicans and the British military.676 However, the republican 
military offensive that raged throughout 1971-1972 could never have been 
sustained for such a prolonged period was it not for the level of active support it 
enjoyed throughout the nationalist community. This encompassed various forms 
of extra-parliamentary civil disobedience including, marches, protests, sit-downs, 
strikes and riots. August 1971 saw the resurrection of ‘no-go’ areas, and in Derry 
mass opposition pushed the military out of the Bogside and Free Derry saw its 
most sustained period. Grassroots organisation engulfed many working class 
areas as civil disobedience committees sprang up throughout the nationalist 
community, and mass protest re-emerged.677 For example, in Derry on 16 August 
workers downed tools and took strike action,678 and on 21 August up to 8000 
took part in a monster sit-in in Derry’s Brandywell football stadium.679 In west 
Belfast, some 15,000 people packed into an anti-internment rally in Casement 
Park on 12 September, uniting a broad spectrum of political opposition.680 
Opposition to internment spanned across the entire Catholic community with 
sections of the Catholic middle class becoming alienated from the state in a way 
that had been hitherto unseen. In a matter of weeks up to 130 opposition 
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councillors— mostly members of the SDLP— resigned their positions from local 
councils.681   
The central pillar of opposition to internment was the rent and rates 
strike, when thousands withheld their rent and rates payments to local authorities. 
Although supported by various political organisations including the SDLP, Sinn 
Féin, both wings of the IRA, NICRA, PD and other organisations of the radical 
left— the strike erupted on such a broad level that it should not be seen as the 
initiative of any one current. Michael Farrell described SDLP politicians— who 
often claimed credit for initiating the strike— as ratifying a fait accompli at the 
behest of the mass of Catholic people. 682   
The tactic of withholding rent and rates spread like wildfire. One account 
of the strike estimated that some 40,000 households took part at its height, and 
they were organised through the newly emerging civil disobedience 
committees.683 Naturally, the strike was strongest in the areas that had born the 
brunt of internment. Kevin Boyle would claim that 95 percent of the 15,000 
families in west Belfast were refusing to pay rents, with a similar picture existing 
outside Belfast. The cost of the strike after four months was said to be up to 
£500,000.684   
One week after the introduction of internment the Unfree Citizen 
indicated the extent of protest: ‘Rent and rates strikes are underway in Derry, 
Coalisland, Newry, Belfast and in many other towns. Protest meetings are being 
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held in almost every town and village in the North of Ireland,’685. PD members 
played an active role in these initiatives, such as in west Belfast, where they were 
heavily involved at rank and file level. In Armagh, one local civil resistance 
committee claimed to represent 800 people who were on rent and rates strike, 
and was chaired by PD activist and former internee Dermot Kelly.686   
The Unionist Party moved swiftly to quell the campaign. Recognising 
that the strike had ‘serious implications for local government and the essential 
local services which councils and similar local bodies provide’687, the 
government acted in mid-October to introduce legislation that aimed to counter 
the civil disobedience campaign. It enabled the government to divert to public 
authorities state payments including the social security benefits of people who 
were taking part in the rent and rates strike. The state argued that those who were 
taking part in the campaign were doing so through fear of intimidation or reprisal 
inside Catholic areas, and the pro-Unionist press was adorned with 
advertisements on behalf of the government that stressed, ‘The rent and rates 
strike is a self-inflicted wound. By helping to end the present campaign, you will 
help yourself, your family and your fellow citizens.’688 But the evidence 
suggested otherwise.  
Yet if opposition to internment was widespread, there was little effort to 
coordinate the mass activity of the people, which was largely a result of the 
disorganised state of the anti-internment forces. However, as momentum 
gathered and civil disobedience action began to coalesce around the central 
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slogan of ‘release all internees’, more coordinated efforts to establish a campaign 
were attempted. The Unfree Citizen called for unity around a list of anti 
repression demands, including; the release of all internees, repeal of the SPA, 
‘break the Orange Unionist link’, and the dismissal of judiciary and bigoted 
courts.689 The PD argued that the escalation in activism necessitated a united 
front initiative that reached beyond the small forces of the left, and that political 
agreement was not a prerequisite in opposing state repression.690  
If unity in action throughout the early phase of civil rights activity had 
been difficult to achieve, it was more problematic in the period after internment. 
Alongside internment, Faulkner had announced a six-month ban on all marches 
making demonstrations illegal. Therefore, while the post-internment period saw 
an explosion of grassroots action, coordinated marches had been non-existent. 
Faced with the prospect of illegal marches many of the moderates within NICRA 
and the SDLP were wary of remobilising the civil rights campaign.  
Throughout the autumn of 1971 forums were convened to debate a 
strategy to advance the campaign. On 17 October in Tyrone one such meeting 
failed to reach agreement over the demands of the campaign. The PD argued for 
a broad based movement that could bring together the civil disobedience 
committees from across the country and coordinate a return to the streets.691 Yet 
such an initiative was at odds with the broader NICRA leadership— and those 
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MPs who had moved away from civil rights organisations into the SDLP— who 
cautioned against remobilisation and were opposed to launching a challenge to 
the Northern state. Instead, they wanted to keep the campaign inside the 
framework of the Civil Rights Association and were undoubtedly suspicious of 
the overlap between the PIRA and the civil disobedience committees.   
The PD hit out at what they identified as the political sectarianism of the 
NICRA leadership who wished to ‘control the whole campaign’692 and failed to 
co-operate with other groups by making it ‘abundantly clear that they are 
prepared to cooperate with no one if they cannot have sole control over the 
campaign.’693 If the moderate left in NICRA were wary of street mobilisation, 
the effort to find a constitutional solution to the Northern crisis was more vocally 
expressed by the SDLP. After welcoming Faulkner’s reforming capacity in 
previous months— only to then embrace what resembled the old tactic of 
abstentionism— SDLP representatives now found themselves in the precarious 
position of being outside the structures of parliament whilst a mass movement 
swept their constituencies, temporarily uniting the Catholic middle class with the 
most militant demand to opt out of the Northern state.  
  As a party wedded to a constitutional vision of reforming the Northern 
state, the SDLP would find it hard to relate to the militant movement that was 
developing on the streets. The party effectively presented its own elected 
representatives as the solution, launching a short-lived and ineffectual 
‘Alternative Assembly’ in Dungiven in late October.694 Lacking any real power 
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and without any agency beyond the mandate of nationalist representatives 
previously ratified in local elections, the Assembly had a short existence— it 
only met on one other occasion.695 On the other hand, those who were looking to 
instigate mass mobilisations as a method to challenge internment began to find 
wider resonance.  
In response to the failure of the civil rights association to initiate any 
campaign of popular protest the PD helped organise a series of conferences with 
republican activists and militant sections of the civil disobedience committees, 
who were willing to re-launch street protests in support of the internees. The first 
serious initiative launched in this direction took place in Omagh on 21 
November, when committee delegates from across the country met in a 
conference that was sponsored by the Tyrone and Fermanagh Civil Resistance 
Committees. After a motion from Michael Farrell the conference elected an 
interim committee, representative of the nine historic counties of Ulster, to lead 
the campaign and so the Northern Resistance Movement was established, 
although its name would not be announced until later. 696 The central unifying 
issue behind the NRM was the need to mobilise against internment; but it was 
also the first real exercise in building a united front between those on the left and 
the republican movement, based on the idea that the fight against repression 
necessitated a sustained struggle against the state. It was recognition of the need 
to overthrow the state that united the PD with the Provisional republican 
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movement. Politically, the NRM united around the slogan ‘Smash Stormont’, 
forwarding its demands as such: 
1. All internees are released unconditionally and the Special 
Powers Act is abolished. 
2. All political prisoners jailed since 1968 are released. 
3. Stormont is smashed and the Unionist government is sacked. 
4. British troops are withdrawn from Northern Ireland.  
The Chairman of the NRM was republican MP Frank MacManus, while the Vice 
Chair was Michael Farrell. Bernadette Devlin was also heavily involved from the 
outset.697 Significantly, the NRM had notable support and involvement from 
Provisional Sinn Féin, which, although a shell of an organisation in 1971, added 
weight to the campaign as they provided a connection to many of the prisoners 
and an obvious affinity with the PIRA. The NRM signalled the beginning of 
unity between the PD and the Provisional movement as the organisation shifted 
toward a more overtly anti-imperialist position on the Northern state. Indeed, the 
NRM demands could be said to be an example of the PD uniting with 
republicans on republican terms and some on the left felt that it strayed too far 
into the republican camp. Eamonn McCann did not get involved in the NRM, 
and looking back on the situation reflected that the sharp PD turn was partially a 
result of the lack of political direction to the organisation: ‘the PD, and a lot of 
people within it, would have thought that the way to react to a worsening 
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situation was simply to become more militant…”698. This development is worth 
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6.4. Smashing Stormont 
As the British Army showed its ability to repress Catholic revolt more effectively 
than the RUC ever had, the PD now found its most consistent allies to be within 
the republican movement. The pattern of events since the introduction of British 
troops suggested that the military had now moved to strengthen the existence of 
Unionist rule. Recognition of the need to challenge the institutions of the 
Northern state saw the PD shift its position away from the crude denunciation of 
the Provisionals to one of critical support for their campaign of national 
liberation. By 1972 the PD would move sharply in support of the PIRA, viewing 
the armed campaign as inextricably linked to the pursuit of socialism in Ireland. 
The PIRA was thus seen as a justifiable reaction to British repression and an 
important component in developing a revolutionary process in the North.       
 To a large extent unity between the PD and republicans was a product of 
immediate political situations that developed, and is well illustrated, for example, 
in the relationship that developed between the PD and activists such as Máire 
Drumm, a leading figure of Cumann na mBan and Vice President of Provisional 
Sinn Féin (1972-1976). Drumm had come to prominence as a leader of the new 
wave of street protest that engulfed nationalist areas as military repression 
increased. For example, her and other women would famously lead the large 
crowd that broke the Falls Road curfew in 1970. Drumm first spoke at a PD 
meeting outside Armagh jail in the summer of 1970, and later worked closely 
with the PD in building the NRM until the end of 1972. The relationship 
continued into the mid 1970s when later prisoner’s campaigns were launched. 
Indeed, when Drumm was killed in 1976 the then central committee of the PD 
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offered an obituary that expressed deep regret at the loss of a ‘dedicated anti-
imperialist and comrade in the struggle…we in People’s Democracy salute the 
memory of Máire Drumm, we are proud to have worked and struggled alongside 
her.’699 Fergus O’Hare, who played a central role in the NRM, recalls their 
political connection in the early days of the anti-internment movement:  
I can remember attending meetings in the early days with Máire 
Drumm, who was a very much involved in political mobilisations. 
Máire was a renowned sort of street speaker, she could make very 
mobilising or inspirational speeches, I suppose if you wanted to call 
them that… We worked for a long time quite closely with her, and 
again the media have her, you know, painted her as a rabble rousing 
rightwing… whereas I worked quite a lot with her and she was very 
interested in the political analysis that we were putting forward and I 
remember her saying that… She certainly had time for the sort of 
messages that we were putting out.700   
There is also evidence to suggest that some internees were won to the politics of 
the PD, which includes more controversial figures associated with the 
Provisional campaign. In August 1973 the Unfree Citizen noted a ‘growing 
number of internees joining People’s Democracy’ and carried a letter from Long 
Kesh written by one new recruit.701 It was penned by Freddie Scappaticci; then a 
twenty seven year old internee who had served a two-year sentence in the camp. 
Scappaticci’s letter was a fairly run-of-the-mill piece, which documented his 
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internment in August 1971 and experiences of prison life. The PD were 
enthusiastic about the input of internees: 
Through political study, activity and discussion within the hell-hole 
that is Long Kesh, he and other internees have decided to join PD. 
We regard this as one of the greatest compliments ever paid to our 
politics and organisation.702 
It is unlikely Scappaticci’s membership of the PD lasted long, and the welcome 
of it in the PD newspaper is an ironic read considering his later history. After 
release from prison Scappaticci would go on play a central role in the Provisional 
IRA, where he acted as head of the movement’s ‘internal security unit’, a 
position that saw him oversee a large number of brutal executions, which are to 
this day shrouded in controversy. In 2003 he was exposed as the double agent 
known as ‘Stakeknife’, purported to be working for British intelligence for a long 
period throughout this time, and has been in hiding ever since.703  
The extent to which the PD recruited new members inside the Long Kesh 
in the early 1970s was probably overstated by the organisation, as there is little 
evidence to suggest any notable base of membership ever existed inside the 
prison. Nevertheless, it does help highlight the type of unity that was developing 
in a context of escalating conflict between republicans and the British army. 
Underlying this was a more fundamental embrace of anti-imperialist politics and 
an appreciation of how the PD viewed the armed struggle is necessary to draw 
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this out. This shift toward the Provisionals was primarily driven by Michael 
Farrell, whose own experience of internment gave him, ‘a new insight into the 
weight of repression the nationalist community had suffered over the years and 
the endurance and resilience of the republican tradition even if its political 
thinking had often been limited’.704 At the end of 1971 Farrell wrote a series of 
articles for the Unfree Citizen that argued a clear line of support for the 
republican movement. Farrell contended that socialists should not equate the 
violence of an oppressed national minority with the violence of an imperial 
oppressor, and that the left should not join the chorus of condemnation against 
the Provisional IRA that was being put forward by both the Unionist state and 
the mainstream media. Although the PD had fundamental differences with 
republican political philosophy and the strategy of the PIRA, Farrell argued that 
the resurgence of the Provisionals was not primarily rooted in such ideology; 
rather, it was a consequent reaction to the level of repression that met the 
nationalist community since 1968. In this context the Provisionals had moved 
away from playing a defensive role toward, ‘fighting one half of an anti-
imperialist war— the other half is the mass civil resistance movement which is 
equally important’. The PD now viewed the military struggle and the political 
campaign as mutually reinforcing. Farrell concluded, ‘Socialists must of course 
support the struggle against imperialism … and co-operate with the Provisionals 
who are doing most of the fighting. But that support and co-operation must be 
critical.’705   
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The PD criticised the Provisionals for a number of reasons, particularly 
when their actions led to the deaths of innocents, but also their alliances with 
sections of the Irish political establishment and the conservative anti-socialism 
that was prominent in their political literature. However, the PD argued that 
when a conflict raged between an imperialist power and an oppressed minority, 
the socialist left could not take a noncommittal stance in which violence was 
condemned on both sides equally. Rather, they should support the IRA against 
the British state and simultaneously engage in a process of debate and discussion 
with the republican movement, in the hope to win them to a more progressive 
strategy and ultimately a socialist position. This began a long period of 
attempting to shift the Provisional movement to the left, arguing that the armed 
campaign should act as an appendage to the political movement. Farrell drew on 
the history of republican compromises with the capitalist system to argue for a 
socialist led strategy directing the movement:    
Politics and the gun must go hand in hand and politics must direct the 
gun. …What is needed today if the Workers’ Republic is to become a 
reality is a new generation of guerrillas with a clear political outlook 
who will sweep the con-men out of the ‘arena’ and negotiate their 
own settlement with the imperialists. Revolutionary socialists in the 
North should be deeply involved in the struggle against Stormont and 
Westminster and should cooperate fully with the Provisionals while 
remaining free to criticise individual actions and overall aspects of 
the campaign such as the apparent disregard for the lives of innocent 
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Protestant— or indeed Catholic— civilians. Such criticism, however, 
will only be listened to by those who are involved in the struggle.706  
The PD and the Provisional movement now shared the same goal— the 
overthrow of the Northern state— although this demand was based upon 
different political visions. In 1971 the strategy of the PIRA was dictated by the 
guiding principles of the Éire Nua document, which called for the establishment 
of ‘Dail Uladh’, a federal assembly envisaged for the nine counties of historic 
Ulster, one of four such assemblies intended to form a new all Ireland 
parliamentary structure. When a meeting was held in Monaghan to establish a 
‘Council of Ulster’, PD members attended. 707 The Dail Uladh strategy had little 
relationship to the socialist tradition in Ireland. Despite rhetoric about taking 
control of the ‘means of production’, it was a call for an independent bourgeois 
Irish state and reflected an ideological challenge to the type of socialism that had 
categorised the republican movement since the early 1960s, by now aptly 
expressed in the politics of the Officials. However, the strategy chimed in with 
PD thinking in its call for the abolition of Stormont and the establishment of 
alternative centres of power in the North. Throughout the same period the PD 
campaigned for a ‘Parliament of the Streets’, in which the anti-Unionist 
community could take control of their areas through popular councils and 
organise independently from the Unionist state, effectively opting out of its 
governance.708  
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The armed struggle and the mass civil disobedience campaign were 
viewed as forming the dynamic of a revolutionary process in the north, one that 
had the potential to overthrow the state. The PD assumed the role of the political 
left in the emerging anti-imperialist movement. Fergus O’Hare recounts an 
experience that seems symbolic of how the PD tried to organise politically 
amidst a situation of near civil war: 
I can remember setting up a poster workshop, and being involved in 
a poster workshop whenever there was a massive gun battle going on 
outside and we’re producing propaganda, and then having to bring 
the posters up the road in a van…Trying to organise politically in a 
situation where there are actual gun battles going on in the street, 
when British soldiers are coming up. The time I’m thinking of is just 
after internment, when there was a massive gun battle in 
Ballymurphy and you could hear this going on and, you know, 
you’re watching out to see if the troops are coming up and all this 
sort of stuff.709  
It was in this context that NRM began to organise marches in support of the 
internees, but the attempt to remobilise a protest movement should not be seen 
simply as tailing the armed struggle. It reflected a different conception through 
which the campaign to bring down the Northern state should be conducted— 
through mass protest, mass action, and the involvement of the population 
alongside the guerrilla movement. Eamonn McCann, although not a PD member, 
would be central to the remobilisation of the civil rights movement and provides 
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a useful analysis of the kind of leftwing thinking that once again was responsible 
for a return to mass protest at this juncture:   
The faction most in favour of marching, almost as a matter of 
principle, was the left within the broader civil rights movement. The 
argument was that none of the other forms of protest provided a way 
for the mass of working people to become actively involved in the 
fight. The rent and rates strike had its attractions, but it was a passive 
sort of activity. The armed struggle could, of its nature, only involve 
a few, while rioting was appropriate mainly to the energetic young.  
At the core of this argument there was a conviction that in politics 
the means can determine the ends; the question of whether change 
could be won by electoralism and parliamentary manoeuvre, or by 
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6.5. Return to the Streets 
Four days after the conference that launched the NRM activists began a 
coordinated return to activity, first by organising anti-internment pickets 
throughout the North. In early December the NRM took part in ‘border fillings’ 
across the country.711 After internment the military had set about on a policy of 
cratering border roads with explosives, in order to prevent suspected IRA 
movements— anti-internment activists in rural areas responded with campaigns 
to refill the roads and make them accessible.712 A more substantial return to the 
streets was called by the NRM alongside trade unionists in a march from west 
Belfast to Long Kesh on Christmas day, 1971. The march was intended to 
coincide with a commercial ‘Christmas boycott’ called by the PD, during which 
supporters of the internees would be encouraged to buy only cards and gifts that 
contributed to internment funds.713   
25 December 1971 would be no normal Christmas in Northern Ireland. 
Two days after the festive celebrations the army issued a stern warning to parents 
throughout Belfast’s Lower Falls, stating that children playing with toy guns 
would likely be mistaken as genuine targets: ‘Remember— if your child plays 
with toy weapons in the street he may be shot. Don’t let this happen.’714 
Nevertheless, the call from the PD to boycott Christmas most likely came across 
as an unrealistic demand among the wider community.715 Whilst the boycott did 
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not take off, the PD did begin to remobilise groups of activists willing to break 
the marching ban in support of those behind the wire in Long Kesh.   
Anti-internment rallies had hitherto been confined to demonstrations and 
mass gatherings inside Catholic areas. The PD intended to break this by walking 
from the Beechmount estate in west Belfast, out of the densely populated 
Catholic slum to the prison camp. The route of the march traversed the M1 
motorway to Long Kesh, some 10 miles outside Belfast, but was met by a large 
military presence roughly three miles ahead, which stopped the crowd and a sit-
down protest on the motorway ensued. Bernadette Devlin, Michael Farrell and 
Frank McManus, MP, delivered speeches.716 Although the marchers had broken 
the ban no arrests were made, and the Irish News reported that police and Army 
had not interfered with the march ‘because it was the season of goodwill’717.  
The PD would later point to the march as a breakthrough: ‘Over 2,000 
people turned out on Christmas day, defied the ban and automatic six-month jail 
sentence, outwitted the Army and got halfway to Long Kesh along the 
motorway.’718 While the numbers on the march were probably exaggerated by 
the Unfree Citizen, it did pressurise NICRA into remobilisation and precipitated 
demonstrations in the New Year. Immediately after Christmas, NICRA called a 
demonstration for 2 January in the Falls Park in west Belfast. The march was a 
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safer bet as it stayed inside ‘Catholic’ areas, but it was to be the first in a series of 
NICRA actions and mobilised up to 7,000 people.719        
On 15 January the NRM marched in Dublin and on 22 January, in 
Armagh, a reported 2,000 attended a demonstration where they met a huge 
military presence that was said to have turned Armagh into a ‘fortress’.720 Again, 
on 29 January the NRM marched, this time joined by the Tyrone Central Civil 
Resistance Committee, to retrace the original civil rights march from Coalisland 
to Dungannon. When activists remobilised they would come up against a much 
heavier level of security. Dungannon’s Market Square was sealed off by a 
massive concentration of police and military, and UDR roadblocks stopped and 
searched marchers. Eventually the marchers crossed a field in order to break the 
ban.721 NICRA did not support the NRM marches, but it would begin to organise 
its own actions and as broader forces mobilised crowd sizes increased.    
While the PD was marching in Armagh on 22 January, John Hume led a 
large demonstration to the newly opened internment camp at Magilligan outside 
Derry. The march coincided with other demonstrations in Newry and 
Castlewellan. Faced with the remobilisation of civil rights protest the military 
acted with open repression in order to stabilise Faulkner’s regime. It was most 
evident at Magilligan, where demonstrators were met with CS gas, rubber bullets 
and baton charges from the paratroopers. Ivan Cooper claimed that he was hit on 
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the head with a rubber bullet and afterward opposition MPs castigated the 
‘appalling savagery’ of the British army.722         
Therefore, when NICRA called an anti internment march intending to 
break the ban in Derry on Sunday, 30 January, some confrontation with the 
military was seen to be inevitable, but none quite expected what would come. 
Opinion surrounding a ‘return to the streets’ varied, and some in NICRA were 
against marching. Bríd Ruddy was one of two PD members who had rejoined the 
NICRA executive after internment, alongside Kevin Boyle. Ruddy recalls that 
due to the impact of internment ‘more and more of the women were coming 
forward’ to lead activity in an increasingly dangerous context. In particular, 
Ruddy remembers the series of shootings of civilians by the British Army at 
Ballymurphy in Belfast after the introduction of internment between 9 and 11 
August 1971, it resulted in 11 civilian deaths and involved the same Parachute 
Regiment which would be deployed in Derry, ‘there was a possibility of people 
getting killed. But NICRA still decided to go and it was all the people in NICRA 
who were very opposed to PD who were at the front of the march.’ In January 
the NICRA executive had met for a final debate on the march. The leadership 
was divided over whether to go ahead, and as it went to vote the two PD 
members pressed strongly for mobilisation: ‘In the end we just got it by a hairs 
whisper really […] It was very, very close, but I think we did win the day and I 
think NICRA were forced into taking the stand that they did, and fair play to 
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them’.723 As the day approached the march organisers stressed their commitment 
to peaceful non-violence.724   
When the 10,000 strong march attempted to move outside of Derry’s 
Catholic area it was prohibited by the army, resulting in a small-scale riot that 
was, by now, a regular occurance in the Bogside. The military response was to 
open fire with live rounds, resulting in the death of 14 unarmed civil rights 
protestors, in what seemed a calculated attempt to put down anti-Unionist 
forces.725 The events of Bloody Sunday have been well documented as sounding 
the death knell of the civil rights movement and pushing Northern Ireland into its 
most violent period in history. After the killings in Derry recruitment to the 
PIRA soared and a more intense phase of violence began, but often overlooked is 
the extent to which mass mobilisation engulfed Ireland in a way that broke 
beyond both the established currents of constitutional nationalism and the armed 
campaign launched by both sections of the IRA.   
Despite much reference to a period of ‘national mourning’ after Bloody 
Sunday— a term that originated in calls from the Irish government, — what 
erupted is better described as an explosion of solidarity with civil rights 
protestors. In Ireland, tens of thousands of workers took strike action in Cork, 
Galway, Limerick, Dundalk and Dublin. As far away as the east coast of the US, 
dockers refused to handle British ships and in Dublin, after three days of rioting, 
the British embassy was burnt to the ground.726 Across the North there were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
723 Interview with Bríd Ruddy, Belfast, 10/12/2015. 
724 Irish News, 28 January 1972.  
725 O’Dochartaigh, From Civil Rights to Armalites, p. 285. 
726 Irish News, 3 February 1972. Also see, McCann, Bloody Sunday in Derry, 
what really happened? pp. 166-167.  
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walkouts, protests and riots in almost all areas that held nationalist majorities. 
The Unfree Citizen listed some of the solidarity actions— a three-day general 
strike in Derry, a general strike in Omagh and Armagh. In Belfast, serious rioting 
broke out across the city and thousands of students took part in protests at 
Queen’s.727 In almost every working class Catholic estate people rioted and 
blocked roads and huge crowds flocked to Derry for the funerals of the 
victims.728 Famously, Bernadette Devlin, who was on the platform during the 
march, delivered her own form of ‘proletarian protest’ to the British government 
when she thumped Tory MP Reginald Maudling in the House of Commons, after 
he argued that the army had fired in self defence against the IRA— a claim that 
is now commonly recognised as false.729  
In Britain, the AIL organised marches in eight cities, Edinburgh, 
Birmingham, Manchester, Bristol, Cambridge, Leeds, Glasgow and London.730 
John Gray recalls that the London demonstration reached a peak, ‘a huge 
moment’ in terms of Irish solidarity demonstrations. Gray helped lead the 
demonstration to Downing Street where it ran into serious clashes with the 
London police. Afterward Gray’s London home was raided and some activists 
were arrested for their part in the demonstration.731 The reaction of the broader 
working class and anti-Unionist constituency in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday 
stood in stark contrast to that of the British state, which defended the actions of 
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730 Irish News, 5 February 1972.  
731 Interview with John Gray, Belfast, 21/04/2015.  
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the paratrooper regiment in Derry and attempted to draw a line under events by 
forcing through the now discredited Widgery tribunal.732 
Immediately after Bloody Sunday the PD released a statement arguing 
that the task ahead of the civil resistance movement was inadvertently clear, 
there could be no reform of the Unionist state and they must smash the Stormont 
regime.733 If opposition to Stormont reached a peak after Bloody Sunday, this 
was not translated into action by the mainstream left and labour movement. The 
outpouring of opposition to Bloody Sunday came primarily from working class 
forces, but the role of the official labour movement and established left stood in 
contradistinction to the conclusion that was being drawn by many Catholics 
throughout the north— that it was now necessary to fight the Unionist state 
through any means necessary. The inability of the left to make any meaningful 
contribution to the fight against the Stormont state further enshrined its 
irrelevancy to the struggle in the north.  
 For example, the NILP had joined Faulkner’s cabinet in 1971 and thus 
found it difficult to distance itself from the repression that had been meted out by 
the military. Two days following Bloody Sunday, Vivian Simpson, the only 
remaining NILP MP at Stormont, took part in a Commons debate surrounding 
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the killings in Derry. After Faulkner had delivered a speech that defended the 
security forces, he was followed by a variety of Unionist MPs who blamed the 
IRA and the civil rights movement for the violence. The timidity of Simpson’s 
intervention is most striking, endorsing some of Faulkner’s speech he did not 
speak out against any of the claims surrounding the violence and was on this 
occasion uncritical of the both the government and the military, calling for, ‘new 
political initiatives so that we may get to the point in time that violence will not 
be uppermost in our minds.’734 The speech illustrated how disconnected the 
NILP were from the growing street movement. The NILP had long held a 
position that supported partition and the existence of the Unionist state, confining 
it to a ‘labour Unionist’ tradition and casting the party increasingly out of touch 
with the trajectory of nationalist politics.735   
If those who strove to be political representatives of the working class 
had been detached from the opposition to state violence, so too was that of the 
broader labour movement. Since internment the ICTU had performed a function 
that could be described as avoiding and ignoring the most oppressive instances of 
violence against the minority community. It was a reflection of ICTU’s more 
general relationship with the Northern state. The fact that internment saw many 
trade union members unlawfully imprisoned was rarely taken up, and when trade 
unionists at grassroots level did get behind the NRM march that broke the ban on 
Christmas 1971 the leadership of ICTU distanced itself from such actions.736 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
734 Stormont Hansard, 1 February 1972, Volume 84, pp. 37-38.  
735 For an account of the NILP see, Edwards, A History of the Northern Ireland 
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736  Indeed, one ICTU official in Belfast was said to have called on union 
members not to take part in the march. Boyd, Have the trade unions failed the 
north? p. 80.   
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Subsequently, when 6 trade union members were gunned down during Bloody 
Sunday, the trade union movement did not officially take part in mobilisations, 
instead organising a ‘peace conference’ in Belfast two days after the killings.737 
The mass revulsion after Bloody Sunday found little organised expression and 
the PD found more in common with the Provisionals in their fight to overthrow 
an ‘irreformable’ state.   
On 31 January, a meeting took place in Dungannon encompassing 
representatives from all of the major anti-internment currents, where the PD 
called for immediate joint action. The Unfree Citizen reported that the feeling in 
the meeting was in favour of such action, were it not for the Communist Party 
and Official IRA representatives who wanted to channel all action through 
NICRA.738 When NICRA called a demonstration, for 6 February in Newry, the 
turnout was on a scale never seen before and the march mobilised up to 50,000 
people. Yet the march also encapsulated the contradictory impasse that the civil 
rights movement had reached. Now mobilising huge numbers— a product of the 
mass movement that was erupting against the Northern state— the civil rights 
leadership offered no political strategy. NICRA organiser Kevin McCorry 
reportedly went to great lengths in the run up to the march to plead with people 
from across Ireland not to come to Newry, urging that the march would be non-
political.739 The Newry demonstration took a different form than previous civil 
rights demonstrations, the leaflet distributed by the local Civil Rights 
Association called for calm:            
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This march is to be in total silence in honour of the Derry dead. We 
are marching to show our contempt for the Stormont system by 
breaking the ban on parades […] We are not searching for a 
confrontation with the British Army… Silence and discipline are our 
watchwords.740       
The sentiments of the leaflet undoubtedly chimed in with the mood after the 
funerals of the Derry dead, but they likely stood in contrast to the feeling inside 
Catholic working class areas, where the violence had been most strongly felt. If 
the Newry rally was a powerfully effective demonstration that unwarranted 
aggression had been meted out to protestors, it also symbolised the end of the 
civil rights movement, as non-violent reform of the state was cast aside for many 
in a generation of Irish Catholics who had seen the civil rights campaign rise and 
fall against continued repression.  
The PD attacked NICRA for not building on the potential of events. 
Michael Farrell described the Newry march as, ‘remarkably docile, never coming 
near to realising its revolutionary potential, 50,000 marchers demanding an end 
to Stormont could have struck terror into Heath and Faulkner; demanding an end 
to Lynch they could have gone a long way to toppling him. They done nothing of 
the kind.’741 Farrell contended that the march should have been used to bind the 
Northern opposition MP’s— both SDLP and NILP— to a policy of ‘no talks 
until internment ends and Stormont is abolished’, and to assert the right of the 
extra-parliamentary resistance movement to do the talking when these conditions 
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Kevin Boyle Papers, A44/1/2/13, James Hardiman Archive, National University 
of Ireland, Galway.  
741 Unfree Citizen No 29, February 18, 1972.  
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were met. He argued that NICRA had no intention of pushing through such a 
radical position, which was the culmination of a series of positions and decisions 
by NICRA that had the effect of emasculating the resistance movement, centred 
around their attitude to Stormont, to the SDLP and to the very conduct of the 
campaign.742   
On 13 February NICRA held its annual conference. Up to 600 delegates 
gathered and Kevin Boyle forwarded an amendment that tried to merge NICRA 
with the NRM. Among other things, the amendment called for a stepping up of 
the campaign in order to secure ‘the temporary suspension of Stormont as the 
only feasible means’ on the road to challenging Unionist dominance in the short 
term, and securing a united Ireland as a longer-term goal. It was defeated by 175 
votes to 144.743 Nevertheless, the PD kept up activity. On the same day as the 
NICRA conference the NRM marched in Enniskillen, attracting up to 10,000 
people out on to the streets and marking the ninth time that anti internment 
marchers had broken Faulkner’s ban. Despite warnings of violence the march 
passed off relatively peacefully and Michael Farrell warned that the NRM would 
continue marching until ‘they had marched over the ruins of Stormont.’744 The 
march showed that the PD was still capable of pulling off substantial 
mobilisations, but the reality was that by 1972 the tide of resistance had greatly 
shifted toward republican militarism.  
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6.6. Dual Power 
By 1972 the claim that the Northern state was a democratic entity had been 
greatly undermined. The breakdown of democracy and the clampdown of 
security against the broader anti-Unionist movement were widespread. Many PD 
members found themselves faced with increased charges due to their role in 
breaking the marching ban. In February three PD members, Michael Farrell, 
Kevin Boyle and Dermot Kelly, were summonsed to court for their part in the 
NRM actions that began the remobilisation of the civil rights movement at the 
beginning of that year. The courtroom was packed with some 60 RUC officers in 
the public gallery, as well as British soldiers. Each of the PD activists were 
sentenced to six-month jail sentences and from the dock Farrell delivered a 
speech that strongly attacked the legal dispensation:   
Some evidence is being offered that I have committed certain actions 
but I want to challenge the whole basis of the legal set-up here, 
which decides what is legal or illegal. I am not guilty of any offence, 
because it appears to me that the system of law and justice in this 
state has broken down and collapsed. On the 9th August 1971, the 
door of my house was broken in and armed soldiers burst in and took 
me away at gunpoint. Later that day I was assaulted, beaten up and 
maltreated at Girdwood Park military barracks and then lodged in 
Crumlin Road jail. I was held there for five weeks and then released. 
At no time was I given any explanation for this treatment. It was later 
shown that it was all quite illegal even under the terms of the Special 
Powers Act. Yet I have no redress and there are some 700 or 800 
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others like me, still being held . . . the law in any society is based on 
a contract between the State and the citizen. When the State 
oversteps this authority, when it tramples on the rights of citizens, 
when it shoots down people in cold blood, then that contract is 
dissolved.745  
The process of repression highlighted by Farrell fuelled the ranks of the 
republican movement, and both the PIRA and the OIRA unleashed a wave of 
violence after Bloody Sunday. While republican actions were primarily aimed at 
security services and the military, the armed campaign increasingly took on a 
more brutal form with disregard for the lives of innocent civilians. One major 
instance was an Official IRA bomb in Aldershot military barracks on 22 
February that killed 7 non-military members of staff.  
Simultaneously, a wider level of communal struggle developed. As the 
rent and rates strike continued, entire Catholic areas threw up barricades, 
virtually seceding from the state and developing ‘no-go’ areas on a larger scale. 
The position of the Unionist government was now so unsecure that the British 
were forced to intervene— heralding the suspension of Stormont. Announced by 
Ted Heath on 24 March, it was solidified with the implementation of Direct Rule 
on 30 March. The suspension of Stormont fulfilled one of the central demands of 
the civil resistance movement, but it also presented a contradictory situation in 
that the British government was now in control of the Northern state while the no 
go areas existed— a balance of power that could not last forever. For the PD this 
situation compromised a context of ‘Dual Power’, with the Catholic community 
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controlling whole areas of the state on the one hand, and the British government 
on the other.   
The PD viewed these areas as containing the potential to develop socialist 
forms of organisation. The ‘liberated’ Catholic areas were zones in which the 
British Army was unable to enter, where republicans moved with some level of 
freedom and grassroots civil resistance committees flourished. As the Unfree 
Citizen put it: ‘whole areas have seceded from the state and there is a situation of 
Dual Power where some areas are controlled by the state and some by the 
people.’746 From this position of strength the return to a reformed version of 
Stormont was seen as a retreat. The PD saw the ‘autonomous’ centres of 
community organisation as being capable of posing a fundamental challenge to 
the state. After an NRM conference in March the movement announced, 
a decision to revolutionise the resistance movement through the 
setting up of an alternative society within the seceded areas and to 
press for the creation of an embryonic state from within, where the 
people will administer their own services, set up their own 
cooperatives and courts and govern their lives accordingly to their 
own dictates.747          
The ceded areas saw the British military pushed out of many Catholic working 
class estates, through a combination of republican armed action and mass civil 
disobedience that could claim to enjoy a significant level of support. Many 
estates had developed networks of rank and file community organisation and 
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self-help. Ranging from anti-internment activity to welfare based initiatives such 
as cleaning up estates and fixing streetlights, and more generally taking over the 
role of local authorities in the absence of any government control. For example, 
in the Andersonstown estate various local committees existed, and in Ardoyne a 
‘People’s Assembly’ was in the process of being set up in order to extend 
grassroots community control. The PD saw these as potential harbingers for a 
future socialist society: ‘Already areas like Andersonstown, Ardoyne and 
Armagh are embarked on this course… It will lay the base for the emergence of a 
new socialist society to replace the capitalist institutions North and South.’748   
The New Lodge area in north Belfast provided an apt example, a working 
class estate that had been the scene of much conflict since the onset of the 
troubles. After the establishment of the ‘New Lodge Road Resistance Council’— 
through which residents had elected representative committees, — the PD 
claimed that this body would represent 20,000 people and described the 
functions of the council as being akin to deciding ‘issues of policy in relation to 
the complete self government of the area’. The emergence of these types of 
organisation meant that,  
A stage has been reached where the anti-Unionists have completely 
broken from Unionist and British government institutions. Vast areas 
of the North respect no traditional forms of government and feel the 
need for organisation in each area. Democracy has been put into the 
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hands of the people […] and the people are electing their own leaders 
and forcing their own democratic organisations.749   
Therefore, ‘It is the duty of revolutionary socialists to foster and develop these 
potential soviets, to give them political direction, and to complete their 
organisation. Each area must be coordinated on a national level and a democratic 
parliament of the streets built up.’750 Fergus O’Hare recalls activity in west 
Belfast, where by 1972 the PD had an Andersonstown branch:  
I can remember us organising what we called at the time a parliament 
of the streets and actually organising an election…It just got off the 
ground, but it didn’t fly for very long… I can remember that being 
organised as an election campaign throughout certainly the 
Andersonstown… it was mostly that area that I was involved in, and 
you had polling booths in people’s garages and in people’s kitchens 
and people nominated who they waited to stand and people voted for 
them… people participated in them… It didn’t last for very long… 
but again it was that idea of self-organisation…bring revolutionary or 
progressive ideas, I mean it was almost the idea of Soviets or 
something to get people organised.751  
The reference to ‘Soviets’ was not simple rhetoric. It reflected how the PD 
viewed the upsurge in community activism, civil disobedience and the no-go 
areas more generally as akin to revolutionary centres of power that could provide 
alternative societal structures; although it should be recognised that the situation 
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of ‘Dual Power’ that was arising in the North owed more to the wider European 
experience of struggle in the 1970s than it did to the traditional method of 
‘Soviets’, or popular workers’ councils. The term ‘Soviet’ originated in the 
development of workers’ councils during the Russian Revolution, representing 
the self-organisation of workers at the point of production and distribution and 
forming the basis of revolutionary working class power in the early 20th Century. 
Leon Trotsky, leader of the first Soviet in 1905, described the development of 
such organs:  
Prior to the Soviet we find among the industrial workers a multitude 
of revolutionary organizations.... But these were organizations within 
the proletariat, and their immediate aim was to achieve influence 
over the masses. The Soviet was, from the start, the organization of 
the proletariat, and its aim was the struggle for revolutionary 
power.752  
Thus a workers’ council applied methods of struggle that were determined by the 
nature of the working class, ‘its role in production, its vast numbers, its social 
homogeneity’ representing ‘the organized expression of the class will of the 
proletariat’753. Historically, the principal method of struggle was the general 
strike and this contained the potential to transform the economic struggle of 
workers into a political contest for state power. A global phenomenon when 
working class self-activity reached a highpoint, they emerged, for example, in 
Germany in 1918, Italy 1919-1920 and more recently in Iran, in 1978-1979. 
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Ireland itself was not immune to workers’ councils with Soviets emerging during 
the revolutionary period of 1920-1921.754  
An examination of the struggle in the North in the early 1970s testifies 
that what was emerging throughout the liberated nationalist areas were not 
organisations ‘of the proletariat’ in the sense outlined above. The form of 
struggle that was taking place in the North in 1972 was not based entirely on 
working class strength, nor was it situated at the point of production and 
distribution, i.e. workplaces, where workers held economic and material power— 
and thus had the ability to disrupt capitalist social relations. Instead, the no-go 
areas were based upon militant community mobilisation and various forms of 
civil disobedience that contained cross class contradictions, uniting working 
class militants with other elements in the nationalist community. Indeed, the no-
go areas can be seen to have reflected the struggles that were developing across 
Europe since the upsurge of 1968, with the development of ‘red bases’, 
‘vanguards’ and ‘autonomous zones’ bearing some resemblance to what was 
happening in the North of Ireland.755  
Therefore, it could be argued that the PD overestimated the potential of 
these forms of struggle as capable of overthrowing the existing social order. For 
example, although the Unfree Citizen described the New Lodge Civil Resistance 
Committee as one that would ‘decide issues of policy in relation to the complete 
self governance of the area’, in reality, the role of the committee would be 
carrying out such activity as tidying up estates, repairing damages to houses, 
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curbing vandalism and fixing street lighting.756 These centres of ‘Dual Power’ 
reflected how the initially defensive struggle to protect areas had been 
transformed into an offensive struggle against the British state, as whole areas of 
the Catholic community opted out of the state. Nevertheless, the situation threw 
up all sorts of contradictions and possibilities for alternative forms of struggle 
aside from the armed campaign of republicanism.  
By late 1972 then, the PD displayed a clear orientation toward the 
militancy of the Catholic community, which was a shift away from their previous 
strategy of uniting Protestant and Catholic workers. However, this should not be 
understood as a straightforward regression into republican politics, it was first 
and foremost a reflection of how difficult it had been to build working class unity 
inside the Northern state. It also reflected a trend across the global new left, 
which orientated toward the most militant aspects of social movements and 
communal struggle.  
In European terms the PD was politically close to the Italian socialist 
group Lotta Continua (‘Continuous Struggle’), who sprung from similar roots to 
the PD and were described by the Unfree Citizen as ‘akin to the PD in 
philosophy and action’757. The connections between the PD and Lotta Continua 
were tentative but important. They published joint literature and coordinated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
756 Unfree Citizen, No 38, 21 April 1972. 
757 Unfree Citizen, No 37, 14 April 1972. Initially a mass student movement that 
emerged in universities in 1968 Lotta Continua radicalized into an autonomous 
socialist group that attempted to build within the Italian working class. In time, 
sections of the Italian movement would experiment with the politics of armed 
struggle as a strategy for overthrowing the Italian state. Lotta Continua also 
produced a pamphlet to coincide with Kelly’s visit, titled Ireland the Vietnam of 
Europe, and a record of Irish protest songs. 
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speaking tours across Ireland and Italy.758 In April 1972 PD member and former 
internee Dermot Kelly reported on one such tour, which was pitched as an 
opportunity to strengthen the links between Irish and Italian revolutionaries.759 
Kelly spoke at large events, reportedly 2,000 people in Turin, 3,000 in Milan and 
a rally of 7,000 in Rome and he described a keen interest on the rent and rates 
strike and the armed struggle.760 Some weeks later the PD reciprocated when a 
three-man delegation of Lotta Continua visited Ireland, touring the country and 
speaking at various venues.761 The struggle in the North had some effect on the 
PD’s Italian counterparts, indeed, ‘At one stage, leaders of Lotta Continua talked 
about setting up ‘red bases’ in the cities, and were impressed with the ‘Northern 
Irish’ model.’762 Other sources recall that the Italian Left group Autonomia 
Operaia became interested in the struggle of ghetto riots being waged by the 
nationalist community.763  
Yet if the Italian revolutionary left was reaching a peak in 1972, proving 
capable of influencing what possibly compromised the most combative working 
class in Europe, the Northern Irish left had moved swiftly to the sidelines amidst 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
758 Italian activist and photographer Fulvio Grimaldi was present in Derry on 
Bloody Sunday where he captured the scenes for the world to see on his camera. 
PD and Lotta Continua first published his images in a joint pamphlet, Blood in 
the Street (1972).    
759 Unfree Citizen, No 48, Friday 30 June 1972.  
760 Kelly stated: ‘I concentrated on political developments, especially on the 
emergence of street committees, their functions and objectives’ Unfree Citizen, 
No 37, 14 April 1972.  
761 Unfree Citizen No 48, Friday 30 June 1972. The tour included the showing of 
the film ‘12th December’ directed by Pier Paolo Pasolini and the singing of both 
Italian and Irish revolutionary songs. Meetings were held in west and north 
Belfast, in Portadown and at Queen’s University.  
762 Sidney Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder: protest and politics in Italy 1965-
1975 (Oxford, Clarendon, 1989), p. 303. 
763 Lorenzo Bosi, Truly days of hope and anger, p. 192.  
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a mounting conflict.764 By 1972 the PD’s social weight and influence was so 
minimal that its arguments surrounding the potential to form alternative 
structures of power against the Northern state were becoming increasingly 
irrelevant to the anti-imperialist struggle being waged by the republican 
movement. Whatever the validity of building a political movement outside of the 
republican armed campaign, the PD was not in a position to put its ideas into 















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
764 As Paul Ginsborg explains, ‘The Italian revolutionary groups, taken together, 
were the largest new left in Europe. Throughout the period 1968-1976, they 
mobilised many thousands of militants in unceasing and exhausting activity, with 
the aim of creating a widespread anti-capitalist and revolutionary consciousness 
among the Italian working class.’ A History of Contemporary Italy, Society and 
Politics, 1943-1988 (London, Penguin Books 1990), p. 313.  
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6.7. Conclusion: Motorman and the fall of Stormont 
The period of ‘Dual Power’ came to an end in mid 1972 after the British 
government moved to dismantle the ‘no go’ areas. The widespread opposition to 
the Unionist state was an intolerable situation for the British government, who, at 
first, took part in talks with the republican movement in an effort to reach a 
solution to the crisis. On 20 June a meeting took place between representatives of 
the PIRA and officials from William Whitelaw’s office. It led to more considered 
talks with the British government on 7 July. Considering the nature of the 
republican struggle, such clandestine talks were inevitable, but for the PD the 
way in which the IRA had carried out the negotiations flew in the face of the 
democracy of the movement. The PD continually criticised the Provisional 
leadership for negotiating without consent or consultation with the civil 
disobedience movement.765 Yet such criticism only served to illustrate the 
illusions that the PD had in the military struggle of the IRA, which never sought 
any form of democratic mandate for its actions.    
The truce broke down two days after the talks, during a dispute over 
housing in west Belfast. It ushered in a new wave of violence with the most 
notorious incident occurring when up to twenty PIRA bombs exploded in Belfast 
on 21 July. Nine people were killed and over 130 were injured in the explosions. 
Such actions put those in the civil resistance movement who supported the 
Provisionals in a difficult position. John Gray recalls how ‘Bloody Friday’ was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
765 The PD held the truce of 1972 as indicative of how the PIRA waged an elitist 
struggle, ‘…when the IRA called a truce in June 1972 they didn’t consult the 
NRM or even inform it… we don’t query the IRA’s right to call a truce, but this 
episode showed a total lack of understanding by the Provos of what commitment 
to a united front involved…’ Unfree Citizen, Vol 6 No 4, January 1977.  
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detrimental to the civil resistance movement and the cause of socialism more 
generally. He remembers that support for the AIL in England considerably 
decreased, citing first the Aldershot bombings and then the Bloody Friday 
killings as key turning points. For Gray, Bloody Friday in particular meant that 
he could no longer remain in an organisation that supported the Provisional 
campaign.766 Gray’s break with the armed campaign was not typical of the 
Belfast base of the PD, who although responding critically to the Provisionals, 
refused to join in with the ‘chorus of unconditional condemnation’ being 
forwarded by the establishment. Instead, the Unfree Citizen cited its already 
established opposition to attacks that were certain to endanger civilian life, but it 
went on to argue that the armed campaign must continue because efforts at 
reaching a truce had been proven futile. What was needed was a more selective 
military campaign, supported by a political movement:  
To the Provo volunteers we say… Redirect your campaign to places 
where civilians cannot be harmed… combine political and military 
activities… A strong political campaign backed up by selective 
military action will restore support for the resistance campaign’s 
demands…767  
Even if the PIRA were to heed such advice— something that was looking both 
unrealistic and unlikely as the armed campaign continued— the entire basis of 
the civil resistance movement being championed by the PD was to be dealt a 
serious blow by the end of that month, when the British military launched its 
biggest operation since the Suez crisis of 1956; 12,000 troops supported by tanks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
766 Interview with John Gray, Belfast, 21/04/2015.  
767 Unfree Citizen, Vol 1 No 51, 31 July 1972. 
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and bulldozers descended onto the no-go areas across the north dismantling 
barricades and putting an end to the brief period of liberated areas. Operation 
Motorman ended the most heightened period of mass resistance to the Unionist 
state, and overnight anti-Unionist areas turned into heavily militarised zones. The 
PD continued to put forward a strategy based upon political protest and 
mobilisation at all cost, but conditions were no longer conducive to mass 
mobilisation. The Unfree Citizen reported a meeting against military occupation 
outside Casement Park on 2 August; attempts to storm the gates were met with 
rubber bullets.768              
In this context the PD was reduced to essentially supporting the 
Provisionals on a propaganda basis and faced with such serious levels of 
repression many of the most militant activists saw the need to respond with arms 
and republican organisations, particularly the Provisionals, became a much more 
attractive option. The urge to hit back militarily through armed action was 
widespread across a generation of militant Catholics throughout the North. It was 
also evident among the small ranks of the PD, and activists recall that some 
members left the PD and entered the republican movement. For example, Gerry 
O’Hare, a PD member from a working class background who had been 
imprisoned in the Long Kesh, cited internment as a major moment in convincing 
him that it was necessary to launch an armed struggle against the state and left 
the PD to join the ranks of the Provisionals.769  
The phase of resistance that met the Unionist government’s policy of 
internment after August 1971 saw the PD play a significant role in reigniting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
768 Unfree Citizen, Vol 2, No1, 14 August 1972.  
769 Interview with Gerry O’Hare, Belfast, 05/10/2015.  
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street protests and political radicalisation. This happened in a wider context of 
republican struggle against the military. Although the PD was a small 
organisation, it played a notable role in events while shifting to supporting the 
republican armed struggle. Considering the conclusions that the PD had drawn 
on the need to smash the Stormont state, and the level of violence that had 
engulfed Northern Ireland by 1972, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
organisation was reduced to an auxiliary role in supporting the Provisional IRA. 
It was the maintenance of this type of position and the political, ideological and 
theoretical conclusions that were drawn in the aftermath of the phase of struggle 
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Chapter 7: The long decline of the PD 
7.1. Introduction 
The years following 1972 were not favourable to the Irish left and the PD was 
reduced to a small current of the broader anti-imperialist movement. Although 
the organisation continued a serious level of activity for a decade or more, it was 
rarely able to influence events. Nevertheless the PD continued to make an 
important political and ideological contribution to the late 1970 and early 1980s. 
This chapter will draw out this process, charting the main tenets of PD activity 
while taking a longer look at the demise of the organisation.   
By late 1972 the different phases of mass resistance to the Northern state, 
encompassing both the early phase of the civil rights movement and the civil 
disobedience campaign that erupted after internment, had waned and been 
superseded by armed struggle. The rise of the Provisionals saw an organised 
force come to the forefront of working class politics in Catholic areas and the 
PD’s pursuit of a militant struggle against the state saw them align in support of 
the republican campaign. The PD had already articulated its own version of 
popular struggle for the Catholic masses when it championed a strategy based 
upon ‘Dual Power’, and their ideological outlook was a mix between the 
revolutionary enthusiasm that was symptomatic of the European-wide revolt 
since 1968, and Ireland’s own revolutionary socialist tradition that claimed its 
lineage back to James Connolly.  
 This transition was directly informed by the experience of the civil rights 
campaign and it brought about a changing view on how socialist politics could 
develop. The PD had initially argued that Protestant workers were a crucial 
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component in the fight for socialism in Ireland, yet the organisation would 
change its perspective. This was chiefly a result of the circumstances that were 
developing at fast pace from 1972 onward— with the intense loyalist backlash 
and rise of loyalist paramilitarism. But it was also a product of the type of 
Marxism that informed the PD, most coherently expressed in the theoretical 
positions developed by Michael Farrell. The PD conviction that the centrality of 
working class struggle was the necessary driving force for socialist change had 
been fused amidst upsurges of activism since 1968, but the organisation had 
failed to build serious roots in working class areas capable of shaping the fight 
against the Northern state. As the struggle against repression intensified, the PD 
quickly shifted toward supporting the most consistent fighters of the northern 
state. Kieran Allen has explained the transition:  
the revolutionaries in People’s Democracy influenced by the 
spontaneist politics of 1968 believed that it was sufficient to be the 
militants of the movement. They pushed for more confrontation with 
the police, more marches, more sit-downs etc, but there was no real 
attempt to argue any particular strategy. At the start of the movement, 
therefore, PD was among those who argued most vehemently that 
partition was not the issue and that the struggle was to unite Catholic 
and Protestant workers against the Tories, North and South. 
However, when the movement itself turned into a fight against the 
British Army and the Northern state, PD became uncritical 
supporters of the Provos, writing off the Protestant working class as 
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semi fascist and seeing the Catholic ghettos of the North as the 
vanguard for the Irish revolution.’770 
This chapter attempts to explain these developments; it shows how the inability 
to win Protestant workers away from Unionist ideology was seen as a product of 
the economic and material relations of the ‘Orange State’, which viewed 
Protestant workers as a privileged caste wedded to the sectarian institutions of 
the state. Such a perspective was at its most convincing in the mid-1970s, when 
the loyalist movement was at its height and was capable of drawing significant 
levels of support from Protestant workers. In this context the PD drifted into 
support for militarism and temporarily characterising the loyalist backlash as 
representing a threat of ‘Orange Fascism’. This chapter begins by analysing the 
Marxism of the PD and its approach toward loyalism and British imperialism in 
Ireland.  
Once again changing the terms of the question, the PD now began to 
argue that working class unity was not possible until the structures of the state 
were dismantled and independence from Britain was achieved. Therefore, the PD 
prioritised the struggle to overthrow the state, and worked within the broader 
anti-imperialist movement. In this regard the PD was capable of playing a 
significant role — at a time when the republican movement was primarily 
focused on the military struggle as opposed to social and political mobilisation— 
and can be said to have punched above its weight in this sense. PD activists were 
among the first to stress the importance of building mass campaigns around the 
issue of the prison struggle in the North, and through organisations such as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
770 Kieran Allen, Socialists, Republicanism and the Armed Struggle, Socialist 
Workers Movement pamphlet (Dublin, Bookmarks, 1991), p. 6.  
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NRM and the Political Hostages Release Committee (PHRC), they launched the 
first serious initiatives in this direction. The Relatives Action Committees and 
the Smash H Block/Armagh campaign, the latter of which saw notable PD 
involvement from its inception, would spearhead the prison campaign during a 
period that saw the revitalisation of mass struggle in the North and the 
emergence of a new popular movement.   
This chapter shows how the ideas and activity deployed at different times 
from the PD influenced sections of the republican movement, who were 
emerging from the Northern struggle. It navigates these developments and argues 
that although the PD played a marginal role in Irish politics, it was nonetheless 
important in developing the broader anti-imperialist political tradition. It was 
also a significant player in instigating moments of activism that influenced and 
resonated with the republican project in Ireland. However, the emergence of 
mass social and political agitation around the prison issue during the hunger 
strikes of 1980-1981 also served as a contradictory development for the 
organisation.  
If the pre-hunger strike period was one in which the republican 
movement neglected political mobilisation, the period during and after the 
hunger strikes was one in which a new generation of activists emerged at the 
leadership of the Provisional movement, and began to reshape the outlook and 
activity of modern Irish republicanism in a political direction. These 
developments exposed the limitations of the politics espoused by the PD, as the 
republican movement occupied the space that the PD held throughout much of 
the 1970s, leading to a crisis of identity for the small organisation. This chapter 
shows how the decline of the PD was due to the political and theoretical 
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development of the organisation over a long period, which saw the new left that 
emerged in 1968 sacrifice the development of an independent Marxist tradition 
to what was essentially a republican position toward the struggle for national 
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7.2. The Orange State 
In the aftermath of the civil rights struggle the PD engaged in a process of 
analysis and attempted to explain the crisis that had erupted in the North. The 
ideological development of the PD is best expressed in the writings of Michael 
Farrell, particularly in his well-known book Northern Ireland: The Orange State, 
but while this work was not published until 1976, his analysis is found in PD 
publications throughout the mid-1970s.771  
Farrell was perhaps the primary individual who applied a Marxist method 
to the experience and demise of the civil rights movement from 1968-1972. The 
Orange State provided the first in-depth history of Northern Ireland; with a fluid 
and erudite style of writing that was typical of its author, it became a widely read 
cornerstone text of Irish historiography, even among those who would disagree 
with its arguments.772 A central thesis advanced by Farrell was that because the 
Unionist state functioned on the basis of Protestant supremacy— through 
handing out marginal privileges to the majority community, thus ensuring its 
allegiance to Unionism— working class unity inside the Northern state had been 
unable to develop. When moments of working class struggle did emerge, Farrell 
contended that the sectarian basis of the state was able to obstruct its 
development. Arguing that it was the relationship between the Protestant 
community and the Northern state that had prevented challenges to the Unionist 
monolith, Farrell cast the Protestant working class as a labour aristocracy, whose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
771 Farrell, The Orange State.  
772 The best academic works that summarize literature surrounding the troubles 
have recognized the importance of this book, see, John Whyte, Interpreting 
Northern Ireland, pp. 179-181. Also see, McGarry and O’Leary, Explaining 
Northern Ireland, p. 8.    
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main community of interest presumably lay not in its relationship with its 
Catholic counterparts, but with the employing classes.773  
Efforts to reform the state had stoked a powerful sectarian backlash, 
unifying Protestant workers behind the most reactionary loyalist forces wanting a 
return to the old style Stormont rule. The development of this theoretical position 
meant the PD now contested that the pursuit of working class unity within the 
Northern state was not possible. Instead, socialists should prioritise the struggle 
to ‘Smash Stormont’; end partition and afterward a process of working class 
unity could develop.   
This would see the PD align more closely with the republican movement, 
and the line of thinking is evident throughout the publications of the PD from 
1972 onward. In October 1972 the Unfree Citizen forwarded a short-term 
solution to the crisis, which called for an end to internment, withdrawal of 
troops, and ‘the dissolution of the six county and twenty-six county states and the 
establishment of an all Ireland Republic’.774 The PD now essentially argued that 
the national question needed resolving before class politics could actualize. 
While circumstances were against the development of working class unity in 
1972, the theoretical outlook that underpinned such demands essentially tailed 
the republican call to first end partition as a precondition to launching a struggle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
773 ‘Most confusion of all has arisen over the relations between Protestant and 
Catholic workers in Northern Ireland, and the utter failure of the Labour 
movement there—even in so heavily industralised a city as Belfast. This failure 
can only be understood against the background of religious discrimination in 
employment, which divided the working class. Giving the Protestant a small but 
real advantage, and creating a Protestant ‘aristocracy of labour’.’ Farrell, The 
Orange State, ‘Preface’ (1976).  
774 Unfree Citizen, Vol 2 No 6, 2 October 1972.  
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for a social reorganisation of society. This strategy, in one form or another, 
essentially remained the position of the PD throughout the rest of its existence.  
It was a marked shift. Indeed, it is notable that during the 1968-1970 
period the PD were among the most avid champions of Protestant and Catholic 
unity as a means to challenge the Unionist state. Why then did the PD shift 
toward a political perspective that essentially dismissed Protestant working class 
agency in the pursuit of socialist politics? The answer to this question lies in 
understanding the connection between the absence of any socialist challenge to 
sectarian politics and the extent of the loyalist backlash against reform of the 
Northern Ireland state, both of which greatly informed the Marxism developed 
by the PD.  
The wider context in the early 1970s was one of shrinking horizons for 
class politics. 1972 saw an intense shift to the right among the Protestant 
community as loyalist opposition escalated and attempted to reassert Protestant 
majority rule against any form of power sharing with nationalists. The formation 
of the Vanguard movement775 signalled how the political right of Unionism was 
capable of mobilising significant sections of the Protestant working class around 
demands that sought a return to old style Stormont rule and repression. In 
response to this much of the left, and indeed the republican movement, viewed 
the rise of loyalist militancy as an expression of working class politics that held 
some progressive features. Against this trend, the PD saw the rise of loyalism as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
775 ‘Ulster Vanguard’ was a militant loyalist movement led by William Craig that 
became a political party. It emerged from a split in the Unionist Party and was 
closely affiliated with loyalist paramilitaries.  
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an altogether reactionary political force, which illustrated how pro-imperialist the 
Protestant community had become.776  
The re-emergence of loyalism took on a militarist tone, involving street 
protest with UDA members in paramilitary regalia, and recruitment to such 
organisations soared. By the mid-1970s the UDA may have had up to 30,000 
members, and close connections existed between loyalist paramilitaries and 
Vanguard.777 At one infamous rally William Craig told an 80,000 strong crowd,  
We must build up a dossier of the men and women who are a menace 
to this country… because if and when the politicians fail us, it may 
be our job to liquidate the enemy.778  
One journalist who covered the period summarised perceptions among the 
minority community; ‘they represented, with all their paramilitary trappings and 
the presence of the UDA, a menacing display reminiscent of Hitler’s Nuremburg 
rallies.’779 The rise of Vanguard coincided with an escalation of sectarian 
murders and although these were widespread across both sides of the sectarian 
divide, the evidence suggests that loyalist killings—carried out by both the UDA 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
776 Farrell would later comment on the nature of loyalist paramilitaries: ‘It is 
sometimes argued that the UDA and UVF are a sort of Protestant working-class 
equivalent of the Provisional IRA and that they are potential allies against the 
'Establishment'. The parallel is based on the crudest superficialities e.g. their 
lower-class membership, usually lumpen proletarian or semi-criminal in the case 
of the Loyalists…. The UDA and UVF are consciously pro-imperialist and boast 
of their members' ex-service records in other outposts in the Empire and both 
have had connections with the National Front. They represent the most 
reactionary and sectarian elements in the Protestant population and there is no 
basis whatsoever for co-operation between them and anti-imperialist 
organisations.’ Farrell, ‘Northern Ireland- an anti imperialist struggle’, Socialist 
Register Vol 14 (1977), p. 77.  
777 Peter Taylor, Loyalists (London, Bloomsbury, 2000), p. 115.  
778 Ibid, p. 96.  
779 Ibid.  
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and the UVF— were notable for being frequently indiscriminate. By the end of 
1972 there had been 121 murders that were defined as assassinations, and two-
thirds of these were carried out by what those in the anti-imperialist movement 
termed ‘loyalist death squads’.780 From 1972-1976 the average number of 
killings in Northern Ireland ran at just over 300 per year, for example, in 1975 
loyalists killed 121 people and the vast majority were innocent Catholic 
civilians.781 Fergus O’Hare recalls the ‘horrendous, unspoken scenario’ of 
innocent Catholics being picked off and killed on purely sectarian grounds, 
which at the time, he argues, were insufficiently acknowledged in the media.782  
The PD viewed the loyalist backlash as a brutal and reactionary phase 
that was rooted in the social and economic crisis of the Northern state. The 
loyalist project was based around uniting Protestant workers with middle and 
upper class elements of Unionism that sought a restoration or Orange power; it 
combined street mobilisation and violence with a regressive political programme. 
Using a perspective that borrowed from the writings of Trotsky, the PD 
described this as a threat of  ‘Orange Fascism’.783 They argued that the historic 
decline of Orange capital in the North— resulting in a decaying Ulster 
bourgeoisie— had created precarious and frightened sections of lower class 
Protestant workers, generating an emerging class alliance that had much to lose if 
changes occurred in the Northern state, hence the appeal of militant loyalism.784 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
780 Ibid, p. 113.  
781 Ibid, p. 143 and p. 157.  
782 Interview with Fergus O’Hare, Belfast, 08/06/2015.  
783 See, Leon Trotsky, Fascism, what it is and how to fight it (Pathfinder press, 
1996).  
784 As the PD newspaper warned: ‘We are now seeing the irrational fears and 
hatreds spawned by Orangeism being given violent expression… The spectre of 
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The loyalist movement offered a solution to the social and economic grievances 
of Protestant workers, by forwarding demands that sought a restoration of 
Unionist rule— and a vision of Protestant economic and social dominance 
associated with the pre-1968 period— through forceful means.  
Although militant loyalism was reaching its peak in this period, the PD 
vastly miscalculated its relationship to British imperialism and therefore its 
potential to seize control of the Northern state. The PD argued that the 
restoration of the Orange state was being increasingly favoured as an option by 
the British establishment, and the period between the introduction of direct rule 
in 1972 until the collapse of the first attempt at power sharing in 1974 was seen 
to illustrate this. In fact, a central problem that would continually face loyalism 
in the 1970s was that— unlike the rise of loyalism in the 1912 period during the 
Ulster Covenant— its contemporary political project conflicted with the 
changing interests of British imperialism and capitalism in Ireland.  
An assessment of the British state’s role in the Northern conflict is crucial 
here; from the collapse of Stormont onward the British attempted to deal with the 
crisis by separating the militant republican campaign and the street movement 
from the political moderates of the SDLP. Thus, the British government worked 
hard to negotiate a settlement that could produce a power sharing arrangement 
between Unionists and nationalists. The strategy reached its height with the 
Sunningdale Agreement, which was implemented from late 1973 and included a 
power-sharing executive alongside a ‘Council of Ireland’, with involvement from 
the southern government. Sunningdale backfired severely and served to provoke 
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substantial resistance within hard-line unionism, leading to the formation of the 
Ulster Workers Council (UWC) and mass Protestant stoppages in workplaces, 
spurred on by paramilitary violence and intimidation, which brought the British 
strategy to its knees. The UWC, which was in many ways a continuation of the 
LAW, relied on support from Vanguard, various Unionist leaders and loyalist 
paramilitaries. While the episode has been correctly described as a ‘lockout’, as 
opposed to a strike, because of the way that loyalists enforced the shut-down, the 
UWC did enjoy mass support and created a heightened climate of fear and 
intimidation in which doomsday scenarios were predicted by some in the 
nationalist community.785  
When the power-sharing executive collapsed, the main lesson drawn by 
the PD was that the British were preparing to hand over power to an ascendant 
loyalist movement, and the wider economic context was seen to confirm this. 
Declining British interest in Ireland, the context of recession during 1973-1975, 
which saw the flight of multi-national capital including various factory closures 
in the North, alongside the extent to which the British military had colluded and 
acquiesced with loyalist opposition to reform, all contributed to a perspective 
that viewed the British state as preparing to withdraw from the North and 
handover power to the most sectarian components of Unionism, thereby allowing 
a much more openly repressive and potentially ‘Orange Fascist’ state to exist. By 
1976 Farrell would conclude his influential history of the Northern State with a 
stark warning toward this end:  
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Britain, once the master in the Northern State, is fast becoming the 
servant of the Ulster Loyalists. Orangeism, once the mere tool of the 
Unionist bourgeoisie, has become the dominant force in Northern 
politics. The loyalists are intent on restoring the Orange system and 
returning to the pre-1968 set-up. They want even greater powers than 
the old Stormont had.786  
For Farrell the situation was devastatingly simple, ‘…between, on the one hand, 
a semi-fascist Orange statelet in the North matched by a pro-imperialist police 
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7.3. Militarism 
Any theory that warned of a semi-fascist loyalist takeover of the North would 
naturally dictate a different form of activism, which ought to be considered 
against the wider context of armed struggle in this period. From 1972 to 1976 the 
Provisional republican movement launched a sustained offensive during what 
Allen has described as a phase of ‘misplaced military optimism and near 
defeat’788. The Provisionals strongly banked on the military capacity of the IRA 
as being capable of overthrowing the Northern state and waged an aggressive 
campaign of bombing and shooting their way to the negotiating table. Among the 
republican leadership there existed a real belief that the heightened military 
campaign was proving to be successful, and that the British government was 
preparing for withdrawal— this line of thinking inside the Provisional movement 
contributed to a ceasefire in 1976, an engagement that would come back to haunt 
those who orchestrated it.   
The PD initially supported this phase of armed struggle in a forthright 
manner. Yet while the Unfree Citizen parroted republican sloganeering, for 
example, by declaring that 1972 would be the ‘Year of Liberty’789, the 
organisation had clearly developed a different and unique analysis surrounding 
the threat of loyalism and the prospects for a British withdrawal. The PD 
challenged the optimism espoused by the Provisionals and instead warned that 
the loyalist movement was preparing for a takeover of power, one that would be 
aided and abetted by British imperialism. The conclusion they drew was that it 
was now necessary to prepare for a situation that would potentially wreak havoc 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
788 Allen, 1916, p. 145.  
789 Unfree Citizen, No 24, 7 January 1972. 
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on the minority community. With the memory of August 1969 still vivid, the 
increase in state repression and the build up of paramilitary violence in the 
proceeding years, the PD now saw defence of Catholic areas as paramount.  
In late 1973 PD members went about setting up their own armed-wing to 
be utilised in the event of a loyalist takeover. First discussed and established in 
1973, the ‘Revolutionary Citizens Army’ (RCA) emerged primarily as a 
defensive mechanism in order to resist the possibility of a mass resurgence of 
attacks against the Catholic community. Its existence was made public by the 
Unfree Citizen in December 1974, which described it as ‘clearly and 
unequivocally the military wing of the PD.’790 The paper stated its raison d’être,  
We have decided to make our existence known to the people at this 
time because of the rapidly deteriorating situation in the six counties 
where the daily collaboration between the British imperialist forces 
and loyalist private armies and murder gangs points to the imminent 
danger of a British backed loyalist takeover and the establishment of 
an Orange Fascist state.791  
The RCA was a clandestine organisation whose volunteers did not reveal their 
identity or membership. It was led by an Army Council, but the military 
leadership was subordinate to the overall leadership of the Central Committee of 
the PD.792 By prioritising the Party over the military wing the PD had attempted 
to distance its armed initiative from the republican tradition, although its clear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
790 Letter to the CC from comrades Farrell, Brown and O’Hare, People’s 
Democracy file, NIPC.   
791 Unfree Citizen, Vol 4 No 10, 9 December 1974.  
792  History of the People’s Democracy (undated internal Party document), 
People’s Democracy file, NIPC.  
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intention was to work alongside republicans for defensive purposes. As the 
Unfree Citizen explained: 
We are prepared to co-operate with all other anti-imperialist forces in 
this task and we urge the Provisional and Official IRA particularly to 
join in making preparations for united defence and resistance in the 
extremely grave situation that now faces us.793  
The reality, however, was that the PD, and therefore also the RCA, was such a 
small organisation by this point that it barely mattered in the wider scheme of 
things. One source claimed that the RCA involved around twenty to thirty 
volunteers at its height.794 This was reflected in the activity that was carried out. 
In 1975 the Unfree Citizen would reveal that ‘limited military actions’795 were 
being waged by the RCA and the evidence suggests that these included arms 
training and some bank robberies that were executed in order to raise funds for 
PD activity.796 PD members paid a price for this type of activity; in February 
1975 the Unfree Citizen reported that activist Seamus Ruddy was sentenced to 
three years in prison for possession of a revolver.797 Ruddy later left the PD 
joining the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP), and becoming the source of 
much controversy and anguish when he was killed and his body was disappeared 
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794 Interview with anonymous PD member, and member of the RCA.  
795 Unfree Citizen, Vol 4 No 28, 12 May 1975.  
796 Interview with anonymous PD member, and member of the RCA.  
797 Unfree Citizen, Vol 4 No 16, 10 February 1975.  
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in Paris in 1985. Thirty-two years later Ruddy’s remains were found in a forest in 
northern France.798   
The fact that a small cortège of PD activists such as Ruddy would later 
decamp and join the IRSP further illustrates the pull of militarism. Formed in late 
1974 and initially welcomed by the PD as a shift toward socialist republicanism, 
the IRSP eventually joined a long list of organisations on the Irish left that 
attempted to unite the traditions of republicanism and socialism, only to fall 
behind the logic of a brutal militarist strategy propagated by its armed wing, the 
INLA.799 
The emergence of the IRSP indicated a shift within Irish republicanism 
that could potentially compliment the project the PD had embarked on over the 
preceding years. The IRSP/INLA was essentially born from frustration within the 
ranks of the Official movement, where a divide developed between those who 
supported the leadership’s strategy– which ostensibly rejected armed actions, 
parked the national question, and embraced the stages theory of democratisation 
of the Northern state– and those who sought to wage an armed campaign against 
partition and British occupation. The latter were grouped around the capable 
figure of Seamus Costello, who subsequently led a split from the Official 
republican movement and brought the IRSP/INLA into existence. As McDonald 
and Holland note, Costello and his comrades essentially ‘took the view that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
798 The murder and disappearance of Seamus Ruddy was one of many 
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report see, Belfast Telegraph, 13 May 2017, available online, 
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/life/features/our-32-years-of-torment-
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799 For the para-military history of this grouping see Henry McDonald and Jack 
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national question and the social question were not to be approached in schematic 
stages but had to be fought for at the same time.’800    
The political realignment indicated here is important, as the IRSP initially 
appealed to sections of the radical left, including the PD. The most prominent left 
figure associated with the organisation was Bernadette McAliskey, who joined 
the first IRSP leadership. McAliskey’s time in the IRSP did not last long, 
however, as the direction of the organisation would from the offset be one of 
militarism devoid of any real political strategy, something clearly documented in 
its later history. The extent to which militarism dictated the terms of play for the 
IRSP was evident early in its existence, with a brutal feud breaking out between 
the INLA and the Officials in Belfast.801 Consequently, the IRSP’s form of 
socialism was one primarily based upon rhetoric and lacking a serious 
engagement with Marxist ideas. Responding to one journalist in the mid 1970s 
the organisation made clear that they were not out to adopt any ‘alien and 
mechanical formulas’, such as the theories of Lenin or Trotsky into the struggle 
against imperialism in Ireland.802  
The PD had commented that the founding of the IRSP was a ‘step 
forward’, particularly in regard to its line on the national question.803 It sent 
observers along to the first IRSP conference, and there was at least some internal 
discussion around the possibility of entering the organisation.804 However, 
beyond this there is little evidence that the organisations worked closely together 
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801 McDonald and Holland, Deadly Divisions, p. 60.  
802 Ibid, p. 45.  
803 Unfree Citizen, Vol 4 No 10, 9 December 1974.  
804 Finn, Challengers to Provisional Republicanism, p. 143.  
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in the immediate years following the formation of the IRSP. While the 
IRSP/INLA very quickly descended into what has been described as a ‘bloody 
baptism’, the PD, on the other hand, developed its armed wing specifically as a 
reaction to political circumstances that were mounting in the mid-1970s as 
members grappled with a heightened threat of loyalist reaction.805 
The turn to militarism was therefore not an attempt at painting 
republicanism red, and can be seen as a fairly unique exercise in paramilitarism 
in Northern Irish terms. Indeed, it was in many ways more consistent with the 
PD’s ability to reflect trends of the global revolutionary left than it was a drift to 
republicanism. In various parts of Europe since the upsurges of 1968, such as 
Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal, leftist currents often found themselves 
supporting armed struggles against different regimes, some of which blurred the 
line between defensive and offensive struggle against state repression and 
dictatorship.806  
Internationalism and the PD’s affinity with world revolutionary currents 
was a clear ideological point of reference and both recollections from former 
activists and publications from the period suggest that paramount to the militarist 
period of the PD was the sense of solidarity with global struggles for national 
liberation and leftist pursuits of armed insurrection. The Brazilian communist 
struggle against military dictatorship was carried under the heading ‘Brazil— 
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same struggle as Ireland’807, and the struggle of the Basque people in Spain was 
widely compared to the Irish case for independence; ‘like the Northern minority, 
the Basques have turned to guerrilla warfare to fight for and achieve their 
aims.’808 Fascist murder gangs in Argentina, who often operated with impunity 
from the state, were compared to loyalist elements in Northern Ireland.809 
Although comparisons with Ireland were often overstated, these were real 
attempts to situate the Irish struggle into an international context. Fergus O’Hare 
explained the outlook: 
I mean we were living in a period whereby, you had the situation in 
central south America, where you had, well obviously the Cuban 
revolution had happened previously to that and was still very much 
being held up as an iconic symbol for young people who were 
striving for a better society. You even had the Maoist tendencies who 
were talking about ‘all power comes from the barrel of a gun’. You 
had then throughout the 70s the situations in you know Central South 
America, El Salvador and Nicaragua and all those places where 
groups were fighting against imperialism on a left platform, you had 
also experiences, which we looked to in Algeria in the 50s and, you 
know, liberation struggles throughout Africa. Again which were seen 
as anti imperialist and progressive in historical terms. I can remember 
during this whole period spending some time in Algeria, and meeting 
a lot of the groups from the different revolutionary organisations 
throughout Africa and being amazed at the commonality of our 
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808 Unfree Citizen, Vol 4 No 20, 10 March 1975. 
809 Unfree Citizen, Vol 4 No 29, 9 June 1975. 
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struggle, listening to them talking about the oppression in their areas 
or in their countries and what they were trying to do to change it and 
so on. So we seen ourselves very much in this context of a world 
progressive movement, a world leftwing movement, a socialist 
movement. Now obviously all those different organisations and 
groups had different political orientations, but they were seen very 
much historically as progressive.810  
Internationalism informed the PD’s drift to militarism, and the effort to implant 
socialist programmes upon armed liberation struggles was a common global 
pattern, with Maoist and Guevarist tendencies giving a distinct revolutionary 
colour to armed insurrectionary movements across the world. Such tendencies 
would of course not develop in any significant way in Ireland— not least because 
of the strength and dominance of the republican tradition— although they were 
at times reflected in some small way through the PD.811    
Against the broader picture of militarism in the North during the 1970s 
the RCA was insignificant, unsurprising then that this is one armed-wing that has 
not featured in the history books. However, it does represent an important 
juncture in the history of the PD. The drift to militarism was the culmination of a 
form of Marxism that the PD had developed since the demise of mass popular 
struggle during the civil rights and civil disobedience movements. It was a 
Marxism that in effect denied any progressive role for Protestant workers as a 
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for revolutionary socialists and republicans in Ireland’. Unfree Citizen, Vol 6 No 
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social force in the pursuit of a socialist Ireland, and went as far as equating the 
most sectarian elements of loyalism with the historic rise of fascism.  
The PD strategy had now become confined to the militancy of the 
minority community, thus tailing the broader anti-imperialist movement in an 
effort to shift the Provisionals to the left. This was largely a result of 
circumstances during the intense loyalist backlash from 1973-1974, but the fear 
and paranoia associated with the prospects of a loyalist takeover of the North, in 
the aftermath of a potential British withdrawal, were also the product of a flawed 
analysis of the Northern state, which reduced the loyalist movement and the role 
of British imperialism in Ireland to a crude class analysis of the Protestant block.  
Incidentally, events in the aftermath of the UWC Strike in 1974 would 
show how flawed the PD perspective was. The perspective of imminent victory 
resulted in near defeat, and far from driving the British military out of Ireland, 
the PIRA were drawn into a lengthy if sporadic truce that formally lasted from 
February 1975 to January 1976, although it involved various acts of violence in 
between. The republican leadership entered the truce with the view that it was 
laying the basis for a British withdrawal. Instead, the British used the ceasefire as 
an opportunity to solidify its position inside the Catholic ghettos, conducting 
important intelligence operations and preparing for a long and protracted fight 
against the PIRA, using methods that aimed to confine the conflict to the North 
through the strategy of ‘Ulsterisation’.812 For example, the reduction of British 
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troops and their replacement with larger numbers of locally recruited units of 
UDR and RUC did not signify that the British Army was gearing up to withdraw. 
Rather, it showed a longer-term commitment from the British to reduce the 
‘Northern Ireland problem’ to an acceptable level of violence, and take British 
soldiers away from the front line of conflict.  
The PD had, therefore, wrongly calculated the strategy of British 
imperialism, yet they continued to warn of a loyalist takeover throughout 1975. 
The political implications for the organisation were dire and the PD shrank into a 
small group that often espoused a politically sectarian position. Years later, 
Michael Farrell would look back on the period:  
People’s Democracy dwindled to a tiny ginger group. Infected with 
the hysteria that prevailed in the ghettos after the collapse of 
Sunningdale, we thought a loyalist takeover was imminent and were 
in an ultra leftist phase of boycotting elections and scorning 
‘reformist’ campaigns.813 
In such a context the PD were disconnected from any wider audience and 
recognition of this would force a rethinking of strategy. The post 1972 period 
were therefore difficult years for PD activists, nevertheless, the organisation had 
kept up activity and arguably would go on to help pioneer what would become 
the next phase of mass mobilisation inside the nationalist community, beginning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
were permitted to live in largely civilian fashion, wearing their own clothes, and 
residing in compounds rather than in cells. Henceforth, those convicted of 
terrorist offences after March 1976 would be treated as ordinary criminals, 
having been tried in the courts. The partiality of those same courts would provide 
a regular bone of contention for years to come.’ Lee, Ireland, 1912-1985, pp. 
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in the late 1970s, which would provide a powerful inrush of support for the anti-
imperialist movement— the campaign for rights for republican prisoners.  We 
now turn to these campaigns, which would precede some of the largest 
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7.4. Mass Action 
Despite the isolation outlined above the PD still made notable efforts at 
instigating political mobilisation in this period. The context of internment and 
resistance meant that by the mid 1970s the North’s jails were filled with 
predominately young working class men, and it was here that many disputes 
were played out which provided focal points for street mobilisation. The 
aftermath of internment saw new battle lines emerging between prisoners and the 
prison authorities. In May 1972 Provisional republican prisoners in Crumlin 
Road Prison, led by Billy McKee, embarked on a hunger strike to demand that 
those prisoners who had been convicted of charges were granted political status 
in a similar fashion to those facing internment. The political climate outside of 
the prisons ‘was not particularly conductive to the building of popular support 
for the prisoner’s demands’, nevertheless, vigils, fasts and pickets were held in 
Catholic areas and these were primarily spearheaded by the NRM with PD 
members driving them forward.814 The most authoritative account of the prison 
movement documented how these broad based protests contrasted to the kind of 
militant displays that the republican movement deployed in support of their 
comrades.815  
Even at this early stage it seems that such actions influenced the thinking 
of some in the leadership of the republican movement. In his memoir, Before the 
Dawn, Gerry Adams recalled his approval of PD action around this time, and 
how their ideas struck a chord with young activists like himself: ‘On the political 
front, the Northern Resistance Movement (NRM) had been formed in October 
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1971 … I spoke at a number of NRM meetings at which PD argued quite 
correctly for wider popular mobilisations, and it struck me that all the potential 
for popular mobilisation was ours, while PD had all the theory.’816  
The mobilisations around the hunger strike had the aura of success when 
McKee and his comrades were granted special category status, but the reality 
was that this decision was made as part of a wider effort to facilitate talks 
between republicans and the British government.817 Everything that followed this 
engagement— including the breakdown of talks and the introduction of 
Operation Motorman— greatly impacted upon the ability of the anti-imperialist 
movement to mobilise. The ending of the no-go areas meant that few 
opportunities for open political mobilisation that challenged the security forces 
existed. But when activity did re-emerge, once again the PD was central to it.   
In June 1973 PD activists Michael Farrell and Tony Canavan were 
arrested for taking part in an illegal demonstration against state repression and 
loyalist killings. The charges related to a demonstration on 10 February, against 
what the PD described as the ‘anti-Catholic murder campaign’ raging in Belfast. 
It was the sixth such PD protest that had been banned in the space of nine 
months, and the organisation would often point out that this greatly contrasted 
with the British Army’s treatment of both the UDA and the Orange Order, who 
held some thirty demonstrations between them in the same period, which were 
tolerated by the military.818 Because Farrell and Canavan were handed sentences 
that were under nine months, they were denied special category status and forced 
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to serve their time in Crumlin Road prison, away from other internees jailed in 
Long Kesh. Faced with the prosecution they claimed their case to be 
straightforward and simple; they had taken part in a political demonstration and 
had received mandatory six-month sentences for political offences. Their trial 
was presided over by Judge W. W. B. Topping, former Unionist MP and one 
time Minister of Home Affairs.819 Their view of the political validity of their 
actions, however, was not shared by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
William Whitelaw, who was adamant in the HOC that ‘Mr. Farrell is not 
activated by political motives’.820  
On 6 July Farrell and Canavan began a hunger strike alongside three 
official republicans in the pursuit of political status. The ordeal was captured in a 
pamphlet produced by the PD, where Farrell gave his account of the hunger 
strike that lasted some 35 days, and in the end saw the two PD activists released 
alongside other prisoners serving similar sentences.821 Gerry Adams later 
reckoned that the episode amounted to the ‘principal anti-unionist political 
success in 1973’822. The PD too declared a victory, and the hunger strike also 
offered an impetus for the beginning of solidarity action. In August the Unfree 
Citizen reported that up to 5,000 people had marched in support of Farrell, 
Canavan and the other prisoners.823 This context saw the PD launch a united 
front initiative that pulled together different factions of the anti-imperialist 
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movement, and others opposed to internment. The Political Hostages Release 
Committee (PHRC) was established on 22 July, although the initial hopes for 
unity proved premature.824 On ‘internment day’ a punch up ensued at a rally in 
the Falls Park in west Belfast, over which factions should address the crowd.825 
PD activist Gerry Ruddy recalls being physically assaulted by Official 
republicans at this demonstration.826 The split in the PHRC resulted in a war of 
words between different factions of the left with division between the PD and 
both the Communist Party and the Official republicans at the centre of it.827 
Nevertheless, the PHRC carried out a range of activity throughout the 
winter of 1973 and spring of 1974, including demonstrations in Armagh, 
Enniskillen, Derry and Newry. On Christmas day 1973 it organised what was 
now an annual march for internees in Belfast.828 This activity is notable as it 
ranks among the first organised efforts to prioritise the prison issue toward a 
strategy of street protest and popular mobilisation, and for some time the PD 
again worked closely with the Provisionals on this committee. One notable 
campaign was the case of the ‘Winchester Hostages’— eight republican 
volunteers convicted of bombings in England, four of whom became a focal 
point for a support campaign when they went on hunger strike to demand their 
repatriation to a prison in the North. All four prisoners eventually won their 
demands and the PHRC organised solidarity actions for the prisoners.829 While 
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there was some limited joint activity between the PD and the Provisionals at this 
time, it soon came to an end. The alliance between the revolutionary socialism of 
the PD and militant republicanism of the Provisionals was always an uneasy one, 
as whilst the PD placed a central emphasis on protest action, the Provisional 
movement viewed such campaigns as a straightforward appendage to the cutting 
edge of armed actions. Events came to a head before the Winchester prisoners 
had won their demands when Sinn Féin pulled out of the PHRC, launching an 
attack on the PD in their newspaper: ‘Sinn Féin will not allow itself to be used to 
support the meandering politics of PD nor will it allow pseudo-revolutionaries to 
bathe in the glory of Ireland’s recent dead.’830 The PD would later argue that this 
reflected a swing to the right in the Belfast faction of Provisional Sinn Féin, 
pointing out that it came at a time when their paper also headlined an article that 
equated contraception with child murder.831 By the time the Provisionals 
withdrew from the PHRC the committee could only claim to represent the PD 
and the even smaller Revolutionary Marxist Group (RMG).  In October 1974 the 
PHRC was disbanded.832  
The lifespan of the PHRC illustrates that the PD attempted to maintain 
popular mobilisation, but the mid-1970s were difficult times for those who 
presented a strategy based upon protest and people power. After the demise of 
the civil disobedience campaign in 1972 violence became frequent and sustained. 
Moreover, from 1972 onward the major basis of working class mobilisation was 
behind the powerful banner of loyalism. Faced with mass Protestant opposition 
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to reform and a republican armed campaign capable of causing serious disruption 
to the Northern state, the PD at times retreated into vulgar support for the 
Provisionals, which was developing a violent dynamic of its own. The republican 
struggle of the mid 1970s involved a sustained campaign of bombing and killings 
predicated on the idea that victory was on the cards and a belief that the might of 
the PIRA could win a lasting victory over the British Army.  
PD support for republican violence would occasionally reach dogmatic 
levels, during instances that seriously contradicted the republican movement’s 
claim that its violence did not wilfully target innocent civilians, or contain any 
sectarian precedent. One incident in particular is forever etched into the history 
books: when members of the PIRA, under the cover name of the South Armagh 
Republican Action Force, murdered ten Protestant workmen at Kingsmill in 
Armagh.833 It was a blatantly sectarian act and the PD reaction illustrates the 
extent to which support for republican violence strained credulity among some in 
its ranks. In the edition of the Unfree Citizen that followed the killings at 
Kingsmill, the paper was primarily concerned with challenging the established 
narrative around sectarian murders— and pointing to the campaign of loyalist 
killings throughout Armagh that was said to have provoked Kingsmill— as 
opposed to condemning the act. It included an ominous statement that seemed to 
justify the killings,  ‘However crude the response to that was, nevertheless we 
must recognize that retaliation of some form was both inevitable and 
necessary.’834 It was, to put it mildly, a controversial message from an 
organisation that was on record as being opposed to sectarian killings. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
833 See, English, Armed Struggle, p.172.  
834 Quoted in, Finn, Challengers to Provisional Republicanism, p. 148.  
	   363	  
Incidentally, the statement did not reflect the position of the organisation 
surrounding Kingsmill. The next issue of the Unfree Citizen would reveal that 
the article had been printed without the support of the leadership and offered a 
different analysis.  
The last issue of the Unfree Citizen carried an article on the 
Kingsmills killings in south Armagh. The last paragraph of the article 
appeared to condone these killings. This is not and was not the policy 
of the People’s Democracy. We are opposed to acts of indiscriminate 
terror like the south Armagh killings and believe they represent a 
disastrous dead-end for the anti- imperialist movement and actively 
prevent the necessary rebuilding of the mass movement . . . Our 
Central Committee voted by a majority to black out the last 
paragraph of the article before the paper was sold—it was too late to 
replace it—and this was done. The article formed part of the internal 
division in our organization and the former editor has since 
resigned.835 
The same edition carried an article revealing that there was ‘serious division’ in 
the PD. In the aftermath of the debate surrounding Kingsmill the organisation 
had experienced a split. The article recognised the overall demoralisation that 
affected the anti-imperialist movement and stated that a group of members saw 
the solution to the impasse in supporting a militarist strategy that was 
increasingly based on small numbers of republican fighters, and increasingly 
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disconnected from the vast majority of ordinary people.836 Those who broke 
away from the PD on this basis would go on to form the short lived ‘Red 
Republican Party’. This group represented the section of the PD who clung on to 
the loyalist takeover theory outlined above, and therefore were most forthright in 
their support for armed struggle and the maintenance of a military wing.837  
Against this trend the PD entered a period of soul searching. Analysing 
the struggle in the north, they argued that recent history showed how armed 
actions were largely irrelevant in the absence of a mass movement, and could 
also be counterproductive to the building of one.838 The new perspective was to 
be crystallised in a document titled ‘militarism versus mass action’, which drew 
upon the experience of years past. It argued that significant advances were only 
made through mass popular activity and the involvement of large numbers of 
people, as opposed to small numbers of armed fighters. The PD compared the 
context of the civil rights and civil disobedience movement with the situation in 
1976. Between 1968-1969 and 1971-1972 real mass movements existed in the 
North: 
There was little need to advertise and organize marches and 
demonstrations in those days, thousands came of their own accord 
often travelling long distances. The whole minority population was in 
ferment. Civil Rights committees and later Resistance committees 
sprang up in every area. The people were self-confident and 
determined, they mounted their own protests without prompting, they 
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stood up and often drove out the RUC and British Army. In Derry 
they controlled their own No-Go area for almost a year. The best 
example is the rent and rates strike; the people in the ghettoes started 
it spontaneously before there were any calls from the politicians. The 
enthusiasm and determination of the people was so great that they 
forced even the parliamentary politicians into the streets and forced 
hostile political groups to cooperate around common demands. It was 
this spectacle of a whole people in revolt, not just the Provos military 
campaign, which brought down Stormont and wrung a whole series 
of concessions from the British […] Compare that with the situation 
today. The anti-imperialist movement is deeply divided, the bulk of 
the minority population are apathetic if not hostile. Let any 
organisation, including Sinn Féin, call a demonstration now around 
some political demands, and how many will turn up? Hardly any 
except their own members and a handful of dedicated activists.839 
The solution to this situation lay in rejecting the elitist tactics of republicanism, 
which saw the masses of ordinary people as ‘passive spectators in their own 
liberation’, and instead rebuild movements from below, through a process of 
education and discussion and ultimately strengthening the national struggle with 
mass involvement and mass mobilisation.840 Applying Lenin, the PD criticised 
the individualist nature of republican violence, which was carried out by small 
groups of people without any democratic mandate or mass participation.841 In a 
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significant appraisal of where the struggle in Ireland was at in 1977, Michael 
Farrell drew attention to the narrow and limited base of republicanism,  
It has drawn its support almost solely from the Catholic minority in 
the North making little or no effort to involve the— initially at any 
rate— sympathetic masses in the South […] It has thus cut itself off 
from the powerful weapon of working class action and is peculiarly 
vulnerable to war-weariness and demoralisation.842   
Farrell argued that an orientation to the social and economic struggles of the 
southern working class was crucial and in the aftermath of the militarism vs. 
mass action document the Unfree Citizen would carry articles that looked at the 
history of the NRM and the PHRC. The central thrust of the articles was to 
articulate a strategy that rejected the militarist tactics of the republican movement 
and argue for broad based mobilisations as an alternative.843   
A clear problem for the PD, however, was that it was an organisation 
with little social weight or ability to carry such a strategy to large numbers of 
people. One account of the republican movement noted that by the late 1970s the 
PD might have had up to 250 strong supporters. Although the author qualifies 
this by stating that, outside of Sinn Féin, PD members were among the most 
determined of political activists who enjoyed the respect of many across the 
republican movement.844 Yet this respect also had its limitations. The PD had 
largely fallen behind the republican campaign, existing at times almost as a 
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propaganda force inside the anti-imperialist movement, and speaking primarily 
to the republican community. Therefore, when the PD attempted to criticise the 
Provisionals and articulate a different direction toward the struggle, they 
challenged the Provisionals on their own terrain and from an obvious position of 
weakness. The very fact that the PD had not taken part in the armed struggle 
meant that they made little headway criticising the Provisionals and an earlier 
commentary from Republican News illustrates how the Provisionals dealt with 
criticism from the PD.  
We do not deride the members of the People’s Democracy for their 
failure to back up sterling words with equally sterling action. They 
have played their part in organizing the people against jackboot 
policies . . . but only one organization has met the English forces in 
consistent armed opposition. Only one group have laid their lives at 
risk to contain and defeat English aggression. When the People’s 
Democracy decides to couple use of the typewriter with use of the 
gun, as Connolly did, then they can jettison the label of armchair 
revolutionaries. Until then they will remain categorized with the 
Official reformists, the Communist Party of Ireland, and the other 
groups who yearn for a 32 County Socialist Workers’ Republic but 
are not prepared to jeopardize their lives to achieve that aim.845 
Finn rightly outlines how this impacted upon the ability of the PD to either grow 
or to influence the Provisional movement:  
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People’s Democracy had done everything short of joining the armed 
struggle: its members had been jailed and interned; they had 
organized illegal demonstrations and even made use of a traditional 
republican weapon, the hunger strike, at some risk to their own lives. 
But they had not planted any bombs or pulled any triggers, and that 
was all that really mattered. Too small to have much of an impact on 
its own, PD could only hope to make a difference as part of a broader 
alliance. But the Provos had no interest in helping a small far-left 
group without so much as an Armalite to its name to gain 
influence.846  
Although a broader anti-imperialist alliance was some distance away in the mid-
1970s, the PD enjoyed a modest influx of new members in 1978, when the Party 
fused with the Movement for a Socialist Republic (MSR), the Irish section of the 
United Secretariat of the Fourth International. Formerly named the 
Revolutionary Marxist Group (RMG), the MSR had emerged in the early 1970s 
and, like the PD, took its cue from a more traditional Trotskyist analysis of 
Ireland. The politics of the Fourth International had historically been the reserve 
of tiny numbers of people in Ireland, and while the post 1968 period did not see 
Trotskyist organisations attract a mass following, it did perhaps offer the 
possibility of Trotskyism securing a foothold in Irish politics in a way that had 
been hitherto unseen.847 The chequered history of the MSR displayed similar 
political persuasions to the PD— a commitment to class politics and to the vision 
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of a 32 county workers’ republic, alongside support for the national liberation 
struggle. Supporters of the USFI had experimented with guerrilla politics in the 
mid 1970s, joining the controversial Saor Éire grouping, although the majority of 
MSR members later reacted strongly against this trend, finding their way to unity 
with the PD.848 The fusion between the PD and MSR represented a certain level 
of awareness surrounding Trotskyist influenced section of the left toward future 
strategy. The extent to which Trotskyism had influenced the political journey of 
the PD is obvious; several of the early PD leaders had associations with the old 
IWG, and joining the USFI was a formal recognition of the strand of Marxism 
that had most dictated the PD’s trajectory over its history.849 The Unfree Citizen 
reflected that the PD ‘began as an activist organisation which came to adopt the 
principles of Marxism through an extremely tough process of trial and error 
which cost us many setbacks and several splits.’850 The newly launched PD, then, 
was born with a hope that the fusion of the two organisations would ‘stimulate 
the process of Marxist re-groupment generally.’851  
The ability of the PD to initiate a re-groupment of Marxist forces in 
Ireland, however, was limited, and the party did not develop a lasting working 
relationship with other Trotskyist organisations. For example, the Irish Militant 
Labour, which was essentially an offshoot of the British Militant Tendency and 
forwarded an entryist strategy inside the Irish Labour Party, held a fundamentally 
different view of the Northern struggle to the PD— one that did not support the 
republican armed struggle or any effort against partition, — were denounced for 
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parroting ‘the propaganda of imperialism’ and helping to ‘perpetuate the problem 
by attempting to foist anti-nationalist prejudices among the working class’852 The 
PD had a better relationship with the Socialist Workers Movement (SWM), the 
Irish component of the International Socialist Tendency, who were an anti-
partitionist organisation, but one that put a serious emphasis on the necessity to 
build independent working class politics inside the Northern state as part of the 
struggle against partition.853 The PD and the SWM would sporadically unite in 
campaigns, such as those around state repression or issues of prisoner’s rights, 
but these did not develop beyond immediate campaigning efforts.   
The consolidation of the PD and the MSR to some extent signified a 
merger between two sections of the Irish left who were united in their increasing 
irrelevance to the bigger picture of anti-imperialist politics. One MSR activist 
recalled that his grouping probably brought only 20 new members into what was 
already a small core of PD activists.854 The ‘new’ PD was officially launched in 
February 1978 and it involved a rebranding of the Unfree Citizen, which was 
renamed Socialist Republic. Although forged in isolation, central to the 
revamped PD was a strategy based upon broad mobilisation and as the period 
ahead saw changes take place within the republican movement, the ideas and 
strategy associated with the PD would begin to find a wider resonance.  
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7.5. The rebirth of civil resistance 
The mid-1970s forced a major rethinking in strategy and tactics inside the 
republican movement, which the PD embraced. The turn was encapsulated in a 
famous speech in June 1977 at the annual Bodenstown march, a key date in the 
republican calendar that would often provide an opportune moment for the 
movement to introduce a new line of thinking. It was here that Jimmy Drumm 
delivered an oration that is widely recognised as the beginning a re-orientation of 
the Provisional movement. The speech drew on themes that bore resemblance to 
previous arguments made by the PD:  
We find that a successful war of liberation cannot be fought 
exclusively on the backs of the oppressed in the Six Counties, nor 
around the physical presence of the British Army. Hatred and 
resentment of the Army cannot sustain the war, and the isolation of 
socialist republicans around the armed struggle is dangerous and has 
produced the reformist notion that ‘Ulster’ is the issue, without the 
mobilisation of the working class in the 26 counties. We need a 
positive tie-in with the mass of the Irish people who have little or no 
idea of the suffering in the North ... We need to make a stand on 
economic issues and on the everyday struggles of people. The 
forging of strong links between the Republican movement and the 
workers of Ireland and radical trade unionists will create an 
irrepressible mass movement and will ensure mass support for the 
continuing armed struggle in the North…The British government is 
NOT withdrawing from the Six Counties and the substantial pull-out 
	   372	  
of business and the closing of factories in 1975 and 1976 was due to 
world economic recession, though mistakenly attributed at the time 
to symptoms of withdrawal. Indeed, the British government is 
committed to stabilising the Six Counties and is pouring vast sums of 
money to improve the area and assure loyalists, and secure from 
loyalists, support for a long haul against the Irish Republican 
Army…855 
A rejection of pure militarism, an orientation toward mass struggle and class 
politics, and a recognition that the perspective of republican imminent military 
victory had been vastly wrong, were central to what the PD had been contending 
for some time. Drumm’s speech clearly put forward a similar perspective to the 
PD in its strategic orientation, for example, in its call to get involved in workers 
struggles and develop links with the trade union movement. Indeed, many of 
these ideas were ones that had been put forward by small groups of PD members 
and were now being presented to a large audience from the main platform of 
radical republicanism in Ireland. The Unfree Citizen warmly welcomed 
Drumm’s speech stating that he had slaughtered one of the ‘sacred cows of 
republicanism’— the notion that the British intended withdrawal from Ireland. 
The paper pointed out the divide that had developed inside the republican 
movement— between traditionalists to the right and a new emerging generation 
that were engaging with politics and espoused left-wing ideas;  
A section of the movement, particularly in Belfast, has gradually but 
definitively moved away from militarism and from exclusive 
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concentration on the Northern question and towards involvement in 
social and economic struggles on both sides of the border.856  
The observation was correct. Drumm’s speech represented the opening salvo in a 
battle that was being waged by the new generation of republicans who had 
emerged from the Northern ghettos to fill the ranks of the Provisional movement 
since 1970; Gerry Adams and Danny Morrison had composed the speech. Adams 
had subtly introduced his new line of thinking in the movement’s newspaper 
Republican News in 1976, under the pseudonym ‘Brownie’, where he argued for 
‘Active Republicanism’ and raised the possibility of ‘Active Abstentionism’. 
Drawing on the experiences of the mass activity during the civil rights 
movement, Adams suggested that republicans should be engaged in building the 
elements of an alternative administration, emphasising the need for social and 
political mobilisation alongside the war effort.857 Adams had already been 
influenced by PD activity during internment and the consistency with the politics 
of the PD here is obvious. The critical shift in republicanism, however, 
represented a wider strategic orientation, in what Allen has described as a period 
of ‘long war and leftist rhetoric’.858  
To tackle the demoralised state of the PIRA a new strategy of ‘long war’ 
was adopted, which recognised that the military struggle was not on the cusp of 
victory. The PIRA was reorganised into a cell structure, which made it harder for 
the British military to penetrate and also meant that it was less dependant on 
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public support. Ideologically, this meant an assault on the traditionalist line of 
Éire Nua and instead a more socialist orientated republicanism was developed, 
This (Éire Nua) was attacked by the younger northern leadership as a 
‘sop to loyalism’ and, using language borrowed from the remnants of 
the PD, it was argued that the Protestant workers were a ‘labour 
aristocracy’, who would only play a progressive role after a united 
Ireland had been achieved. On the basis of posing as more hard-line 
and closer to the realities of Catholic working-class ghettos, the 
Adams leadership set out to modernise republicanism.859  
In one internal document presented to the republican movement, known as the 
‘gray document’, Adams drew upon Connolly and explicitly called for a socialist 
reorganisation of society: ‘We desire to see capitalism abolished and a 
democratic system of common or public ownership. This democratic system, 
which is called socialism, will, we believe, come as a result of the continuous 
increase of the power of the working class.’860 Naturally then, the PD welcomed 
these developments as sections of the republican movement began to embrace 
long held leftist positions. The extent of the shift was always largely based upon 
rhetoric, as Allen suggests, nevertheless, the turn would provide a powerful 
impetus for allowing the republican movement to break beyond its limited base, 
which as the PD contended, was a minority inside a minority in the North.861 
The context for a new phase in popular protest came in 1976 after the 
British government withdrew ‘special category status’ for republican and loyalist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
859 Ibid, p. 148.  
860 Ibid, pp. 149-150.  
861 Ibid, p. 148.  
	   375	  
prisoners. The policy was part of the wider strategy to ‘ulsterise’ the conflict and 
therefore treat prisoners as normal criminal elements. It precipitated a lengthy 
struggle when republican prisoners embarked on the ‘blanket protest’ in demand 
of political rights. The prison struggle of 1976-1981 would provide the effective 
basis for implementing Adams’ new line of thinking, mobilising large swathes of 
the population in support of republican prisoners. However, it is important not to 
see this as a steady process of development for the movement. The prison issue 
was reemerging, but it took some time for those advancing a strategy based upon 
political action to put it at the centre of the republican movement’s approach. In 
this context the PD were able to play an important role in prioritising the prison 
issue, and arguably influenced historic shifts in direction across Irish 
republicanism.  
Initially, when the blanket protest first began the prison issue was taken 
up by relatives of those inside the Long Kesh. On Easter Monday, 1976, a 
‘Prisoners Action Committee’ soon to be renamed ‘Relatives Action Committee’ 
(RAC) was established in Belfast. Sinn Féin were centrally involved in setting up 
and supporting the RAC’s, however, there also existed an almost constant 
tension between relatives and those in the republican movement who prioritised 
the war effort over all else.862 Therefore, it can be said that when the blanket 
protest began, neither Sinn Féin nor the IRA fully prioritised the issue. The 
Unfree Citizen would point out how it was the hard work of the RAC that at first 
championed activity throughout that summer, ‘leafleting, holding meetings and 
pickets to build up support on the political status issue.’ 863 Against the 
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prevailing republican thinking, which focused on the heroic sacrifice of the few, 
the PD argued that history had shown that a victory in relation to political status 
would be won by the mass mobilisation of the people and that such a process was 
needed to turn the tide of the present struggle. The PD itself was a tiny 
organisation confined to Catholic ghettos, but it did put the prison issue at the 
centre of its activity through its publications and by, for example, launching a 
petition for political status.864 The same cannot perhaps be said for the wider 
anti-imperialist movement in the early days of the dispute, and the Unfree Citizen 
would carry a telling letter from republican activist Jim Gibney, a young 
republican prisoner and a close ally of Gerry Adams. Gibney spoke directly to 
the issue of political status:  
I feel that the issue is not being given enough support by all the 
groupings concerned. Whilst not singling out any group in particular, 
I believe that unity on this issue is essential. All groupings should 
recognize the importance of utilizing the opportunity this issue 
provides in rallying the people away from their inertia and apathy. I 
believe that if we are to get back to a situation where the struggle for 
a united Ireland is seen to be visibly supported by the Irish people 
then we must halt the series of victories that the British and their 
allies are having against the anti-imperialists and the anti-Unionist 
population. The struggle for the retention of political prisoner status 
must be won by involving the people.865 
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Gibney’s comments—which were more than a veiled criticism of his own 
movement— are instructive, as he would emerge as a key player who helped 
shift the movement in a more political direction. Gibney kept close contact with 
leftwing organisations and read PD publications and, as Brian Feeney recounts, 
‘He (Gibney) was struck by a debate on the far left about militarism versus mass 
struggle, which argued that Sinn Féin was losing out and limiting its appeal 
because it supported only armed struggle.’866 Gibney himself is on record in 
appreciating the role that the PD played in the period that predated the mass 
prison movement that was soon to emerge:  
You know, People’s Democracy were to the fore. They dominated 
the scene politically from about 1970 to the 1975 period. They were 
the recognised political leadership of what we loosely called the anti-
imperialist movement in this city and elsewhere… And there was 
pressure coming from republicans for a republican leadership to 
emerge who would, in a sense, replace PD as the public expressions 
of how republicans are feeling at that particular time… What 
republicans wanted was a Sinn Féin person to speak on their 
behalf.867 
Throughout the months following the establishment of the Relatives Action 
Committees Sinn Féin had not got heavily involved in the fight for the retention 
of political status. Gerry Adams remembered it as a period when ‘Sinn Féin was 
in many ways a victim of the aversion to politics which marked Republicanism at 
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this time.’868 Nevertheless, the small numbers of relatives who had established 
themselves around the RAC campaigned vigorously on behalf of the prisoners 
from 1976 onward, and although they were yet to break out of the limited 
support that they enjoyed in republican areas, their actions provided a focal point 
for wider numbers of anti-repression activists.  
 It was recognition of both the limited impact and the potentially wider 
appeal of the RAC that was behind a decision to call an anti-repression 
conference in Coalisland in January 1978, which was primarily initiated by 
Bernadette McAliskey and other local activists. The PD had already consistently 
set out its stall as to what it wanted to develop:  
The final aim should be a united front drawing together Republican 
and Socialist groups, local united communities and the many 
individual militants who are willing to fight back but who will 
remain disorganised and ineffective without such a body to unify 
them. Such a front could rebuild the mass movement and mass 
struggle on which the defeat of imperialism must be based.869  
The PD considered the conference a great success. It noted that up to 800 
delegates attended, who were representative of a broad level of the Irish left and 
anti-imperialist movement, including, the RAC’s, Sinn Féin, IRSP, RRP, IWG, 
SWM870, MSR, PD and various community groupings. Michael Farrell spoke on 
the platform at the conference where he argued for mass demonstrations in 
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support of political status, and the conference passed an important motion calling 
for the building of RACs throughout the six counties and agreed on tentative 
action for the weeks ahead.871   
After the conference the Unfree Citizen reported on an early debate that 
arose highlighting the different approaches to the campaign. The issue centred 
upon the question of unity with forces outside of the ‘anti-imperialist movement’ 
and a debate emerged about the role of the SDLP, who had recently shifted their 
position toward one that more vocally challenged state repression. The 
Provisional movement held a long-standing hostility to working with the SDLP, 
but the PD argued that it was necessary to involve such wider forces. Their 
reasoning was that because large numbers of people would not view the SDLP in 
the same way that the radical left did, it was necessary to expose their limitations 
through the course of campaigning and win people away from the moderates in 
practice.872 It was an early indication of the type of united front approach that 
was to be applied in order for the movement to reach a wider audience.   
Some weeks after the Coalisland conference up to 100 delegates from 
across the North met in west Belfast, where the debate over the nature of the 
campaign continued. The PD proposed a motion calling for a broad campaign 
that argued, quite crucially, that demanding support for armed actions would 
hinder this process. It would become a central debate throughout the campaign, 
with, for example, the PD and others on the left arguing against the killing of 
prison officers during the course of the prison dispute, due to the alienating and 
negative impact that such attacks had. The Socialist Republic noted that the 
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motion received a mixed reception among republicans, some of whom seemed to 
think that support for armed actions was the only way in which support for the 
prisoners could be built.873  
The relationship between the armed struggle and the campaign in support 
of republican prisoners would be a contentious issue throughout the campaign. In 
the aftermath of the conference in west Belfast the republican press hit out at the 
PD, it challenged the idea that a new mass resistance comparable to the civil 
rights movement could emerge out of the Coalisland conference. Nor would it 
provide an alternative to armed struggle, argued the Provisional’s newspaper:  
The clock cannot simply be turned back like that much as People’s 
Democracy and Bernadette McAliskey might wish it to be . . . any 
public campaign against torture and for political status needs to be 
pointed firmly in the direction of ‘Brits out’ and needs to recognize 
the necessary methods for this aim. For status and torture in reality 
cannot be isolated from the Brit presence; a presence which cannot 
be removed without armed struggle.874  
After the debate between the PD and Sinn Féin came to a head the negative 
impact of militarism was felt when a botched PIRA bombing operation 
incinerated a restaurant in County Down, burning 12 innocent Protestants to 
death and injuring many more. The La Mon restaurant bombing brought the 
debate surrounding militarism to a new level and was the source of much 
criticism, even among republican ranks. Gerry Adams would recall ‘two years of 
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work going down the drain’875. The campaign petered on throughout 1978 and a 
hardcore of political militants worked to raise the profile of the prison issue, it 
was significantly aided by high profile visits to the prison by members of the 
Catholic Church. Throughout 1978 there was also a rapid expansion of the 
RAC’s as more prisoners joined the blanket protest and awareness was garnered 
from media outlets.876  
In this context the North approached the ten-year anniversary of the civil 
rights movement, and the first joint action of the RAC’s that had sprung up 
throughout the year was a march that coincided with the anniversary of the first 
civil rights demonstration in Coalisland, in August 1968. Its numbers reflected 
the growing groundswell in support of the prisoners; the Socialist Republic 
claimed the demonstration involved up to 10,000 people and it was soon 
followed by a march in west Belfast.877 Following this, the first major marches of 
the civil rights movement were marked with demonstrations in support of the 
blanketmen. In early October Sinn Féin organised a march to mark the 
anniversary of the first civil rights march in Derry, on 5 October.878 To mark the 
anniversary of the Burntollet march ten years previously, the PD spearheaded a 
demonstration from Belfast to Derry. It was officially organised by the United 
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Burntollet Commemoration Committee, which included PD, IRSP, RRP, ISP and 
the Socialist Labour Party (SLP).879 The PD claimed that the march mobilised a 
couple of thousand people, but the series of demonstrations that marked the 
outbreak of civil rights agitation revealed the various splits and schisms that 
existed across the anti-imperialist movement. The PD had previously complained 
about Sinn Féin’s unwillingness to involve other groups in their demonstrations, 
and after the Burntollet anniversary march they hit out at the republican 
movement for not supporting the initiative. The reason Sinn Féin gave for not 
backing the demonstration was that the PD had given the RUC notice that they 
intended to march, and therefore recognised their legitimacy.880 It was another 
debate that illustrated the contention between the traditional and arguably 
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7.6. Smash the H Blocks 
In May 1979 Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party ousted the Labour 
government, thus inaugurating a British administration that would become the 
most bitter of opponents to republican prisoners. The following month Northern 
Ireland would go to the polls in a European election. Refusal to recognise the 
institutions of the Northern state had been a central tenet of republicanism since 
partition, and this meant rejection of the electoral process. The Provisional 
movement had reiterated its longstanding refusal to participate in electoral 
politics at its Ard Fheis in 1978. Again, forces to the radical left would act as a 
counterweight to this position and Bernadette McAliskey came forward to make 
another mark in history. McAliskey contested the European election on a radical 
pro-prisoner platform, arguing for political status and an end to the H Block 
system.881 The electoral intervention caused a great deal of division and 
bitterness, with the Provisionals condemning McAliskey for ‘exploiting’ the 
prison issue and running a negative campaign against her.882 The PD got 
involved in McAliskey’s campaign and documented how sections of Sinn Féin 
and the IRSP had ‘used all the resources at their disposal’ to ensure that a 
genuine anti-imperialist electoral campaign was scuppered.883   
Nevertheless, the long-term result of the election campaign undoubtedly 
influenced those in the republican movement who wanted to see a wider political 
response in support of the prisoners. McAliskey polled an impressive 33,969 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
881 Ross, Smashing H-Block, pp. 58-59. 
882 ‘Leading Provos such as Derry’s Martin McGuinness followed McAliskey 
and her supporters on the campaign trail, heckling them with the aid of 
megaphones.’ Ibid, p. 158.  
883 Socialist Republic, Vol 2, No 3.  
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votes, and Gerry Adams recalls that by 1980 Jim Gibney was arguing internally 
that Sinn Féin should contest local elections.884 The major shift that facilitated 
this end came in October 1979, when the republican movement called a ‘Smash 
H Block conference’ in west Belfast. The conference was a response to the dire 
conditions that were developing inside the prison, in which a hunger strike 
looked likely, and therefore more strenuous efforts were now being made by the 
republican leadership outside of the prison to develop a broad based movement 
of support, in order to prevent this end.885  
The conference was formally sponsored by the RAC and up to 600 
delegates packed the hall. It saw significant involvement from Sinn Féin but 
various other organisations were also represented including IRSP, PD, the Irish 
Civil Rights Action League, the Trade Union Campaign Against Repression886, 
Conradh na Gaeilge887, the Socialist Workers Group, the Socialist Labour Party 
and the Peace People.888 The PD saw the conference as an opportunity to build 
the united front approach that it had long agitated for: 
We see the primary task of the conference to begin the process of 
building active support for this struggle from outside those layers of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
884 Adams, Before the Dawn, p. 279.  
885 As one former blanketman remarked: ‘Morale was at an all time low, and the 
more experienced men spoke for the rest of us when they said they were nearly at 
the end of their tether.’ Ross, Smashing H-Block, p. 61.  
886 The Trade Union Campaign Against Repression was established by socialist 
and republican trade unionists in Dublin and campaigned on a range of issues in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
887 Conradh na Gaeilge was the main social and cultural organisation that 
promoted the Irish language across Ireland.   
888 Ross, Smashing H-Block, p. 62.  
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people we already have on our side; i.e. prisoners relatives plus 
republican and socialist organisations.889  
The conference elected a 17-person steering committee whose role was to 
campaign around the prisoners’ five central demands: no prison work, the right 
to wear civilian clothing, free association with other prisoners, the right to 
educational and recreational facilitates and full remission. The initiative 
represented a significant shift, as it was open to all who agreed with these 
demands. The republican movement had finally embraced a campaign to support 
the prisoners, one that did not demand support for the armed struggle as a 
prerequisite. Although the steering committee was heavily weighted in favour of 
the Provisional movement, other groups were represented at leadership level, 
including the PD and the IRSP. Fergus O’Hare was elected to the steering 
committee on behalf of the PD, where he would play a central role in the mass 
movement that would rock the Northern state.890  
The PD entered 1980 on an optimistic note surrounding the shifts that 
were taking place inside the republican movement. An article in the Socialist 
Republic provided an overview of the Sinn Féin Ard Fheis in 1979 and it 
welcomed recent policy shifts such as the new emphasis on prison mobilisation. 
The paper commented on the rise of a new generation of Sinn Féin leaders, 
centred on Gerry Adams, who spoke more openly from a leftist platform and 
were elected to the leadership of Sinn Féin, including Danny Morrison and Tom 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
889 Discussion document for H/Block open conference, by People’s Democracy, 
21 October 1979. NIPC.  
890 Interview with Fergus O’ Hare, Belfast, 08/06/2015.  
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Hartley.891 However, it also noted how this generation were keen to appease the 
traditional right in the republican movement, indicating a long-term strategy of 
the Adams leadership that was designed to shift the organisation to the left while 
avoiding any serious rupture with the traditionalists. There was much truth to this 
claim.892  
1980 began with a large protest under the banner of the National H-
Block/Armagh committee from west Belfast to the Long Kesh prison, but 
activists were stopped by security forces and the result was a large sit-down 
protest.893 This happened against a backdrop of deteriorating conditions inside 
the prisons. The National H-Block campaign had been established in order to 
prevent what many could see was going to result in Hunger Strike, but the 
obvious contradiction was that public sympathy and support for the prisoners 
was dictated by the extent to which they were capable of battling against 
gruelling conditions.  As Finn explains, 
…there was a fundamental contradiction embedded in the campaign. 
Its activists—especially those who came from a left-wing 
background—wanted to end the phenomenon of ‘spectator politics’ 
for good. Yet they were ultimately dependent on the physical 
strength and determination of a tiny group of men in the H-Blocks: it 
was their willingness to risk death that made it possible to organize 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
891 Danny Morrison and Tom Hartley would go on to be two important figures in 
Gerry Adams’ ‘kitchen cabinet’, an internal think tank that had a powerful 
influence in directing the Provisional republican movement over the next number 
of decades.  
892 Socialist Republic, Vol 3, No 1.  
893 Ross, Smashing H-Block, pp. 74-75.  
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the largest demonstrations Northern Ireland had seen since the early 
1970s.894   
Throughout 1980 the blanket protest escalated and so too did the street 
campaign, bringing severe repercussions. By the end of that year two well-
known anti-H Block activists, Miriam Daly of the IRSP and John Turnley of the 
Irish Independence Party895, had been assassinated by loyalist paramilitaries. 
Radical leftists at the leadership of the campaign had become prime targets for 
loyalists in actions that were often claimed by anti-H Block campaigners as 
having hallmarks of collusion. In January 1981 Bernadette McAliskey and her 
husband were shot several times by members of the UVF in their home in 
Coalisland. One account of the history of the UDA suggests that the ‘next 
candidate for assassination was Michael Farrell’.896 The threat likely influenced 
Farrell’s decision to relocate to Dublin, a move that would see the most 
significant PD activist fade from socialist politics in the North. 
The targeting of anti-H Block campaigners was a clear result of the 
impact of the campaign; indeed, much work had been carried out across Ireland, 
for example, in petitioning for support among the trade union movement and 
organising speaking tours. In mid September the National H Block/Armagh 
committee could at its second conference claim up to 30 action groups.897 The 
seismic shift came, however, when republican prison leader Brendan Hughes 
announced the first hunger strike in October 1980. The immediate impact of the 
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895 The Irish Independence Party was an Irish Nationalist Party founded in the 
late 1970s by Frank McManus MP.  
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(Dublin, Penguin, 2004), p. 118.  
897 Ross, Smashing H-Block, p. 85.  
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strike was to provide momentum for the biggest demonstrations since the civil 
rights and anti-internment movement. The first major march in October drew 
some 17,000 people and journalists drew comparisons between it and the civil 
rights movement. In the weeks that followed there would be pickets, fasts and 
rallies the length and breadth of the country, with major demonstrations taking 
place in Derry and Dublin.898 A number of affiliated H-Block groups sprang up 
across the country and many took on a clearly humanitarian tone. By mid-
November 1981 around 125 groups existed and at its height the campaign 
boasted some 437 affiliated groups.899   
While the story of what happened behind lonely prison walls in 1981 is 
well known, the history of the individuals and activists who made up the 
campaign on the outside is less understood. The history of the hunger strike has 
been thoroughly documented; during the first protest the leadership was faced 
with one hunger striker that was nearing death and a deal was accepted under 
disputed circumstances. The result of the deal did not change the prisoners’ 
circumstances and as the same regime remained inside the Long Kesh, it was 
perhaps inevitable that another hunger strike would be called. In the context of 
mass mobilisations in support of republican hunger strikers the death of long-
standing MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone Frank McManus provided the 
terrain in which the republican movement would take its first steps into electoral 
politics, with Bobby Sands running in the by-election. Later, in the southern Irish 
election in June 1981, the campaign stood 9 prisoner candidates returning two 
TDs and securing over 40,000 votes. Although the hunger strike of 1981 ended 
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without winning its demands, the entire period served to transform Irish politics. 
The movement that emerged outside of the prisons, which F. Stuart Ross 
contends arguably ‘dwarfed that of 1968 and 1969’900 provided fertile ground for 
a new politicised republican movement to grow. Central to this was the way in 
which strategies from the left intersected with and influenced republican 
thinking, and in this regard the PD was involved in every level of the campaign.  
 The central argument pushed by the PD throughout the campaign 
surrounded the necessity to build a broad united front that did not demand 
support for armed actions as a precondition for supporting the plight of the 
prisoners. It was the broad humanitarian appeal in support of the prisoners that 
saw masses of people participate in the campaign, thereby vindicating the 
arguments made by PD and others. Gerry Adams recognised this years later 
when he looked back on the Coalisland conference. From the conference floor 
‘one of our people insisted that anyone involved in campaigning for the prisoners 
should accept the legitimacy of the armed struggle… I knew it was a mistake the 
moment I heard about it.’901  
This united front approach also influenced the shift in republicanism on a 
wider level surrounding electoral interventions. Thus, while the election of 
Bobby Sands resulted from an unpredictable accident of history, the local 
government elections in May 1981 were well anticipated in advance. The 
Provisional movement, which had reaffirmed its opposition to contesting 
elections during its recent Ard Fheis in 1980, in effect shunned this election. The 
PD, on the other hand, argued strongly against abstentionism and would emerge 
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alongside others to challenge politicians in the nationalist community who would 
not support the republican prisoners. By targeting two representatives in 
particular, Gerry Fitt and Paddy Devlin, the PD offered a scathing critique of the 
SDLP: 
The anti-imperialist movement is paying a heavy price for continuing 
the policy of abstention in elections. It is quite clear that we cannot 
ignore quislings like [Gerry] Fitt nor can we render them irrelevant 
simply by mass mobilizations. They must be fought and defeated on 
their home ground and exposed as completely unrepresentative of the 
Irish people. That is why People’s Democracy has stood candidates 
against Fitt and union bureaucrat Paddy Devlin in the local 
government elections. The immediate and central problem is to 
demonstrate the massive support that there is for the hunger strikers, 
but we also want to show that elections can be used by anti-
imperialists.902 
Both Devlin and Fitt had refused to support the campaign, with the latter 
denouncing the prisoners in severe terms.903 The PD insistence that the anti-
imperialist movement could use elections was successful, after standing Fergus 
O’Hare and John McAnulty, they unseated Gerry Fitt and beat Paddy Devlin 
significantly. Both men were political heavyweights of the nationalist 
community. O’Hare achieved 20 percent of the vote while McAnulty polled 17 
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percent, and their victories coincided with three IRSP members also being 
elected on a pro-prisoner platform.904 The republican leadership noted the 
intervention of those to the left of the Provisionals, and Adams would later recall 
that the election had seen Sinn Féin ‘surrendering further ground’ to the PD and 
others.905 But the Adams leadership, which was becoming increasingly solidified 
throughout the hunger strike period, had little intention of conceding further 
ground to the left in the aftermath of the death of Bobby Sands. Sands’ seat was 
won in a second by-election after his death by his own election agent, Owen 
Carron. 
After nine other hunger strikers died, in what signalled one of the most 
intense battles of modern Irish history, the Provisional movement made an 
historic turn towards electoralism in the early 1980s. The prison dispute ended in 
terms that meant a defeat for the prisoners’ five demands. However, it also led to 
a major process of revitalisation across the republican movement, categorised by 
unprecedented levels of public support and swathes of new activists, spurring the 
growth of republicanism over the next two decades.906  
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http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/flg81.htm, accessed on 06/01/2017.  
905 Adams, Before the Dawn, p. 278.  
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campaign, and the way that it led to an inrush of support and membership for 
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The PD did not fare well throughout this process. Although the 
organisation had campaigned for a united front approach, at times as if such a 
development itself would ensure the conditions in which the party would gain 
support, the reality was that Sinn Féin was by far the largest and most important 
force inside the prison movement and would continually dictate the terms of 
play. In October 1982 the Smash H Block/ Armagh campaign was disbanded and 
the PD could do little but comment upon ‘the collapse of the H Block/Armagh 
campaign’907. This was largely a result of the strategy of the republican forces, 
which although willing to partake in united campaigning for the duration of the 
prison dispute, did not share this principle as part of their wider strategy in its 
aftermath. Instead the republican movement was embarking on its own form of 
combining militarism and political action, aptly summarised by Danny 
Morrison’s well-known phrase aimed at re-orientating the republican struggle to 
one with a ballot paper in one hand ‘and the Armalite in the other’.908  
Therefore, in 1982 when Thatcher’s government announced an Assembly 
election, Sinn Féin would stand, taking five seats and ten percent of the vote, 
returning activists who represented the new shift in republican thinking including 
Adams, Morrison and Martin McGuinness. The PD— seemingly confused about 
what approach to take— had initially called for a boycott of the Assembly 
election and then changed its tune when the Provisionals announced 
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candidates.909 PD councillors Fergus O’Hare and John McAnulty stood, but were 
only able to muster 442 votes between them.910 The small electoral gains that the 
PD previously made were dwarfed in a way that was symbolic of the 
organisation’s fate. In 1983, after the resignation of IRSP Belfast City 
Councillor, Gerry Kelly, Sinn Féin activist Alex Maskey was elected and became 
the party’s first member to take his seat in the council chamber. The motion to 
trigger the by-election was moved by PD councillor Fergus O’Hare, setting in 
train the process that would begin the rise of Sinn Féin in local councils in the 
North.911 By the 1985 council election the PD totalled a measly 131 votes, or 0.1 
percent of the vote.912 The extent to which the marginal space that the PD had 
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910 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly election results, available online, 
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7.7. Conclusion 
Despite the pioneering role that the PD had played in the prisoners’ movement 
the organisation came out of the Smash H Block/Armagh campaign with little 
ground gained. It did not recruit significantly, and in the new situation it tended 
to swim with the tide toward political republicanism. Unsurprising then, that a 
debate would surface surrounding the PD’s relationship to the politics of Sinn 
Féin. There existed an obvious tendency for those in the ranks of the PD to be 
influenced by the republican movement, with activists often joining the 
Provisionals and other republican organisations on an individual basis. But by 
the early 1980s the political ground had shifted to the extent that it posed a crisis 
of identity for the PD.  
One internal PD document from 1984 proposed a new orientation to the 
republican movement, noting, ‘Sinn Féin has grown significantly. It is more 
attractive to left-wing militants. This includes PD ranks and periphery. We must 
project a new strategic orientation’. The document went on to argue that ‘anti-
imperialist politics today are dominated by Sinn Féin’s turn to the left’, and 
pointed out that Sinn Féin now embraced a broader acceptance of the need for 
united action, greater involvement with the trade unions and more attention to 
social and economic issues— including issues of women’s rights—, and a more 
constructive approach to elections.913 The new orientation favoured an anti-
imperialist united front that could unite the PD with republicanism.    
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 Such a process of unity was not to emerge and the document itself 
arguably illustrated the continued illusions that the PD held in the republican 
movement. Namely, that with pressure from the radical left it would embrace a 
socialist agenda. Nevertheless, on this basis a significant section of the PD 
membership voted to join Provisional Sinn Féin. Of the two PD councillors 
elected in 1981 Fergus O’Hare left the organisation, while John McAnulty 
continued activity with the small rump of the PD that still existed for some years. 
Vincent Doherty was also one of those who would join Sinn Féin, although he 
did so some years later. Doherty’s own recollections about his political transition 
testify to the sheer weight of the experience of the Smash H-Block period, 
offering an interesting anecdote of how those on the anti-imperialist left in the 
north viewed the situation in the 1980s.  
The first thing was the incredible emotion of the period. As it 
happens I was born two weeks before Bobby Sands so the 
chronology would be pretty exact. Bombay Street and the pogram of 
69 at 15. Falls Road curfew 1970 at 16. Internment, widespread 
torture in 71, at 17. Bloody Sunday in 72, still 17. The Hunger 
Strikers were the single biggest political events in my life up to that 
point. The massive upsurge in the activities of the Loyalist death 
squads and the widespread British Army and RUC repression caused 
a feeling of suffocation and instinctual reaction to fight back, 
physically as well as politically. The other thing I wanted to say was 
that certainly in my case, we weren't exactly received with open arms 
into SF. That was to change later but initially they were quite 
suspicious, wondering if people especially would organise a 
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tendency in the party, which off course never happened and which in 
time allowed for people to be brought into line one by one.914 
Doherty’s recollection illustrate the extent to which such a tactic was not likely 
to bear fruit. Notwithstanding the perceived ‘shift to the left’ within Sinn Féin, 
the movement was not particularly open to democratic debate and development. 
Indeed, the party retained the same military ethos as the Provisional movement, 
and a small and tight knit leadership would enact significant control over the 
organisation throughout the next number of decades. The great irony was that the 
political changes taking place across the republican movement in the period 
following the late 1980s did not necessarily result in resurgent left radicalism. In 
fact the movement embarked on a long road of embracing constitutional 
establishment politics in the North. After years of political struggle the PD had 
failed to develop as a significant force in Irish politics, and instead sacrificed 
their socialism to the politics and indeed the organisations of the republican 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1. Assessing years of struggle 
‘We find after years of struggle that we do not take a trip; a trip takes 
us.’- John Steinbeck. 
This thesis set out to chart the history of the PD, its role during the most intense 
period of the troubles, and its contribution to the socialist tradition in Ireland. It 
is clear that the organisation experienced an eventful but varied history. At the 
outset this thesis posed some general questions; what follows is an attempt to 
address these questions, summarise the findings that can be concluded from this 
study, and offer an appraisal of this topic. The central task that this research set 
was to ascertain how a relatively small organisation exercised a wide influence 
on events. It is the contention of this thesis that the PD at times played a crucial 
role in recent history because of its emphasis on mass protest and mass action, as 
opposed to other political strategies, ranging from armed actions to 
parliamentarianism. The PD’s role in the civil rights movement illustrates that 
the organisation was a decisive driving force to the social movement that 
mounted a challenge to Unionist majority rule in the late 1960s. Moreover, this 
thesis has contested that the PD’s contribution was not confined to the most 
known instances of protest action in 1968-69, but continued up until the very end 
of civil rights mobilisation, when, for example, PD members helped lead 
opposition to internment and pressed for a march in Derry in January 1972, 
which became Bloody Sunday.   
An appreciation of both the continuity and change that encompassed the 
1960s is necessary in defining the significance of the new left’s role in Ireland. It 
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is tempting to see the emergence of the PD as a something entirely peculiar to 
1968, a moment of radicalism that would be forced to accommodate to the 
sectarian divisions that are enshrined into the social and political makeup of 
Northern Irish politics. Such an analysis has been warned against by some of 
those who engaged in the pursuit of socialism from 1968 onward. Looking back 
on 1968 with the benefit of two decades hindsight, Chris Harman challenged 
what he described as the conventional ‘media account’ of the period, which 
presented the radicalism of 1968 as an historical anomaly, one of militant student 
protestors who would inevitably be absorbed into the reality of life under 
capitalism. Harman argued that the origins of the revolts of the 1960s had deep 
roots and their impact would continue to define the period that followed; ‘1968 
was the product of contradictions which had been developing in the years that 
came before and which continued to explode in the decade afterward.’915 Perhaps 
nowhere illustrated this point more clearly than Northern Ireland.   
There are times when a relatively small political movement can 
encapsulate a shift of profound importance, and this was the case with the PD. 
The students who marched for civil rights in October 1968 were among the most 
visible products of the changing social, economic and cultural tides that swept 
the post-WWII period. Politically, the PD reflected the process of liberalisation 
of the 1960s. The Unionist and nationalist traditions of yesteryear were seen as 
dead-weights that belonged to previous generations, they were viewed as 
irrelevant and indeed at times counterpoised to the struggle for equality and 
social justice. Therefore, while a radical tradition existed in Ireland, which 
included generational struggles against colonialism, these did not feature in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
915 Harman, ‘Prologue’, The Fire Last Time.  
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PD’s early outlook. Validity was taken not from any well-honed analysis of Irish 
society, but from a gut reaction to the repressive and discriminatory practices of 
the Unionist government, and from the powerful impact of the movements that 
were emerging across the globe. The PD best expressed the internationalism of 
the civil rights movement and mirrored the protest movements emerging across 
the world at this time. This is most evident throughout 1968 and 1969, when they 
replicated forms of action that were being utilised by their global generational 
counterparts. Although the PD began as a broad, liberal and ill-defined protest 
movement, this thesis has shown that it was from the beginning driven forward 
by a small current of radical socialists who viewed the civil rights movement as 
an opportunity to advance class politics across the sectarian divide. The radical 
left are to be credited with launching civil rights protests in Belfast in the wake 
of the police violence of 5 October. The same activists would go on to shape the 
politics and activity of the civil rights movement into 1969.  
The ‘new left’ currents of the 1960s shared a commonality of social roots 
and often reflected similar goals, but they were all tempered by specific national 
and political contexts. When a campaign against Unionist domination in 
Northern Ireland was launched a crisis of hegemony and authority engulfed the 
state. By 1969, the level of repression that met the civil rights movement 
confounded the PD. The initial strength of the PD was its fluidity and its ability 
to move fast, putting civil disobedience and ‘people power’ at the centre of the 
civil rights campaign. However, its strengths also contained its weakness, as the 
lack of organisation and strategy left the PD unable to coherently grow. As the 
struggle for civil rights precipitated a struggle against the state for a large section 
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of the minority community, the PD was unable to relate to this in any significant 
way. More traditional political forces did not have this problem.  
Understanding the way in which working class communities were divided 
during the civil rights movement demands an investigation of a number of key 
themes, including the sectarian nature of the Northern Ireland state in the 1960s, 
and the weaknesses of socialist and anti-sectarian forces as the civil rights 
movement emerged in 1968. It is worth drawing some conclusions in regard to 
the latter point. As Colin Barker points out, social movements are, in essence, 
‘mediated expressions of class struggle’.916 The PD was the most militantly 
class-conscious element of the social movement that erupted in the late 1960s in 
Ireland. It was the main force on the left that attempted to build Catholic and 
Protestant unity through common struggle, but aside from limited protests among 
the student body, it was unsuccessful in this pursuit. Always a minority within 
the broader civil rights movement, this thesis has measured the PD against the 
role of the bigger and more established currents of the Irish left, who put forward 
distinctly different strategies to the PD.   
The civil rights movement was a ‘social movement from below’; a 
movement of subaltern groups aimed a challenging a dominant and repressive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
916 ‘Only at a level more immediate level than that explored in Marx’s Capital 
can we locate definite people, speaking in particular tongues and with their own 
histories and traditions, struggling to understand and achieve control of their 
material and social conditions. It is at this more immediate level, of more 
‘concrete’ sociocultural formations, that ‘social movements’ emerge, as specific 
forms of social and political activity. Movements are mediated expressions of 
class struggle.’ Colin Barker, ‘Class Struggle and Social Movements’, Marxism 
and Social Movements, ed. Colin Barker, Laurence Cox, John Krinsky and Alf 
Gunvald Nilsen, (Boston, Brill Books 2013), p. 47.  
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societal structure.917 In contrast, the loyalist backlash represented a form of 
‘social movement from above’, emerging chiefly as a project of dominant groups 
that sought to both maintain and modify an existing structure of entrenched 
needs and capabilities.918 These countervailing forces emerged simultaneously, 
and explaining the outbreak of conflict lies in understanding both the failure of 
the social movement from below in challenging the Unionist hierarchy, and the 
strength of the social movement from above in asserting itself in order to 
maintain and modify the fractured hegemony of the Unionist state. The PD was 
briefly at the centre of these events, and its role is notable in highlighting both 
the failures of the civil rights movement and the extent of the Unionist backlash 
against reform.  
The civil rights movement emerged primarily concerning the grievances 
and advancement of one community; this posed obvious problems for those 
trying to fight for working class interest as a whole. From the outset the PD had 
maintained that the civil rights cause was a universal working class cause, not to 
be confined to one community. However, the effort to rectify the sectarian 
imbalance inside the arrangements of the Northern state gave the perception that 
any advancement for the Catholic minority meant a retreat for the Protestant 
majority. This was a perception that was fuelled by sectarian currents who 
wished to maintain one party Unionist rule, but there was also logic to this 
perception. The civil rights movement temporarily united a broad range of 
forces, including nationalists, socialists, republicans and various class currents in 
a programme aimed at reforming the state. Such reforms, enacted within the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
917 Alf Gunvald Nilsen and Laurence Cox, ‘What would a Marxist theory of 
social movement look like?’ Marxism and Social Movements, p. 73.  
918 Ibid, p. 66.  
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confines of the Northern state offered little gain to Protestant workers. The 
necessity of the social movement from below to wage a struggle against the 
totality of the system, not solely one individual component of it, was crucial both 
to advance the gains made by the civil rights movement and to win Protestant 
support.919 It was the radical left— most notably in the PD, but also sections of 
the Derry left— who identified a key problem with the civil rights movement, in 
that by 1969 it was developing as a broad pan-Catholic alliance, and therefore 
failing to appeal to Protestant workers on a class basis. The absence of any united 
class orientation meant that the civil rights movement was incapable of offering 
an alternative to the communal pressures that were mounting.  
Although the PD presented a critique of the moderates in the civil rights 
movement, they had no real strategy to overcome this problem. PD activists did 
attempt to counter the imbalance by putting the emphasis on the social and 
economic grievances of both communities. The campaigning of the PD 
throughout 1969 and afterward, encapsulated in the slogans of ‘jobs and houses 
for all’ and the rejection of ‘Orange and Green Tories’, were genuine attempts to 
shift this emphasis. However, given the disorganised nature of the PD 
movement, its size, strength and lack of social weight, not to mention the extent 
of crisis and opposition that met the civil rights movement, these efforts were 
largely in vain. Could things have gone differently for the left during the civil 
rights movement? Such a question is impossible to answer, but nonetheless 
important to ask. Those who retain a note of optimism surrounding the growth of 
socialist politics in Ireland have argued that the problem with the civil rights 
upsurge was the lack of socialist organisation, rooted in working areas and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
919 Ibid, pp. 77-80.  
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capable of advancing independent class politics, whilst also offering an 
alternative direction to the fight that erupted in the Catholic ghettos in the post-
1969 period.920 The PD had obviously recognised the need for this to some 
extent, but they were never able to put such a project into practice. It was a 
failure that helped seal the fate of the left during the civil rights movement.  
From 1968 to 1972 a powerfully repressive state apparatus met the civil 
rights movement. Those seeking reform were forced to confront the reality that 
the Northern Ireland state was not redressing the problem of sectarian 
dominance, but was in fact intensifying division and conflict. For the PD, the 
struggle to ‘overcome’ sectarianism became a struggle to overthrow the state. 
This was informed by events throughout 1968-1969, when violence emerged 
against the civil rights campaign at a time when non-violent politics were central 
to oppositional politics. Its result would lay the basis for a sustained conflict. By 
examining the PD, this thesis has argued that sectarian violence and aggression 
toward civil rights action was not something that emerged at exceptional 
moments, nor was it driven from the fringes of Unionism, but was in fact 
widespread and systemic. An understanding of this is crucial to explaining 
August 1969 and what followed. It is also central to understanding the 
development of the PD.  
The most widely commented upon instance of PD activity is the 
Burntollet march. This thesis has challenged the conventional narrative around 
Burntollet, which views the actions of the PD as intended at provoking violence, 
thereby preventing reform and contributing to the mounting of sectarian tension. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
920 See, McCann, War in an Irish Town, and Allen, 1916.  
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This narrative is often based upon a distortion of the PD’s aims and its politics, 
and its wider impact has been to downplay the extent that sectarian repression 
was driven by the Unionist state in this period. It was the inability of the state to 
deliver meaningful reform— both through its own internal mechanisms, and later 
through the ‘external’ intervention of the British government, and the way that 
the response to demands for reform generated far bigger grievances among the 
nationalist population— that primarily created the conditions for conflict to 
emerge in the North.921 The early history of the PD encompasses some of the 
most important moments of this process.  
In this early phase the PD enjoyed a notable, if temporary, level of 
support as was shown in the election in February 1969. The events that followed 
illustrated the extent to which the left was unable to influence the forces 
unleashed by civil rights action. If the PD was central to oppositional politics in 
early 1969, its minimal role in August 69 indicated how the socialist current of 
the civil rights campaign was sidelined. Finally, PD activists were clearly victims 
of sectarian violence during 1968 and 1969, but they were not passive agitators. 
After the crisis of 1969 the most politicised PD activists concluded upon the 
primacy of socialist organisation. The history of the PD post-1969 is the history 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
921 As Niall O’ Dochartaigh explains in regard to Derry in 1969: ‘One person one 
vote, for example, was granted shortly after the April riots in Derry during which 
Samuel Devenney, who later died, was severely beaten by the RUC and large 
sections of the population of the Bogside had been evacuated to Creggan in 
response to the threat of an RUC ‘invasion’ of the area. To say that the grievance 
of one-person one vote had been superseded by other grievances by then, would 
be to understate the case. The sequence in which reform was granted taught the 
cynical lesson that ‘reform’, and the British government interventions which 
prompted it, were dependant on the conflict and that the progress of reform was 
inseparable from the pace and progress of the conflict. It was not something apart 
from the conflict which could help solve it.’ O’ Dochartaigh, From Civil Rights 
to Armalites, p. 311.  
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of one of the most determined efforts to construct socialist organisation and 
develop Marxist ideas in Northern Ireland during the troubles. In terms of both 
the activity of the PD and the ideological influences of the organisation, the 
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8.2. Pursuing the Workers’ Republic 
The PD attempt to build a revolutionary socialist party from 1969 onward 
undoubtedly began with high hopes, but the organisation never reached a 
position where it could continually shape Irish politics in a significant way, and 
this was reflected in its consistently small size. The PD never grew far beyond a 
small membership, amounting to no more than perhaps 100 activists.922 
However, one should avoid citing the low membership of the organisation as the 
determining factor in labelling it as ineffectual, or as a small ‘sect’ of the radical 
left. The term sect is often used to describe small socialist groupings, implying 
an inward looking organisation concerned with its own prerogatives. The classic 
Marxist definition of political sectarianism is that of an organisation that puts its 
own interests before the interests of working class forces.923 It is evident that 
throughout the history of the PD the organisation was largely concerned with 
influencing events outside of its ranks, to the point that it perhaps even neglected 
the process of consolidating and building upon whatever gains it had made 
during different periods of political agitation. Despite the almost constant array 
of activism, PD members never managed to develop their organisation into a 
serious national force.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
922 Although membership figures for the PD are hard to find this estimation was 
gleaned from interviews with a number of PD activists. Interview with Brid 
Ruddy, Belfast, 10/12/2015, Fergus O’Hare, Belfast, 08/06/2015, Jim 
Monaghan, Dublin, 15/03/2015.  
923 As Marx put it, ‘The sect sees the justification for its existence and its point of 
honour not in what it has in common with the class movement but in the 
particular shibboleth which distinguishes it from the movement.’ Letter from 
Marx to Schweitzer, 13 October 1868, Marx and Engels Correspondence, 
(International Publishers, 1968), available online, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1868/letters/68_10_13-abs.htm, 
accessed on 13/01/2017.  
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This thesis has drawn out the strategies, perspectives and activism of the 
PD and shown how these developed against a backdrop of social crisis and 
intense political change. The PD embrace of anti-partitionism and 32-county 
socialism happened in a context of resurgent republican armed struggle, which, 
for the first time in history was concentrated in urban areas. As the mass upsurge 
of the Catholic working class during the civil rights struggle intersected with 
armed struggle against the state, the PD began a long and complicated 
relationship with Irish republicanism. The journey of the PD, from 1968 until the 
1980s, to some extent reflected the precarious historical position that the 
organisation began to occupy within the broader anti imperialist movement.  
The post-1969 period was one in which PD members tried hard to agitate 
for working class unity inside the Northern state, but their own activity was no 
substitute for a wider realignment of left-wing forces and although PD members 
embarked on a variety of campaigns, they had little success. Viewing the failures 
of the Irish left through the prism of one small current is insufficient. Instead, 
this thesis has measured the PD against the bigger battalions of the organised left 
in the North, including the NILP, the Communist Party and the trade unions. The 
established left tended to base its strategy on reform through the parliamentary 
arena and by extension through offering support to the institutions of the 
Northern state. The PD maintained quite a different strategy, which argued for 
the primacy of working class struggle from below in a challenge to the state. 
Unsurprising then that as violence and repression increased against the civil 
rights movement the horizons for such a project shrank. Catholic grievances 
against the state became increasingly articulated through republican armed 
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struggle and more militant forms of civil resistance, consequently the PD moved 
closer toward the republican position.     
Distinguishing between the different strategies across the left is 
important, however, the crucial overarching point is that class struggle or 
workers’ unity clearly did not develop during the late 1960s and early 1970s in 
any significant way. By 1969 sectarian division ran deep and although the left 
had a notable base in nationalist areas, it failed to make any real inroads among 
Protestant workers. The opportunities for the PD receded by the early 1970s, and 
the weight of communal division strongly impacted against any left-wing project. 
The ultimate lesson that the PD drew from the experience since 1968 was that 
the Northern state was incompatible with democracy and was the main motor of 
repression against those mobilising for radical change. The process has been 
documented above, and if August 1969 had alienated large parts of the 
nationalist community from the state in some of the most densely populated 
areas in Belfast and Derry, then internment should be recognised as having this 
effect across the North more generally. Building a socialist organisation at this 
time was an arduous task. Mass struggle reached its height, and combined with 
large-scale republican militarism during the civil disobedience campaign, the PD 
radicalised, contending that the fight against British imperialism was now crucial 
to deliver progress for the Irish working class. The turn signified a political 
alignment with the Provisional campaign and the post-internment period marks 
an important shift in the PD. It was during this time that the organisation dropped 
its ambition of building an independent working class force, instead falling 
behind the Provisional demand to first smash the Northern state before the social 
question could be properly addressed. This thesis has shown how the PD 
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developed an important political contribution in this regard— based on popular 
struggle from below and anti-imperialism— which gathered some traction at a 
time when the republican movement was concerned with waging a military 
campaign. This allowed the PD space to develop a political movement that 
influenced a range of areas, including popular campaigns of street protest, such 
as the NRM, but also the development of a theoretical critique of the Northern 
Ireland state.  
Internment was a watershed moment that generated widespread Catholic 
alienation against the British military and led to sustained violence. It also had a 
great deal of impact on the PD and wider civil rights movement. Figures like 
Michael Farrell had been centrally involved in challenging the Unionist 
government since 1968, but their activity had been entirely based upon mass civil 
disobedience, and was dictated by the politics of non-violence. The treatment of 
internees, including PD members, was a microcosm of what was meted out to the 
nationalist community more generally in the autumn of 1971. Amidst the 
explosive circumstances that followed internment the PD played a key role 
alongside other forces in pressing ahead with marches during the civil resistance 
campaign. This was a crucial period in the history of the troubles as it sparked a 
new wave of mass protest.  
Among historians, internment is primarily associated with the rise of 
republican armed struggle; this thesis has shown that there was a wider explosion 
of oppositional politics. The PD played a notable role in this regard, indeed, 
while republicanism grew significantly in this period it could not have enjoyed 
such wide support, nor was it likely to have had such a destabilising effect, were 
it not for various forms of civil disobedience and mass participatory action that 
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were waged throughout the Catholic community— including, the rent and rates 
strike, marches, workplace walkouts, demonstrations and frequent riots. Amidst 
all of this the PD tried to direct the civil disobedience campaign with a strategy 
that looked to coordinated mass action.  
The anti-internment campaign formed part of an almost whole scale 
community struggle. The PD hoped that this could counter and challenge the 
authority of Britain in Ireland, forming the basis of a wider process of national 
and social liberation. This reached its height with the establishment of no-go 
areas, where a significant level of communal control was exercised through civil 
disobedience committees and other forums that resembled popular assemblies. 
Although the PD supported the republican campaign, it held a different 
conception of how advances could be made, viewing the emergence of no-go 
areas as offering an alternative to the tightly controlled militarist campaign that 
was being waged by the PIRA. Affinities with other sections of the European 
revolutionary left were again relevant, with the PD contesting that these areas of 
‘Dual power’ could form alternative centres of governance in the way that 
workers’ councils had historically acted. There existed some degree of hopeful 
‘movementism’ in the politics of the PD.924 The organisation forwarded a vague 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
924 Chris Harman argued that the ‘movementism’ of the left in the 1970s and 
1980s was a retreat from an independent working class position: ‘Often, instead 
of the revolutionary left winning new people from these movements the reverse 
has happened – these movements have won members of the revolutionary left to 
their non-working class approach. Revolutionaries have begun to make 
concessions to the idea that the movements’ goals can be achieved without 
working class action. The situation has been made worse by the inevitable 
pattern of such movements… Revolutionary socialists who put their faith in such 
movements receive an initial boost, only then to suffer all the demoralisation that 
comes with the decline.’ Harman, ‘Women’s liberation and Revolutionary 
Socialism’, International Socialism Journal, 2: 23, available online, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/harman/1984/xx/women.html, accessed on 
	   411	  
strategy based upon the militancy and self-governance of the ‘anti-imperialist’ 
population, but it could not explain how this situation could be maintained and 
developed against the balance of forces. The weakness of this strategy was 
shown when the British military dismantled the no go areas.  
Motorman indicated Britain’s long-term strategy toward Ireland. Despite 
its declining interest in the North, and the level of destabilisation that engulfed 
the state, the British establishment was prepared for a strategy of containing and 
controlling the Northern conflict. The following years would see shrinking 
horizons for the PD as the phase of mass civil resistance ended and militant 
oppositional politics was articulated primarily by armed republicanism. In this 
context the PD drifted into more open and uncritical support for the Provisional 
movement. The anti-imperialist shift of the PD can be summarised as being 
rooted in a progressive view of the republican struggle in challenging 
imperialism, and ultimately the existence of the Northern state through armed 
action. It was also a reflection of how the PD had come to understand the nature 
of the Protestant backlash that had developed at a fast pace by 1972. The context 
created by rising sectarian tension and Protestant opposition to power sharing has 
been drawn upon. However, this thesis has also illustrated how the changing 
politics of the PD was a product of its version of Marxism, its approach to the 
‘Protestants of Ulster’ and their relationship to the Unionist state. Initially, the 
PD had been the most committed voice of Protestant and Catholic unity, but as 
loyalist opposition mounted working class unity was seen to be impossible 
within the parameters of the ‘Orange state’.  
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The Marxism of the PD essentially contended that the whole Protestant 
community held a stake in maintaining the arrangements of the Northern state. 
The theory of the ‘labour aristocracy’ viewed Protestant workers as wedded to 
the institutions of the state through the granting of marginal privileges. This 
theoretical outlook, then, dictated that progressive class struggle would not 
involve a significant section of the Protestant community until the structures of 
the state had been dismantled. Consequently, the PD almost solely orientated 
toward Catholic workers, regressing into a defensive position against militant 
loyalism, which was on the offensive in this period. By the time the Protestant 
backlash reached its height with the UWC strike of 1974, the PD had theorised a 
potential loyalist takeover of the North, which facilitated a more general drift 
into supporting the republican position of armed struggle. The dismissal of 
Protestant working class agency in the struggle for socialism ensured a much 
longer problem as it confined the PD to working within the ‘anti-imperialist- 
movement’, and thus neglected the long and difficult task of building a socialist 
current independent of republicanism.  
The contradictions contained in this position would take some time to 
develop, partially because of the state of the republican movement in the mid-
1970s. Indeed, the PD operated during a period when republicanism in Ireland 
lacked any real political strength and was focused almost wholly on the military 
struggle. In these circumstances the PD was able to play an important role in 
instigating social and political mobilisation within the nationalist community at 
various junctures. A focus on mass movements and mass mobilisation was 
central to the politics and strategy of the PD since 1968, and such an outlook was 
clearly influential in reinvigorating republicanism in the North at the beginning 
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of the 1980s. This thesis has shown that there was an important level of 
continuity between the civil rights movement, the civil disobedience campaign 
and the movement against prison repression.925 This continuity was best 
expressed by the PD and others on the radical left, such as Bernadette 
Devlin/McAliskey, who played a leading role in these periods of mass political 
action. Throughout these different periods of grassroots activism the PD emerged 
to the forefront of political agitation, where they would often utilise similar 
tactics from previous struggles. The central strategy espoused by the PD was one 
based upon the application of mass action and popular protest, as an alternative 
to a strategy based upon individual actions and the elitist tactics that 
characterised the republican armed struggle.   
The PD had clear successes during both the civil rights campaign and the 
civil disobedience campaigns, in both cases managing to draw out large numbers 
of people, and put respective issues of civil rights and anti-repression to the 
forefront of Northern politics in a radical way. A similar process took place 
during the campaign for prisoners’ rights in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
although it is important not to overstate the role of the PD in the latter period. By 
the late 1970s Northern Ireland had long crossed the Rubicon into a period of 
conflict. Among the anti-imperialist constituency the terms of play were strongly 
dictated by the Provisional republican movement, and the period was less open to 
other political possibilities in comparison with the civil rights era. Nevertheless, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
925 As Finn notes of these campaigns: ‘We find the same individuals and 
organisations coming to the fore… The history of the troubles cannot be reduced 
to a straightforward choice between the revolutionary militarism of the Provos 
and the parliamentary nationalism of the SDLP’. Finn, Challengers to 
Provisional Republicianism, p. 181.  
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throughout modern Irish history there has always been an interesting relationship 
between the radical republican movement and the socialist left.  
In the 1970s this relationship was most evident by the connections 
between the PD and the Provisionals. The ideas and actions of the PD would 
influence historic changes in republicanism in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
The PD were among the first groups to prioritise the prison issue alongside 
prisoners’ relatives, arguing that it was a crucial area that should be focused on in 
terms of social and political mobilisation. When conditions inside the prison 
forced wider movement in this direction the PD had a consistent line, arguing for 
a broad based campaign that reached beyond the confines of the minority pro-
republican constituency in Ireland. The campaign took some time to develop— 
not least due to the traditional strand of the Provisionals, who had to be won 
gradually to embrace such shifts— but as it did develop it was clearly influenced 
by the approach forwarded by the PD. For example, the united front strategy 
articulated by the PD meant dropping the assertion that support for prisoners 
necessitated support for armed republicanism, and the left’s initiatives toward 
electoral contests on a pro-prisoner platform contributed to seismic shifts in 
republican strategy in the early 1980s.  
Yet while the PD had a consistent line surrounding what type of 
campaigning it wished to see during the Smash H-Block movement, the 
consistency of the organisation itself was less certain. The PD was capable of 
playing an important role in politics during a time when the republican 
movement neglected the political field. However, in the post-1981 period the 
situation had remarkably changed and as a new politicised republicanism 
emerged, it quickly filled the space that the PD had previously occupied. The 
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changing politics of Sinn Féin— which reflected the contradictory position that 
the Provisionals found themselves in since the mid 1970s, as republicans 
grappled with a growing realisation that they could not defeat the British state 
using military power alone— reached a critical moment in the early 1980s after 
the hunger strikes, when a new generation of political activists emerged around 
the movement and proved capable of dwarfing the small forces to the left of the 
party. 
The irony was that while the PD viewed the changing politics of Sinn 
Féin as a welcome shift to the left, the republican movement was on a much 
longer road to embracing constitutional politics.926 Indeed, the future electoral 
trajectory of Sinn Féin was predominantly geared toward realignment with the 
forces of Irish nationalism of the SDLP, in what was fully realised with the ‘pan-
nationalist’ strategy of the republican leadership.927 The fact that in later years no 
organised left current would develop within Sinn Féin was another obvious 
illustration of the limitations surrounding an entryist strategy into a militarist 
movement. It would be some decades before an independent revolutionary left of 
any meaningful size or influence would again exist in the North of Ireland. 
Always a small organisation, when a section of the PD joined Sinn Féin in the 
mid 1980s it completed the group’s long demise. Joining Sinn Féin was not quite 
an ending fitting for the start. The changing politics of the PD— from the non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
926 As Kevin Bean writes: ‘The history of Provisionalism can be summarized as 
one of a long retreat from the highpoint of the early 1970s to the current 
pragmatic adaptation to the status quo. As the insurrectionary wave that had 
produced the Provisional’s began to recede after 1974, they were forced to 
manoeuvre for nearly twenty years to avoid obvious military and political defeat. 
However, by the 1990s Republicans were eventually compelled to yield and 
through the peace process arrive at their current position of accommodation with 
the British state in Northern Ireland.’ Bean, The new politics of Sinn Féin, p. 2.  
927 Moloney, Secret History of the IRA, p. 389-390.  
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violence of the student new left of 1968, through the civil rights and civil 
disobedience movements, and later to supporting the militant republican struggle 
against the state— is perhaps the most vivid example of the radical left’s search 
for a revolutionary socialist tradition amidst the turbulent crisis that engulfed the 
North throughout the troubles.   
Clearly, the PD’s changing position on the national question is crucial to 
understanding the fate of the organisation. The PD began life with an aversion to 
the national question, but ignoring partition, and the state that it maintained, 
proved detrimental to the left during the civil rights movement. As events rapidly 
changed, the PD often just as rapidly changed the terms of the question, thus 
changing themselves in the process. This was of course forced by circumstances 
but it also reflected the inconsistency of the PD’s Marxism. The writing off of 
the Protestant working class in the fight for socialism in the North was an 
inverted version of the PD’s initial insistence that challenging partition was not 
necessary. Its later drift toward republicanism showed how far the organisation 
had shifted toward overthrowing the state through anti-imperialism.  
The long demise of the PD was in one sense the story of the new left’s 
failure to make itself relevant to the struggle that erupted against the Northern 
state. Ultimately, the retreat into Sinn Féin by a significant portion of its 
members best signified that the PD had adopted a left republican position toward 
national liberation and reunification. Today, the political tradition established by 
the PD has been largely forgotten. Yet the PD enjoyed a small but important role 
throughout the troubles representing one of the most eventful leftwing 
experiments of its time. An appraisal the role of the PD helps us in understanding 
the development of the Irish left, and also contributes to our knowledge to what 
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happened during the most tumultuous period of recent Irish history. This thesis is 
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